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Toward a concept of pluralistic, 
inter-relational semiosis
Floyd Merr ell
Department of Foreign Languages and Literature 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA 
e-mail: fmerrell@purdue.edu
Abstract. Brief consideration o f (1) Peirce’s ‘logic o f vagueness’, (2) his 
categories, and (3) the concepts o f overdetermination and underdetermination, 
vagueness and generality, and inconsistency and incompleteness, along with 
(4) the abrogation of classical Aristotelian principles o f logic, bear out the 
complexity of all relatively rich sign systems. Given this complexity, there is 
semiotic indeterminacy, which suggests sign limitations, and at the same time 
it promises semiotic freedom, giving rise to sign proliferation the yield of 
which is pluralistic, inter-relational semiosis. This proliferation of signs owes 
its perpetual flowing change in time to the inapplicability of classical logical 
principles, namely Non-Contradiction and Excluded-Middle, with respect to 
elements o f vagueness and generality in all signs. Hempel’s ‘Inductivity Para­
dox’ and Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ bear out the limitation and 
freedom of sign making and sign taking. A concrete cultural example, the 
Spaniards’ world including the Virgin of Guadalupe and the Aztecs world 
including their Goddess, Lonantzi'n, are given a Hempel-Goodman interpreta­
tion to reveal the ambiguous, vague, and complex nature of intercultural sign 
systems, further suggesting pluralism. In fact, when taking the ‘limitative 
theorems’ of Gödel, Luring, and Chaitin into account, pluralism becomes 
undeniable, in view o f the inconsistency-incompleteness of complex systems. 
A model for embracing and coping with pluralism suggests itself in the form 
of contexlualized novelty seeking relativism. Lhis form of pluralism takes 
overdetermination, largely characteristic o f Peirce’s Firstness, and under­
determination largely characteristic of Peirce’s Lhirdness, into its embrace to 
reveal a global context capable o f elucidating local contexts the collection of 
which is considerably less than that global view. Lhe entirety of this global 
context is impossible to encompass, given our inevitable finitude and 
fallibilism. Yet, we usually manage to cope with processual pluralism, within 
the play o f semiosis.
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Vagueness anyone?
Charles S. Peirce occasionally alluded to what he labeled ‘logic of 
vagueness’ as ‘logic’ in ‘the broadest possible sense’. Obviously, such 
‘logic’ would go against the grain o f classical bivalent logic insofar as 
it was developed in Peirce’s time in part by Peirce himself, as well as 
by Boole, de Morgan, Whatley, Schröder, and others. One might 
expect that such a ‘logic o f vagueness’ would follow the lines of 
‘triadic logic’. But it must be more than that. As ‘logic’ in ‘the broa­
dest possible sense’, it should offer a foreshadowing of today’s ‘fuzzy 
logic’ and ‘paraconsistent logic’.1 Although Peirce never made good
' ‘Fuzzy logic’ has at least two chief sources over the past centuiy The first 
was initiated by Peirce during his occasional ruminations on a ‘logic of
on his promise to construct this general ‘logic’, in 1908 he did envi­
sion a ‘triadic logic’ based on ‘real possibility’, ‘actuality’, and ‘real 
necessity’, in line with his categories, Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness. I turn to Peirce’s effort along these lines as the preliminary 
stage in outlining a concept of pluralistic, inter-relational semiosis.
Peirce points out that a proposition asserting actual existents 
(Seconds) lies at the half-way house between the poles of assertion of 
possibility (Firstness) and those of necessity (Thirdness).2 While 
assertions regarding existents or ‘actuals’ follow the tenets of classical 
logic, assertions of possibility and necessity do not, not necessarily, 
that is. In Peirce’s words:
that which characterizes and defines an assertion of Possibility is its emanci­
pation from the Principle o f Contradiction, [...] while that which characterizes 
and defines an assertion of Necessity is that it [...] throws off the yoke of the 
Principle o f Excluded Third; and what characterizes and defines an assertion 
of Actuality, or simple Existence, is that it acknowledges allegiance to both 
formulae, and is thus just midway between the two rational ‘Modals’, as the 
modified forms are called by all the old logicians. (MS 678: 34-35)
What lies within the sphere of possibility (Firstness) by and large 
violates the Principle o f  Non-Contradiction, the principle that custo­
marily reigns in the ‘semiotically real’ world of Secondness and 
classical logic. Within the sphere of Firstness, contradictories can 
quite comfortably exist side by side, for, given the nature of unactua­
lized Firstness as a superposed set of possibilities, everything is there, 
timelessly. The sphere of Firstness composes an unimaginably mas­
sive, continuous collage of compatible and incompatible, consistent
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vagueness’. Peirce’s concept of vagueness later became the focus of studies by 
Brock (1979), Chiasson (2000), Engel-Tiercelin (1992), Merrell (1995, 2003), and 
Nadin (1982, 1983), among others. The second source is an outgrowth of work 
with ‘fuzzy sets’ in the 1960s and 1970s by Lofti Zadeh (1965, 1975). Regarding 
‘paraconsistent logic’, which plays havoc with the classical Principles of Non- 
Contradiction and Excluded-Middle, see early work by Newton da Costa (1974), 
and later, especially Graham Priest (1989, 1991, 1998) and Camielli, Coniglio and 
D’Ottaviano (2002).
2 According to Peirce, any conceptual body of knowledge, no matter how 
complex, can be reduced to triadicity (three ‘categories’), but triadicity cannot be 
further reduced. Although limited time and space do not permit my expounding on 
the categories in this essay, I would recommend Almeder (1980) and Hookway 
(1985).
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and inconsistent, and complementary and contradictory, nonessences. 
It is pure chance, spontaneity, infinitely diluted vagueness. Nothing is 
(yet) specified, and everything is virtually at one with everything else. 
There are as yet no distinctions, no borders, and no taxonomies. 
There is no static plenum, per se, but rather, effervescent, fluctuating, 
flickering, superposed possibilia in expectancy of their actualization 
into Secondness. Thus vagueness is thoroughly overdetermined. There 
is no knowing whether what would otherwise be considered two or 
more contradictory terms might not be considered equally ‘true’ at 
different times and places (e.g. the ‘Earth’ as center of the universe 
before Copernicus, the ‘Sun’ as center of the universe after Coper­
nicus, and, after Einstein, neither the ‘Earth’ nor the ‘Sun’ is center
о
but, so to speak, every place is its own center).
The sphere of probability or necessity (Thirdness) includes media­
tion of terms, and mediation of mediations, with no end in sight. Thus, 
any and all sets of signs remain invariably incomplete; something 
more can always be added. Hence, unlike the crisp eithers and ors of 
Secondness, within Thirdness, the Excluded-Middle Principle 
threatens to fall by the wayside. Among any given set of signs, with 
sufficient time and changes of context, the potential always exists for 
other signs and their meanings, or the same signs and other meanings, 
to emerge and gain favorable recognition. It is not a matter of the 
‘center’ of the universe either as the Earth (Ptolemy) or the Sun 
(Copernicus), but now, it is neither the one nor the other, but some­
thing else that may be in the process of emerging. In other words, the 
‘center’ for Ptolemy and the ‘center’ for Copernicus is not simply a 
matter o f either-or alternatives: with the demise of classical physics, 
the ‘center’ can now conveniently be conceived as something else 
altogether (i.e. something entered the gap between the erstwhile 
either/or categories to render them neither-nor). Consequently, given 
sufficient time, any and all conceptual schemes are destined to 
incompleteness, since no matter how replete the previously considered 
gap between the either and the or is filled, there will always be room
It will become evident that in this context I do not use overdetermination in 
the Freudian sense. It is not a compulsory drive to force all possible signs toward 
some predetermined end, but rather, an undetermined number o f possible paths 
are always available to the range of possible signs; hence overdetermination offers 
an indefinite multiplicity o f consequences for an indefinite set o f sign possibi­
lities.
for something else. Due to this persistence of incompleteness, under­
determination necessarily prevails.
Overdetermination, in contrast to underdetermination, includes the 
domain within which a sign is not yet definitely or authoritatively 
decided, settled, or fixed —  though according to the circumstances it 
presumably can be —  and as such it is not bound by definite limits or 
restrictions.
Overdetermination is basically related to Firstness, as well as to 
the concepts of vagueness and inconsistency. However, overdeter­
mination, in the purest sense, is actually tantamount to what we might 
label ‘pre-Firstness’, before there is or can be consciousness o f  a sign 
(Baer 1988). Consciousness o f  a sign, during the very moment it is 
emerging, remains vague, to be sure. As consciousness o f  the sign 
becomes more pronounced, and vagueness gives way to increasing 
precision, a small number of the indeterminate range of possible speci­
fications of the sign can become actualized as Seconds to take their 
place in what is perceived and conceived to be the ‘semiotically real’ 
world usually interpreted in terms of either/or categories. But what­
ever specification might have been actualized, others remain as possi­
bilities, some of them contradictory with respect to that which was 
actualized. In other words, regarding the Secondness and Thirdness of 
signs o f  which there is consciousness, and regarding which specifi­
cation of meaning can be made more precise, underdetermination 
(qualified by generality and incompleteness) stands a chance of 
making its presence known here and there.
In another way of putting it, within the sphere of overdeter­
mination, mutually incompatible possibilities of meaning can cohabit 
without undue conflict (and as a result, the Principle o f  Non-Contra- 
diction loses some of its sting); within the sphere of underdeter­
mination, actualized meanings within one timespace context can be­
come something slightly to radically different within another 
timespace context (hence the Excluded-Middle Principle does not 
strictly apply).
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Playing one side against the other
The sphere of vagueness (of possibilia, Firstness) is timeless, while 
that of generality (actuals developing toward the fullness of Third­
ness) is time-bound. By the very nature of this interrelationship, signs 
of generality are destined to suffer a fate complementary with that of 
signs o f vagueness.
In this spirit, Peirce wrote that “[notwithstanding their contrariety, 
generality and vagueness are, from a formal point of view, seen to be 
on a par” (CP: 5.447). Vague signs cannot be construed as vague 
unless endowed with at least a tinge of generality, and general signs, 
given their inevitable degree of incompleteness, are invariably 
somewhat vague. Peirce readily conceded that no sign can be equally 
vague and general from the same perspective and from within the 
same timespace context, since insofar as the determination of a sign is 
extended to the interpreter —  i.e. the case of generality — it is by and 
large denied to the utterer, and insofar as it is extended to the utterer —
i.e. the case of vagueness — it lies largely beyond the grasp of the 
interpreter (CP: 1.463-69, 5.447-57). By no means, however, do I wish 
to imply that Firstness has a monopoly on vagueness, but rather, 
vagueness to a greater or lesser degree pervades any and all signs.
It bears mentioning that the interrelationships herein implied 
between vagueness and generality —  and overdetermination and 
underdetermination —  are not customarily forthcoming in philo­
sophical discourse. To cite certain notable exceptions, Bertrand Rus­
sell (1923) relates the law of excluded-middles exclusively to vague­
ness. Willard V. O. Quine (1953, 1960) focuses almost obsessively on 
underdetermination with respect to scientific theories, and by exten­
sion, natural language. More recently, Donald Davidson (1984) 
throws vagueness into the same bag with generality and incomplete­
ness without showing how they are agonistically set apart and at the 
same time intricately intertwined.
That much said, the inevitable vagueness and generality of all 
signs, however small, suggests that every sign is at least partially 
determined, and its partial determination is contingent upon its 
varying degree of context-dependent vagueness and generality.
A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone 
external signs), that is in any respect objectively indeterminate (i.e. whose 
object is undetermined by the sign itself) is objectively general in so far as it
extends to the interpreter the privilege of carrying its determination further. 
Example: ‘Man is mortal’. To the question, What man? the reply is that the 
proposition explicitly leaves it to you to apply its assertion to what man or 
men you will. A sign that is objectively indeterminate in any respect is 
objectively vague in so far as it reserves further determination to be made in 
some other conceivable signs, or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its 
deputy in this office. Example: ‘A man whom I could mention seems to be a 
little conceited’. The suggestion here is that the man in view is the person 
addressed, but the utterer does not authorize such an interpretation or any 
other application of what she says. She can still say if she likes, that she does 
not mean the person addressed. Every utterance naturally leaves the right of 
further exposition in the utterer, and therefore, in so far as a sign is 
indeterminate, it is vague, unless it is expressly or by a well understood 
convention rendered general. (CP: 5.447; also 1.434)
Thus, “a sign can only escape from being either vague or general by 
not being indeterminate”. Yet no sign “can be absolutely and 
completely indeterminate” (vague) (CP: 5.506). For a sign, “however 
determinate, may be made more determinate still, but not [...] 
absolutely determinate” (general) (CP: 3.93). This is to say that if a 
sign were totally determinate, it would always be as it is, its attributes 
remaining intact and changeless. And if a sign were totally indeter­
minate, it could not have become an actual sign (of Secondness) fo r  
some interpreter in some sense or other.
In everyday situations, when the plethora of potentially variant 
timespace contexts comes into the picture, the possibility of any abso­
lutely determinate sign dissolves. There was President Bill Clinton as 
now neoliberal, now for social programs, now wooing the conserva­
tives, now catering to the business community, now also of the 
working class and capable of eating hamburgers and French fries with 
the best of them, now favorable to the educators, now sympathetic 
with women and minority groups and gays, now friendly with the 
women folks but doing nothing improper, now intimate with members 
of the opposite sex but still morally upstanding, and these days, Bill 
Clinton is ex-president and knowledgeable observer of the global 
scene and campaigner for his wife’s presidential nomination. Bill 
Clinton, like all signs, can be many things to many people. Like all 
signs, he simply cannot stand still. Were a changeless sign actually to 
exist, it would be autonomous, individual, and indivisible. However, 
such absolutes “can not only not be realized in sense or thought, but 
cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any time,
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however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time it 
will undergo some change in its relations (CP. 3.39 n 1).
So, every sign must relate to some not-quite-absolutely-general 
‘semiotic object’.4 The ‘object’ cannot be the absolutely ‘real object’ 
as it is, for all ‘objects’ are related to all other ‘objects’ of a given field 
of signs. To be sure, all signs relate to some singular ‘object’, at least 
potentially understood by all semiotic agents. But since the ‘really 
real’ in all its plenitude lies perpetually beyond our grasp, there must 
exist some lesser sphere containing signs and their ‘semiotic objects’. 
That sphere is partly shared by the semiotic agents involved in 
dialogic exchange, and those signs and semiotic ‘objects’ are to a 
greater or lesser degree general, though never absolutely so, and 
hence they are to a greater or lesser degree vague. Vagueness and 
generality are in this sense complementary forms of semiotic 
indeterminacy. A sentence can be determinately judged either ‘true’ or 
‘false’ in a given ‘here-now’, though in the ‘there-then’ its value 
might have suffered a change —  in this manner Peirce’s conception of 
‘logic’ in the ‘broadest possible sense’ embraces temporality. And a 
sentence that has been determined either ‘true’ or ‘false’ in one respect 
may be neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’ in another. A sound can be neither 
blue nor red in the literal sense, though it may conceivably be either 
the one or the other in the synaesthetic sense. Consequently, the 
predicates ‘shrill’ or ‘mellow’, ‘bitter’ or ‘sweet’, or ‘blue’ or ‘red’ 
attached to the sign can be both ‘true’ and ‘false’ from within the 
range o f all possible conceptions.
Vagueness, given its nature as indefinite, ambiguous, and indeter­
minate, takes the terms ‘possibility’, ‘chance’, ‘spontaneity’, and 
‘novelty’ into its embrace. Generality includes the Peircean terms 
‘potentiality’, ‘convention’, ‘necessity’, ‘conditionality’, and ‘regula­
rity’ — all o f the category of Thirdness — which imply process, 
growth, intellect, and mind (CP: 1.340). Generality thus calls for ever 
greater account of particular signs and their attributes as types. Yet, to 
expect absolute determinacy through generality is out o f the question: 
there can be no more than an approximation toward a sign’s meaning
16 Floyd Merrell
4 Peirce uses the term ‘object’, and I attach to it the term ‘semiotic’ to 
distinguish it from the ‘independently real’ object in the physical world. Actually 
elsewhere I have used a tripartite set o f terms, ‘object’, ‘act’, and/or ‘event’ all of 
which can qualify as signs, the latter two terms themselves interrelating with one 
or more ‘semiotic objects’ (Merrell 1997, 2000, 2003).
in its most general sense.5 While generality entails relations to 
semiotic ‘objects’, vagueness bears no form or fashion of relatedness 
of signs to other signs established by some semiotic agent. Pure 
vagueness (Firstness) is the superposition of all possibilities without 
any of them (yet) being actualized. However, vagueness of actual 
signs (Secondness) requires their concrete contextualization and their 
being related to other signs. Such actualized signs, according to their 
interpretation, can now take on generality (Thirdness). It is for this 
reason that further determination of a general sign is left to the 
conceptual scheme, the criteria, and the style of reason and the wishes 
and whims of its interpreter. In contrast, determination of a vague sign 
depends upon further revelation and specification of its meaning by its 
author and the context of its engenderment.
In view of the complementarity of vagueness and generality, in a 
finite community of fallible semiotic agents, there can be no 
unadulterated sign of generality without at least a tinge of vagueness. 
And there can be no purely vague sign, for once actualized in order 
that it be made intelligible; a vague sign must take on at least some 
modicum of generality according to its interpreters’ inevitable beliefs, 
habits, presuppositions, prejudices, and preconceptions. If any form or 
fashion of a ‘logic in the broadest possible sense’ there may be, it 
must include the spheres of both vagueness and generality. The upshot 
is that insofar as we, semiotic agents, are concerned, all generals are 
also possibly false at some time and place or another (i.e. the 
incompleteness of underdetermination), therefore they can be taken 
only conditionally as necessary, those conditions always remaining 
subject to their partial fulfillment, or in the event that they are false, to 
their unfulfillment.
Now for a further look at the complementary role of a sign’s author 
and its interpreters —  themselves also signs.
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5 The allusion here is to Peirce’s often maligned idea that science —  and 
knowledge in general —  is in a process asymptotically of approximating the truth 
(for a critique of Peirce’s convergence theory, see Rorty 1991; for a discussion of 
the pros and cons, Skagestad 1981; for a defense, Hausman 1993).
Our signs’ elusiveness
Taking into account the composite characteristics of possibility 
(Firstness), actuality (Secondness), and potentiality (Thirdness), what 
I have summarily alluded as a Principle o f  Indeterminacy is crucial to 
an understanding of Peirce’s notion of semiosis.
Quite obviously, Peirce was keen on the idea that we dwell in a 
vague and inconsistent, and general but perpetually incomplete, world 
of signs. The ubiquity of vagueness and inconsistency breeds a 
tendency to embrace contradiction and paradox. And the inevitability 
of incompleteness in all signs of general nature allows for the entrance 
of unexpected thirds without conceivable end. Yet, Peirce writes in so 
many ways that the collusion of possibility, actuality, and potentiality 
makes up our ‘semiotically real world’ as we perceive and conceive it, 
which, if we are fortunate, stands a chance of approximating some 
portion of the ‘real’. Any and all ‘semiotic worlds’, in this light, must 
remain radically uncertain, for, “when we busy ourselves to find the 
answer to a question, we are going upon the hope that there is an 
answer, which can be called the answer, that is, the final answer. It 
may be that there is none.” (CP: 4.61)
To be more specific, Peirce does not use the pair of Kurt Gödel 
terms, inconsistency and incompleteness, now commonplace in mathe­
matics, logic, and physics (Nagel, Newman 1958; Goldstein 2005). 
However, his vagueness-generality dyad is brought in line with 
something reminiscent of a Gödelian framework by Nicholas Rescher 
and Robert Brandom (1979: 124-26), though admittedly for a diffe­
rent purpose (see also Merrell 1995; Nadin 1982, 1983). The 
relationship between vagueness-generality and inconsistency-in- 
completeness and their relevance to indeterminacy (or undecidability) 
becomes apparent if one sufficiently contemplates Peirce’s suggestion, 
as cited above, that “[e]very utterance naturally leaves the right of 
further exposition in the utterer; and therefore, in so far as a sign is 
indeterminate, it is vague, unless it is expressly or by a well-under­
stood convention rendered general”. In other words, the indeter­
minately vague sign calls out to its maker for further clarification, 
since that which can render it less vague is more accessible to the 
possibilities that lie before her than before the sign interpreter.
If a sign o f vagueness includes contradictions, then the sign’s 
meaning for one community might be incompatible with its meaning
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for another community at the same or another time, or that same 
community at another time. And if a sign of generality is never 
determined to the extent that it cannot be determined further, then an 
unordered set of potential interpretations exists with the characteristic 
that between any given pair of alternate interpretations there can 
always be a third one. In other words, as we have noted, the Excluded- 
Middle Principle loses part of its sting. A small group of mathe­
maticians, the intuitionists, deny the Excluded-Middle Principle 
altogether. They would discard statements like “Either there is a string 
of 18 consecutive 5s somewhere in the decimal expansion of я or 
there is not”, since they can most likely enjoy no proof in our finite 
world. That is to say, ‘truth’ is intimately linked to provability. For 
quite different reasons, a handful of quantum theorists also reject the 
Excluded-Middle. In fact, John von Neumann pioneered an alternate 
‘logic’, ‘quantum logic’, especially tailored to the needs of quantum 
phenomena. Following the general implications of quantum theory 
and quantum logic, a sign’s becoming a genuine sign depends upon 
the interpreter’s interaction with it. Just as no ‘wave packet’ is an 
actualized ‘parti cl e-event’ until it enters into relationship with some 
aspect of its surroundings, so also no sign is a full-blown sign until it 
has been actualized (and interpreted) by some interpreter in some 
respect or capacity (Fraassen 1974; Heelan 1974).
An additional example may serve to illustrate the idea that: (1) a 
sign is not a genuine sign until it has interacted with some semiotic 
agent, (2) within the (vague) realm of all possible signs, inconsistency 
or contradiction inevitably prevails, and (3) given the range of all 
(general) signs, past, present, and future, there is no guarantee that the 
Excluded-Middle applies, hence the meaning of any and all signs will 
be incomplete. For example, assuming I have little knowledge 
regarding a particular event reported in the newspaper, I can read each 
individual sentence with rather wide-eyed, innocent —  and 
exceedingly vague —  belief. Yet at a more general level I may also 
believe that this article, like all others, is in all probability the victim 
of at least some degree of biased reporting. I tend to believe each 
individual sentence as it stands, but at the same time I am willing to 
concede to the possibility that my belief in a given sentence can 
embrace contradiction, since I also believe that, lurking somewhere in 
the report, there is undoubtedly some distortion of the ‘truth’. So I 
take the article as a whole with a grain of disbelief, though I have not
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yet encountered any sign of deceit: it remains as a sign of possibility. 
Even though I might not have been able to catch the reporter at her 
devious game, I may still retain my faith that a closer reading will in 
all likelihood reveal some sort of inconsistency (i.e. that the sign of 
possibility will be actualized). In other words, I believe the article is 
neither wholly ‘true’ nor wholly ‘false’, but somewhere in between 
(we once again realize that banishing any and all contradictions and 
paradoxes is an interminable and hence futile enterprise). Extra­
polating from Peirce, it follows that, as has been summarily intimated 
above: (1) an assertion of possibility (Firstness), having found new­
born freedom from the Principle of Noncontradiction, rests chiefly 
within the domain of vagueness; (2) an assertion of necessity (Third­
ness), liberated from the fetters of the Excluded-Middle Principle, 
pertains primarily to generality; and (3) an assertion of actuality 
(Secondness) by and large, and for practical purposes, remains by and 
large obedient to the demands of classical logic.
This collusion of vagueness and generality constitutes a funda­
mental principle of what Peirce envisioned for his ‘logic in the 
broadest possible sense’. According to the tenets of classical logic, 
once the identity of a proposition has been determined, it is either 
‘true’ or ‘false’. But for Peirce’s more general ‘logic’, as long as a 
proposition remains indeterminate —  which must always be the case 
to a greater or lesser degree —  it is not necessarily ‘true’ that it is 
either ‘true’ or ‘false’. In fact, it may also be neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’, 
for some newly born ‘truth’ may exist somewhere between the 
erstwhile horns of the presumed extremes of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’. And 
until the proposition is an absolutely determinate actuality — which 
will never be the case in a finite setting of fallible semiotic agents — it 
may be ‘true’, given its vast range o f all possible determinations at 
diverse timespace contexts, that it is both ‘true’ and ‘false’. Peirce’s 
‘logic’, it tentatively appears, reflects a tension and potential 
mediation between vagueness and generality, the individual and the 
universal, and discontinuity and continuity. This accounts for the 
elusiveness of his hopeful ‘logic’, and his obvious difficulty in 
bringing it to fruition.6
Peirce’s ‘logic’ also endows the terms in question with a flavor somewhat 
reminiscent o f Niels Bohr’s complementarity regarding the wave/particle duality 
of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty, which, he argued repeatedly, is more a
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Filling in a few more gaps
The underdeterminationist assumption has it that, intuitively, we believe 
something but not everything is ‘real’. Since we cannot by empirical 
means discover what is ‘real’ without a shadow of a doubt, the matter is 
left to our judgment, according to our persuasions and propensities and 
wishes and whims. Underdetermination implies that what is taken as 
‘real’ could always have been construed otherwise, and what is ‘unreal’ 
may yet stand some outside chance of becoming ‘real’ at another time 
and another place. Underdetermination regarding scientific theories also 
stipulates that competing and equally legitimate theories — equally 
legitimate from within their particular conceptual schemes, that is — 
can be generated on the basis of the same set of observations.7
Quine (1969) argues that a theoretical sentence in physics can have 
the same underdetermined relation to experiments and observation 
sentences that a sentence of natural language has to the observed 
objects, acts, and events that it is about (Vuillemin 1986). He writes 
that since experience is never an infallible adjudicator for rejecting or 
embracing individual theoretical sentences, theoretical physics cannot 
be other than an interconnected web of sentences, procedures, and 
formalisms in contact with the world only at its edges, if at all. Any 
impact observation sentences may have on the web becomes 
distributed throughout the web such that no part of it is immune to 
change, and no part stands alone in bearing the brunt of that impact. 
Additions, deletions, and adjustments of diverse sorts can often be 
made in the whole to accommodate the experience, but there is no 
infallible or unique method for making these adjustments. Four 
naturally occurring elements or many of them, phlogiston or oxygen, 
Euclidean geometry or Reimannian or Lobachevskyan geometry,
methodological and epistemological than an ontological necessity, and of Gödel’s 
incompleteness-inconsistency (Merrell 2000).
7 In this vein, at the turn of the century, Pierre Duhem (1954) and Henri 
Poincare (1958), and more recently, Nancy Cartwright (1983) and Hilary Putnam 
(1983), argue that there will always be equally satisfactory alternatives to a given 
theory or general theoretical framework. Consequently, no single story can 
account for all the furniture of the world in one fell-swoop. This is, in essence, the 
Duhem-Quine scenario —  in which Peirce is a principle actor, though his role in 
this respect is often overlooked — predicated on the radical underdetermination of 
theories (i.e. they are empirically equivalent but logically incompatible) (see also 
Gähde and Stegmüller 1986, Roth 1987, Sacks 1989).
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Darwinian or Lamarckian evolution, all during certain periods, have 
been aided and abetted by proper ‘empirical’ or at least ‘intuitive 
evidence’ from one perspective or another. According to the dictates 
of a community’s desires, what now appear to us as the most bizarre 
of theories could be, and at times have been, granted ‘truth value’. 
And when fads, fashions, and tastes have suffered from the intro­
duction of alternatives, theories have either followed suit, or they have 
served as stimuli for the most likely candidates from among those 
alternatives.
Given the nature of underdetermination, it is often possible to 
embrace logically incompatible but empirically equivalent theories — 
albeit at different times and in different places. As a consequence, 
competing and mutually exclusive theories may always be available to 
account for the observational data at hand. Arguments for determining 
absolute ‘Truth’ are thus rejected: we can at best only know what we 
(think we) know, for we can’t know whether what we know is 
infallibly ‘true’. That is, by Peircean refutation or Popperian (1963) 
falsification, we can’t know that what we know is not ‘false’. So the 
dominoes are set up only to be knocked down. Yet the hope persists 
that to all questions an answer can eventually be found; otherwise 
there would hardly be any motivation for continuing to play the game 
of inquiry. In other words, thought can potentially cure all ills, though 
when put into signs for communication with other semiotic agents, it 
often threatens to become undecidable.
It would appear that our ideals are perpetually out of line with our 
real capacities. Such is the general nature of Peirce’s doctrine of 
fallibilism. Thus we see with greater force that overdetermination and 
underdetermination apply to the very idea of fictionality, and 
especially to the inexorable fuzziness between fictions and the ‘semio- 
tically real’. The exact quantity of gold in Pike’s peak, the cause of 
Hamlet’s dementia, Napoleon’s reason for his decision at the Battle of 
Waterloo, Don Quixote’s height, the use o f V-l in quantum theoretical 
equations, the absolutely precise nature o f the sun with respect to all 
other entities in the firmament, are all underdetermined in that they are 
never so complete as to be immune to further determination. Con­
sequently, a community’s fabric of signs is read into experience, and 
in the process it becomes the world that is, the ‘semiotically real’. 
‘Semiotically real’ signs from diverse time periods and from a variety 
of belief that are pregnant with meaning (‘mass’, ‘energy’, ‘Eucha­
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rist’, ‘Big Foot’, ‘Zeus’, ‘UFOs’, ‘mana’, ‘witches’, ‘AIDS’, ‘choles­
terol’, and the ‘Cross’ and ‘Swastika’) have become excessively im­
pregnated because of the role they play and the place they occupy in 
their respective interwoven semiosic fabric. They do not describe 
experience; they are ‘intersubjective idealizations’, whether dressed in 
relatively concise and complete abstract language or in everyday lan­
guage and enshrouded in vagueness, thus much of their meaning 
remains implicit.
After all has been said and done, the overdetermination (vague­
ness) —  underdetermination (incompleteness) pair of terms is itself 
perhaps most economically viewed as two complementary approaches 
toward knowing what is (see especially CP: 2.322-23). The two 
approaches pattern the Heraclitus-Parmenides and Aristotle-Plato 
antagonisms. In their purest form, one is messy and unkempt; the other 
is orderly. One is rich in the variety of its concrete particulars; the other 
is formal and parsimonious. The one is a maze of tropical flora; the 
other is a barren desert converted into a grid of meticulously cultivated 
plots. But there must be more: the Included-Middle emerging from 
within the pairs of terms, evincing inconsistencies here and there, 
keeping the complementarities together, in spite of whatever tensions 
might arise. So, we cope with our unruly signs, as best we can, and get 
on with life’s processes. This is to suggest that semiosis, which is 
continuous process rather than finished, relatively fixed product, cannot 
but be construed as the possibility for pluralist semiotics.
Let us now take up Peirce’s categories insofar as they bear on his 
concept of the sign.
The categories, and the sign: toward the pluralist concept
To recap, Firstness is possibility, what might become; Secondness is 
actuality, what has become or presumably is; and Thirdness is the 
likelihood or probability that what has become is in the process of 
becoming something other than what it was becoming due to the 
prevailing conditions. Metaphorically speaking, Firstness is position, 
stasis; Secondness is velocity, change; Thirdness is acceleration, 
change of change.
Figure 1 gives us an impression of Thirdness as mediating First­
ness and Secondness and bringing them interdependently, inter­
relatedly and interactively together in the same way that it comes into 
interdependent, interrelated interaction with each of them (the
italicized terms —  hereafter specified as i-i-i----- are not Peircean in
origin; nevertheless I believe the way I use them in this essay is in the 
spirit of Peirce [see Merrell 2000, 2003, 2004]). I use a ‘tripodic’ 
model of the ‘processual’ interrelationship between the categories: 
‘processual’ because the lines of interconnection are always flowing 
and becoming something other than what they were becoming.
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This semiosic flow also qualifies Peirce’s sign components, which are 
most adequately presented in tripodic form (see Fig. 2). Since the 
interpretant brings the representamen and semiotic object into i-i-i- in 
the same way it comes into i-i-i- with them, the tripod is in a manner 
of speaking ‘democratic’. All three legs are necessary. Remove any 
one of them and the tripod falls. The representamen and semiotic 
object without an interpretant are disconnected; the interpretant 
without a representamen and a semiotic object is of no consequence.
Firstness
Thirdness
Figure 1. Thirdness as mediating First­
ness and Secondness and bringing them 
interdependently, interrelatedly and 
interactively together, coming thus into 
interdependent, interrelated interaction 
with each of them
Representamen
Semiotic
Object
Interpretant Figure 2. Peirce’s sign components in 
tripodic form.
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A disconnected representamen, as Firstness, is no more than an 
‘autonomous atom’. Unless it interrelates with something other than 
what it is —  some ‘semiotic object’ — it cannot become a genuine 
sign. A ‘semiotic object’, or Secondness, without the Firstness of the 
sign, also simply is what it is, and no more. In other words, a semiotic 
‘object’ of Secondness cannot become a genuine sign without a 
representamen with which it can interrelate. Thirdness plays the role 
of bringing the representamen and semiotic object, Firstness and 
Secondness, into i-i-i-, and at the same time it brings itself into i-i-i- 
with them. But neither can the interpretant, in and of itself, become a 
genuine sign.
This triadic process can be summarized as follows:
A. Firstness as representamen implies a set of possible instantiations 
of Secondness as ‘semiotic objects’ and their possible inter- 
pretants. A First can emerge within different timespace contexts. 
This is to say that within a given timespace context, a possibility 
can emerge in coherence with other possibilities, and within 
another timespace context, a contradictory possibility can emerge, 
but both the possibility and its contradictions cannot emerge within 
the same timespace context —  this characteristic entails genuine 
complementary interrelations. Hence the classical logical Principle 
of Non-Contradiction does not hold within the overdetermined 
sphere of Firstness, or sign possibilities.
B. Secondness is a possibility that has emerged as a semiotic object in 
i-i-i- with its respective representamen as Firstness. A Second 
entails what is taken as ‘real’, and as ‘real’, ordinarily it cannot be 
anything other than what it is. It is either what it is or it is not what 
it is; but it is what it is taken to be, therefore it presumably cannot 
be anything else. Hence the classical Principles of Identity, Non- 
Contradiction, and Excluded-Middle usually apply to Secondness 
insofar as what is a Second is perceived and conceived according 
to the social conventions that are collectively accepted by the 
community of sign makers and takers.
C. Thirdness is the likelihood that a semiotic object will come into i-i- 
i- with a given representamen according to some set of conven­
tions. This is due to the mediary effective of an interpretant that 
brings about the emergence of meaning of the sign. The act of 
mediation occurs in time, which is to imply that successive time­
space contexts come to bear on the process of i-i-i- between
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, and representamen, se­
miotic object’, and interpretant. Time, with respect to Thirdness, 
accompanies change, and change introduces unpredictability re­
garding future timespace contexts. Thus, whatever possibility of 
Firstness (a representamen) might have emerged to come into i-i-i- 
with some possibility of Secondness (a ‘semiotic object’) mediated 
by some possibility of Thirdness (an interpretant), at some later 
moment the conditions might have changed such that other alter­
nate, and conceivably more viable possibilities can emerge, even 
though they may be incompatible with the possibility that preceded 
them. Consequently the classical Principle of Excluded-Middle 
does not necessarily apply within the underdetermined sphere of 
Thirdness.
How to cope with Peirce’s apparently outlandish claims about the 
Principles of Non-Contradiction and Excluded-Middle? Perhaps by 
beginning with the question ...
What, in the final analysis, happened 
to classical logical principles?
A Peircean example of a general statement or proposition might be: (1) 
‘All swans are white’. It seems quite unproblematic, and to take it as 
neither true nor false would certainly seem counter-intuitive. An 
example of vagueness can be: (2) ‘I could say something about George 
Bush’. What the speaker could say might be both one statement and 
another contrasting statement, and it might be interpreted in both one 
way and another way, depending on the interpreter.
Validation of (1) depends on the sign taker’s past experience and 
potential future experience of the whiteness or nonwhiteness of all 
swans. In this event there exists the possibility, however remote, that it 
is neither the case that all swans are white nor that no swans are white, 
but rather most swans might be white with the exception of a few 
swans, that happen to be black. Determination o f (2) depends on the 
sign maker’s further specification of what she might say. If she says 
‘Bush is a moron’, the statement could be taken as true by some sign 
takers and false by others. So it might be said that the as yet un­
actualized sign is still both true and false, given the timespace context 
of its interpretation. If it is taken as both true and false within the same
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timespace context it is nothing at all; in other words, it cannot be more 
than a possibility of either the one or the other of the two signs (for 
further on this topic, see Margolis 1991: 40-53, Lane 1999, Merrell 
2007, and Peirce CP: 5.447, 1.434, 2.598, MS' 611, 6.168).
We have, then, at one pole, general signs of chiefly Thirdness that 
are not necessarily determinable by the Principle of Excluded- 
Middles, and at the other pole, vague signs of chiefly Firstness that are 
not necessarily accountable to the Principle of Non-Contradiction. 
Where’s the security in all this? By and large in the middle, where 
signs chiefly o f  Secondness play their key role. These signs, as we 
make and take them according to our habituated ways and our social 
conventions, lend themselves to either/or alternatives, hence when on 
their best of behavior they abide by Identity, Non-Contradiction, and 
Excluded-Middles. A sign saturated with vagueness entails the pos­
sibility of an interpretant; a sign in the most general sense is a sign 
whose interpretant can be up for reform or rejection; a sign of 
either/or alternatives is a sign taken in terms of its truth/false values, 
however tenuous those values may be.
It would seem that our signs, in their composite form, are more 
complex than we would perhaps wish to admit. This assumption cries 
out for a closer look.
Hempel’s ‘Inductivity Paradox’: 
substantive or existential anxiety
Carl Hempel (1945) argues that sentences in the order of ‘All swans 
are white’ can be restated as ‘All nonwhite things are nonswans’. How 
so? Actually, the two hypotheses have the same content; they are 
different formulations of the same proposition. In order to demonstrate 
this, Hempel posits what he calls the equivalence condition between 
the two hypotheses: whatever confirms (or refutes) one of the two 
equivalent sentences, also confirms (or refutes) the other.
In other words, one hypothesis is a contrapositive of the other 
hypothesis. To state ‘That swan is white, therefore all swans must be 
white’ also confirms the statement ‘That bear is a nonswan and it is 
nonwhite, therefore all nonwhite things must be nonswans’. Of course 
‘All nonwhite things are nonswans’ is the much easier of the two 
hypotheses to test. Pink flamingos, red cardinals, gray doves, yellow
canaries, and blue jays, all confirm the contrapositive version of the 
hypothesis, as do yellow lemons, silver coins, red herrings, and green 
emeralds. So we can go through life, at each step spying either white 
swans or nonwhite nonswans, and our original hypothesis asserting 
that all swans are white will not yet be absolutely confirmed, for 
something will always remain to be observed, including species of 
insects in the Amazon basin becoming extinct daily. (And, true to 
form, Captain Cook once discovered some black swans while 
exploring Australia, thus confirming the statement ‘Most swans are 
white, but some are black, namely a strain of swans that can be found 
down under’. So now we know, at least until somebody might happen 
to run onto a nonwhite-nonblack swan, somewhere and sometime.)
Here, then, we have a prime example of a general sign further spe­
cification of which depends on us, the sign takers. In spite of Hem- 
pel’s ‘inductivity paradox’, we usually do what we do best, and get on 
with it. We send and take, and engender and translate signs, and we 
cut the world up as we go along. We compare new experiences to old 
ones, and pack signs into the pigeon-holes with which we have 
become comfortable, notwithstanding the risk we constantly run in 
view of the assumption that what is correct from one vantage may be 
absurd from another. However, during life’s processes within that 
culture, every item of experience that happens to pop up might 
possibly bring us to an awareness of the underdetermination of our 
signs, and of the incompleteness of our semiotic world. Given Hem- 
pel’s paradox regarding the inexorable incompleteness of our in­
ductively derived generalities, how can we hope to avoid pluralism?
As if Hempel weren’t enough, there’s more to come.
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Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’: 
qualifying the anxiety
Goodman’s (1965) ‘New Riddle o f Induction’ goes like this. We 
would like to believe that the statement ‘Emeralds are green’ is 
beyond doubt true. Supposing that all the emeralds we have examined 
before a given time are ‘Green’, we are quite confident that ‘Emeralds 
are green’ will always be confirmed, for according to our observa­
tions, emerald a on examination was ‘Green’, emerald b was ‘Green’, 
and so on.
But suppose we meet someone from Netherworld whose percep­
tion o f things is out of sync with ours. Among other oddities, Nether- 
worlder’s language contains the following two terms which we, after a 
few hits and misses, learned to translate into our language thus:
Grue = examined before the temporal ‘reference point’
t0 and is reported to be ‘green’ or is not examined
before t0 and reported to be ‘blue’. (t0 is apparently
an otherwise arbitrary moment of time that is not in 
the past.)
Bleen = examined before the temporal ‘reference point’
t0 and is reported to be ‘blue’ or not examined
before t0 and is reported to be ‘green’.
Before time t0 our statements assert an emerald is ‘Green’, but 
Netherworlder has a parallel statement asserting it is ‘Grue’. And as 
far as she is concerned, her observations that emerald a on examina­
tion is ‘Grue’, that emerald b is ‘Grue’, and so on, adequately confirm 
her own hypothesis. It will obviously appear to us from the standpoint 
of our language and our color taxonomy that Netherworlder’s sensory 
images change radically after t0. But actually, from her perspective, 
the glove is turned inside out: as far as she can tell, it is our taxonomy 
that is time-dependent. That is, Netherworlder’s translation of our 
color scheme would result in the following report:
Green = examined before t0 and is reported to be
‘grue’, or not and is reported to be ‘bleen’.
Blue = examined before t0 and is reported to be
‘bleen’, or is not and is reported to be ‘grue’.
From the perspective of each translator, the other’s inductive process 
is false. Apparently, there is no possible resonance with respect to 
‘Green’ and ‘Grue’. However, if the two perspectives are taken 
together as an atemporal whole, they are symmetrical; but when taken 
separately as self-sufficient wholes, they are asymmetrical with 
respect to one another (Gärdenfors 1994; Rescher 1978). In a manner 
of speaking, we and Netherworlder possess our own Jacques Derrida 
‘metaphysics of presence’ with respect to other’s conception of the
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world, though, from the other’s complementary world, this ‘meta­
physics of presence' is easily demythified (Hesse 1969).
In short. Netherworld and Ourworld are two, and they are both 
consistent enough from within the purview of Netherworlders and 
Ourwordlers, respectively; yet they appear incompatible; and yet,... if 
we can at least partly understand Netherworld, and if Netherworlder 
can at least partly understand Ourworld, then the two worlds can’t be 
entirely incommensurable. Both have been drawn from the sphere of 
all possible worlds: The World.
Hempel’s paradox tells us that surprises are inevitable somewhere 
along the road. These surprises entail differences that make a diffe­
rence, some of them earthshaking, revealing that our world is some­
thing other than we thought it was, and letting us know that virtually 
nothing is absolutely fixed. Goodman’s dilemma tells us that different 
individuals from the same culture, and most strikingly, individuals 
from different cultures, can throw a monkey wrench in our conven­
tions (presuppositions, predispositions, prejudices), such that we either 
ignore other ways of taking our world version and other world 
versions in general. The two problems suggest: (1) the inevitable 
complexity of our particular world version, here and now, when con­
sidered in view of all possible world versions, and (2) the inevitability 
of our confronting multiplicity during every step, whether we are 
talking about abstract ideas and concepts or walking along life’s 
swerving, sinuous path.
Another score for pluralism. But enough imaginary constructs; 
let’s return to real life situations within the concrete world.
Alien culture anxiety
We can’t seem to break entirely free from imagination — we’re 
always in some form or other in tune with that sphere of possible 
worlds, by way of Firstness. In this vein, the story I have in mind 
entails an imaginary construct in the most radical sense.
Bizarre though it might seem, my stoiy, including the Patron Saint 
of Mexico, the Virgin of Guadalupe, exemplifies a combination of 
Hempel’s paradox and Goodman's riddle. In 1531, ten years after the 
Aztec nation had been subdued by the Spaniards, the Virgin Mary 
purportedly appeared before Juan Diego —  an Amerindian originally
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brought up in the tradition of the Indigenous people’s own Virgin 
Goddess, Tonantzin. The Mexican Catholic Virgin eventually became 
known as ‘Guadalupe’. The Catholic fathers appropriately dis­
tinguished between ‘Guadalupe’ and the Aztec goddess, ‘Tonantzin’, 
before t0, and after t0, such distinction remained in force. As far as the 
good fathers were concerned, Guadalupe was, and would always be, 
an exclusively Catholic image.
Such clarity and distinction, however, simply doesn’t hold as far as 
human cultures go: they involve flowing, fluctuating i-i-i- phenomena 
as described above. The Amerindians’ cultural experiences serve to 
bear this out. The Amerindians’ image presented a countenance of 
conformity to the Catholic tradition that usually pleased the Spaniards, 
for sure. But underneath this countenance, the Amerindians nurtured 
vestiges of their traditional beliefs, and thus resisted the Guadalupe 
image thrust upon them by the Spaniards. And how were their 
traditional beliefs manifested? By combining their cherished ‘To­
nantzin’ with ‘Guadalupe’ —  in paradoxical Goodmanesque fas­
hion —  to create the image o f ‘Guadantzin’ (or ‘Tonalupe’, depending 
upon the emphasis), a transformed Aztec image in lieu of the Catholic 
image. That is to say, the two images, ‘Guadalupe’ and ‘Tonantzin’ 
were fused, confused, and hybridized, such that something new 
emerged from within the erstwhile Excluded-Middle.8
Now, since, pace Goodman’s ‘paradox’, what is experienced as 
‘true’ at one time may be experienced as ‘false’ at another time, given 
the perspective, we obviously need some provision in order to account 
for change and time. Time-dependent considerations of ‘truth’, of 
course, go against the grain of much modem logic. Peirce, however, 
believed logic to be a normative practice, and hence time-bound. How 
can we apply Peirce’s vagueness to the concrete life situation 
involving conquerors and conquered in Mexico?
Let us consider concrete experience of the world’s objects. At a 
particular point in time, experience of some of these objects can 
become ambiguous, or even anomalous: for instance, Ludwig Witt­
genstein’s (1953) allusion to the Rabbit/Duck’ ambiguity. Suppose
Admittedly, 1 summarize this story to the extreme, which is necessary given 
the limitations of this essay. For the entire account from a plurality of views, see 
Brading (1985, 1988, 2001), Castillo (1996), Elizondo (1997), Glantz (1995), 
Lafaye (1976), Maza (1953), Nebel (1995), Pallares (1981), Rodriguez (1994), 
Siller, Glodomiro (1989).
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someone observes a dozen times that the Wittgensteinian form is a 
‘Rabbit’. Then, in a distinct context, or perhaps not, a radical per­
ceptual switch might occur such that the drawing is suddenly reported 
as a ‘Duck’, and with this thirteenth observation its ambiguous nature 
finally becomes apparent to the observer. With respect to Wittgen­
stein’s ‘Rabbit/Duck’, suppose Netherworlder has the following set of 
signs:
Dabbit = examined before t0 (which is arbitrary) and
reported to be a ‘Rabbit’, or not so examined and 
reported to be a ‘Duck’.
Ruck = examined before t0 and reported to be a ‘Duck’,
or not so examined and reported to be a ‘Rabbit’.
Assume somebody from Ourworld is capable of seeing the drawing 
only as a ‘Rabbit’ —  in other words, he is not cognizant of the 
drawing’s ambiguity. Netherworlder, in contrast, sees the drawing as 
one thing —  which is the equivalent of Ourworlder’s ‘Rabbit’ — prior 
to a particular moment. Then, after that moment, she reports it as 
something else entirely —  the equivalent of what would be 
Ourworlder’s ‘Duck’, were she able to see it in the drawing.
Netherworlder would obviously be as far as Ourworlder is con­
cerned rather naive and whimsical, changing her mind, signs, and 
perception apparently at the drop of a hat. Naturally, of course, 
Netherworlder believes this is not the case at all. She merely perceived 
something as what was for Ourworlder something else at a given time, 
and in so doing attained what is for Ourworlder an alternate (that is, a 
nutty) level of awareness, and that’s that. The important issue is, 
however, that the so-called alternate level of awareness must be for 
Netherworlder irreversible (discounting memory loss, of course). The 
time at which phenomena are observed, then, can determine ‘truth- 
value’ and meaning with respect to those phenomena. What is con­
sidered ‘true’ at a particular time depends upon expectations derived 
from memory of previous experiences. However, when those expecta­
tions are not satisfied, discovery of a new form of ‘truth’ and 
meaning— and of ambiguity in the ‘Rabbit/Duck’ case —  is poten­
tially forthcoming (for further along these lines see Merrell 2004).
This, I would respectfully submit, is the process our Indigenous 
people irom the Valley of Mexico were caught up in. The Spaniards
continued to distinguish between Guadalupe and Tonantzin; the 
Amerindians fused them to create an image hitherto unknown, Gua- 
dantzin (or Tonalupe) after t0. The Spaniards’ world conformed to 
their bivalent categories, and the twain between must never meet; the 
Amerindians brought forth a new sign from within the Guadalupe/ 
Tonantzin pair of terms, thus violating the Excluded-Middle impera­
tive. But their image, Guadantzin (or Tonalupe) could have been for 
them, after t0, as clear and distinct an image, and as distinguishable 
from either Guadalupe or Tonantzin, as was the Spaniards’ pair of 
images, one sacred and the other heretical. The very fundamental 
nature of this semiosic process is that now there were three images, 
and potentially four different terms, rather than the original two.
Signs grow, and in so doing they breed complexity, a complexity 
bearing witness to a pluralism of worlds.9 Let us hold the Guadalupe- 
Tonantzin-Guadantzin story in abeyance, while we look at some 
further implications for cultural semiotic processes
Logical principles, and conundrums of deductivity
Problems at the core of classical thought now loom large. Eventually, 
the bivalent model of classical logic threatens to fall in a heap, for 
inconsistency and contradiction eventually raise what the well- 
groomed logician considers their ugly heads. As inconsistent, a given 
translation —  or body of knowledge as it were — shows itself to be 
overdetermined, for a host of possible alternate translations are always 
somewhere, as semiotic possibilities, ready and waiting to replace 
whatever translation happens to be in the public eye within a given 
spacetime context. In other words, from within a given horizon, local 
consistency may seem to rule. But at the global level, when any and 
all cultural horizons, possible and actual, are ushered onto the scene, 
inconsistency inevitably becomes immanent at some point or other.
9 In a comparable vein, Terry Eagleton (1996) writes that postmodernism is “a 
style o f thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, reason, identity 
and objectivity, of the idea of universal progress or emancipation or single 
frameworks, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation” (viii), and that 
against the Enlightenment ideals, postmodernism “sees the world as contingent, 
ungrounded, diverse, unstable, indeterminate, a set of disunified cultures or 
interpretations which breed a degree of skepticism about the objectivity of truth, 
history and norms, the giveness of nature and the coherence of identities” (vii).
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Absolutely clear and distinct translations, from one horizon to 
another, from one language to another, from one theory to another, or 
in science from observation sentences regarding perceived phenomena 
to theoretical statements, are generally considered to become, as we 
shall note below, difficult, and at times well-nigh impossible. It is as if 
one culture and its respective language roughly had meaningi for a 
given word, while another culture roughly had meaning2 for what 
appears to be the equivalent word. Yet the two meanings are radically 
at odds. How many cultures and languages and meanings can there be 
anyway? Many, virtually uncountable many, pluralistically many. 
How can meanings in one language be mapped onto meanings from 
another culture? They can’t, at least in a Cartesian clear and distinct 
manner. The upshot is that any and all translations are inevitably 
incomplete, and underdetermination rules, for within some timespace 
context some alternate translation will emerge into the light of day 
that will be deemed more adequate and hence it will replace the 
translation that was previously given a favorable nod. Each translation 
is a generality regarding the target text, and as a generality, 
incompleteness always inheres.
Disconcerting, all this. It reminds us once again of Gödel’s un­
expected and often unwanted incompleteness theorems. To make 
matters worse, in 1936 Alan Turing demonstrated that there is no 
mechanical procedure that can decide in advance if a computer 
program will be capable of a given task or not; if it will ‘halt’ or not. 
And yet,...
The problem complexifies even further: toward radical pluralism
In the 1950s Gregory Chaitin convinced a growing number of physi­
cists, mathematicians, and logicians that not only was David Hilbert 
just a little bit wrong —  in his contention that a finite set of axioms 
could be written capable of accounting for the whole of mathematics. 
It's actually much worse than Hilbert ever imagined. There are 
extreme cases, namely regarding the matter of randomness, where the 
idea of mathematical truth has no structure at all, where it’s comple­
tely unknowable, where it’s merely accidental, where mathematical 
truths are no more than a coin toss, where they are true by accident for 
no apparent reason.
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Chaitin himself tells us that Gödel surprised us with purely formal 
incompleteness, and with Turing incompleteness took a turn to 
concrete mechanical issues, but with his —  Chaitin’s —  work, given 
the infiniteness of any and all possibilities when considering the 
totality of all possible programs, randomness and pure chance inhere, 
and wherever we turn we smash against a brick wall because 
incompleteness hits us in the face (Chaitin 2001).
What we have in terms of this expulsion from the inductivity and 
deductivity paradises, given the work of Hempel, Goodman, Gödel, 
Turing, Chaitin —  and many others too numerous to discuss here —  is 
enough to put a scare in the most stalwart mathematicians and 
scientists. Inductivity allows for an uncountable number of world 
versions, each of which, locally speaking, can be either true or false, 
according to the eye of the beholder. But by putting a collection of 
world versions into the same mix, we inevitably end up with more 
than merely a few inconsistencies here and there. Deductivity allows 
for what appear to be clean and consistent premises, methods and stra­
tegies. But within some unforeseen timespace context, some alterna­
tive to the commonly accepted system of thought and perspectives 
will pop up and throw us into turmoil, for this new system appears 
superior to the old one. Taking all systems of thought and mind into 
account, past, present, and whatever might emerge in the future, we 
must concede that, globally speaking, the truth lies in neither the one 
nor the other system of which we have some modicum of knowledge, 
but in some other system awareness of which we do not yet enjoy.
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And yet,... and yet,... should we really fret over it?
In fact, if we conflate the above words on Peirce with the problems of 
induction and deduction, it might appear that we are going from the 
frying pan to the fire.10 But are we really? Let us construct and 
contemplate something in the order of Figure 3.
“Why complicate the issue?” comes the immediate protest. I would 
contend that the issue is indeed complex, and to reduce it to simplicity 
brings on other complications the likes of which we have haven’t yet
10 Actually, Peirce has a third term, abduction, which corresponds to Firstness, 
while abductivity pertains to Secondness and deductivity to Thirdness (see 
Queiroz, Merrell 2005).
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seen and would rather not see. Actually, Figure 3 affords us an image 
of the processual —  and hence Peircean —  nature of homogeny, 
hierogeny (■autogeny in conjunction with hegemony), and heterogeny. 
I end these terms with the suffix ‘-geny’, since, of the same root as 
gene, it elicits the image of genesis, organicity, and process, and it 
falls in line with the processual nature of semiosis. I use the prefixes, 
‘homo-’, ‘hiero-’, and ‘hetero-’, respectively, as: (1) ‘same’, ‘like’, or 
‘analogous to’, (2) ‘positioned or ranked’, with priority given to one 
term over the other one, and (3) ‘different’, ‘dissimilar’, ‘diverse’.
Dialogic
Open
Closure
Figure 3. Processual nature of 
homogeny, hierogeny and hetero­
geny.
On the right side of Figure 3 we have dialogic openness and on the 
left side closure. In the center we have the swirling, swiveling legs of 
the Peircean semiotic tripod. From the bottom left to the top we have 
possible passages, that can be either two-way or one-way, depending 
on the circumstances, and the same condition exists along the right 
side. At the upper portion of the diagram we have one-way passage 
from openness toward closedness, and at the lower portion we have a 
possible passage upward toward the left side.
So, what’s the figure all about? The emergence of somethingness 
from the sphere of pure possibilities at the lower left to somethingness 
in the center to successive differentiation at the upper left. Something 
emerges out of homogeny, as a First. This is left-side homogeny, as 
pure possibility, capable of holding possible signs and their contraries, 
complementarities, and contradictories together as unruly but compla­
cent bedfellows. Obviously, the Principle of Non-Contradiction has no 
place in this rippling, effervescent sea of apparently chaotic options 
there and waiting their chance to be selected and chosen to emerge as 
candidates for signhood. And in the process something is emerging, 
into hierogeny. Then, we label it as either one thing or something else, 
as a Second. As a Second, it has been duly classified as something or 
other rather than something else, which it might have been, had the 
conditions been otherwise, hence it becomes a Third. (For example, a 
Ptolemaic scientist would label the ‘Earth’ the center of the universe, 
while for his Copemican counterpart that label would belong to the 
‘Sun’, and today’s scientist would attach the label to something else 
entirely.) Within Thirdness, we become aware of the subtle variations 
by which this Second is differentiated from all other Seconds in its 
category and from all Seconds within other categories. (The Ptolemaic 
true-believer knew the ‘Earth’ is the center of the universe because of 
such-and-such a set of premises and their conclusions; the Copemican 
would have a different and contradictory set of premises and 
conclusion; for the contemporary scientist the nature of the universe is 
something altogether different.) Since Thirdness has entered into the 
light of day, everything is out in the open, and subject to subtle and 
occasionally to radical changes, given their nature as Thirds.
And all of us, within our culturally embedded contexts, usually 
manage to get along. In fact, we might get along so well that we 
tacitly assume the way we perceive and conceive and label our world 
is clearly and distinctly the way the world is. This is to say that we are 
now in the process of closing the doors to novelty, to creativity, at the 
right-side of Figure 3. Consequently, heterogeny becomes fixed; pro­
grammatic hierogeny becomes hegemony — and may the ‘best man’ 
win; that is, homogeny is on the road toward becoming autogeny — 
our thought and perceptual and conceptual patterns and actions are 
becoming virtually fixed. Now, only by a radical change of heart and 
mind —  a ‘paradigm switch’ if you will —  some iconoclastic and 
enterprising soul might be able to take a strong swim against the
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current, enter into the light of day once again, and experience dialogic 
openness by taking that wild ride from right-side homogeny to left­
side hierogeny.
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Now consider Figure 4, since it can illustrate what I have in mind 
better than 1 can say it. Homogeny left, overdetermined and of utter 
vagueness, is what ‘might become’, within some timespace context. 
Hierogeny left consists of what is what it is, or at least so it appears to 
us. It makes up our world, the world we have come to know and with 
which we are familiar. It is the world we’ve made; we’ve made it as 
much as we’ve found it; it is invented and fashioned rather than 
merely discovered and explored as if it were something ‘out there’ for 
our taking.
Fret over it or not, this is our condition
Heterogeny 
Positive generality
Negative generality
Overdetermination 
'Might become'
homogeny 
Utter vagueness
anything other than
Positive vagueness 
Negative generality 
'Overdetermination' 
'Has to be, period,
and cannot be
homogeny
(autogeny)
what it is'
Figure 4. Positive and negative 
generality, positive and negative 
vagueness, underdetermination, 
overdetermination and ‘over- 
determination’ in the processual 
model of homogeny, hierogeny 
and heterogeny.
Heterogeny left is underdetermined positive generality, where one 
takes what one thinks is as it is, with acknowledgment that at any 
moment it could be in the process of becoming something other than 
what it was becoming. It is of positive generality insofar as there is 
such awareness that the world could be other than what within our 
particular timespace conjunction we take it to be. It is also of negative 
vagueness, since under ordinary circumstances we tend to embrace 
our set of conceptual categories or generalities and conveniently 
ignore the inevitable tinge of vagueness and ambiguity, or fuzziness, 
in all our conceptual schemes. And we improvise, at least until our 
fallibilism catches up with us and we begin looking for some alterna­
tive to what has become a glitch in our knowing. Heterogeny, 
hierogeny, and homogeny right depict progressive fixity of the left­
side processes, as described above. Since our overriding tendency, 
within our community, is to assume we are more right than wrong, 
and if we encounter few instances that would lead us to believe 
otherwise, our knowing and our travels through the pathways of our 
everyday living become increasingly entrenched, sedimented, 
stabilized. Thus we begin gravitating toward hegemony-right. There, 
negative generality resides alongside positive vagueness. Negative 
generality is that which is merely potential, and positive vagueness is 
that which would otherwise be vague. But since negative generality is 
the merely potential that due to sedimented, entrenched, habituated 
action and reaction has become mindlessly perceived and conceived as 
the world that is, within that world, what is ‘overdeterminately’ actua­
lized from Firstness is taken as static, permanent — and processual 
becoming remains frozen.11
In sum, homogeny-left is overdetermined, and populated with 
inconsistencies, given its nature as utter vagueness. Hierogeny-left is 
the sphere of bivalence, wherein Identity, Non-Contradiction, and 
Excluded-Middle find themselves in congenial company. Heterogeny- 
left is underdetermined and perpetually incomplete. On the opposite 
side of Figure 4, homogeny is ‘overdeteremined’, which, unlike over­
determination on the left-side, is not a question of virtually unlimited
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11 According to the premises underlying Figure 4, and in view of my suggestion 
in footnote 3, ‘overdetermination’ must be distinguished from overdetermination. 
The former is comparable to Freud’s use of the term; it is the product of 
compulsion. The later, in contrast, offers relatively free-wheeling possibilities of 
choice according to the timespace conditions that might happen to inhere.
possibilities within a diversity of timespace contexts at all, but rather, 
it is hard-driven by a compulsion to jam-pack everything into a set of 
fixed categories of thought and action-reaction. Thus what is actua­
lized, hierogenized, is what is, with nary a shadow of a doubt. What 
might have been openness along the left-side has become closure on 
the right-side.
In view of Figure 4’s nature of i-i-i-, Sandra Rosenthal (1994) 
effectively argues for Peirce’s concept of vagueness and possibility as 
vagueness of positive possibility and vagueness of negative possibility. 
Negative possibility is Firstness in the most general sense: left-side 
Firstness containing all possibilities at all possible times and places, 
the vast majority of which lie outside critical common-sensism at a 
particular time and place (the Aztecs’ initial confrontation with 
Guadalupe). Positive possibility is Firstness in the vaguest sense: 
right-side Firstness limited to tunnel-minded thinking that disallows 
alternatives other than those permitted by sedimented ways and means 
(the Guadalupe image the Spaniards wished to impose on the Aztecs). 
It follows, Rosenthal suggests, that there must also be varying degrees 
of both positive and negative generality, and since there can be no 
generality without vagueness and no vagueness without generality, 
there must be generality of Firstness as well as of Thirdness, and 
vagueness of Thirdness as well as of Firstness (this opened the door 
allowing the Aztecs to slip a dose of resistance into their outward 
show of conformity).
Utter vagueness is overdetermined possibility in the most general 
sense. This is negative generality, since nothing has been actualized to 
take its place as a generality in the positive sense. What is actualized 
on the left-side becomes the world of appearances that, under­
determined in terms of positive generality, can at some point give way 
to some alternative or other (and the Aztecs could create their hybrid 
image, Guadantzin). A move to the right-side yields positive gene­
rality as a dogmatic ‘must be’, with little inclination to entertain the 
possibility of alternatives; then, gravitation downward breeds closed, 
entrenched, and more dogmatic and even hegemonic certainty. 
Finally, sedimentation settles down to negative generality and positive 
vagueness, of the ‘overdetermined’ sort —  but now in the sense of 
Freudian repression, hence the scare quotes —  that demands a definite 
set of canned action and reaction modes to whatever situation happens
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to pop up (that, of course, was the ultimate goal of the conquerors, the 
Spaniards).
Acritical knowing finds itself on the right-side. Before it can 
become critical, however, it must bring about the swinging, swirling 
voyage to the left-side, where the horizon is open to view and a 
proliferation of alternatives emerge. Then, and only then, is it possible 
to keep the interpretative process alive. If one remains on the right- 
side, cut-in-stone knowledge is the order of the day. But this would be 
‘semiotic death’, as far as the interpretative process goes. For, what 
keeps the process vital is a proliferation of alternatives along the 
semiosic stream (and the Aztecs took advantage of one of the possible 
alternatives they had at hand).
Pluralism. It perplexes, and it entices, given the freedom it offers.
When the semiotic gusher is at its best, 
what are the consequences?
The very idea of pluralism lends itself to a multiplicity of interpreta­
tions, which is to be expected, of course, given the nature of plura­
lism: a pluralism of theoretical possibilities would appear to be the 
only feasibility. Or perhaps better, we should try for a pluralism of 
theory versions (Rescher 2004: 79). As Rescher argues, pluralism 
admits to in the very least to four versions (see Table 1), which I’ve 
altered in order to render them congenial to the above words on 
Peirce’s concept of the sign.
Let us integrate this table with Figures 3 and 4.
1. Dogmatism, takes its place within a system of authoritarian 
hegemonizing force. It is an outgrowth of heterogeny-right; it 
has universalized one particular world version that has become 
dominant, and the standard to be imposed on oncoming world 
versions. The dogmatic mind can be dangerous, as it tends 
downward, threatening a totalitarian homogenization of all 
world versions and patterning them after the dogma.
2. Doubt and denial, or Radical negativism, has its beginning 
prior to the left hegemonizing side, where no world version that 
can possibly be actualized has yet been adopted. This is the 
good news. As long as an open, dialogic spirit prevails, a host 
of possibilities are available for adoption. However, a move to
right-side heterogeny by the potential dogmatic mind intro­
duces us to the bad news: skepticism in its most radical form 
can infiltrate, become entrenched and sedimented, and then 
solidification and dogmatic closure threatens. When this occurs, 
no world version has a chance of realizing its self-organizing 
tendencies, since it will be rejected as soon as it is made 
known; subsequently, everything must be sent on its linear, 
tunnel-minded road toward homogeny-right.
3. Syncretic relativism can find a home within hierogeny-left, as it 
enters into the process of heterogeny. The problem is that, as 
syncretism, it consists of a mix of world versions but there is no 
genuine fusion ; hence the individual properties of each world 
version remain by and large identifiable. Syncretic relativism is 
no more than a salad-like concoction, and it will remain so, 
because the diverse elements cannot, or at least have not yet, 
interdependently merged into one another to bring about the 
creation of something different, something new. In this manner, 
genuine heterogeny stands hardly a chance of effectively 
carrying out its role. Syncretic relativism is thus of an ‘every­
thing that is, is good, and equally viable’ sort. Within its 
context, as pluralistic concoction of world versions, syncretic 
relativism can offer hardly anything different and of lasting 
value. It only presents an array of divergent, and often incom­
mensurable, world versions. As such, since there is apparently 
no promising alternative that can be embraced and adopted, the 
tendency is toward the right-side, where dogmatism attracts and 
entices.
4. Contextualized novelty seeking relativism emerges from 
homogeny-left and flows into heterogeny. It is a perspectival 
contextualist view that is capable of fusing a plurality o f  world 
versions (of the Goodmanesque sort we saw in the Aztecs case), 
in the process create finer and finer differences such that the 
tendency is toward homogeny. But not quite, for, in the first 
place, since two or more world versions have become fused, 
syncretic relativism and doubt-and-denial skepticism have been 
left in the wake, as the flow is always toward something novel 
emerging out there, somewhere, somewhen. And in the second 
place, there is no longer any tendency toward homogeny-right, 
since, even though differences become finer and finer, neverthe-
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less, there can be no more than a near-continuity of differences, 
as fine as the smoothest vanilla ice cream. Genuine continuity is 
possible, but only in the theoretical long run. Thus novelty 
seeking relativism can in the best of all worlds move increasingly 
closer to that of a general world version, virtually in ‘semiotics 
unbounded’ fashion (Petrilli and Ponzio 2005). But not quite, for 
incompleteness there will always be. (Recall the above sections 
on our inductive and deductive limitations, and the incomplete­
ness and/or inconsistency, as well as the uncertainly, of our 
knowing, the inapplicability of the classical Principles of 
Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded-Middle with respect to 
signs of vagueness and Firstness and generality and Thirdness.)12 
The dangers of dogmatism, religious fanaticism, doctrinaire political 
ideologies, hard-nosed scientific paradigm enforcers, and such, I trust, 
hardly need further clarification. Suffice it to say that the skeptic on 
the left-side engages in a healthy form of moderate ‘negativism’, 
giving virtually any and all world versions a careful look, yet 
invariably ending up with the same version. The radical skeptic, on 
the right-side, categorically and closed-mindedly rejects all available 
options. The left-side syncretic relativist also maintains a healthy
12 At this juncture, a few observations. For Peirce the ‘real world’ is the world of 
‘sensible experience’ (CP: 3.527), and ‘sensible experience’ is the result of 
perceptual awareness that is given perceptual judgment concerning the nature and 
content of the percept (CP: 5.115). In other words, the interpreted percept bears 
on what is perceived and it is what is ‘real’ according to the perceiver (CP: 5.568). 
As such, what is judged as what is, by and large conforms to the classical logical 
principles of Non-Contradiction and Excluded-Middle (CP: 3.529). It involves i-i- 
i- between perceiver and the brute physical world; it is the perceiver’s world of 
‘fact’, of ‘facts’ that are what they are, and at that timespace juncture cannot be 
other than what they are. However, this world is the perceiver’s ‘ideal world’, for, 
since alternatives to what for that perceiver is that it is will always exist — within 
the general, ‘underdetermined sphere’ — and can make their play at the most 
unexpected moments. These alternatives are not forthcoming out o f the clear blue 
sky, but rather, they emerge from Firstness — from within the vague, ‘over­
determined sphere’ — hence Peirce’s notion that the ‘real' must be conceived as 
‘fallibilism objectified’ (CP: 1.171). This unification of Firstness and Thirdness 
with Secondness, and overdetermination and underdetermination, Sandra Ro­
senthal to suggests, “undercuts the dichotomy of foundationalism or nonfoun- 
dationalism and along with it, the closely related dichotomies of realism or anti­
realism and objectivism or relativism since each of these dichotomies, in its own 
way, represents the alternatives of an absolute grounding of knowledge or 
skepticism” (Rosenthal 2004: 207, 209).
posture of tolerance, generally embracing other particular ethnic, 
racial, and gendered world versions in an effort to maintain openness 
to all and all within an open dialogical process. She might even go to 
the left-hand extreme, endorsing the whole bag of world versions, 
with a presupposed open-minded pluralism. This is an ‘anything goes’ 
mentality that sees good on all sides and tends to endorse the whole 
lot of world versions might eventually enter, somewhat in the sense of 
Paul Feyerabend (1975), though his form of syncretism does not go 
without a critical view of left-field bogus versions.
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Table 1. Four versions of pluralism.
Condition Conception Assertion
А! (В, С ... are 
o f little to no 
consequence)
Dogmatism.
Hegemonizing, imposing one’s 
version on others through 
coercion and domination.
“One and only One 
alternative must be adopted, 
for that is the way the world
is”.
~A and ~B and
~C ... ~n\
Doubt and denial: skepticism 
(and toward cynicism).
Moderate to radical negativism, 
carefully appraising world ver­
sions and ending up with 
his/her own, or rejecting any 
and all world versions except 
his/her own.
Either, “I’ll look at all alter­
natives with the idea that, 
ultimately, no alternative (or 
no alternative other than 
mine) should be adopted”, 
or, “I’ll categorically reject 
all alternatives, for none of 
them are adequately viable 
(except mine)”.
A and В and С 
... n\
Syncretic relativism.
Holism: an effort to hold all 
his/her versions together, and 
ideally render them mutually 
inclusive, yet his/her inclination 
is to remain with his/her world 
version.
“All alternatives are to a 
greater or lesser degree 
acceptable, within their 
particular, self-contained, 
self-sufficient, self-reflexive, 
holistic cultural context, but 
I’ll stick with my world 
version, thank you”.
neither A nor В 
nor С ... n ) ... 
b u t ... -> vy!
Contextualized novelty seeking 
relativism.
Emergentist pluralism: fallibi- 
lism admitted, and an incessant 
search for a more viable 
alternative through dialogue 
with others and with the world.
“ I’ve provisionally adopted 
what appears to be the most 
viable alternative, with an 
eye constantly open to other 
alternatives that within their 
inherent context, may prove 
more adequate”.
The novelty seeking relativist, remaining on the left-side, admits to her 
fallibilism, hence she never ceases her effort to further specify, clarify, 
and validate her knowing, such that it may be in the process of 
becoming something other than what it was becoming. And to top her 
quest off, she engages in an incessant search for viable alternatives to 
her process of knowing. She conducts her knowing affairs with care 
and caution, hoping for something unexpected around the next bend in 
the stream; hence she is rarely surprised that she’s isn’t surprised 
when something unexpected emerges. In short, the dogmatist hardly 
takes a serious look at any alternatives, the negative doubter might 
venture to entertain alternate possibilities, but after a brief appraisal 
will customarily accept none of them, the syncretic relativist tries his 
damnedest to hold the unruly mess in one piece, and the novelty 
seeking relativist circumspectly appraises everything and accepts what 
she deems most adequate.
Indeed: a pluralism of rivalries. The dogmatist will have nothing to 
do with any alternative. The skeptic would have us reject virtually 
everything as irrelevant or inadequate. The syncretic relativist smiles 
approvingly of virtually all alternatives, insofar as she can keep them 
interrelative and complementarity, from within her global purview. In 
other words, she would like to steer clear of confrontations and in- 
your-face controversy, refusing a negative posture by embracing 
everything, as if to say that there’s no posture she would reject out of 
hand. For the novelty seeking relativist, as emergentist, no alternative 
is so wretched that it must categorically be tossed in the garbage can, 
nor is there any alternative so pure that it is capable of standing the 
test of time indefinitely. Rather, the search for something a mite better 
must endure.
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Yet, syncretic relativism has its attraction
Constructionists and many cultural theorists have been attracted to the 
syncretic view under various guises (hybridism, transculturation), and 
such, that, in spite of their better judgment, occasional slips into dua- 
listic, and even essentialist, thinking. Granted, they pay due lip service 
to the evils of ‘binary oppositions’, and more often than not make 
good on their words. Yet, there is some tendency to slip into that smug 
security blanket. At the same time, they keep minuscule differences
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between their opinion and that of somebody else alive, so that 
conferences, articles, and books can continue to be forthcoming. In 
their way of thinking, this is what generates and perpetuates pluralism. 
But actually, there need not be a pluralism of conflicting views; rather, 
contextualized novelty seeking relativism maintains, insofar as pos­
sible, an inclusive concoction of alternatives in check, while always 
keeping an eye open for whatever might happen to be emerging.
Be that as it may, syncretic relativism holds truth to be sufficiently 
magnanimous in order to accommodate contradictions without exces­
sive distress. It would seem that, in good Nicholas of Cusa, and later 
Hegelian spirit, the hallowed Principle of Non-Contradiction can find 
a comfortable place in the sphere of Truth —  which can also be the 
case in ‘logics of inconsistency’ and ‘paraconsistency’. This con­
ception of Truth sees no problem in encompassing multiple truths and 
conceding rightness to many rival positions and competing theories. 
This ecumenical, all-embracing doctrine follows a model reminiscent 
of a combination of two of Jorge Luis Borges’s (1962) chimerical 
books. One book, which is the objective of his tale, ‘The Garden of 
Forking Paths’, contains infinitely self-returning paths. The other 
book, in the ‘Library of Babel’, contains a Compendium that lists all 
possible books that can be composed by all possible combinations of a 
25-character alphabet. Just as the Library contains all possible books, 
each of which must confront its anti-book somewhere, so also the 
‘Book of infinitely forking temporal paths’ is inherently self-contra- 
dictory. And yet,... the reality' of all books, or of the ‘Book of the Uni­
verse*, so to speak, is a mind-numbing complexity of possibilities (the 
overdetermined sphere) that, over an interminable expanse of time­
space contexts, gives way to the engenderment of a virtually un­
countable number of those possibilities (within the underdetermined 
sphere).
At first glance, Nelson Goodman’s ‘ways of worldmaking’ (1978) 
would seem to defend a posture comparable to that of syncretic 
relativism. His preferred term I’ve used in this essay, ‘world versions“, 
lays to rest the demand for one and only one Truth. Instead of Truth, 
there are many possible ‘world versions’ one of which can be within 
the purview of the subject at a given timespace juncture, though in 
another time and place an alternative ‘world version’ might be pre­
sumed equally adequate; or, the subject can, if she so desires, entertain 
now one ‘world version’, now another, and then perhaps even another,
for the sheer joy of doing so, for purposes of comparison and contrast, 
or in order to adjudicate between them so as hopefully to remain with 
the most genuine ‘world version’. In this manner, a variety of 
competing ‘world versions’ can be entertained, though no concoction 
of ‘world versions’ can legitimately be held up as The World (but 
such a ‘God’s-eye’ view is impossible for finite, fallible mortals). 
Goodman’s competing ‘world versions’, in this respect, are not really 
what syncretic relativism is all about for precisely that reason: they are 
always at odds with one another, and they make their differences 
known at every opportunity (e.g. the ‘Grue’ example).
Moreover, syncretic relativism, a form of ‘perspectivism’, is by no 
means simply Hegelian dialectics. There is no synthetic embrace of 
two contradictory views, which is then plagued with its own anti­
thesis, and on and on. There is no synthesis, because there is no 
dissolution of views, nor is there a fusion of views into a more 
encompassing view that has taken center stage. There is no grand 
synthesis for the syncretic relativist, but rather, alternatives are thrown 
into the same bag, duly entertained, and kept around for good 
measure, and yet syncretic relativism is considered the order of the 
day, with full awareness that it is not, and cannot be, the ultimate 
answer. In other words, to affirm any given alternative is in a sense to 
negate it, for the process must go on. Syncretic relativism appears 
generous enough, it would seem. Yet it isn’t satisfactory, for the 
subject can’t really have her cake and eat it too; she can’t have 
anything and everything at once and at the same time hold true to her 
syncretic relativism. What she can do is hold now one alternative — 
whether fresh and new or some combination erstwhile alternatives — 
in her purview, now another alternative, and so on, but not two or 
more of them at the same time.
Syncretic relativism would like to envision itself as a grand 
cultural symphony. The problem is that for every melody there are 
virtually countless possible counter-melodies. The resulting pluralism 
of cultural rhythms would be closer to a multiply variegated baroque 
counterpoint. Whatever might happen to appear concordant at an un­
expected moment turns discordant; balance and harmony become 
disequilibrium and disharmony; synchrony veers off along multi­
linear diachronic streams; consonance turns incongruent; clarity 
dissolves into vagueness and ambiguity. At times cacophony might 
seem to erupt.
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Refusing any and all discriminations by accepting everything and 
anything snuffs out controversy; hence dialogue tends to degenerate 
into a collection of solipsistic monologues. Over the long haul, the 
end product is the same as if nothing were accepted, dogmatically. 
Embracing everything, and in the final analysis there is nothing left to 
say; accepting nothing, and nothing remains. Openness to all 
alternatives is as if  there were no alternatives possibly replacing what 
had been in some time past adopted, if only provisionally; closedness 
to all alternatives is as if there were no alternative worthy of replacing 
anything else, including that which had been in some time past 
adopted, dogmatically speaking.
In another way of putting it, acknowledging and admitting all 
alternate possibilities puts one within the sphere of overdetermi­
nation, where Contradictions present no problem, but where there are 
no differences that make an appreciable difference; so one gets no­
where. Acknowledging and admitting no alternate possibilities leads 
one to assume the end of the road has been reached, and the pot of 
gold at the end of the rainbow is there, to be snatched up. But there 
can be no underdetermination of the novelty seeking relativist sort that 
entertains the notion of alternatives that may emerge, and the notion 
that one of them may prove itself a more satisfactory candidate for 
what had been at some time past accepted.
Summarizing the postures in Table 1 within a pluralist setting, we 
have:
1. Accept my way and my way only (dogmatism).
2. You might as well accept no way, since they’re all most likely 
fraught with inconsistencies (doubt and denial: skepticism).
3. Accept a combination of any or all of them, as you like, for 
they are all viable on their own grounds (syncretic relativism).
4. Take what appears most viable from the array of alternatives 
for the moment, but always keep your options open for 
something more to your taste in the future (novelty seeking 
relativism).
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Some variations on the theme
Giving additional thought to the implications of Table 1 raises some 
perplexing issues. Nelson Goodman’s ‘New Riddle’ introduces us to
the strange case of the Grueworlders for whom emeralds are ‘Grue’, 
the color we would ordinarily label ‘Green’ up to time to, and 
thereafter they are what we would ordinarily label ‘Blue’. From within 
the two cultures, that of the Grueworlders and that of Ourworlders, it 
seems inductively reasonable to project ‘Green’ (or ‘Grue’), into our 
perception and conception of ‘Emeralds’. Eventually, whatever the 
projection may be, it becomes entrenched, and that’s that: ‘All 
emeralds are green (or grue)’. This is our way of classifying the world 
and it is the only acceptable way (hegemonically speaking, might 
makes right). Case closed.
But the world of our inductive capacities is not as obedient as we 
would like. Carl Flempel demonstrates so much: ‘All swans are white’ 
can be restated as ‘All non white things are nonswans’, since the two 
hypotheses are different formulations of the same proposition. And 
yet, in spite of Hempel’s Paradox, we are usually able to cope. We 
send and take, and engender and translate signs. We compare new 
experiences to old ones, and pack signs into the pigeon-holes with 
which we have become most comfortable. Consequently, we use our 
conventional sets of categories to classify everything in our world that 
we wish to select, distinguish, and indicate. If at some moment there is 
apparently no fit, then some surprise reveals something new. So we 
revise our ‘knowing’, make whatever changes that seem most appro­
priate, and we usually go on with life. In this vein, perhaps virtually 
any and all color terms, or any other adjectives or qualifying labels 
attached to substantives, and even those substantives themselves, can 
no longer be held sacrosanct. Our knowledge of them, and in fact, our 
knowledge in general, can at the most unexpected turn in the stream of 
semiosis be up for grabs.
But if we have no iron-clad inductive guarantees, should we not go 
into denial? Become skeptics? Accept nothing in order to avoid falling 
into error at some step along the way? Or should we allow our 
categories to proliferate? How many categories can there be for 
qualifying emeralds anyway? ‘Gro’, ‘Gru’, Gue’, ‘Gou’, and whatever 
else, according to the whims of our perceptual and conceptual facul­
ties? Are we not pushed to the edge of the terrible abyss of nihilism? 
Against our better thinking, we might find ourselves gravitating 
toward the right-side of Figures 3 and 4, toward closedness. Well, 
then, perhaps we can accept any and all alternatives as at least 
ephemerally valid on their own grounds. And so we become syncretic
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relativists, more or less embracing an ‘anything goes’ posture. But in 
such case, we risk finding ourselves also gravitating toward the right- 
side, since our obsession for embracing all paths is as closed as any 
other fixed obsession: the embrace of all ways is but another form of 
closedness if pushed down the gullet of all oncomers. Should we 
accept nothing of skepticism and accept everything of syncretic 
relativism? Nothing and everything, choosing no possibilities and 
choosing all possibilities and their contradictions? —  which is the 
same as choosing none of them, for everything virtually cancels out 
everything else. The response should be negative.
Ultimately, solely novelty seeking relativism can effectively keep 
the door open; it is the only viable way, because it embraces one 
alternative with the admission that at another time and another place 
some other existent alternative or some new alternative that has 
surfaced might be more workable. Does this way deny the possibility 
of some fusion of alternatives? No. For example, with respect to our 
Mexican cultural case, one person may choose Guadalupe, the other 
Tonantzin, and someone else neither of them (the skeptic); someone 
may syncretically accept both of them in some juxtaposition 
(Guadalupe-Tonantzin); and yet someone else may opt for merging 
them together, interpenetrating them and rendering them i-i-i- with 
everything else to yield Guadantzin or Tonalupe, according to the 
emphasis. But this is no static fusion, for it is always becoming 
something other than what it was becoming.
Is anybody’s experience really as valid as anybody else’s? Is it 
equally true and compelling? But ‘equally true and compelling’ for 
whom? The experiences of others certainly are not equivalent for 
us —  save insofar as we somehow make them part and parcel of our 
own. Moreover, my own experience, I would like to think, is unique. 
You surely believe the same of your experience. In any event, if I 
choose to accept novelty seeking relativism, from within each and 
every timespace context I have hardly any recourse but to proceed 
from wherever I happen to find myself. This radically pluralist 
perspectivism, nevertheless, is the most satisfactory answer; it in­
volves constant improvisation, perpetual creative responses to 
incessantly altering cultural processes. There is nothing absolutely 
given in advance, nothing that we are endowed with as if ex nihilo, 
nothing that we can justifiably presume, or presuppose, no 
preconditions on the basis of which we can act. There is only the
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moment, right here and now. By the time we can conceptually prepare 
ourselves to take action, the background of our experience has already 
begun becoming something other than what it was becoming. By the 
time, in that next moment, we got to the point where we thought we 
were proceeding, that point has become something else. We cannot 
know where and when we are, and we cannot perceive and conceive 
what there is as if from ‘nowhere’ (that God’s-eye view again). Nor 
are we in a vacuum with respect to our myriad perspectival takes on 
ourselves, on others, and on our world. Yet, we always enjoy some 
position; we cannot maneuver in our everyday existence without some 
position or other, however ephemeral it may be.
But another question emerges: Is this experience always from 
somewhere and somewhen not also some sort of absolute? As such, 
does it not range over time and space to afford us ephemeral grasps of 
that absolute? And if so, then is it not as absolute as any other 
absolute? No, because there are always complementary contextual 
possibilities as alternatives to whatever we have at hand. Well then, to 
pose Rescher’s (2004: 117) questions: ‘Does not contextualist 
pluralism put everyone’s position on a par? Does it not underwrite the 
view that all the alternatives ultimately lie on the same level of 
acceptability?’ Once again, we must ask: Acceptability for whom? 
The response, I would submit, should be: Acceptable for each 
individual, for s/he is committed to her/his own set of experiences. 
This, once again, involves a pluralism of multiply diverse postures.
Comes another counterargument
It appears that the form of pluralism I am advocating stands little 
chance of getting anywhere, since, in spite of my better judgment, it 
places all competitive views on equal footing. Not really, however. 
Pluralistic novelty seeking relativism admits to some merits, however 
minimal, in any and all views, and, in addition, it holds that any and 
all views are fallible, hence no view is absolutely without faults.
No view gets everything entirely right for all time, for all views at 
some time and place or other will reveal some flaw. Indeed, pluralistic 
novelty seeking relativism resists the temptation to reject rival views 
outright before they have been duly appraised. It also struggles against 
gullibly accepting any view straight and without a chaser. There is
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discrimination here, but with the idea that whatever looks good today 
might become ugly tomorrow, and whatever appeared hideous 
yesterday might take on a rather attractive countenance today. The 
watchword? Neither dogmatic dismissal nor blind reception; neither 
total tolerance nor intransigent intolerance, but rather, judicious 
contemplation and evaluation and selection of what is at hand today, 
with the expectation that the next day will likely place things in a 
different light.
This is to say that just as the pluralistic novelty seeking relativist 
would advise others to abandon whatever position they might have 
held when some more promising alternative happens to come along, 
so also she would advise them never to cease seeking more enticing 
alternatives, within ever-changing contexts and circumstances. In this 
case one should never view one’s position as superior to other 
positions, whether actual or possible. Either there are many future 
possibilities, and the idea that any possibility is determinately better 
than all others does not come up, or there is only one possibility that is 
determinately better than all others, and so the search for that 
possibility has no end point. If contexts and circumstances are indeed 
ever-changing — and given the premises underlying this essay, they 
are —  then the search for the ideal superior possibility will never 
cease; hence there is no knowing absolutely whether a given 
possibility within some particular timespace context might be 
precisely what the search has been all about. So in the final analysis it 
might appear that you can eat your cake according to your heart’s 
desire, but you can never have it in its entirety.
Yet, I would respectfully suggest, one must take a stand, choose 
sides, decide who is friend and who is foe. And one must defend 
oneself against those who disagree. If the critic turns out to be 
dogmatic, a nay-saying skeptic, or an open-arms relativist, one might 
consider intolerance toward the intolerant, temperance toward the 
‘nothing cuts it’ crowd, and deference toward the ‘virtually anything 
goes’ gang. Above all, the search for something better must always go 
on. And decisions must be made. Buridan’s thirsty and hungry donkey 
that couldn’t decide whether to go for the hay to the right or the water 
to the left is no model to emulate. Nor should one look for some shade 
of grey as the ideal. From within the timespace context where and 
when one happens to find oneself, a decision must be made, for the 
here and now. And if one perchance chooses well, given the general
conventions within one’s community, then one might be able to enjoy 
communing with others for another day.
In this vein, the proper path is: homogeny-left signs emerge, as a 
consequence of complementary co-participation between sign makers 
and takers and the signs themselves, in i-i-i-. Then, differences that 
make a difference appear, variations on the signs’s original theme 
make their play, and movement tends toward heterogeny-left. Even­
tually, a tendency toward smugness, toward unwarranted certainty 
seeps in, and heterogeny-right beckons, offering the security of like- 
minded and therefore right-minded thinking and doing. But beware. 
Once on the right-side, hierogeny-right and hegemonic practices, and 
with them, entrenchment, and tunnel-minded certainty can come to 
dominate. Dogmatism may soon raise its ugly countenance, and 
closure exercises its force. The answer? Keep everything open, insofar 
as possible, at heterogeny-left.
However, objections are still forthcoming: It would seem that my 
heterogeny-left would entail a perpetual state of dissensus, with no 
possible consensus. At best there would be no more than some form of 
syncretic relativism, and at worst there would be a disgruntled 
atmosphere of doubt and denial, or skepticism. In order for the 
creation of a coherent, congenial communal state of affairs to come 
about, there must be a move to the right side, must there not? In order 
for this community to be self-perpetuating, it must bear some system 
of values, within the hierogenic mode, which would at least tend 
toward homogeny-right, but, hopefully, without degenerating into 
some dogmatically imposed homogenous doctrine.
As reasonable as this sounds, it doesn’t quite hold water. On the 
one hand, heterogeny-left allows for a tolerable degree of dissensus. 
This isn’t to say that it falls into rampant negativism and syncretic 
relativism, because the most proper hierogenic mode is on the left­
side. Hierogeny-left provisionally adopts a global view by means of 
which local level dissensus can usually be moderated. When 
moderation appears unfeasible, then global premises, proclivities, 
presuppositions and preconceptions may be placed in question, and in 
dire cases that global view may give way to some alternative or other. 
This condition exists only in the presence of open dialogue, openness 
to the overdetermined sphere of homogeny-left, and a level of 
tolerance for contradictory possibilities that can seep up through the 
Included-Middles within heterogenic-left processes. Nevertheless, a
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move upward and toward heterogeny-right cannot help but tend 
toward doubt, denial, and skepticism, and then toward dogmatism. 
When this occurs, dissensus is eradicated whenever possible, 
consensus is enforced according to those who hold power, doors are 
closed to dialogic exchange, any and all Contradictions are barred, and 
the Excluded-Middle Principle is invariably honored.
Others, and their cultural contexts
Within a pluralistic context, taking the open, self-correcting nature of 
knowing into account, some degree of incompleteness, hence 
indeterminacy, and more often than not inconsistency, will sooner or 
later make their presence known. For what will be one’s knowing 
within some future timespace context will be quite different from what 
one at present (thinks one) knows. In this manner, our knowing is 
always restricted by the world version within which we dwell and 
within which we perceive and conceive ourselves, others, and our 
physical world.
This knowing involves the whole of our perceptual capacities, and 
to boot, proprioceptive, kinesthetic and somatic knowing; it is a matter 
of feeling and sensing in addition to more explicit dialogical and 
discursive knowing. The problem is that, for some neo-pragmatists, 
namely, Richard Rorty (1979, 1982), our knowing, and hence our 
world, is taken as nothing more than a bundle of sentences — a giant 
step beyond David Hume for whom we are nothing more than a 
bundle of sensations. Rorty calls this form of knowing ‘textual 
idealism’ —  a sort of ‘language-centered’ alternative to George Ber­
keley’s ‘subjective idealism’. If we accept this posture, we’re in 
trouble. For we will be ignoring bodymind feeling and sensing at its 
most concrete; that is, we will be by and large ignoring iconicity and 
indexicality, while our focus will remain on hypertrophied symbo­
lism.b
This is to say that statements about the world from within hiero­
geny-left can be true from a particular perspective, but percepts and 
concepts regarding the same world are not necessarily true regarding
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statements from some other perspective (they true for us, but not 
necessarily true for others). Rorty would like to keep the conversation 
between ourselves and others and our physical world open, so we can 
come to an agreement about our percepts and concepts. The problem 
is that the other minds out there occasionally tend toward authorita­
rianism. This means that they might wish dogmatically to make their 
statements true and the statements of others false, which might lead to 
discrimination, racism and fascism. And great harm could be meted 
out to the weak by the strong, who are strong, because they were most 
effective in pushing their way around. All this entails a move toward 
hierogeny- and hegemony-right. But we don’t have to share beliefs 
with or agree with others in order to understand them. We can to a 
greater or lesser degree understand them, yet tolerate them in our 
disagreement.
How can we be sure we can understand them? For example, how 
do we know that Ptolemy and Copernicus were talking about the same 
Earth and Sun we talk about? They’re not here to tell us so. How, 
then, can we be so confident that our Earth and Sun are either the 
same as or different from theirs? How can we know if Joseph 
Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’ is the same as or different from Henri 
Cavendish’s ‘oxygen’, or our ‘oxygen’ for that matter? How can we 
know in the twenty first century whether Guadalupe and Tonantzin 
were distinct, fused, or merely confused, in the minds of the 
conquered Aztecs? And how is it that I can with such facility coin the 
agglutinated term ‘Guadantzin’ to depict the Amerindians’ perception 
and conception of their venerated image? Answers are not easily 
forthcoming. But, if answers there must be, 1 would expect they would 
involve differences with respect to how the world is perceived and 
conceived by way of feelings and sensations with respect to Peirce’s 
Firsts, of perceptual inferences with respect to Peirce’s Seconds, and 
of conceptual inferences with respect to Thirdness. Before one can 
approach others and their cultures, one must become engrossed, 
through bodymind feeling and sensing at its most basic, with: (1) one’s 
immersion within one’s own cultural flux and flow, (2) one’s culture- 
dependent, conventional practices regarding one’s community and 
one’s physical world, and (3) one’s notion of a generalized set of 
interpretative modes according to the presuppositions, predispositions, 
and prejudices, and the conventions and norms, of one’s culture.
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One finds oneself within one’s conventions and norms, acknow­
ledging and embracing them in part explicitly and in part tacitly. 
These conventions and norms are virtually self-sufficient yet self- 
correcting. self-contained yet open: they are by no means autonomous, 
fixed, wholes. However, even under optimal circumstances, there is no 
unchanging, well-formed and presumably universal consensus with 
respect to one’s conventions and norms within one’s community. 
There is no set of like minded and presumably right minded indivi­
duals, homogenized by coercion, propaganda or brainwashing. Rather, 
there is a bubbling mix of behavioral patterns, ways of feeling and 
sensing, and modes of perception and conception. There is an open, 
almost free-wheeling exchange of opinions and ideas, often bordering 
on conflict and struggle. Under these conditions, there may be pursuit 
of communal consensus, for sure. And there is the desire for balance 
and harmony, relatively free of discord, dispute and wrangling. Who 
wouldn't wish for substantial agreement among members of a benign 
and enlightened community ?
However, substantial agreement among members of one’s com­
munity is a far cry from beginning to understand others within their 
community, and it is even further from the dream of consensus.
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Yet, is it not possible to understand others?
How does one find one’s place, and the place of others, within one’s 
community ? This problem should precede talk of consensus, and even 
more so with respect to points of contact, and the possibility of some 
consensual view, concerning vital issues across cultures. When one is 
within the flux and flow of one’s cultural world, given its complexity, 
its pluralism, then, and only then, can one effectively hope to enter the 
flux and flow of some alternative to one’s cultural world, or of some 
alternative cultural world. And one might hope that understanding 
between cultures is possible through some sort of tacit agreement or 
consensus betw een members of those cultures.
Jürgen Habermas’s (1971, 1979) communicative project to 
complete modernity’s enterprise often sees consensus regarding our 
community, or our community and other communities, as a realizable 
goal. He would like to avoid Hegel’s notion of evolution toward the 
ideal order by more or less adopting Peirce’s idea of an asymptotic
approximation toward consensus. What is meant by an ‘approximation 
toward’? The asymptote gets nearer and nearer to the finish line, but 
the increments remaining to be traversed become finer and finer, such 
that termination of the increasingly torpid trek will occur only at the 
infinite stretch. Commensurately, for Peirce, consensus, knowledge of 
the truth, or the end of science as it were, is available solely to some 
infallible and immortal individual, or to a community containing and 
infinity of individuals. So we finite, fallible humans will never reach 
the ideal. However benign Habermas’s social order may be, if we take 
Peirce at face value, it will never be so harmonious, so complete, and 
so consistent or free of contention and strife, that there will be nothing 
more to be done. The commonsensical notion among members of a 
given community that the goal of consensus is the way to go is 
admirable, and it can provide for a healthy exchange of ideas and 
modes of behavior. But if expectations will settle for nothing short of 
consensus, frustration will surely be the virtually inevitable yield.
The problem with the idea of consensus is that, no matter how 
satisfactory it might appear, sooner or later some degree of dissensus 
will enter the scene (Rescher 2004). This is both the boon and the 
bane of diversity, of plurality, of differences that make a difference. 
‘Like minded’ and ‘right minded’ thinking and talking and behaving 
might take on the trappings of an ideal community, even of a demo­
cratic community. But divergence, discord and disagreement will 
always be just around the next bend in the road. Tolerance is called 
for. And if practiced, there will nevertheless be some indication or 
other of some degree of intolerance. Reasonableness is called for. Yet 
irreason will tend to emerge here and there when least expected. And 
reasonableness will eventually show some unreasonable countenance. 
Some degree of dissensus, dissonance and divergence is inevitable. 
This should be no call for alarm, however. Disagreement within 
pluralism can be applauded, that is, if those who disagree are willing 
to enter into open-minded dialogue. This is a matter of acquiescence 
within disagreement, however, not subservient acquiescence; it is 
acquiescence, but with openness toward alternatives, and when a 
viable alternative presents itself, even if it appears to flow against the 
grain of the communal current, the option exists that some degree of 
resistance may be forthcoming. In this regard, there is never complete 
uniformity (homogeny), but always some element of dissonance and 
diversity (heterogeny), that perhaps at various juncture may threaten
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to erupt into conflict and perhaps even chaos — but every measure
must be taken to prevent this.
Another problem with consensus is that its pursuit is by and large 
counterproductive —  if consensus could somehow be achieved, the 
desire to achieve success of one’s ideas and interpretative strategies 
over those of others would abate — and it is unrealistic — since total 
consensus can’t be achieved, why waste time striving to reach it? The 
pursuit of excellence and the desire to succeed more likely than not 
exists within a context involving diversity and conflict: pluralism. 
This relatively benign form of diversity and conflict is most notable 
along the left-side of Figures 3 and 4, since the supreme goal of the 
dominant haves on the right-side is to hammer the subordinate 
havenots into shape so as to homogenize society, thus reducing diver­
sity and conflict and creating, through dedifferentiation, conformity 
and passivity.
Still, in spite of the inevitable pushes toward right-side homogeny 
and consensus, dissensus there will always be. The telling tale is 
whether a given society, or two different societies, both at the local 
and the global levels, can maintain a healthy degree of tolerance in a 
diverse social milieu consisting of high levels of free thought and 
expression and at the same time exact a sufficient degree of mutual 
acceptance of and accommodation to traditional and established 
standards, values, and modes of conduct. In other words, pluralism 
need not end up in chaos.
Back to the vortex
The fact is that, whatever mutual acceptance, accommodation, and 
conformity there might be, intellectual, cultural, and social progress is 
often accompanied by resistance and rebellion, whether through print 
or by violent protest, against complacent, conservative dominant 
groups. And from whence does this resistance and rebellion flow? 
From the sphere of possibilities, emerging into the swirling, 
fluctuating, undulating, scintillating semiosic process at the lower left­
side of Figures 3 and 4. In fact, those figures are calling out for 
another look in the form of Figure 5.
We see the morphological lines of flowing transition between 
terms and from column to column. We see the radical break from
homogeny-right to hierogeny-left. And we see something new: the 
process of dyadism becoming triadism and triadism pluralism, and 
vice-versa, finally to monism. The sphere of possibilia embraces 
everything, the range of all unselected possibilities plus those paltry 
few that have been selected and actualized into some cultural milieu as 
hierogenous, and perchance Manichean dualistic distinctions, while 
that which remains unselected and within the nonselected awaits its 
selection at some propitious future moment or other. Once entering 
into the processual flow and toward heterogeny-left, cultural distinc­
tions become finer and finer, as changes render them increasingly 
ambiguous and vague. In other words, distinctions become more and 
more differentiated until they threaten to become indifference rather 
than difference. Novelty seeking relativism, provides freedom in an 
open process to continue on, creating differences that make a diffe­
rence, no matter how virtually imperceptible they may become.
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Figure 5. Homogeny left, overdetermined and of utter vagueness, is what ‘might 
become’, within some timespace context. Hierogeny left consists o f what is what 
it is, or at least so it appears to us.
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This form o f relativism is such that only one alternative would 
ordinarily be accepted from within a particular timespace context. 
This is not necessarily based on rationally cogent grounds, but it 
emerges from considerations o f taste, o f personal inclination, or social 
conventions. It is a pluralistic relativism, a relativism emerging con­
textually, and dependent upon particular perspectival modes created 
from arrays o f cultural contexts; it is a relativism regarding which the 
community as a whole has created and developed a particular world 
version that allows for a diversity o f variations within the parameters 
set by that com m unity’s set o f  conventions. This is the ‘idealistic’ side 
o f Peirce’s enigmatic philosophical posture he labels ‘objective 
idealism ’. The ‘objective’ side is found in tempered and guarded 
relativism —  perspectivism, contextualism —  according to which 
only one alternative at a given timespace juncture should be accepted, 
and this acceptance has a basis o f general community agreement with 
respect to what should be prohibited and what should be permitted.14
Left-side heterogenous pluralism, or novelty seeking relativism, 
tends toward indifferentism. There is maximal diversity which allows 
different sign makers and takers —  and, all the more, different groups 
and timespace contexts —  to adopt different views. The idea that there 
are a variety o f fundamental perspectives regarding the nature of
14 ‘Objective idealism’ at first blush is a strange mix. In formulating his 
philosophical posture, Peirce is caught in a dilemma. He tries to wiggle out of it 
by coining the term ‘objective idealism’. The concept follows Peirce’s notion that 
interpretants, and our world version they and we have co-participatingly created, 
involve neither exclusively the material world nor the perceiving and conceiving 
mind, but a fusion of matter and mind. As Peirce summarizes his notion: “The one 
intelligible theory of the universe is that o f objective idealism, that matter is effete 
mind, inveterate habits becoming physicals laws” (CP: 6.25). The physical world 
is the world perceived in static slices, so to speak, and the mental world creates a 
flow of these slices from past to future (CP: 6.127). In this light, ‘objective 
idealism’ is the Identity principle (regarding interpretants) becoming processual 
such that there is no fixed identity, and the Non-Contradiction and Excluded- 
Middle principles (regarding interpretants) giving way to the becoming of 
alternatives and their displacement of what was perceived and conceived as fixed. 
In this manner, ‘objective idealism’ is comparable to a fusion of methodological 
objectivism and epistemological idealism: according to our preferred methods and 
strategies we interact with the phenomena of our physical world and our mental 
worlds in order to make them more intelligible, but we are repeatedly thwarted in 
our efforts, and we replace what we (thought we) knew by something we (think 
we) now know.
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things that engender different positions is thus virtually as old as 
human societies themselves. Genuine novelty seeking relativism takes 
things as they come such that from the view o f various groups indiffe­
rentism can eventually pervade. In this regard, relatively paltry 
distinctions are o f little regard, since, if  they are not totally contra­
dictory, then the differences can be smoothed out, and if  they appear 
contradictory, then most likely there is equally no problem, for some­
thing new can likely slip through the two horns o f the dilemma and 
emerge as newly bom novelty. The advice would be: ‘nothing 
ventured, nothing gained’. Take risks, keep a level head, improvise at 
every opportunity, and things will have a tendency to work themselves 
out.
Risks, however, can emerge from three different directions. First, 
there are risks dismpting the effort to avoid risks altogether. Aversion 
to risks breeds intolerance toward anything other than what is deemed 
‘normal’ and hence right. This is the dogmatic, hegemonizing attitude, 
which counsels against taking chances by playing it safe. What is done 
is the right way, and every other way is wrong. Those who hold this 
attitude are prone to expect the worst —  the natural consequence o f 
skepticism, along the right-side o f Figures 3, 4, and 5. A second form 
of risk involves calculated risk taking. Those who tend to fall into this 
category have what would seem to be a natural propensity for holding 
all possibilities in check in order to weigh each one against the others 
and decide which option will most likely pay the most dividends. This 
is an expression o f syncretic relativism. A third position regarding 
risks involves caution, for sure, comparable to calculated risk taking, 
but, in addition, it includes the willingness to seek out new risks with 
the idea that they will lead to the greatest possible variety o f alterna­
tives regarding life situations. This is a more daring calculated 
approach than the second form o f risk taking. It delights in the 
consequences that ensue from a risky pathway having been taken, and 
equally delights in the challenge at every step o f the way and the need 
constantly to improvise. Risk seeking takes chances, with eager 
anticipation and relish, assuming that things will eventually turn out 
for the best, and if  not, it will have been a fruitful learning experience 
to keep in mind for the next encounter. Such risk taking is a prime 
example o f novelty> seeking relativism; it is left-side heterogeny at its 
best.
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In other words, practice moderation in all things
Open-minded pluralism, as suggested, does not simply entail an 
‘anything goes’ posture. It is no uncritical acceptance o f whatever risk 
happens to pop up. It is no wild, uncritical embrace o f anything and 
everything. It involves risk seeking and risk taking with care and 
caution.
Risks are sought out, with this idea that by taking risks and 
improvising along the way to keep one’s head above water, change 
remains alive and well, and novelty continues to seep up into the open. 
W hereas the dogmatist and skeptic bar all the available options except 
the only one that is viable, theirs, and counsel us to reject everything 
that deviates from the pathway o f appropriateness, the novelty seeking 
relativist moves in the opposite direction, willing and able to reject 
whatever is at hand here and now for something that might take on the 
guise o f acceptability in the next here and now. Alternatives are 
brought together, and fused, if  possible, in order to draw something 
new from the fountain o f  opportunity within the Included-Middle, 
between the horns o f every pair o f otherwise antagonistic either/or 
options.
Novelty seeking relativism sees rival alternatives as equally 
plausible, until they prove otherwise in the give-and-take of human 
experience within diverse timespace contexts. That is, a given 
workable alternative, having emerged from the Included-Middle, can 
often be capable o f accommodating some contradiction or other. If 
there is lack o f self-consistency, then self-sufficiency can overcome 
the problem, and if  not, with the addition o f some improvised 
measures here and there, the problem can often be at least partly 
ameliorated. This posture conjoins alternatives, and on the whole, life 
can go on, albeit often to the tune o f no more than a syncopated, 
tenuous balance.
The problem with such tenuousness is that insecurity can enter, 
uncertainty can make its play, an inevitable move toward the right- 
side might ensue, and increasing closure threatens, with all its 
either/or imperatives and shunted hegemony. Subsequently, authorita­
rian truth, Our Truth, becomes the one and only alternative. Along 
with truth, the word can tend to become virtually sacrosanct, at the 
most extreme much in the order o f religious rhetoric. The book, 
consequently, is considered to say what it says, and that’s that; forget
multiple competing readings. And we are flirting dangerously with 
homogeny-right mandates. However, just as a library contains many 
diverse books, some o f them presenting counterarguments to argu­
ments in other books, others telling stories as variations on themes o f 
other books, and still others creating enticing juxtapositions between 
themselves and other books, so also reality is a complex concoction o f 
many different and discordant world versions. Each book has its own 
consistent or inconsistent, and incomplete or presumably in­
complete —  and if so, inconsistent —  organizing style led by its own 
‘practical reason’ (Sahlins 1978). But The World, the collection o f all 
possible world versions, encompasses all possible books, just as the 
world o f our concrete everyday experiences encompasses multiple 
world versions within our own culture and from culture to culture, as 
well as all cultures that have been in the past, and all cultures that will 
have been in the future. Each world version presents its own 
complexity, and The World as a whole embraces them all without 
being confined to any o f them (Goodman 1978).
This conception, quite obviously once again, entails novelty 
seeking relativism. One must bear in mind, however, that novelty 
seeking relativism's fusion o f world versions, o f  perspectives, and o f 
cultural practices, does not involve a collection o f elements held 
together with superglue, while they all retain their former identity. 
Fusion is brought about from within the Included-Middles, between 
two or more antagonisms, distinctions, or even minute differences that 
make an important difference, as something new that nonetheless 
carries within itself something o f the nature o f that from within which 
it emerged. Nothing is absolutely lost, and nothing is absolutely won; 
there is no absolute gain and the pain is never without some reward. 
Everything always flows, toward somewhere and somewhen. Along 
left-side hierogeny and heterogeny, o f course.
Wrapping it up with an analogy
The pluralist view is that o f an ongoing soccer game —  not basketball, 
baseball or football, punctuated by lapses between plays, time outs, 
and such —  during which each player contributes to the overall effort, 
complementing the other players, all o f  them, to the rhythm o f the 
game. All players are co-participating with one another in the effort to
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get the ball between the goal posts. The players are the melody and the 
harmony; they are syncopated, now consonantly, now dissonantly, 
now improvisingly creating a tenuous balance while passing the ball 
back and forth, now to the left, now to the right, now closer to the 
goal, now strategically in the other direction, and all the while 
presenting a counterpoint and an alternate melody to counteract the 
counter melody their opponents defensively present against their 
melody in the process o f its unfoldment.
Like the soccer match, things don’t usually go as planned; in fact, 
they rarely go as planned —  that’s why the number o f goals during a 
game is always so paltry. Incompatibility and inconsistency is more 
often than not the yield. A strategy can end in incompleteness, loss, 
and frustration, when the opposing team comes up with a surprising 
countermove. But there’s no turning back, no time to regroup, no rest 
period to map out a new strategy, for the game must go on, 
processually. T here’s pluralism, for sure. Each player has her/his 
repertoire o f patented moves, and the collection o f players making up 
the team has its characteristic way o f playing the game as it evolves. 
The team incorporates a ‘world version’, one version among many 
within the vast universe called ‘Soccer’, and after a losing effort, the 
players might convene for a special session and a pep talk after which 
they have created a new ‘world version’. Then, with renewed confi­
dence, they enter the uncertainty o f the next match with a different 
team. Pluralism, processual pluralism: that, I would submit, is the 
name o f the play, o f  semiosis.
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К вопросу о плюралистическом и 
интерреляционном понятии семиозиса
Всю сложность любой достаточно развитой знаковой системы можно 
охватить с помощью: 1) Пирсовской «логики неопределенности», 2) 
его категорий, 3) понятий сверх- и недодетерминированность, 
неясность и всеобщность, противоречивость и неукомплектован­
ность, 4) опровержения принципов классической аристотелевской 
логики. Благодаря сложности знаковых систем существует семиоти­
ческая неопределенность, которая с одной стороны предполагает 
ограниченность знаков, но в то же время позволяет и семиотическую 
свободу, которая становится причиной размножения знаков, резуль­
татом которого в свою очередь будет плюралистический интер­
реляционный семиозис. Это размножение знаков обязано своим не- 
прекрашаюшимся текучим изменением тому факту, что правила 
«непротиворечивости» и «исключенного третьего» классической ло­
гики неприменимы к ним ввиду неясности и всеобщности, содержа­
щихся во всех знаках. Все ограничения и свобода при создании и 
выявлении знаков объяснимы в рамках «индуктивного парадокса» 
Хемпеля и «новой загадки индукции» Гудмена. В качестве конкрет­
ного примера в статье с помощью методик Хемпеля и Гудмена
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анализируется противостояние картины мира испанцев, в центре 
которой находится гваделупская Дева, миру ацтеков (в центре кото­
рой стоит бог Тонанцин). Пример иллюстрирует многозначную, 
неясную и сложную природу межкультурных знаковых систем, в 
дальнейшем приводящие к плюрализму. Фактически, исходя из 
«ограничивающих/лимитирующих теорем» Гёделя, Тюринга и Чей- 
тина невозможно отрицать плюрализм, прежде всего из-за про­
тиворечивости и неукомплектованности сложных структур. Одной 
из возможных моделей, описывающих плюрализм, могло бы быть 
стремящееся к релятивизму контекстуачизированное новшество. 
Эта форма плюрализма охватывает сверхдетерминированность (что 
характерно в общих чертах пирсовской Первичности) и недодетер­
минированность (что в общих чертах характерно для пирсовской 
Третичности), выдвигая социальный контекст, через который стано­
вится возможным объяснить все локальные контексты. Нужно иметь 
в виду, что сумма всех локальных контекстов никогда не достигает 
уровня глобального контекста, так как целостность глобального 
контекста никогда невозможно охватить полностью по причине 
неизбежной конечности и фаллибилизма нас как субъектов. Тем не 
менее мы обычно способны справится с процессуальным плюра­
лизмом в рамках игры семиозиса.
Pluralistliku ja suhestusliku semioosi mõiste suunas
Ükskõik millise rikkaliku märgisüsteemi kogu keerukus on hõlmatav järg­
miste elementidega: Peirce’i ‘ähmasuse loogika’, tema kategooriate, 
mõistete ülem äär atletus ja  alamääratletus, ähmasus ja  üldisus, vastu- 
käivus ja  poolikus analüüs ning klassikalise aristotelliku loogikapõhi- 
mõtete kummutamine. Tingitud märgisüsteemide keerukusest, eksisteerib 
teatud semiootiline määramatus, mis ühelt poolt eeldab märkide piiritle­
tust, kuid võimaldab samaaegselt semiootilist vabadust, mis põhjustab 
märkide vohamist, mille tulemuseks on omakorda pluralistlik suhestuslik 
semioos. Märkide vohamise igavene voolav muutumine on võimalik 
seepärast, et klassikalise loogika ‘mittevasturääkivuse’ ja ‘välistatud kol­
manda’ reegleid ei ole neile võimalik rakendada kõikides märkides 
sisalduva ähmasuse ja üldisuse tõttu. Kõik märgiloomise ja märgistatud 
saamise piirangud ja  vabadus on selgitatav Hempeli ‘induktiivsus- 
paradoksi’ ja Goodmani ‘uue induktsioonimõistatuse’ raames. Konkreetse 
kultuurinäitena analüüsitakse käesolevas artiklis Hempeli ja  Goodmani
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metoodika järgi hispaanlaste maailmapilti, mille keskmes oli Guadalupe 
Neitsi, vastanduses asteekide maailmaga, mille keskmes oli jumal Tonant- 
zin, illustreerimaks pluralismi aluseks olevate kultuuridevaheHste märgi­
süsteemide mitmetimõistetavat, ähmast ja  keerukat loomust. Õigupoolest 
on Gödeli, Turingi ja  Chaitini ‘piiritlevatest teoreemidest’ lähtudes plura­
lismi võimatu eitada, seda eelkõige keerukate struktuuride vastukäivuse ja 
poolikuse tõttu. Üheks mudeliks pluralismi käsitlemisel võiks olla relati­
vismi poole püüdlev kontekstualiseeritud uudsus. See pluralismi vorm 
hõlmab ülemääratletust (mis on üldjoontes iseloomulik Peirce’i Esma­
susele) ja alamääratletust (mis on üldjoontes iseloomulik Peirce’i 
Kolmasusele), tuues esile globaalse konteksti, mille kaudu on võimalik 
seletada kõiki lokaalseid kontekste. Tuleb silmas pidada, et kõikide 
lokaalsete kontekstide summa ei küüni kunagi taolise globaalse konteksti 
tasemele, kuivõrd globaalse konteksti terviklikkust ei ole meie kui 
subjektide lõplikkuse ja ekslikkuse tõttu iialgi võimalik täielikult haarata. 
Siiski oleme semioosi mänguruumis enamasti võimelised toime tulema 
protsessuaalse pluralismiga.
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Abstract. The notion of culture implies the relative stability o f sets of 
algorithms that become entrenched in human brains as children become 
socialized, and, to a lesser extent, when immigrants become assimilated into a 
new society. The semiotics o f culture has used the notion of signs and systems 
of signs to conceptualize this process, which takes for granted memory as a 
natural affordance of the brain without raising the question of how and why 
cultural signs impact behaviour in a durable manner. Indeed, under the 
influence of structuralism, the semiotics o f culture has mostly achieved 
synchronic descriptions. Dynamic models have been proposed to account for 
the action of signs (e.g., semiosis, dialogism, dialectic) and their resulting 
cultural changes and cultural diversity. However, these models have remained 
remarkably abstract, and somewhat disconnected from the actual brain 
processes, which must be assumed to be involved in the emergence, main­
tenance, and transformations of cultures. Semiotic terminology has con­
tributed to a systematic representation of cultural objects and processes but the 
philosophical origin of its basic concepts has made it difficult to construct a 
productive interface with the cognitive neurosciences as they have developed 
and achieved notable advances in the understanding of memory over the last 
few decades. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that further advances in 
semiotics will require a shift from philosophical and linguistic notions toward 
biological and evolutionary models.
In epistemological matters the notion o f heritage is double edged. 
Undoubtedly, historical research can trace back the development o f 
concepts, models and methods and bring to light some patterns o f 
dynamic continuity through filiation or contagion. But, more often 
than not, the most interesting achievements in the pursuit o f human 
knowledge comes from sudden shifting o f perspectives and counter-
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intuitive evidence that succeed in overcoming the force o f inertia of 
intellectual traditions. From this point o f view, heritage can be equated 
more with epistemological hindrance than with scientific advances. 
Naturally, for those who consider it to be a mere doctrine, semiotics 
can appear to have been formed by successive layers o f commentaries 
and by school debates and exercises derived from the authoritative 
words o f some early fountainheads. Ultimately, a doctrine can only 
progress through further endoctrination that conserves and increases 
the “heritage” . But, if  the semiotic project, as many modern thinkers 
understand it, has some legitimate claim to scientific status and episte­
mological relevance, it must be prepared to undergo paradigmatic 
shifts and confront cognitive revolutions. It cannot develop in isola­
tion from the dynamic o f the sciences, even if  it positions itself on a 
different level. This, however, is a risky epistemological position.
Semioticians have often raised the question o f the epistemological 
status o f the sciences. But what about the epistemological status of 
semiotics itself? Is it not all too often taken for granted by semioti­
cians that their discipline provides a privileged vantage point? Is this 
really so? What kind o f knowledge does semiotic inquiry produce? 
What does semiotic knowledge consist of? Are the methodologies 
used by semioticians reliable? These questions are in order for who­
ever tries to explore the interface between semiotics and the sciences.
1. Semiotics and the sciences
For the sake o f heuristic simplification, we can consider that there are 
at least four basic ways o f acquiring knowledge, that is, meaningful 
information either in the form o f solutions to well defined problems or 
counterintuitive discoveries that bring forth new ways of interpreting 
data and the life experience in general. The great majority o f those 
involved in research are likely to agree that these four ways of 
acquiring knowledge include the following.
(i) The construction o f problems based on the state o f knowledge in a 
particular domain and the invention o f methods to solve these prob­
lems. For instance, it is known that some experienced events are 
somewhat represented in the human brain and remain accessible to 
consciousness only for a limited time after which they fade away,
while some others are stored in a manner such that they remain acces­
sible practically for a life time. Thus, neuropsychologists distinguish 
working memory (that ensures the conscious binding o f the parallel 
and successive stages o f a complex task), short-term memory (that 
lasts from a few hours to a few days) and long-term memory (that 
persists over years and decades). These various kinds o f memory can 
be selectively impaired by brain traumas and diseases. Therefore it can 
be assumed that either the storage processes or the accessibility 
processes, or both, are supported by different neurological networks 
and architectures. Consequently, neuroscientists design experiments in 
order to obtain evidence toward a solution to the precise problems that 
can be formulated with respect to which specific cognitive deficits can 
be correlated with which functional part(s) o f  the brain.
(ii) Another way to obtain information is by reasoning and argumen­
tation that build virtual models either through a calculus which is 
blindly pursued to its ultimate consequences, or a systematic meta­
phorical extension o f patterns across apparently distant domains o f 
experience. A good example o f this is Gabriel Tarde’s elaboration o f a 
nominalistic model o f collective behaviour based on imitation and his 
extension o f epidemiological models to the understanding o f lan­
guages and other semiotic systems as social phenomena (Tarde 1903). 
More recently, a similar reasoning lead evolutionists such as George 
Williams (1966), Richard Dawkins (1976) and Terrence Deacon 
(1997) and social scientists such as Luigi Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus 
Feldman (1981) and Dan Sperber (1996) to formulate counterintuitive 
hypotheses purporting to explain cultural emergence, diffusion and 
transformation through the biological notions o f parasitism and 
contagion. Similarly, Levi-Straussian structuralism introduced a new 
vision of cultures by pushing to their conceivable limits the models 
extrapolated from structural linguistics (Levi-Strauss 1963).
These two ways o f producing information are deliberate and 
controlled. They usually operate in complementary manner. The latter 
may lead to formulating precise problems such as the question o f how 
cultural knowledge is represented in the human brain. Is it through 
digital algorithms or prototypical analogical models? Is its storage 
content specific? Cognitive neurologists contend that cultural infor­
mation is acquired, stored and accessed in a manner that is different
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from episodic memory (working, short- or long-term) and various 
people have given various names to cultural memory, some calling it 
“semantic memory”, some “generic knowledge” or “general 
knowledge o f the world” (see Tulving 1995). Another question is 
whether this kind o f memory is a sort o f procedural memory —  that is, 
the memory that supports skills, habits, all that can be defined as 
instances o f “knowing how” rather than “knowing that” —  or is it 
implemented through specific processes in a distinct architecture.
(iii) A third way o f acquiring knowledge is through chance discovery, 
also called serendipity, the surprising occurrence o f an empirical event 
that is beyond the scope o f rational expectations as defined by a state 
o f knowledge in a given domain. Short o f probing at random, there 
cannot be a cost-efficient method that produces serendipity. But, in 
spite o f its unpredictability, serendipity is far from being a negligible 
aspect in the edification o f scientific knowledge. If cognitive neuro­
scientists now tentatively distinguish at least five kinds of memory 
(namely, 1 —  procedural or non-declarative, 2 —  episodic or per­
sonal, event memory , 3 —  perceptual priming memory, 4 —  primary, 
short-term or working memory, 5 —  semantic memory), it is because 
these categories emerged from surprising observations (e. g., 
Blakemore 1977). Striking examples have come from pathological 
cases that showed the selective impairment o f only one of the five 
kinds o f  memory that are currently distinguished as a result of these 
observations rather than as result o f pure reasoning. Earlier clinical 
categorisations such as dementia or amnesia are now replaced by more 
refined cognitive pathological categories, and several explanatory 
models are competing for confirmation either through case studies or 
through non-invasive observations.
(iv) Finally, an important source o f information comes from an 
approach to research that is called “meta-analysis”. It consists of 
reading through a large number o f specialised scientific publications, 
selected among the published literature in one or several domains of 
inquiry, and o f relating the partial results within a more encompassing 
model than the ones that are held by the various specialists concerned. 
In so doing, results are assessed in view o f whether or not they are 
congruent with a particular hypothesis, and thus support or weaken an 
argument. If data appears to contradict each other, it may be that some
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data are artefacts o f the experiments or that the model needs to be 
changed in order to accommodate those seemingly incompatible data. 
It happens indeed that trough meta-analysis some unexpected patterns 
emerge which lead to new theories.
How does today’s semiotics fare with respect to these four ways o f 
acquiring knowledge? Putting aside the part o f semiotic discourse that 
consists o f mere doctrinal exegesis o f speculative texts written in a 
more or less remote past, it would seem that semiotics is an episte- 
mological enterprise that, until now, has relied upon argumentation 
and meta-analysis rather than upon experimentation and serendipity. 
While there is always a more or less latent expectation o f revolutio­
nary discovery in the sciences, the epistemological horizon o f today’s 
semiotics is fairly redundant and lacks a sense o f risk. Information 
comes more in the relative form o f reconfigurations or formalizations 
of established knowledge than in the form o f radical paradigmatic 
shifts. This remark is not meant to question the validity o f semiotics 
with respect to the construction o f scientific knowledge. On the 
contrary, argumentation and meta-analysis are essential parts o f  even 
the most specialised empirical research since any design o f experi­
ments is necessarily based on some form o f argument derived from 
past experimental results, but this is done usually within the confines 
of a disciplinary culture or subculture. For instance, neuropsycho­
logists currently test the threshold o f facial recognition in patients 
affected by various kinds o f neurological lesions (e. g., Bruce et al.
1992). Clinical data led them to assume that primate faces constitute a 
particular perceptual input that tends to override other inputs and 
focus attention, and that the memory bank o f familiar faces is handled 
by specific brain architectures and circuitry . For instance, experiments 
in this domain consist o f testing the speed o f recognition o f a visual 
pattern as a face using as inputs various versions o f a drawing or o f a 
photograph representing a human face (degree o f schematization or 
disorganization, unusual orientation, different patterns o f light and 
shadow, scale o f chromatic saturation, etc.) both in nonnal and brain- 
impaired patients. Other experiments test the recognition o f familiar 
faces (kins, historical figures or contemporary celebrities) (Mosco- 
vitch et al. 1997). The punctual results thus obtained can become 
significant only through wide-ranging meta-analyses o f similar 
published experiments, as well as psychological and ethnological
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reports concerning the importance o f facial recognition and cate­
gorisation in social transactions from an evolutionary point o f view. It 
is known, for instance, that monkeys recognize individual infants in 
their band and behave toward each o f them in view o f their past 
experience with the infants' mothers, that is, what is a particular 
m other’s rank and whether they have with her a history o f mutual 
support or aggression (Cheney, Seyfarth 1990; Kummer 1995). 
However, meta-analysis across disciplines is extremely rare in the 
sciences, and the role o f semioticians in this respect is crucial. Even if 
they tend to jum p to unwarranted conclusions, or to reduce a wealth of 
data to the few abstract categories that their particular brand of 
semiotics has dreamed, the epistemological dynamic thus created can 
only feed further speculations, argumentations and experiments. 
Naturally, this can be true only as long as semioticians develop and 
cultivate interfaces with the researchers in the sciences, and do not 
lock themselves within a solipsist formal system or a mythical grand 
narrative.
2The challeng of memory
Considering that semiotics takes as its main object o f inquiry systems 
o f signs that are learned (languages, cultural codes, social discourse, 
etc.), it is surprising that so few semioticians so far have shown a 
marked interest in the science o f memory. Moreover, although most 
semiotic models that have been produced to date imply some form of 
constitutive duration over time —  let them be associative, mimetic, 
intertextual, processual, dialogical, dialectical, and so on —  the issue 
o f their memory foundations has been generally obfuscated by 
considerations bearing upon their logical consistency. We can say that, 
all in all, memory is taken for granted in semiotic speculations as we 
take for granted the oxygen we breathe. Unfortunately, the memory 
that is taken for granted is a fallacious representation that is con­
ceived, in mediaeval manner, as a faculty o f  the mind, together with 
imagination, emotion, reason, volition and the like. Semiotic models 
construct a kind o f virtual universe to which common sense know­
ledge and thought experiments lend a degree o f  credibility. Semiotic 
models are indeed often introduced and delivered through a rhetoric of 
philosophical persuasion and the way some o f  these models have
Semiotics as the science o f memory 77
spread among fairly large constituencies owes a great deal to the 
charisma o f a few individuals and the institutional pressures they 
create. Like sects, some semiotic models offer a theory o f everything 
rife with tautological predications and self-fulfilling prophecies. They 
lack the capacity o f  constructing a horizon o f ignorance, that is, to 
formulate real problems that can be solved, so as to provide the means 
o f eliciting true information (Bouissac 1992). Fortunately, semiotics 
fosters since its early beginnings a critical capacity that it can apply to 
itself as well to other epistemological constructs. It is within the 
purview o f the semiotic project to critically raise the issue o f why 
memory is so conspicuously absent from contemporary mainstream 
semiotic discourse.
Memory has been a topos o f western philosophical discourse at least 
since Plato. If innate ideas constitute a sort o f ontological memory, 
recoverable through anamnesis, signs are only shadows o f shadows and 
what is learned and remembered through sensorial experience can only 
be accidental and superficial. The relative significance o f these two 
kinds o f memory —  ontological and accidental —  in Aristotle and 
Augustine is endlessly debated in the Middle Ages. For instance, 
Richard Fishacre and his disciple Robert Kilwardby (ca 1215-1279) 
pursued this debate by explicitly distinguishing two types o f memory 
(Popkin 1999: 239-241). Such a distinction is based on impression, 
reasoning and argumentation rather than upon psychological evidence. 
Later philosophers, relying on both logical reasoning and psychological 
evidence provided by controlled introspection or other empirical obser­
vations, will propose different kinds o f distinctions, always pointing to 
the fact that memory is not a simple, wholesome faculty but a complex, 
more or less diversified set o f competencies. For instance, Bergson 
(1914) distinguishes “habit-memory” (the capacity o f remembering 
something one has learned) from “pure memory” or “recollection” (the 
capacity o f representing in the present something one has experienced 
in the past). Taking issue with Russell’s logico-philosophical views on 
the relationship o f memory to knowledge (1921), Ryle (1949) points out 
that when we use the verb “remembering” we may mean any o f the 
following different senses: “retaining”, “memorizing”, “recognizing” or 
“recollecting”. However, these distinct processes remain for him 
“aspects” o f a single knowledge property. The details o f this continuing 
philosophical discussion o f memory are documented informatively in 
von Leyden (1961). With the emergence o f experimental psychology
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(the first laboratory was founded in Leipzig by Wundt in 1879) memory 
became a prime target o f systematic investigations (e. g., Ebbinghaus 
1885), with contrasting new approaches brought about, as time un­
folded, by Bartlett (1932), Lashley (1950) and Penfield (1975), to name 
only a few.
This brief, sketchy and patchy excursus into the history of the 
science o f memory in the context o f European research institutions 
underlines the strangeness o f the conspicuous absence o f concern for 
the science o f memory in contemporary European semiotic discourse.
3. Sign processes as memory processes
While keeping in mind that the development o f a science o f memory 
is an on-going process, three possible bridges or anchor points 
between semioticians and the researchers who investigate the various 
forms o f memory can be suggested: (a) a re-evaluation o f the notion of 
semiosis in view o f current neuropsychological knowledge concerning 
memory; (b) a reconsideration o f semiosis in view of the development 
o f evolutionary approaches in psychology; (c) a critical questioning of 
the communication model that pervades semiotics in view of alter­
native models provided by biological theories o f imitation and 
contagion.
3.1. Semiosis and memory
The notion o f semiosis now pervades the semiotic discourse. It is used 
sometimes in a technical sense in relation to Peirce’s system of 
thought, sometimes it refers more casually to the action of signs as 
opposed to a static vision o f sign structures. In spite o f these frequent 
uses semiosis remains a rather vague notion that minimally includes 
the idea o f directionality, transitivity, mediation, transformation and, 
more generally, dynamism. But even if  the (intensional) definition 
lacks precision, there is no shortage o f examples. At least as far as 
primates, including humans, are concerned, semiosis is a process that 
is not conceivable in the absence o f a brain. The state o f  knowledge in 
the cognitive neurosciences may be still short o f  a definitive answer to 
many problems, but there is nevertheless a wealth o f recent
discoveries, which should allow semioticians to go beyond simplistic 
notions such as semiosis in their efforts to understand the processes 
that involve signs. A phenomenological description o f any semiosic 
event reveal that all the memory systems which have been elucidated 
during the last few decades must be factors in such processes. 
Reconceiving semiosis in view o f these memory systems reveals 
parameters, which remain conceptually invisible in the model as long 
as semiosis is understood as a general, all-purpose competence o f the 
mind.
Let us take, as a typical act o f semiosis, the reading o f a multi- 
media message such as a comic strip (Gubem 1998) or a joke that 
involves a gesture as its punchline (Sebeok 2001: 115-119). The syn­
tactic and pragmatic dimensions o f such messages require the mental 
capacity o f holding their simultaneous and immediate successive 
components in the unified structure o f the task. But the acts o f  reading 
or joke understanding demand that other cognitive resources be 
available, some coming from the knowledge accumulated in the 
relatively recent past (e. g., recent political events), some belonging to 
a stock o f data that have been stored for so long in the memory o f the 
decoder that he/she does not remember when or how he/she acquired 
this knowledge. This applies to both the "knowledge o f 1 (for instance 
the list o f capital cities in the world) and the "knowledge how" (for 
instance how to read). Often, partial information such as the beginning 
o f a sentence will trigger the automatic completion o f a proverb, for 
instance, or the mention or vision o f an object will trigger an 
association o f a paradigmatic or syntagmatic kind. Looking at memory 
as a mere general competence that can be taken for granted overlooks 
the complex synergy o f semiosis and its reliance on the memory 
systems that have been independently fine-tuned by evolution under 
distinct and specific environmental constraints.
Working memory, short term memory, semantic memory, long 
term memory, procedural memory, priming memory have been 
distinguished by neuropsychologists not for the sake o f classification 
but because there is cumulative evidence that these events are 
supported by distinct brain architectures and circuitry since each o f 
these functions can fail while the others continue to operate. Semiotics 
has not paid enough attention to the dysfunctions o f communication 
and sense making. Roman Jakobson is the exception, although it is 
now recognized that he may have jum ped too quickly to generali-
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sations (Jakobson. Halle 1956). What neurologists traditionally called 
dementia can be shown to be specific semiosic dysfunctions caused by 
various impairments o f memory systems. Semioticians would learn a 
lot about semiosis if  they were teaming up more efficiently with 
cognitive neuroscientists who try to make sense o f the fine-grained 
pathologies o f human cognition, which until recently were lumped 
together under the gross category' o f deep amnesia or dementia. A 
meta-analysis o f clinical case studies by semioticians would un­
doubtedly yield data relevant to a better understanding o f semiosis.
3.2. Evolutionär}- approaches in psychology and 
the science o f memory
Early empirical research on memory' assumed that the human brain 
was a tabula rasa and that the faculty' o f memory' could be better 
tested with arbitrary, nonsensical sounds or patterns. This is what did 
Ebbinghaus in 1885, following Gustav Theodor Fechners psycho­
physical methods for the study o f the '"higher mental processes” 
(Ebbinghaus 1964). The idea that associations can be created at will 
w ith the help o f the proper method or through the open-ended hap­
penings o f experience remains at the base o f the semiotic approaches 
that emerged at the turn o f the 20th century. But it took time for 
alternative perspectives to gain scientific credentials. The most 
enlightening is perhaps the British psychologist Frederick Bartlett 
(1887-1969), a professor o f experimental psychology at the university 
o f Cambridge whose Remembering: A study in experimental and 
social psychology (1932) demonstrates what we would call now a 
marked semiotic sensitivity in as much as his experiments take into 
account the study o f the conditions o f  organic and mental functions. 
Rather than aiming at a mere analysis o f abstract, all-purpose mental 
structures, he tested memory with material that is o f interest to 
humans as a species (let it be through linguistic or visual input). 
Bartlett acknowledged the evolutionär) constraints that must have 
moulded the various memory competencies. In animal ethology, 
Konrad Lorenz (1981) focused on a similar sort o f constraints by 
considering patterned behaviour as a result o f the same evolutionär}' 
laws that created organs if  only because, even if  the brain evolved a 
general competence to learn, this competence remains determined by
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the law o f evolution, in the same manner as an omnivorous organism 
is only relatively omnivorous. From the contemporary point o f view 
o f evolutionary memory, memory cannot be a general competence that 
would be the result o f a mere general plasticity o f the brain. Each 
memory system must have evolved under specific selection pressures 
and, consequently, must be content-specific (Gallistel 1995; Desimone 
1995).
A case in point is working memory, that is, the capacity to hold in 
awareness a bundle o f relevant information with respect to a particular 
task or event. There are two sets o f  constraints on this system: first the 
limits o f the sensorial input (i.e., the limits o f the sensorial apparatus 
of Homo sapiens) and the limits o f the capacity o f the memory system 
both in range and duration (this capacity varies among individuals but 
has absolute limits that preclude the simultaneous consideration o f a 
large informational set. The maximum capacity can be understood as 
being sufficient for survival in the physical and social contexts in 
which it has evolved. Another case in point is that some kind o f 
information cannot be recorded but are forgotten beyond their echoic 
or iconic resonance as if the scratchpads, as some psychologists call 
these, were automatically erased by the system (Horowitz, Wolfe 
1998; Ward 1998). Information that cannot be construed as meaning­
ful is as interesting for semiotics as information that is construed as 
meaningful. Likewise for meaningful information that is not remem­
bered, or remembered for a limited time.
3.3. Imitation as memory
The dominance o f the communication model in semiotics both in its 
functionalist and its technological forms has reduced imitation to a 
special case o f either forms: mechanical replications and functional 
equivalences. Imitation has been the focus o f  attention almost 
exclusively as an intentional, psychological, goal-oriented behaviour, 
mostly in the context o f  aesthetics under the name o f mimesis or more 
generally as an instance o f iconism. In the same way, mimetism has 
been treated as a special case o f animal signalling. But the notion o f 
imitation as a general process through which behaviour o f any sort 
spread among organisms o f one or several species has been the object 
of scant attention. Perhaps this is because contemporary semiotics has
developed under the umbrella o f individualistic psychology and 
continues to carry an implicit teleological ideology o f free subjects 
from whom emanates intentional communicative behaviour (the 
psychoanalytical perspective enhances rather than mitigates this focus 
on the individual). However since Gabriel Tarde’s revolutionary 
theory o f imitation, that stood as a nominalistic alternative to the 
sociological model propounded by Emile Durkheim, imitation and its 
obvious reliance on memory has been the object o f isolated specu­
lations adumbrating a different semiotic paradigm. One o f the most 
serious problems raised by semiotic theories based on communication 
is that they do not fit well with evolutionist perspectives (Bouissac
1993). Many phenomena labelled as communicative are better 
described as imitative. It seems that this stream o f speculation is now 
coming o f age following its effective popularisation by Richard 
Dawkins who recognized his debt to George W illiams’ ideas when he 
coined the word meme. Since then, a powerful movement has 
developed under the name o f memetics whose relevance to the main 
issues o f semiotics is obvious. Terrence Deacon’s The Symbolic 
Species (1997) offers an innovative integration o f the concept of 
meme as parasite in an explicitly semiotic theory o f the origin of 
symbols and languages. It amounts to a Copemican revolution in the 
understanding o f signs and semiosis in as much as signs are con­
ceptualised as agents, rather than passive tools, that exploit the human 
brain as a resource for their replication. Like in any parasitic 
relationship, the meme-brain coevolution presupposes that the initial 
resource —  in this particular case, a memory resource —  evolved 
under independent evolutionary constraints. This counter-intuitive 
theoretical vista can open the way to formulating hypotheses that 
could be tested in the context o f what could be called "‘wet” 
semiotics —  that is, semiotic research conducted in the neurological 
clinical laboratory —  in contrast with “dry” semiotics, or ‘‘armchair 
semiotics” (Bouissac 1998a; 1998b).
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Conclusion
Obviously, I have relied in this paper on argumentative and meta- 
analytical strategies. The advantage o f this combined approach is that 
it allows external information to constrain and control speculation and
thus to avoid the pitfalls o f  purely subjective evidence and thought 
experiments. However it is not either without dangers: (i) reasoning is 
on the one hand subject to cognitive illusions, and, on the other hand, 
it is to a larger extent than usually thought, historically conditioned by 
a particular Zeitgeist or episteme; to perceive and appreciate infor­
mation sometimes requires that we “unthink” basic knowledge we 
take for granted; (ii) the value o f meta-analysis depends o f how 
complete is the literature that is perused; not only is the selection o f 
the corpus under the dependence o f the indi vidual preconceptions o f 
the researcher but information comes prepackaged so to speak by 
disciplinary gatekeepers. Moreover, this information is couched in 
specialized languages often hard to decipher, and the experimental and 
theoretical landscape o f a vast and diversified domain like the 
neurosciences is fast changing. With respect to the particular topic that 
has been the focus o f this paper, two multidisciplinary scientific 
journals offer a wide array o f research papers among which appear 
fairly regularly some articles relevant to the cognitive neurosciences, 
in particular to memory. These are Nature and Science. Should a 
breakthrough occur in the understanding o f memory, or memes, it is 
more than likely that it would be reported in their pages. The Annual 
Review o f Neuroscience and The Journal o f Cognitive Neuroscience 
are also reliable sources o f information for whoever wants to keep an 
eye on developments in the field. There also appears once or twice a 
decade a collective volume that provide state o f the art knowledge in 
the neurophysiology o f cognitive functions (e. g., Gazzaniga 1995). 
But, more importantly, there exist at least two journals devoted to 
memory research in relation to domains akin to semiotics: Memory 
and Cognition and Memory and Language. Both offer articles very 
relevant to the sort o f problems that have been indicated in this paper.
To conclude on an optative note, it would make sense for 
1ASS/AIS to endeavour to create a journal titled Memory and Semio­
tics, whose function would be to develop much further the interface 
between semiotics and psychology (developmental psychology, 
neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, computational psychology, 
and whatever other subspecialties and emerging paradigms that may 
appear in the near future). This would provide both a focus and a 
forum for many younger researchers interested in constructing
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productive interfaces between the rich speculations o f semiotics and 
the methods o f the empirical sciences.
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Семиотика как наука о памяти
Понятие культуры предполагает, что алгоритмы, которые офор­
мляются в ходе социализации ребенка или (в меньшей мере) в ходе 
ассимилации иммигрантов в новое общество, довольно стабильны. 
Семиотика культуры пользовалась для осмысления этого процесса 
понятиями знака и знаковых процессов, считая память в качестве 
определенной способности (affordance) мозга само собой разу­
меющейся, не спрашивая, как и почему знаки вообще могут постоян­
ным образом влиять на поведение человека. По правде говоря, 
находящаяся под влиянием структурализма семиотика создала 
только выдающиеся синхронные описания. Динамическими моделя­
ми пользовались хтя описания действий знака (т.е., семиозиса, 
диалогизма и диалектики) и результатов этих действий —  изменений 
в кулыуре и культурное многообразие. Все же эти модели оста­
вались довольно абстрактными и отдалились от реальных мозговых 
процессов. В то же время именно мозговые процессы связаны с 
возникновением, сохранением и изменениями культуры. Семиоти­
ческая терминология внесла большой вклад в систематическое 
понимание объектов и процессов культуры, в то же время фило­
софский фон основных понятий семиотики не позволяет продук­
тивно сотрудничать с когнитивными дисциплинами нейрологии, 
которые в течении последних десятилетий достигли значительных 
успехов в понимании памяти. Цель настоящей статьи —  обратить 
внимание на факт, что дальнейшее развитие семиотики требует 
перехода от философских и лингвистических понятий к биологи­
ческим и эволюционным моделям.
Semiootika kui mäluteadus
Kultuuri mõiste eeldab, et algoritmid, mis kujunevad välja lapse sotsia- 
liseerumise või (ehkki vähemal määral) immigrantide uude ühiskonda 
assimileerumise käigus, on suhteliselt stabiilsed. Kultuurisemiootika on
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selle protsessi mõtestamiseks kasutanud märgi ja  märgiprotsesside 
mõistet, pidades mälu kui aju teatud lubavust (affordance) iseenesest 
mõistetavaks, küsimata endalt, kuidas ja  miks suudavad märgid üldse 
inimese käitumist püsival moel mõjutada. Kui aus olla, on strukturalismi- 
mõjuline semiootika jõudnud vaid väljapaistvate sünkroonsete kirjeldus­
teni. Dünaamilisi mudeleid on kasutatud, analüüsimaks märgitoimeid (st 
semioosi, dialogismi, dialektikat) ning nende poolt tekitatud kultuurilisi 
muutusi ja mitmekesisust. Siiski on need mudelid jäänud kaunis abstrakt­
seteks ja on reaalsetest ajuprotsessidest kuidagi eemaldunud. Ometi on 
just ajuprotsessid need, mis on seotud kultuuride esilekerkimise, püsimise 
ja muutustega. Semiootiline terminoloogia on andnud suure panuse 
kultuuriobjektide ning -protsesside süstemaatilisse kirjeldusse, kuid se­
miootika põhimõistete filosoofiline taust on teinud võimatuks semiootika 
produktiivse lõimumise kognitiivsetega neuroteadustega, mis on viimaste 
aastakümnete vältel teinud märkimisväärseid edusamme mälu mõistmisel. 
Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on juhtida tähelepanu asjaolule, et semioo­
tika edasine areng nõuab üleminekut filosoofilistelt ja  lingvistilistelt 
mõistetelt bioloogilistele ja  evolutsioonilistele mudelitele.
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Abstract. The temporal orientations of any sociocultural grouping are major 
factors comprising its central identity. The manner in which the past 
(memories), the present (perception), and the future (anticipation/expectation) 
are commonly articulated also concern cultural identity. The identity of a 
cultural group is altered by developmental changes in time keeping and 
related objective, scientific temporalities.
Three modes of temporality, objective, narrative, and transcendental, 
congruent with different kinds of brain processes, are common throughout our 
planet. Objective temporality tends to alter and replace traditional narrative 
and transcendental (spiritual) time, timing, and tempos. Objective temporality 
is concerned with what is transitory, modem and “progressive”. Objective 
time is not a traditional form of cultural time; it is a derived Westernized 
scientific imposition, rather than any cultural formation. This essay develops a 
new conception of how semiosis occurs. All information is essentially 
rhythmic, transduced through sensory systems as signals in a space-time 
domain, but deposited for use into a spectral thermodynamic domain in the 
human cortex.
A “chronemic” perspective, (temporality as it is based in semiotic pro­
cesses related to human communication) is assumed throughout. Such a 
perspective appears to be somewhat novel in both communication and se- 
miotic studies.
Introduction
Time study is a very important area o f inquiry. All communicative 
behavior has an underlying temporality, as time in its many forms is 
central to human beings and their lives. The temporal transformations 
o f the globe concern change, rates o f  change, and kinds o f change as 
well as adaptations or resistances to change. Change is basically a 
temporal notion concerned with brain processes. What is new to a 
person within any sociocultural contact situation is what his or her 
brain will reject or acquire. Certain aspects o f brain studies are in­
cluded under another title to outline a new way to understand percep­
tion or semiosis.
It is quite clear that each sociocultural collective can be characte­
rized as having a distinct psychological time configuration in terms of 
the relationships between their pasts, their presents, and their futures. 
These differences, as well as several other very important traditional 
temporal processes, have not been adequately addressed in semiotic 
and communication theory studies. Each sociocultural grouping ex­
hibits unique temporal signals, symbols, beliefs, attitudes, values, and 
motives (Bruneau 1977, 1987, 1988, 1996). Time study requires inter­
disciplinary focus as well as a focus on neglected historical texts. The 
study o f time is ripe for developing new communication theory.
Chronemics concerns the study o f human temporality as it is 
semiotically communicative. This study includes many levels of hu­
man experience and not merely how people objectify, categorize, and 
thingify time keeping. Human processes are deeply embedded as 
temporalities. All genetic, biological, perceptual, psychological, so­
cial, or cultural processes show, indeed, that we are homo temporalis 
(Bradley 1973). Throughout the years, a few studies have been 
presented or published covering many areas o f temporality in an 
attempt to build a “chronemics” (Bruneau 1973, 1974, 1977, 1979a, 
1979b, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1996). Hall developed early ideas 
about time studies and was highly influential in the development of 
time and communication studies (Hall 1952, 1960, 1966, 1983).
The literature on human time experiencing is voluminous and 
complex. The appearance o f Julius T. Fraser’s anthology, The Voices 
o f Time (1966) and the publication o f the proceedings o f a conference 
sponsored by the New York Academy o f Sciences in 1966, Inter­
disciplinary Perspectives o f Time (Fischer 1967), initiated a generative
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impetus toward the study o f human time experiences. These early 
thrusts provided the impetus for the creation o f the International 
Society for the Study o f Time. This writer has been a member o f this 
group for the past 30 years. In 1991, the journal Time & Society 
(1991-) appeared, focusing on social aspects o f temporality. Recently, 
KronoScope: Journal for the Study o f Time (2001-) was launched by 
the International Society for the Study o f Time. A close examination 
of the interdisciplinary time literature, however, shows that some 
scholars in philosophy, physics, biology, and some other fields o f 
study have dedicated themselves to time study and its mysteries long 
before the advent o f these publications.
This essay attempts to bring together some concepts o f time 
experiencing study as they could possibly be applied to semiotic and 
sociocultural communication. In turn, we will consider the need for 
and the neglect o f human time study, the steady spread or diffusion o f 
objective time keeping and its limiting assumptions, implications o f 
recent brain studies, and some considerations about the dynamics o f 
communicative entrainments (adjusting to strangeness) and synchroni- 
city (sharing similar tempos).
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The need for and the importance of time study
While a “chronemics” o f human communication is occasionally 
mentioned in the communication studies literature about time as a 
nonverbal characteristic, it is often only related to a few popular ideas 
such as being on time, waiting, being late, monochronic as opposed to 
polychronic time (Hall 1960, 1966), and punctuation (Watzlawick, 
Beavin, and Jackson 1967). However, there has not been any 
sustained or serious focus on human temporality in communication or 
semiotic studies. I have often claimed that it is not space that is the 
hidden dimension o f human communication (Hall 1966), but it is time 
that is hidden and is a major aspect o f all areas o f semiotic or non­
verbal communication. Time, timing, and tempo actually seem to 
integrate areas o f nonverbal communication not previously considered 
related to time, i.e., proxemics, kinesics, paralinguistics, haptics, 
oculesics, olfaction, and gustation. All are essentially temporally 
wave-based, rhythmic, and neural semiotic processes.
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In the past, statements were collected about the need to study time 
in human conduct, (see below). Around 1990, these statements came 
to a halt and an increase in the study o f time and human relations 
began. The last significant statement about the need for social and 
psychological time study, that I am familiar with, is that o f McGrath 
and Kelly:
Although time has been given considerable attention in philosophy, and in the 
physical and biological sciences, it has been given remarkably little attention 
in the social and behavioral sciences in general, and in psychology and social 
psychology in particular. In mainstream social psychology, time has virtually 
been ignored. (McGrath, Kelly 1992: 399-400)
Some scholars in their fields o f study begin the study o f temporality 
by discovering its all-pervasive importance and, then, realize that they 
are exploring and charting exciting new territories. The attestations to 
the importance o f time studies have not been heeded to-date in com­
munication or semiotic studies, but these attestations spanning several 
decades are important to understanding the value o f incorporating time 
study in human contact studies. These statements below are important 
because they not only show a continuing lack o f scholarly focus, but a 
continual and present need for time study in human relations.
Long ago, Frank stated that,
Perhaps no area is more in need of exploration for its temporal implications 
than the field of human conduct and none offers more promise of fruitful 
reward for imaginative speculation, since all human conduct [...] is 
conditioned by [...] the time perspectives of the individual and his culture [...]. 
(Frank 1939: 294)
Innis (1952: 57) observed that, “A neglect o f the time problem implies 
a lack o f interest in theoretical problems”. Hall stated that, “Ame­
ricans are perplexed by people w'ho [operate without clock time] [...] 
we can no longer neglect other conceptions o f reality” (Hall 1959: 
138). Polak (1961: 138), in discussing variable future perspectives, 
said, “Each cultural epoch has its own unique fitting images of the 
future [...] certain types o f [people] hold certain types o f visions”.
The sociologist Moore (1963), stressed the need for communica­
tive and social time study four decades ago:
Conceptions of time are distinctly variable from one culture to another. Yet 
the ordering of social behavior has received only sporadic or intermittent 
attention by the sciences dealing with man [...] The focus on time as a central 
feature of order and sequence [...] is so minimally developed that no one has 
even invented a name for a science of the temporal dimensions of social life. 
(Moore 1963: 5)
Doob (1971: 63) noted that, “All aspects o f time that are standardized 
within a society —  the modal information, standards, perspectives —  
may be utilized as clues to understanding the significance o f many 
forms o f behavior” . According to Cohen (1971: 153-154), “A scienti­
fic world picture with pretensions to comprehensiveness cannot refuse 
to reckon [...] with the experience o f time”. Maxwell observed that:
Anthropological theorizing about time perspectives and time-reckoning 
schemes is still in the formative stage. The cross-cultural study of time has 
not yet been given a name, nor have ‘schools’ of thought about the subject 
emerged within the discipline. No anthropologist is known as a specialist in 
time studies. (Maxwell 1972: 47^48)
Fisher (1978: 79-80), a communication theorist, commented that, 
“Time is, without doubt, one o f the most crucial, yet most neglected 
variables o f communication [...] [a] failure or unwillingness or 
inability to deal with the complexity o f time, its varied aspects and 
dimensions”. The social temporalist, Zerubavel, noted that, “While 
time is definitely one o f the most central dimensions o f the social 
world, it has so far been relatively neglected by sociologists [...] as a 
topic in its own right”, (1981: ix; also see, Zerubavel 1979, 2003). In 
his revolutionary book, The Dance o f Life: The Other Dimension o f 
Time, Hall (1983: 184) stated that, “In this book, I have done my best 
to sketch the outlines o f what will someday be an active, important 
major field o f study, with significance to everybody”. However, H all’s 
book on time has never gained any import in communication studies, 
as did his previous texts, and it is seldom cited by communication 
scholars. McGrath and Kelly (1986: v) asserted that, “The study o f 
time at the social-psychological level is important. It is relatively 
uncharted area, with new ideas awaiting researchers at every turn. It is 
a topical area too long neglected. And, we believe, it will be even 
more important in the future.” Maines lamented the scarcity o f 
temporal focus in sociological theory:
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To purport to engage in an act of sociological inquiry is to commit oneself to 
the investigation of temporality [...] it is a basic mechanism through which 
social acts, organizations, institutions, cultures, and social structures exist and 
operate [...] there can be no genuine sociological theory [or semiotic and 
communication theory] that does not contain an underlying theory of 
temporality. (Maines 1987: 303)
What is amazing about all o f these important calls for consideration of 
time study in the semiotics o f interpersonal, social, and cultural 
communication contexts, is that few o f them have been heeded at this 
date and a relative lack o f focus on human temporality currently 
continues in these area studies.
It is not just the idea that time study is terribly complex; it is also a 
matter o f assumptive neglect. The neglect assumes that: time is what 
a clock does; personal, social, and cultural dimensions o f time are not 
real or valid; scientific uses o f objective time are valid and natural to 
human living. However, Priestly observed that Westerners “hyposta- 
tize” time, “ [...] to give actual existence to a concept [process, act, 
event, etc.] abstracted from our experience o f succession” (1964: 53). 
It is typical o f English and other Northern European languages to 
objectify and spatialize reality, to thingify. Word frequency counts 
find the words “is,” “it” and “thing” to be some of the most used 
words in English. So, we often say “What time is it?” instead of 
saying “What is time?”
Our linguistic concepts about tense and syntactic systems (not to 
mention punctuation and juncture) impose a bias toward the 
objectification o f time as spatial. WTien we use prepositions that imply 
temporal meanings, such as when we say, “at this point in time,'* 
“across time,” “change over time,” “ahead o f time,” “behind time,'' for 
example, we assume that they are small and simple words. However, 
these small and seemingly simple prepositional words bring into being 
a vast host o f  semantic and epistemological assumptions, (see Bree, 
Feddag, and Pratt 1993) for a more elaborate discussion o f time and 
prepositions). These assumptions, for instance, are inherent in 
diffusion theoiy (how innovations are filtered and flow from suppo­
sedly progressive societies to less progressive ones) as outlined by 
Rogers (1995). Most communication scholars take only a scientific, 
objective time approach to their studies. But, in doing so, omit time as 
highly variable. The position here is that, instead o f objectifying time, 
we should consider “change” as being an important definition o f time.
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Our definition here is that change is equated with temporal variability. 
Time expands and contracts, necessarily, as a very basic human 
condition necessary to brain processes as will be shown under another 
heading.
More change or novelty as information means that time is expe­
rienced as going faster, the less change, the more time seems to drag 
in reference to clock time. Time varies with the speed, amount and 
complexity o f information volume, a ratio o f deja vue (already seen) 
and jamais vue (novel or new) information. “ In-formation” means 
“formation within,” and this definition has consequences in how we 
understand the importance o f brain studies. It is also well known that 
novelty produces highly attentive states, making one’s time appear to 
flow faster, while boring information makes one’s personal time 
appear to drag. An exciting lecture seems to move the hands o f a wall 
clock faster, while a highly boring lecture seems to develop a lethargic 
or frozen clock. Also, the Law o f Janet can be understood as follows: 
how long a moment is, is inversely proportional to the length o f life 
already lived. So, to very young children, time seems to drag, while 
elderly persons feel that time is flying by. This condition concerns the 
amount o f oxygenated blood flowing to the main cortex and the 
lowering of brain temperature as people age. If we equate change with 
time, then to speak o f “change over time” can seem ridiculous, even if 
it is a hallmark o f science. It is not very well understood that scientific 
methodologies are often deeply assumptive about human temporality.
Objective forms o f temporality current in diffusion, develop­
mental, and sociocultural concepts concern time keeping and time­
tables (daily timing and calendrical scheduling). Sociocultural kinds 
of temporality, however, concern how people change, resist change, 
adapt to change, expand and contract the present, enact memories, and 
imagine any futurity.
All sociocultural time concerns subjective temporalities, the 
rhythms o f social interaction, as well as psychic temporal orientations. 
Personal time concerns the unique temporalities o f  each individual 
(Bruneau 1977, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1996). All o f  these temporal 
distinctions are implied in any concern with diffusions o f novelties 
across cultures as well as most developmental and sociocultural 
communication contacts. While there are marginalized people in every 
sociocultural grouping, most individual tempos often reflect those
Time, change, and sociocultural communication 95
96 Thomas J. Bruneau
exhibited in one’s primary reference groups. There are, however, 
common temporal norm violations and problems.
The notion o f “time” is often assumed in technologically advanced 
societies to be what clocks and calendars and their extensions do. It 
will be argued here that all technologies, especially those based in 
media transmissions, are merely extensions o f clock time, which is the 
basic medium o f all technological media. Yet, tremendous numbers of 
people spread throughout the globe do not wear watches on their 
wrists. Investing money into the clock-making industry is still a good 
idea. Clocks, calendars, and time zones actually are not what time is; 
they tend to eliminate natural human time, the subjective temporality 
o f individuals and cultural groupings. This is especially important in 
understanding those global groupings that can be conceived as 
“traditional”. To assume that the clock is time is common and neces­
sarily convenient to the evolution and diffusion o f Western scientific 
objectivity and lineal reality parading as “modem progression” 
globally, a growing linearity. The oldest and most persistent “inno­
vation” in a global context is that o f objective time related to time­
keeping assumptions. An excellent reference on the “semiotics of 
wristwatches” is an article by (Freake 1995). However, a huge litera­
ture exists on the concepts o f  “time keeping”.
Objective, scientific, and technical time
The clock is the master machine/device o f all scientific and techno­
logical developments. McLuhan (1964: 143) once observed that, 
“Clocks are mechanical [or electronic] media that transform tasks and 
create new work and wealth by accelerating the pace o f human 
association” . Almost all o f our modem communication technologies 
concern faster and faster and more and more contacts between people 
in both their work and private lives. Gonseth commented that:
One speaks as if [...] the indispensable observation clocks were entirely made 
[...] One seems to forget that this clock has not dropped out of the skies, but 
that it had to be put together, and that this could be done by an audacious 
anticipation, by laying down as correct the veiy laws of mechanics that it 
would serve to submit to observations. (Gonseth 1972: 289-290)
Mumford noted that, “The clock [...] is the key machine o f the 
industrial [and the technological and electronic] age” (1962: 14) and 
“The first characteristic o f modem machine civilization is its temporal 
regularity” (1962: 269). An early alarmist, Wright (1958: 7), noted 
that, “This is a history o f an increasing, unchecked, and now intoler­
able chronarchy [...]. Let chronarchy, then, be not merely ‘rule by 
time’, but ‘regimentation o f man by timekeeping’” .
Clocks are created to produce lineally assumed equal intervals in a 
cyclic sequentiality, (the Newtonian equitable flow without reference 
to anything else), which in turn helps people to regularize and 
coordinate divergent personal and sociocultural rhythms. Modem, so- 
called progressive societies would collapse without a common time 
keeping. But, when Einstein was asked for a simple definition o f 
“relativity”, he said, “When you sit with a pretty girl for an hour it 
seems like a minute; but when you are on a “hot seat” for a minute it 
feels like an hour. That’s relativity” (Kugelmass 1967: vi). Actually, 
Einstein was really making a sexual comment about highly attentive 
states as contrasted with physical heat upon biological processes. 
Actually, he often saw relativity in terms o f biological time, rather 
than the time o f physics. His viewpoint was that personal time, or 
what he referred to as “I-time,” cannot be measured. But, increasingly, 
biological rhythms are measurable as noted in the increasing study o f 
chronogenetics and chronobiology. Biological needs become drives, 
if not satisfied. Biological needs create biologic drives that alter both 
the expansion and the contraction o f momentary experience. All 
biological needs and processes have temporal variations, including 
heart and breathing rates related to semiotic interactions. Much more 
study of sociobiological processes should yield important insights for 
semiotic studies.
Communication theorists and researchers have not dealt with 
temporality as complex processes, neglecting especially the idea o f 
human relativity. We will refer to relative temporality as “narrative 
consciousness” (see, for reference to time and narrative, Ricoeur 1984, 
1985, 1888). To neglect relativity is to live in an objective world. This 
can be troubling because it prevents new thinking about human 
interactions. Clocks, timing devices, and objective time constructions 
can occasionally be coordinate with the sociocultural rhythms o f the 
young, the elderly, and most o f the world’s population who are not yet 
on the Internet, but frankly, such coordination is rare.
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The British psychologist, John Cohen (1966: 252) noted that, “[...] 
it is conceivable that our reliance on watches and other artificial aids 
[to timekeeping] has led to an atrophy o f our sense o f tim e”. The iden­
tity o f many people concerns how they measure up to a clock or clock­
like “pacers”, a “clock insanity” can develop (Bruneau 1974). Much 
o f Westernized public interactions take place in an objective time 
angst or with quick glances at clocks and objective time references of 
many kinds. Pointing to the clock as time itself, as an independent, but 
constant variable (a contradiction, because there are no constancies in 
a human processual world) is the first resistance to temporality as a 
complex dependent variable. Startings and stoppings, beginnings and 
endings, befores and afters, zeros and ones, etc., are elusively complex 
and assumptively fixated only as objective time impositions and asser­
tions. However, these tend to regularize our temporal perceptions and 
estimates. As Berg stated, “ If the aim pursued by the clock would be 
realized, there would no longer be time [as subjective or personal]. For 
time is the inequality o f dimensions [...]. An honest clock is 
thoroughly complete in its attempt to eliminate time”, (Berg 1970: 
111-112). Further, as Whitrow (1972: 27) cogently observed, “The 
mechanization o f time helped to disassociate time from human events 
and helped to perpetuate a belief in an independent world o f science”. 
John Dewey said:
Individuality conceived as a temporal development involves uncertainty, 
indeterminacy, or contingency... The mystery of time is [...] the mysteiy of 
the existence of real individuals [...]. Genuine time [...] is all one with the 
existence of individuals as individuals, with the creative, with the occurrence 
of unpredictable novelties [or changes], (Dewey 1940: 204-206)
Personal, social, and psychological temporalities, then, are genuine 
kinds o f time. Clocks do not measure time; they measure assumed 
empty spaces, and actually tend to help spatialize human rhythms and 
processes as statically invisible. What seems to have escaped the 
purview o f diffusion o f innovation, developmental, and sociocultural 
communication theorists is the greatest diffusion o f innovation ever on 
the globe: the slow and persistent diffusion o f Western forms of 
objective time. This global innovation has been increasingly spreading 
a different kind o f temporality for several hundred years. Objective 
time is in the media, the channels o f  TV, the satellites, the computers, 
and all forms o f new technology. These common devices o f most
98 Thomas J. Bruneau
technologically developed nations are not used by the great majority 
of the world’s population. When peoples from various cultures do 
come to use these devices, they change their customary cultural acts, 
events, occasions, etc. Technological and objective temporalities tend 
to significantly alter sociocultural rhythms and tempo.
It was said previously that diffusion theory concerns how new 
ideas and products are accepted or rejected in different global regions 
by individuals and their groups. Diffusion theory appears to be 
epistemologically consistent in the adoption o f a linear progression 
model as the very basis o f its theoretical assumptions (Rogers 1962, 
1983, 1995; Rogers, Shoemaker 1971; Rogers, Kincaid 1981). From a 
Western viewpoint for the purposes o f research, for accountability in 
terms o f diffusion rates, for S-curve production, for the success o f a 
diffusion (novelty or change), and for the need to assess overall 
results, such a linear approach seems natural and justified, if  one 
values objective temporality. After all, corporations and governmental 
agencies expect to know as much as possible about efficiency as well 
as on-going success and knowledge o f results for difficult and expen­
sive efforts.
It is understood here that such a linear, objective time view, when 
diffusions flow into various sociocultural collectives, can and does 
have indigenous sociocultural time resistances and even hostility. 
These resistances, according to Rogers, are important. Rogers noted 
that, “Until we study resistances, they cannot successfully be over­
come. So, diffusion o f innovation scholars should devote more atten­
tion to studying resistances to innovations” (Singhal, Law 1997: 43). 
In selecting and planning for innovation acceptance across socio­
cultural boundaries, it should be noted that temporal compatibility and 
predictability (futurity) within a traditional sociocultural collective 
must be considered as major factors as resistances. As Rogers aptly 
noted in an interview, “It is one thing to study an innovation that has 
diffused after it has done so. It is much more difficult to predict its 
diffusion” (Singhal, Law 1997: 43). Such an accurate prediction 
centers on further understanding o f the neglected temporal differences, 
the basic human rhythms, o f target sociocultural audiences.
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Cultural time concerns the unique and characteristic temporal environ­
ments o f particular sociocultural groupings great and small, formal 
and informal. Each traditional sociocultural collective develops a 
unique style o f temporality. The rhythms o f everyday life, of lan­
guage, o f communicative interaction, o f nature, the rhythms created in 
people built environments, and all nonverbal or semiotic behaviors are 
built upon genetically and metabolically driven biological rhythms 
(Bruneau, 1980, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1995b, 1996, 1997). The 
position here is that all semiotic information is rhythmically-based; 
light waves, sound waves, pressure waves, molecular waves, and 
chemical waves aid in the creation o f both individual and cultural 
time. Sociocultural rhythms, from birth to death, are inducted into 
each and every individual, into his or her everyday life, with rhythms 
arising from one’s collective and its many rhythmicities. Sociocultural 
time also concerns how a collective develops a past, a present, and a 
future as its psychological time shared by its members. Authentic time 
is how change changes, how dynamic here-and-now processes vary, 
how there are kinds and rates o f change, and how authentic human 
time concerns the unique and divergent temporalities o f individuals 
interacting rhythmically within sociocultural collectives.
All cultural groups tend to develop unique, indigenous codifica­
tions o f a naturalistic time (sunsets, siestas, when the birds first sing in 
the morning, when birds or fish return etc.) not necessary to clocks. 
Time reckoning by celestial bodies, the indigenous accounting of the 
rhythms o f nature and the seasons, and biological events have evolved 
for many, many thousands o f years where people have not needed a 
clock to tell them that they are hungry or that it is time to change their 
wakefulness. The manner in which the past is codified in language, in 
nonverbal communication, in rituals, in ceremonies, in dances, in 
songs, etc., varies considerably from one cultural group to another. 
There are many kinds o f ‘"histories”, not simply one history as defined 
by Western societies. Mythic history is common throughout the globe 
and Western history is no exception. Each religious grouping, too, has 
its past codified as a permanent exactitude leading to a happy or sad 
hereafter. Quests for permanency are commonly, but differentially, 
balanced with the processual flight o f  impermanence everywhere.
Sociocultural rhythms (cultural time)
It is not possible here to fully discuss sociocultural rhythmicity. 
However, three classical scholars o f time and sociocultural change 
seem to nicely summarize what should be minimally said. Leonard 
Doob (1971: 49-60) outlined a series o f propositions about tem po­
rality in social and cultural perspectives. Some o f them are:
Periodic changes in the external milieu invariably and everywhere provide the 
potential for acquiring knowledge concerning the duration and succession of 
intervals and for the arousal of temporal motives. (49)
All persons everywhere are oriented periodically toward the past, the 
present, and the future. (52)
Modally within the person, within significant groups, and within the 
society as a whole, one temporal perspective rather than another is likely to be 
facilitated. (54)
The modal temporal perspective of a society reflects and affects a modal 
philosophy of values pertaining to other behavior. (56)
The stronger the temporal perspective, the weaker the orientation in other 
directions. (59)
Each society provides appropriate information for passing temporal 
judgments. (Doob 1971: 60)
Lomax offers us one o f the keenest and distinct descriptions o f cultu­
ral rhythmicity:
Rhythm is, after all, a prime mover in social relations. Rhythmic patterns 
facilitate the co-activity of groups and aid their members in coordinating 
energies and resources in work, nurturance, defense, social discourse, rites of 
passage, interchange of information, and, above all, expressive acts. The 
important role of rhythms in group behavior suggests that we can view the 
rhythmic aspects of communication as essentially social in nature — a system 
that binds individuals together into effective groups and links groups into 
communities and polities. Each such “rhythmic style”, passed on 
generationally, shapes many aspects of each cultural tradition. (Lomax 1982: 
149)
Semiotic, linguistic, built environment, and social rhythms are 
inducted or channeled into the brains o f individuals (see below). 
Fraisse (1963) describes a process o f “rhythmic induction” whereby 
energy wave fields as rhythms are acquired by individuals develop- 
mentally. Holonomic brain theory, below, describes this process more 
thoroughly. Thus, the individual acquires the sociocultural rhythms o f 
his or her social order for better or for worse. Fraisse (1963: 40-41) 
elegantly describes this process: “Rhythmic induction permits living
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creatures to turn reflex reactions into reactions o f anticipation 
The existence o f organic rhythms induced by periodic variations in the 
environment has particular psychological consequences for [people]. 
They provide [them] with an internal clock”.
Induction concerns, o f course, how brain operations and systems of 
perception or semiosis are temporal processes in interactions between 
nowness (attentiveness, presentness), memories, and forebrain pro­
cesses. These temporal brain systems are analogously approximate to 
all environmental rhythms and simply codify and, then, regulate our 
adaptation to them.
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Brain differences across cultures
It is only possible here to briefly sketch some ideas about brain diffe­
rences and the reader is referred elsewhere for further information 
(Pribram 1971, 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2003, 
2004; Bradley, Pribram 1995; Pribram, Bradley 1998; Bruneau 1985, 
1988, 1989, 1995a, 1997).
Holonomic brain theory and research (Pribram 1990b, 1991, 1999, 
2004) and “connectionist” brain theory (below), when integrated, help 
to explain why brains differ from one individual or cultural grouping 
to another. Holonomic brain theory deals with how rhythmic and 
wave-based energy fields in any person’s various environs are 
converted and transduced or channeled as signalic to brain area corti­
ces. Signalic (semiotic) conductions, as nerve impulses in the regular 
“space-time domain”, are then slowed, converted, and synapically 
spread as thermodynamic transformational patternings in an analogic, 
algebraic, “spectral domain” in the main cortex and several others 
thinly covering some mid-brain organs.
Holonomic brain theory concerns how extremely complex, dyna­
mic and vibrant lakes o f energy or holoscapes (holograms if mea­
sured) interact with other such “configurations”. Each cortical neuron 
is connected dendritically with approximately ten thousand other 
neurons. It is in the many millions o f synaptic connections, working in 
aggregate, that we find the brain’s re-presentation o f any semiotic 
signal. The description concerns thermodynamic transformations 
coupled with brain circuitry connecting various brain areas and medial 
brain organs. Within synapses are microscopic structures called
“microtubuals”. Within the microtubuals are neurochemical processes 
that create photon emissions (Jibu et al. 1994, 1996; Pribram 1990a, 
1991, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2003, 2004). Thus, the main cortex o f the 
brain concerns complex thermodynamics, but the nature o f meanings 
and consciousness concern many puzzles as to how thermodynamic 
photon emissions or cortical “light” relate to meanings. How 
thermodynamic energy is related to systems o f consciousness is highly 
speculative at this juncture. But, a kind o f superconductivity has been 
speculated about “thinking”. It is also important to consider that 
“minding” concerns in-formation or formation within, but “matter” or 
immediate reality concerns ex-formation, (Pribram 2004). The main 
cortex is connected to mid-brain organs and other sub-cortical 
structures by built in brain pathways or circuitry. We will discuss 
some of these important pathways below under the subtitle “Three 
brain axes”.
Connectionist brain theory develops the idea that the “mind” is not 
initially in the brain, but is carried within the energy-based rhythms 
(semiotics) o f any individual’s natural, people built, and sociocultural 
environs to be acquired (see, for example, Fischer 1989, 1990, 1992, 
1996; Freeman 1995; Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1993). The individual 
brain maps upon the messages (the mind) o f its sociocultural rhythmic 
environments. So, perceptions as rhythmicities (semiosis) from the 
sociocultural collective are transduced or impinged upon individual 
brains within an initially limited freedom o f choice. But, each 
individual has a unique genetic and biological thrust against its 
environmental rhythmic configurations and restraints. Each child 
projects against its surrounds differentially and developmentally 
increases his or her projective, top-down brain axis. The brain “re­
presents” (makes present again) the rhythms o f energy patterning 
previously acquired through usage (repetition and redundancy are very 
important). The stored habitual energy analogically maps onto 
rhythmic stimuli present in the three-dimensional world o f matter or 
ex-formation (Pribram 2004). The mapping is never exact and creates 
individual and unique experience. It is “in-formation”, or “formation 
within” which is compared to new experiences as cyclic (in and out) 
perception. It is recursivity and inhibition that concerns regularity and 
one’s re-ality (all again) or stable environment. Novelty or learning 
concerns attending to rhythmicities that vary from our individual 
stabilities or exformations, “matter” .
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The new paradigm is: the brain is the “medium”, the mind is the 
“message”, and communication is the “means” . The brain is the 
medium o f all other media. This obvious fact is not sufficiently 
appreciated for its revolutionary import. Most scholars seem to think 
that what carries a message is its media. But, this is a terrible 
assumption because it is the brain that processes information, media 
devices only transmit information, but only the brain processes 
formations within. Cybernetic developments are making inroads into 
these processes. The brain is central to all information. How the brain 
is constructed (self-organizing theory) is similar in every culture and 
person, but males and females have brain chemical, biological, 
anatomical, and consequent usage pattern tropism differences that can 
account for many sociocultural gendered communicative differences 
(Bruneau 1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2000; LeVay 1993; Loy 1986; 
O ’Keefe, Nadel 1978).
Every child is bom into some kind o f sociocultural collective and 
is exposed or not exposed to other collectives. It is the collective (the 
mind or messages) that develops sociocultural rhythms that are 
channeled into individual brains; the rhythmicities are transduced 
through sensory systems and hippocampal screenings that sort out 
novelty from habituation. This process is described further below in 
considering three brain axes. From a connectionist brain perspective, 
the “mind” is carried in the sociocultural collective and deposited 
purposively or haphazardly into individual brains. It is human commu­
nication, semiotic contact and exchange, that provide the means 
whereby any individual becomes a member o f a particular mind 
already existing in his or her environmental surrounds. The mind is 
acquired however haphazardly or efficiently within the restraints or 
opportunities afforded in every sociocultural collective.
Brain differences across cultural groupings are real and involve 
how energy is habitually and repetitively patterned into the brains of 
its members with the inevitable presence o f signalic noise, as well as 
forgetting. It is complex temporal regularities or pattemings that 
create brain differences from one sociocultural collective and one 
individual to another.
Three brain axes
Brain differences not only involve the regularized rhythms to which 
persons are exposed, but also to the habitual interactions o f three 
major brain axes. The functions o f these axes and their stylized usages 
and interdependencies create different kinds o f consciousness from 
culture to culture. These major axes dynamically intersect and create a 
person’s consciousness within his or her sociocultural collective. 
These axes can be described as: “bottom-up— top-down; “left— right”; 
and, “back— front” (Pribram 1998, 1999, 2003).
“Bottom-up” deals with how all energy is wave-based and is 
“input” or formation within the brain. It concerns all stimuli from our 
senses and our soma transduced and conducted to the brain. The “top- 
down” axis concerns how the brain projects previous habituations 
upon bottom-up processes to create interfaces. We project upon recep­
tions; this is the essence o f semiosis. It is an “ in and out” process, 
rather than an “in or out” process, as behaviorists would have it in 
their brainless endeavors. Thermodynamic energy within the brain 
from previously collected and stored rhythms is projected upon and 
interfaced with energy being transduced. The hippocampus helps to 
map and screen information, allowing novelties to accend to the cortex 
and ignoring habituations (O ’Keefe, Nadel 1979; Isaacson, Pribram 
1986). We imagine reality to be only external to us and stimulus- 
response theory and behaviorist interpretations have created this 
mythology. Behaviorism study has not included brain study, but a 
future neurobehaviorism seem probable. All formation within is 
cyclically and recursively connected with current stimuli projected 
within the sociocultural collective. Some brain formations are 
detrimental to a person, some are liberating. Sociopathic rhythmicities 
are easily mapped upon brains to become problematic in any social or 
cultural grouping.
The “left— right” axis deals with processing information that is 
integrated between the two major hemispheres (Efron 1990). The 
richly myelinated corpus callosal and septal bridges between the 
hemispheres allow for extremely quick interactions and are not meant 
to separate the hemispheric processes, but to conjoin them. The left 
hemisphere is the objective, sequential, area o f the brain. The left 
hemisphere does not usually act independently from the right 
hemisphere, but can do so in the processing o f linear, ordinal, and
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sequential information. Most men seem to be often unable to sustain 
and process information well in the right hemisphere. The right 
hemisphere is the attitudinal, emotional, intuitive, and feeling area of 
the human brain. The right hemisphere concerns flow o f experience, 
narrative, and analogically-based, emotive information processing. 
Men and women differ significantly on the integrations between the 
hemispheres and habitual usage patterning. Women have richer 
connections between the hemispheres and appear to be able to process 
emotional and intuitive information better than men (Bruneau 1995a, 
1995b, 1997).
The “back— front” axis is as important as the “left— right” axis 
(Pribram 1998). The “back” concerns reference memory usage in the 
parietal areas and connects through mid-brain organs with the frontal 
lobes. So, the memory reference area o f the brain (past) is connected 
to the frontal lobe areas (futurity), involving attentive readiness, 
expectation, prediction, forecasting, planning, and anticipatory 
forethought, etc.
The circuitry and structures o f the mid-brain connect these axes to 
define a person’s “re-ality” (all again) at any given moment (Bruneau
1988, 1989, 1995a, 1996, 1997, 2000). The rhythms o f the natural 
and celestial environments are inducted into the brain along with the 
rhythmicities o f the social and constructed environments. Many 
people in so-called “developed” countries have actually lost contact 
with the narratives o f natural environments or these environments are 
completely ignored or have been or are being destroyed. Techno­
logical time is mainly left-brained and concerns objectivities pro­
cessed in the left parietal lobe (back) and sequenced in the left fronto- 
orbital lobe areas (front) as planned futurity. It concerns unitized 
sequentiality and is called “objective consciousness” . It is generally 
egocentrically operational, logically or illogically so. It develops 
slowly in boys and is the reason why boys go over big waterfalls in 
small bad boats. Left brained sequential planning takes years to 
develop, but thinking “ahead” is an art form in great need of 
development through education. The development o f the frontal lobes 
in long range planning is a recent phenomenon, developmentally and 
historically.
The right hemisphere processes attitudes, feelings, emotions and a 
flowing narrative o f experiencing in conjunction with certain mid­
brained circuitry. It concerns empathic forethought and intuition; it is
allocentrically (other-directed) construed and involves empathic 
feelings into others semiotically and thoughtfully (Bruneau 1988,
1989, 1995b, 1996, 1997, 2000). Most cultural groupings are still 
more narratively involved in familia and the collectively mapped 
mind; this concerns what can be called, narrative consciousness. It 
also includes metaphoric flow, aesthetics, poetics, life stories, and 
literary modes, etc. (Ricoeur 1984, 1985, 1988).
Modem technological media are mainly left-brained operationally, 
but can instigate narrative (e.g., words can create poetic, artistic, and 
metaphorical flow). Technological or objective time utilizes left- 
brained unitizations and predicated sequentialities that are uncommon 
to the vast majority o f the global populations. It is a Western kind o f 
thinking and relating. Modem communication technologies are being 
rapidly diffused into groupings whose traditional members are based 
in narrative consciousness, but the children or grandchildren are into 
cyber worlds, thinking and behaving differently than their cultural 
groupings. This is an unappreciated aspect o f the so-called, “digital 
divide”, a mismatch in brain consciousness usage across sociocultural 
boundaries. Traditional sociocultural rhythms mainly concern habi­
tually narrative and analogically based information processing (per­
sonal and social temporalities); technological time concerns objecti­
vity, rationality, order, structure, etc. only infrequently practiced by 
older members o f a sociocultural grouping. A number o f avenues into 
time and cultural studies are reported by Bruneau (1979b, 1980, 1990, 
1995b, 1997; Merriam 1983). Some o f the more recent works that deal 
with the problems o f objective time in contrast with traditional 
cultural or narrative time, for example, are: a study o f the time o f a 
northern Philippine community (Pertierra 1993); traditional Sicilian 
time (Morello 1997); forced exposure to Western time in traditional 
Japan (Ikuko 1997); time travel among the Crow (Barnes 2005).
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An energy-based model of human communication
When a person enters another sociocultural grouping as a stranger, he 
or she is a novelty and the new sociocultural collective is a novelty to 
the person, a double novelty or double strangeness occurs. This 
increases the uncertainty and creates tension fields (dysrhythmia) as 
temporal differences become apparent. What happens, then, when
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people from objective consciousness groupings communicate with 
those from a narrative and/or a transcendental consciousness group?
We should understand that an “ innovation” can be an object, a 
device, a product, an idea, or a new person in another person’s regular 
sociocultural awareness. A person can be and often is an innovation, a 
novelty, a temporal strangeness. So, on the cover o f Rogers’ fourth 
edition o f his Diffusion o f Innovations text (1995), is a photograph of 
a drop o f water that has created an innovation (waves flowing 
outwardly in ripples through the water medium (the sociocultural 
collective). Actually, this is a very credible, but simplified, model of 
what happens when a new input is accommodated in the human brain. 
We must understand that the human brain is what changes and must 
change in the world o f differences across cultures. Let us examine 
how energy is involved.
Fourier, a French mathematician, visited North Africa on an expe­
dition with Napoleon. Upon his visit he consulted with some Arab 
mathematicians. They showed Fourier how a pebble dropped into a 
pond created wave fronts that could be intersected with other wave 
fronts from other rocks dropped. It was shown that waves intersected, 
interacted. Also, waves could back propagate from the boundary 
shores and create more wave fronts. In holonomic brain theory, the 
boundary enfold distributions o f holoscapes appear to be similarly 
constructed (Pribram 1991). So, in a field o f thermodynamic wavelets 
intersecting, we can imagine analogically how holoscapes are created 
in the human brain. Every wave created can be traced back to its 
original force and velocity (stones hitting the water) at any intersect of 
the wave complex. This is a characteristic o f holographic formation 
within.
Brain holoscapes are Fourier transformations, huge networks of 
brain aggregates working together in a spectral domain, a thermo­
dynamic complexity (Pribram 1991). Every neuron in the cortex is 
connected simultaneously with an average o f 10,000 other neurons 
through dendritic, synaptic connections. So, with a brain averaging 
something on the order o f 80 billion cortical cells, with each cell 
connected to approximately 10,000 other cells, we can imagine a great 
complexity o f holoscapes interconnecting exponentially. Holoscapes 
are algebraic representations o f previous usage patterns o f perception; 
these patterns o f perceptions (habits o f  perceiving) are what each 
sociocultural interactant brings to a communication contact with
strangers. So, what are mapped upon every human brain are kinds o f 
wave-based information from perceptions within their rhythmic 
environments, their built, social and natural collectives. The acquired 
and active brain energy transformations are projected recursively and 
cyclically upon both new and old rhythms contained in the bottom-up 
stimuli from an individual’s biological and sociological rhythmic 
surrounds.
Sociocultural contacts between strangers bring different holoscapes 
from culturally different people into the interaction as unknown or 
unresolved entrainment tensions, dysrhythmic interactions, hopefully 
with eventual attempts to synchronize with one another.
The hippocampus in connection with the human cortex creates a 
mapping function similar to what was previously said to be a blocking 
of the defunct reticular formation. So, the brain conserves its energy 
by screening out information that is old hat or already common. When 
a stimulus is new, an innovation, a different kind o f person, a visitor to 
an unusual cultural group, this newness can be resisted, ignored, or 
accepted into new brain pattern imaging. When a new perception is 
accommodated and allowed to enter the human cortex, the cortex must 
be adjusted to allow the difference to be integrated. This is called 
“entrainment”, or attempting to adjust to a new difference. Once the 
difference is adjusted and integrated, it can be called a synchronicity 
or dealt with as people being somewhat in “synch”.
Brain patterns that are used over and over create more stable and 
less changeable holoscapic patterns or memories. Dogmatism, closed­
mindedness and rigidity o f consciousness can negate new information 
attempts to create a restructuring o f the holoscapic energy fields. This 
is what learning is all about. The “plasticity” or the ability to 
reconstruct brain patterns after injury or after habituation is important. 
Rigidity in perception implies that brains can be wired up in the sense 
that software becomes more like hardware. Deja vue information 
concerns habitual processing while jamais vue information concerns 
dishabituations (novelty). The challenge for any innovation or change 
across cultures is to first assess the habitual rhythmicities in a 
sociocultural collective and, then, to plan on how new rhythms can be 
projected into an already existing kinds o f perceptual and psycho­
logical time, a stranger’s temporal perception and consciousness.
Interestingly, Bradley and Pribram (1995) have attempted to 
connect the energy transformations in the brain with social communi­
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cation networks. They were trying to show that what is networked 
within brain transformations is reflected in networks o f social rhythms 
with some congruence. Such a connection between the rhythms of 
society and the rhythms o f a brain within that society is credible in a 
recursively cyclic model o f perception. Pribram and Bradley (1998) 
have also attempted to connect brain processes with a hidden personal 
self (an “I”) in contrast with an expressed public self (a “me”).
All media is the medium o f the brain. The brain is the medium of 
all communication, regardless o f how information is transmitted. 
What else could be the medium o f media? New technologies do not 
mediate brains and temporal differences across cultures. It is the other 
way around: brains mediate all technological media transmissions and 
these transmissions are integrated or not integrated in sociocultural 
communication transmissions. Any sociocultural communication 
problem must be understood as differences in brain activities, per­
ceptual (non-verbal or semiotic) codes, and systems o f consciousness. 
This is a basic and primary effort that is in great need o f further 
support from semiotic and communication scholars.
Summary
It was shown that there is a need to include time study in sociocultural 
communication and semiotic study and that a neglect o f time study 
has occurred. Sociocultural rhythms are combinations o f objective and 
subjective temporalities. The more modern and technological a socio­
cultural collective, the more formalized are its objective time perspec­
tives; the less modem and technological a sociocultural collective, the 
more that narrative forms o f experiencing, o f consciousness, and 
subjective temporalities will define the spatio-temporal characteristics 
o f a grouping. It must be understood that some members o f a collec­
tive operate within a spiritual or transcendental temporality (Bruneau 
1988, 1989, 1995a). Transcendental kinds o f consciousness are often 
extensions o f narrative consciousness and utilize quasi-linear or non­
linear contemplative or meditative brain processes.
The temporal characteristics o f a group are mapped upon and 
within the brains o f its individuals. Holonomic brain theory and its 
integration with connectionist brain theory offer explanations about 
how people can reject or resist the adoption o f the differences (no­
velties) encountered in sociocultural as well as person to person 
communication. Differences between objective time and subjective 
time concern differences in temporal styles o f consciousness. These 
differences have to do with the rhythms o f innovations and the 
rhythms already mapped upon the societal mind and imposed upon or 
accepted by individuals. It is suggested that semiotic and commu­
nication theorists in diffusion, developmental, and sociocultural com­
munication studies integrate temporal concepts into their thinking and 
research in future years.1
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Время, изменение и социокультурная коммуникация: 
хронемнческий подход
Временные ориентиры являются основными составляющими ядер- 
ного идентитета каждой социокультурной группы. Способ, которым 
обычно выражаются прошлое (воспоминания), настоящее (перцеп­
ция) и будущ ее (ожидания, надежды), тесно связан с культурным 
идентитетом. Изменения в способах измерения времени и развитие 
объективных научных подходов к проблеме времени меняют и иден- 
титет культуры.
На нашей планете существуют три основных модуса темпораль- 
ности (temporality): объективная, нарративная и трансцендентальная. 
Все эти три модуса связаны с разными мозговыми процессами. У 
объективной темпоральности наблюдается тенденция изменить 
традиционные нарративы и трансцендентальное (спиритуальное) 
время, временное членение (timing) и темпы. Объективное время 
соотносится со всем проходящим, настоящим и «прогрессивным». 
Объективное время само по себе является не традиционной формой 
культурного времени или продуктом культуры, а скорее изобра­
жением Запада в точных науках.
Настоящее эссе пытается представить новое понимание истоков 
семиозиса. Любая информация в своей сущности ритмична и пере­
дается нам сигналами по сенсорным путям в пространство-времен- 
ном измерении, но затем сохраняется для дальнейшего употребления 
в спектральном термодинамическом измерении коры мозга.
Вся статья написана в «хронемическом» ключе, т.е. временность 
рассматривается с точки зрения семиопгческих процессов, связан­
ных с человеческой коммуникацией. Такой подход можно считать 
новым как в теории коммуникации, так и в семиотике.
Aeg, muutus ja sotsiokultuuriline kommunikatsioon: 
kroneemiline lähenemine
Ajalised orientiirid on iga sotsiokultuurilise üksuse tuumidentiteedi põhi­
liseks koostisosaks. Viis, kuidas minevikku (mälestusi), olevikku (taju) ja  
tulevikku (ootusi/lootusi) tavaliselt väljendatakse, on kultuurilise identi­
teediga tihedalt seotud. Aja mõõtmise viiside ning nendega seotud objek­
tiivsete teaduslike ajakäsitluste arengumuutused muudavad ka kultuuri 
identiteeti.
Meie planeedil esineb kolm põhilist ajalisuse viisi: objektiivne, narra- 
tiivne ja transtsendentaalne. Kõik need kolm viisi on seotud erinevate 
protsessidega ajus. Objektiivsel ajalisusel on tendents traditsioonilisi 
narratiive ning transtsendentaalset (spirituaalset) aega, ajastust ja  tem­
posid muuta. Objektiivne aeg seostub kõige mööduva, modernse ja 
“progressiivsega”. Objektiivne aeg ise ei ole kultuurilise aja traditsioo­
niline vorm ega kultuuriline saadus — pigem on ta Lääne täppisteaduslik 
kuvand. Käesolev essee püüab pakkuda uut arusaamist sellest, kuidas 
semioos tekib. Igasugune informatsioon on oma olemuselt rütmiline ning 
antakse meie sensoorseid juhteteid pidi signaalidena edasi ajalis-ruumili- 
ses alas, kuid seejärel talletatakse see edasiseks kasutamiseks ajukoore 
spektraalsesse termodünaamilisse alasse.
Kogu artikkel on kirjutatud “kroneemilise” lähenemise võtmes, see 
tähendab, et ajalisust käsitletakse inimsuhtlusega seonduvate semiootiliste 
protsesside pinnalt. Taolist lähenemist võib pidada uudseks nii kommuni­
katsiooni- kui semiootikauuringuis.
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Abstract. For all human sciences, understanding of how the mind works 
requires a new theory that starts from the assumption of potential infinite 
variability of human symbolic forms. These forms are socially constructed by 
the person who moves through an endless variety of unique encounters with 
the world. A theory of symbolic forms needs to capture the essence of hyper­
dynamic, irreversible nature of the stream of consciousness and activity. The 
human mind is regulated through a dynamic hierarchy o f semiotic mechanisms 
of increasingly generalized kind, which involves mutual constraining between 
levels of the hierarchy. It is demonstrated that semiotic mediation leads to a 
triplet o f personal-cultural constructions — a new symbolic form , a meta- 
symbolic form, and a regulatory signal to stop or enable the construction of 
further semiotic hierarchy. In everyday terms — human beings produce new 
problems, together with new efforts at solving them, and make decisions when 
to stop producing the former two. Hence, semiotic mediation guarantees both 
flexibility and inflexibility of the human psychological system, through the 
processes of abstracting generalization and contextualizing specification. 
Context specificity of psychological phenomena is an indication of general 
mechanisms that generate variability. Scientific investigation of human 
psychological complexity is necessarily oriented to the study of variability 
within the individual person’s psychological time-space.
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I have created the world in thought 
Hence I am greater than thought 
But I worship thought 
Is this not surprising?
Ramamirtham (1986)1
Human beings are amazing —  they create subjective worlds of high 
complexity —  and take it to be objective reality. They organize their 
mental realms through continuously creating hierarchies o f semiotic 
mediating devices. These devices regulate their relations with their 
immediate environments by giving meaning to their extra-actions that 
change the environments, and intra-actions that change their own 
subjective worlds. Persons create deeply subjective and abstracted 
from the immediate life meanings —  which are at times personified in 
terms of deities —  various “personal gods” for whom shrines can be 
constructed (Oliveira, Valsiner 1997; Valsiner 1999). Other persons — 
a Juliet for a Romeo, or film star for an adolescent —  may become 
vehicles for such construction o f hyper-generalized personal sense 
systems that operate with holistic field-like signs (Valsiner 2005, 
2006). Pictorial images o f idealized “social others” —  Baoule 
“wooden spouses” (Ravenhill 1996; Vogel 1997) or images of the 
madonna in Catholic homes —  are iconic signs for regulating one’s 
own self. All o f these cultural forms are symbolic resources (Zittoun 
2006, 2007; Zittoun et al. 2004) that function as external regulators of 
the intra-psychological cultural domains. The acts o f Psyche operate 
through a multi-faceted process o f semiosis in which persons set their 
goals, and act in ways that give meaningfulness for their movement 
towards these goals (Rosa 2007; Salgado, Gon9alves 2007).
At the same time, the realities o f the social world guide the persons 
towards some —  rather than other —  objectives (Valsiner 2007). The 
ancestors are to be honored, political leaders are to be followed, 
despised, deposed, or elected, wars are to be fought as activities of 
“patriotic duty”, and children made for the sake o f self-fulfillment, 
“reproductive success”, or for replenishing the human resources of a 
given social order. In the theatre o f human living, we are actors and
Quoted via Eichinger Ferro-Luzzi 2002: 128.
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spectators at the same time. We —  as unique individuals with hard to 
penetrate layers o f defense o f our privacies —  are at the same time 
completely dependent upon the resources o f  the semiosphere that we 
live with. Our personal uniqueness is the result o f our social belon­
ging. At that boundary o f persons’ relations with the signs-infested 
environments, persons create ever new signs and use these for creating 
further personal uniqueness. How does that happen?
The generic personal act of semiosis
In the generalized form, such acts o f personal-cultural creation can be 
summarized by the following:
the person constructs meaning complex x...
I
...objectifies it by fixing its form...,
(e.g. internal — internalized social norm, or 
external — monument, picture of deity, figurine)
I .
...and starts to act as if  the objectified meaning complex x 
is an external agent that controls the person
It is here where culture enters into the human psyche —  and infinitely 
complicates the construction o f the sciences o f the human mind. All 
scientific terminology —  similarly to its everyday counterpart —  is in 
fact a version o f such regulating system. It is that part that is meant to 
objectively and abstractly explain the complexity o f our psychological 
phenomena — a scientific theory is a kind o f a mental cathedral that 
stands in the center o f the booming and buzzing confusion we call 
living a life.
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Homage to Henri Bergson: uniqueness of irreversibility
The philosophy o f Henri Bergson is perhaps too famous to be 
advanced further. This happens when a particular thinker becomes 
hailed as a guru figure by all too ardent followers —  who fail to see 
that his (or her) ideas are only unfinished sketches o f a bigger picture 
o f understanding the complex nature o f what is being studied.
When the educated public in Paris tried hard to get to Bergson’s 
presentations in early 20th century —  and gossiped about his mysti­
cism o f the elan vital —  the major role he played in the advancement 
o f the developmental science may have been overlooked. In his 
Creative Evolution (1945 [1907]), Bergson synthesized the basic 
knowledge about language, evolution, and development that came out 
o f the 19th century thought, and created the basis for the 20th century 
developmental science. The key figures o f that science —  Jean Piaget 
and Lev Vygotskij (to mention just a few) picked up the ideas and put 
them to practice. Yet much o f it has gone forgotten —  and that 
forgetting has hindered the development o f sciences over the past 
century.
Adaptation is apprehensive
A central concept important for a developmentally open cultural (as 
well as evolutionary) psychology was Bergson’s notion o f adaptation. 
That concept —  popular as it was (and is), can carry different 
meanings. First, it has been seen as direct reaction to the conditions 
that are causing change —  either “positive” (by way o f giving rise to 
new variations) or “negative” (elimination o f misfitting emerged 
variations). Bergson disagreed with both o f these meanings —  on the 
basis o f the mechanistic nature (Bergson 1911a: 63). Instead, he 
focused on adaptation as the process o f emergence o f novel mecha­
nisms in ways coordinated with context demands. Thus —  adaptation 
does not mean that environment “molds” or “shapes” the organism. 
Instead, the environment triggers the emergence o f new forms — 
biological and symbolic alike. These forms go beyond the demands of 
the here-and-now environment, rather than “fit with” it.
Thus, human psychological development o f the higher psycho­
logical functions leads to new organizational forms that make it
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possible for the human beings to encounter new possible conditions in 
the future. O f course the demands o f the future cannot be pre-set in the 
present — even with full knowledge o f the past. Hence the emergent 
new forms are crucial in bridging the past and the upcoming future 
(Bergson 191 la2).
In sum — in the case o f creative adaptation, the organizational 
forms that emerge in adaptation go beyond the “fit with” the present 
state of the survival conditions, and set the basis for facing the 
challenges of the possible future demands.
Bergson’s notion o f becoming was expressed on the material o f 
human personality in his characteristic ways:
Our personality, which is being built up at each instant with its accumulated 
experience, changes without ceasing. By changing it prevents any state, 
although superficially identical with another, from forever repeating it in its 
very depth [En changeant, elle empeche un etat, füt-il identique ä lui-meme en 
surface, de se repeter jamais en profondeur]. That is why our duration is 
irreversible. We could not live over again a single moment, for we should 
have to begin by effacing the memory o f  all [souvenir de tout] that had 
followed. (Bergson 1911a: 8; French versions inserted from Bergson 1945 
[1907]: 23)
[...] to foresee consists o f projecting into the future what has been perceived in 
the past, or of imagining for a later time a new grouping, in a new order, o f  
elements already perceived. But that which has never been perceived, and 
which is at the same time simple, is necessarily unforeseeable. Now such is 
the case with each o f our states, regarded as a moment in a history that is 
gradually unfolding [...]. It is an original moment o f a no less original history. 
(Bergson 191 la: 9, emphasis added)
Bergson’s emphasis on the role o f acting upon one’s environment as 
functional in development sets him up as a forerunner o f our contem­
porary activity theories —  starting with those o f Pierre Janet (e.g., 
Bergson, 191 lb: xix, 151, 229, etc.; for an analysis o f Janet’s activity 
theory see Valsiner, van der Veer 2000). The traditions o f Bergson 
and Janet played a crucial role in the development o f the Russian 
cultural-historical school o f thought o f Lev Vygotskij and Aleksander 
Luria (van der Veer, Valsiner 1991).
Discussion o f canalizing involved in vision —  Bergson 1911a: 105-108; and 
in the role of concepts in canalizing conscious processes —  Bergson 1911a: 305-
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The issue at stake here is the constructive use o f the history of 
scientific thought. The ideas o f the past thinkers are not just “museum 
specimens’*, but examples o f the construction o f epistemic tools. Some 
o f the “old” construction ideas surpass some o f our contemporary 
ones —  and vice versa. Bergson’s ideas were well ahead o f his time, 
as they attempted to capture a very crucial side o f human mental 
dynamism.
Maintained stability of the hyper-dynamic mind
In the world o f social sciences that tend to fight the perils of 
“Cartesian dualisms”, it would probably sound old-fashioned to make 
the simple claim —  the human experience is dual. Its duality is that of 
the unity o f stability and dynamism. The human mind maintains itself 
as open-ended and dynamic —  its socially organized forms (stability) 
operate in always unique contexts that are given by the irreversible 
nature o f time (the dynamics o f forms). Combining these two within 
one single theoretical framework would entail the creation of a 
substantive science o f social being. This task is still ahead for our 
contemporary social sciences. The difficulties here are theoretical, 
rather than practical (or social).
Experience that proceeds within irreversible time, and is depen­
dent upon constant interchange with the environment, entails 
indeterminacy that defies prediction and control o f future outcomes. 
Instead, it is filled with constant emergence, proliferation, and extinc­
tion o f ‘intermediate gestalts’ (in terms o f the classical theory of 
microgenesis —  Valsiner, van der Veer 2000: ch. 7). So, in other 
terms —  most o f the human meaning-making process is not directly 
reflected in the static (final) symbolic forms —  but vanish without 
trace during the process o f construction o f such forms. The easy 
availability o f outcomes o f symbolic constriction hides the processes 
that produce these outcomes. This feature o f our access limitations to 
relevant phenomena is most clearly visible in the case o f rating scales 
and questionnaires (Valsiner, Diriwächter, Sauck 2005; Wagoner, 
Valsiner 2005).
This feature o f the mismatch o f the process and outcome within the 
human mind invalidates the hopes o f pragmatist philosophy —  which 
uses consequences —  or ‘final gestalts’ —  as the criterion of truth.
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For pragmatism, consequence (surviving experience) proves the 
righteousness o f the survival process —  yet from these consequences 
we cannot analyze the ways o f producing them (Valsiner 2000). 
Pragmatism attempted to unite the focus on the dynamic processes o f 
experiencing with static evaluation o f these processes (through out­
comes) —  a conceptual task o f utmost complexity. They failed — as 
they could not consider the relevant feature o f signs —  their capacity 
to create new signifying possibilities, or their ontopotentiality (Valsi­
ner 2002). The power o f signs has been conceptualized in theoretically 
productive ways by another thinker —  who as often been considered 
to belong to the “pragmatist tradition”3 —  Charles Sanders Peirce.
From duality to triality: 
the functional infinity of semiosis
Life experience —  viewed within Bergsonian time —  is infinite —  
until the moment it ends. How can we look at the proceeding expe­
rience as the time never allows for repetition o f it? There is a basic 
feature of all organic matter: it is being bom from the past, and the 
opposite idea —  the past emerging from the future —  cannot take 
place. This recognition is also at the foundation o f James Mark Bald­
win’s “genetic logic” (Baldwin 1906): development cannot be repre­
sented by convertible propositions (A-> В is not В A). The irrever­
sibility of time breaks the symmetry (Prigogine 1973). Furthermore —  
duality of an opposition is not sufficient for explaining the emergence 
of novelty — a third component needs to be added to an oppositional 
duality to make it transform into a new form (Nöth 1994: 44-46). 
Human lives are not governed by dualities —  even as these are its 
compositional units —  but by trialities4. A triality is a temporal- 
structural unit which entails two mutually related opposites (duality) 
together with the structural conditions o f its own transformation into a 
new form (which includes the maintenance o f the old form). Figure 1 
gives the generic structure o f triality.
Which he himself tried to avoid.
It would be very interesting to see if  the current habitual fights in the post­
modern social sciences against “dualisms” become transformed into similar 
bashing of “trialisms”.
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Figure 1. The generic structure o f triality.
The centrality o f “thirdness” in semiogenetic processes has been re­
cognized in many areas o f inquiry (Marcus 1997). It has been brought 
into psychology on its developmental and cultural sides (Markova 
1990; Rosa 2007). The notion o f triality opens the way for scientific 
discourses to consider the open-ended nature o f developmental 
phenomena. Their structure is deterministically indeterministic 
(Valsiner 1997) —  it has the current structure (with its history) that is 
expected to result in new versions —  unpredictable in their specifics, 
yet predictable in their fact o f being novel.
Roots o f  triality: C. S. Peirce
It is here where C. S. Peirce’s semiotics meets the needs of develop­
mental sciences. Peirce superimposed the mathematical demonstration of 
infinity from a geometric realm to that o f time. If one were to explain 
infinity in case o f dividing a line into sub-segments, this division (which 
itself is a discrete act o f dividing a whole into two parts) process can be
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continued infinitely, with the result o f dividing the line into infini- 
tesimally small (and ever smaller) sub-parts. If, instead a geometric 
figure (line) there is the time, the time too can be divided into similar 
infinitesimally small segments (moments). Thus, the present in the 
infinitesimal time moment between the past and the future. As such, the 
experiencing organism cannot perceive it as “the present”. All perception 
of the present, and reflection upon it in ideas, is already the next present’s 
reconstruction of the immediate past.
The notion of the present is a boundary in the personal division o f the 
past and future. For Peirce, “ ...the present is half past and half to come” 
(Peirce 1892/1923: 219). The moving boundary o f the present is not that 
of a co-presence of the past and the future (as some kinds o f existential 
“surfaces”), but a process o f emergence. Peirce recognized this diffe­
rence of the flow of consciousness-in-time (Peirce 1923 [1892]: 220).
How does the “birth of the next present” take place in the psycholo­
gical domain? Peirce emphasized the role o f generalization that operates 
between the fields of past re-constructions and future expectations. 
Development for Peirce entailed limitation o f possibilities within a field 
(Peirce 1923 [1892]: 221). Peirce solves the problem of generalization 
through the notion of association:
A finite interval o f time generally contains an innumerable series o f  feelings; 
and when these become welded together in association, the result is general 
idea. [...]
The first character o f a general idea so resulting is that o f its living feeling. A 
continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but still embracing 
innumerable parts, and also, through infinitesimal, entirely unlimited, is 
immediately present. (Peirce 1923 [1892]: 224, added emphases)
The person can overcome the limitations o f the present through gene­
ralizing an idea reaching out into the past and future. Yet the general idea 
is immediately present in the form of a general feeling, in the boundary 
of the present. Signs operate in ways that prepare the sign-maker to face 
the next moment.
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Autoregulatory and heteroregulatory sign processes
The duality o f human mind is paralleled by the triplicate nature of 
signs that regulate that mind. A use or invention o f a word depicting 
something is not only referring to the denoted referent, but presenting 
that referent for some purposes, directions.
For instance, if  I tell you that “this article is printed on white paper”, 
I am not merely reiterating the obvious (which the reader can see 
anyway), but presenting that aspect o f  the environment for some 
purposes. I need not have specific goals while making such statement, 
yet the statement (about the obvious) is simultaneously representation, 
co-presentation, and pre-presentation (Valsiner, 2001a; 2001b; 2002). 
The message is therefore necessarily ambiguous —  in terms of re­
presentation it is true and obvious (the paper seems white indeed), while 
in terms o f co-presentation it raises the question o f “why is he pointing 
our attention to this particular' fact?”. Last (but not least) —  the pre­
presentation entails communication about the future state o f the object 
(“ ...but the paper will become yellow in 100 years” or “ ...but it is the 
waste o f trees to make the paper on which this article is printed”).
Three levels o f sign regulation
How does a meaning-maker regulate one’s mind? The semiotic/ histo­
rical view on signs considers those to be constantly oriented towards 
the immediate future o f the present psychological processes. Signs 
function in parallel to accomplish three functions —  maintain them­
selves (autoregulation), maintain their immediate next level signs (or 
lower psychological processes), or terminate further meaning-making 
(Fig. 2).
If  we look at the Level N sign (in Figure 2), which can generate a 
higher level (N + l) meta-sign, or relate to other level-N signs, aside 
from regulating the subordinate process, then we see that each sign 
can be involved in three relations o f autoregulatory kind at the same
5 Out o f  all possible features o f the object to be emphasized. Specifically as we 
live in a pleromatic universe the possibilities for immediate co-presentation by the 
Sender and the Recipient are wide. So are their different interpretations o f the 
message (Bühler 1934).
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time (downwards, upwards, and horizontally). While controlling and 
canalizing the flow o f lived-through experience the signs are involved 
in “networking” (with other signs) and generalizing. Abstractive 
generalization is the basis for human empathy (W orringer 1911) and 
thinking (Bühler 1934). The person is ready for subjective synthesis in 
making sense o f the world based on the mutuality o f immediate life 
experience and pre-established meaning fields.
LOWER PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS
/ 4  I \  /  '
/  I л r 1 T / ■ " Д ,wrr- У \/  I A I I I \ / \
THE FLOW OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE-» time
Figure 2. Summary o f the autoregulation (A.R.) and heteroregulation (H.R.) by 
signs in a dynamically changing semiotic hierarchy.
130 Jaan Valsiner
The triality o f the autoregulatory processes guarantee that any level of 
signs cannot be isomorphic with the lower processes (nor with one 
another). Here an interesting side issue is worth mentioning. Psycho­
logists have disputed the issue o f “consistency between behavior and 
self report”, usually lamenting that such consistency is low. From the 
present viewpoint, low consistency is a necessary result from the role 
signs play in regulation o f conduct. To expect full consistency here 
(i.e., that self-reports “fully and accurately” depict behavior) would 
deny both the heteroregulatory (H.R.) and autoregulatory (A.R.) 
functions o f the signs.
From generalization to contextualizing specification
Two processes can be present in the regulatory hierarchies — 
abstracting generalization and contextualizing specification. Abstrac­
ting generalization creates new levels o f semiotic regulators, removing 
the re-co-pre-presentational role increasingly further towards higher 
complexity o f abstraction. For example, human values are generaliza­
tions o f abstracted kind. Extremely general terms like “love”, “justi­
ce” , “freedom” etc are meaningful in their overgeneralized abstract­
ness.
As such, these generalized signs can be brought to bear upon re­
gulating very specific contexts (by process we could call con­
textualizing specification). They operate in very concrete settings — 
linking their abstracted properties with the specifics o f a here-and-now 
setting. Through this process any momentous application of long- 
established —  and rarely used —  generalized meaning in new 
contexts becomes possible. The immediate feeling o f “this street looks 
dangerous” when a person is about to enter a dark alley is possible 
only through such specification. Prior to actual experience the 
meaning o f “dangerous” as applied to “this X” (street, person, drug, 
activity, etc.) is re-presentationally a lie, co-presentationally a sign for 
checking consensus, and pre-presentationally a self-guiding device. 
We operate through such specification all the time —  without it all our 
language use would remain purely re-presentational.
What is fun?
Consider a very “trans-Atlantic” example —  you may find many 
North Americans talking about something vague —  yet (for them) 
very concrete —  the notion o f fun. That term is heard in social 
discourses in America all the time —  and its collective-cultural power 
is precisely in its vagueness. Nobody can exactly define that term, but 
its use is possible across an immense variety o f concrete contexts. So, 
Americans can “have fun” doing almost anything —  from doing 
nothing to working hard on their self-created hobbies. When you are 
eating at a restaurant the waiter may come and ask “are you having 
fun with your steak?' and you may be uncertain what is implied. You 
hear people boasting how some event was “я lot o f  fun” —  and again 
it is uncertain what it means. People can set up “fun” as the criterion 
for improvement (by making “having more fun ” one’s personal goal- 
orientation) or even for competition (“I want to have more fu n  than 
John’’). It is an open field for future psychologists to develop stan­
dardized methods for measurement o f “having fun” (like there are so 
many standard methods for the study o f anything in psychology).
The meaning o f “fun” itself is in principle indeterminate, and in 
two ways. First, within a person’s personal culture, it is an abstracted 
overgeneralization from a wide variety o f personal life experiences o f 
the past, linked with the language notion o f “fun”. The contrast here is 
with the opposite (“non-fun”) that helps to specify boundary o f the 
two for specific referents (e.g. “X is fun, Y is not fun”). Secondly —  
and more importantly —  for interpersonal communication, the notion 
of “fun” is completely indeterminate in its meaning, yet easily usable 
for creating a state o f illusory intersubjectivity. W hatever is my 
personal-cultural background for making any statement, it is not 
revealed in the statement itself, which remains a widely open sign- 
“blurb”. Still, within the collective cultural world it does resonate on 
the side of recipients. The ill-defined notion fun  is a result o f  sub­
jective abstraction —  and a tool for uses in any new contexts (speci­
fication).
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Concluding point: Irreversibly constrained freedom  
for novel thinking
The dynamic function o f the triplet —  new symbolic form, meta- 
symbolic form, and regulation o f the depth o f hierarchy —  creates a 
powerful mechanism o f meaning making that adjusts well to many 
new contexts. Signs constrain actions, feelings about actions, and their 
own actions upon actions and mental processes. Yet they do not do it 
in a fixed way —  instead o f transitive hierarchies (a>b, b>c, a>c) we 
may come across seemingly inconsistent intransitive hierarchies (a>b, 
b>c and c>a) o f signs —  and o f the relations between sign makers and 
signs. Thus —  indeed we construct thought, become guided by the 
thought —  and yet our subservience to the thought that guides us is 
made up by ourselves (Valsiner 1999). The maker becomes the made 
and moves on to be the maker for the something new. Our life 
experiences are grown into our personal cultures. That makes human 
way o f meaningful living possible. Personal cultures operate through 
semiotic abstractive generalizations that feed forward into re­
organization o f the social world —  which then gives further rise to 
personal-cultural meaningfulness. Semiosis at the personal level is 
infinite in its constant production o f novelty until the person lives. 
Human beings are consistent in their capacity for becoming in­
consistent with their pasts. This provides them with a basis for 
adaptation that goes beyond the given environment. Such permanent 
transcendence is the essence o f all living. Its human form is 
characterized by a new form o f triality —  that o f creating a sign as if it 
had always been there in its givenness.6
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Семиотическая саморегуляция: 
как динамические иерархии знаков организуют течение
сознания
Во всех гуманитарных науках для понимания функционирования 
сознания необходимо наличие новой теории, которая исходила бы из 
предпосылки, что количество символических форм в человеческой 
культуре в принципе бесконечно. Эти формы сознания порождаются 
бесконечным числом уникальных встреч человека с окружающим 
миром. Теория символических форм должна учитывать, что течение 
сознания и действие по существу являются гипердинамичными и 
необратимыми. Человеческое сознание регулируется динамической 
иерархией семиотических систем, причем каждый новый уровень в 
этой иерархии более универсален и отдельные уровни взаимодейст­
вуют между собой. Доказано, что семиотическое опосредование 
создает в конструкциях между отдельной личностью и культурой 
триаду: новая символическая форма, метасимволическая форма и 
регулятивный сигнал, который останавливает или инициирует 
возникновение следующего уровня семиотической иерархии. Выра­
жаясь более простым языком, человеческие существа создают новые 
проблемы, а заодно и новые попытки разрешения этих проблем, и 
принимают решение, когда остановить генерирование проблем и их 
разрешений. Таким образом семиотическое опосредование путем 
абстрагирующего обобщения и контекстуализирующего определе­
ния одновременно укрепляет как гибкость, так и ригидность психо­
логической системы человека. Зависимость психологических про­
цессов от контекста является знаком наличия общих механизмов, 
создающих разнообразие. Исследование сложной психики человека 
обязательно должно сосредоточиваться на анализе многообразия 
психологического хронотопа отдельных личностей.
Semiootiline eneseregulatsioon: 
kuidas dünaamilised märgihierarhiad piiravad teadvusekulgu
Kõigis humanitaarteadustes on teadvuse toimimise mõistmiseks vajalik 
uue teooria olemasolu, mis lähtuks eeldusest, et sümboliliste vormide 
hulk inimkultuuris on põhimõtteliselt lõputu. Sümbolilised vormid on 
sotsiaalselt konstrueeritud inimese poolt, liikudes läbi maailmaga 
ainukordsete kohtumiste lõputu hulga. Sümboliliste vormide teooria peab 
võtma arvesse teadvusevoolu ja tegevuse olemuse, mis on oma loomult
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hüperdünaamilised ning pöördumatud. Inimese vaimu reguleerib semioo­
tiliste mehhanismide dünaamiline hierarhia, mille iga uus tasand on järjest 
üldisem ning mille tasandid limiteerivad üksteist. On tõestatud, et 
semiootiline vahendamine tekitab üksikisiku ja  kultuuri vaheliste 
konstruktsioonide kolmiku: uus sümboliline vorm, metasümboliline vorm 
ja  regulatiivne signaal, mis peatab või algatab semiootilise hierarhia 
järgneva tasandi tekkimise. Ehk tavakeelsemalt: inimolendid tekitavad 
probleeme lahendades uusi probleeme ja uusi püüdlusi ning võtavad vastu 
otsuseid, millal probleemide ja  lahenduste genereerimine järele jätta. 
Seega kindlustab semiootiline vahendamine abstraheeriva üldistuse ja 
kontekstualiseeriva määratlemise protsesside kaudu ühtaegu nii inimese 
psühholoogilise süsteemi paindlikkuse kui ka selle jäikuse. Psühholoo­
giliste protsesside kontekstispetsiifilisus on märk mitmekesisust loovate 
üldiste mehhanismide olemasolust. Inimeste keerulise psüühika uurimine 
peab tingimata keskenduma üksikisikute psühholoogilise aegruumi 
mitmekesisuse analüüsile.
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Abstract. The article views the development o f  the Tartu-Moscow semiotic 
school from the analysis o f texts to the study o f  spatial entities (semiosphere 
being most well known o f them). It comes to light that ‘culture’ and ‘space’ 
have been such notions in Tartu-Moscow School to which, for instance, the 
‘semiosphere’ does not add much. There are studied possibilities to join 
Uexküll’s and Lotman’s basic concepts (as certain grounds o f  Estonian 
semiotics) with Tartu-Moscow School’s treatment o f  culture and space 
through the notion o f ‘semiotic subject’. Such an approach allows to see 
transdisciplinarity, which has come to issue only during the last decade, 
already in the first conceptions o f Tartu-Moscow School where trans­
disciplinarity revealed itself in the symbiotic use o f ‘culture’ and ‘space’.
The Tartu-Moscow school o f semiotics (TMS) has often been labelled 
as (the) one of cultural semiotics. Indeed, an article from the period 
until which semiotics had been dealt with in Tartu for nearly 10 years, 
appeared under the title Theses o f Cultural Semiotics as the manifesto 
of the school (Uspenskij et al. 1973). This paper is definitely worthy 
of notice and a remarkable piece on bordering a paradigm in 
semiotics, which does not happen too often. On the other hand, if  we 
look at further developments o f the Tartu-M oscow thought in cultural 
semiotics, we can but conclude that neither ‘semiotics’ nor ‘culture’ 
were (or have been) understood as uniformly as to actually 
characterise a ‘school’ in a strict paradigmatic sense. There are five 
definitions o f ‘culture’ and at least three (less implicit ones might be 
added) o f ‘semiotics’ outlined in the Conceptual Dictionary o f the 
Tartu-Moscow School (Levchenko, Salupere 1999), and this defi­
nitely does not look as a fact characterising a paradigm.
Thus, one may wish to look for other features that would allow us 
to speak about a real school or paradigm o f  thought. There is no doubt 
that ‘secondary modelling systems’ can be taken as the centre of 
TMS; sometimes the ‘semiotics’ o f TMS is equalised with the study 
of either natural language or language-based sign systems (Revzin 
1971). It is probably the occasional rigidity o f TMS in its definitions 
that has made it possible to argue against its standpoints and key 
concepts (e.g., Sebeok 1988); there is, however, no doubt in that this 
rigidity has been —  seemingly paradoxically —  connected with 
heuristic innovativeness. It is clear that considering culture-genetic 
sign systems either as secondary or tertiary does not make any 
difference in respect to TM S’s studies or its pretty vague metho­
dology1. On the other hand, Sebeok’s argument on such a difference 
ought to be kept in mind, if aspects resulting from the analysis of 
Umwelt were involved in the study o f the cultural sphere...
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From text to (textual) space
There is another way to see and define the position o f TMS. This may 
seem simplistic, but has definitely important consequences for both 
understanding TMS and using it in contemporary analysis of 
sociocultural phenomena. The topic under discussion is the one of 
juxtaposition or, more frequently, open contrasting o f diverse 
phenomena, or —  in advance —  o f dissimilar spheres, beginning from 
elementary binaries to the cultural level. Often, the inspection of 
sociocultural phenomena has been subjected to choice between the 
analysis o f either processes or structures (see, e.g., Archer 1996). 
Semiotics, all the more TM S’s cultural semiotics, has been associated 
with structuralism so repeatedly that it is not worthwhile to spend time 
and space on this in the current paper. We might, however, take TMS 
under inspection, and find out that while individual treatments have 
identified themselves with structuralist standpoints (e.g., Lotman 
1970), the overall impression o f TMS must be that o f a synthesis of 
the functionalist (or processual) and structuralist approach. It seems 
clear that the structuralist approach favours the entailment of 
juxtaposing, at least it should not be surprising to meet the viewing of
1 Noting such vagueness in methods has no evaluative aspect here, but is due to 
the ad hoc nature o f  the development o f TMS; see Randviir 2005.
texts, cultural phenomena or the world, in the end, as based on 
oppositions. Application o f binaries has been a major feature o f 
structuralists, be them either representatives o f TMS, the Greimasian 
tradition, or others. While we can meet Greimas’ devotion to the 
Aristotelian logical square under the notion o f the semiotic square 
(Greimas 1987: 66, 78), and the appliance o f it to diverse types o f 
texts, in TMS thinking in binaries has been simpler —  at least on the 
surface. There, however, is a common feature, if  not a red line, in both 
conventions: be them categories o f the semiotic square or binaries, the 
formative entities are univocally certain semantic or semiotic fields (in 
the sense o f formal logic). In the TMS tradition, we can observe the 
use at least the following descriptive frames formed on the basis o f 
binaries: culture— nature; culture— another culture; culture— non­
culture; text— non-text; the textual— the extratextual2; textual world—  
extratextual world; I— (s)he; the own— the alien; etc. Even though 
these categories have been set in oppositions, and they do encompass 
non-identical inner components, it is hard to find, in TMS works, any 
other treatment o f their relations than those acknowledging dynamism 
(following, basically, the developmental pattern o f centre— periphery). 
This, in short, means that the structural view is, in TMS, immanently 
conjoined with the functionalist/processual ideology.
Now, if we understand the constituents o f the above-mentioned 
oppositions as dynamic structures (e.g. semantic fields, textual bodies, 
physical phenomena), we can, in brief, maintain that TMS has, to a 
large extent, been a school o f the semiotics o f space. Thinking 
in/about spheres has been customary in TMS, beginning from ‘textual 
spaces’ to individual’s identity or, at the end, the semiosphere. There 
are several features or factors we can bring forward as evidence in 
TMS that concur with the semiotics o f space, and most o f those 
characteristics are o f keynote importance for the identification o f TMS 
itself. The ‘text’, as a central notion o f TMS, has a certain inner
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It is important here to pay attention to difference between the English ‘extra- 
textual’ and the Russian ‘vnetekstovyi’. Whereas ‘extratextual’ may or may not 
include contextual or со-textual connections, the Russian original seems rather to 
indicate at a sphere differentiated from the ‘textual’ by a disjunctive boundary. At 
the same time, however, there occur also hints at the extratextual world as that 
composed o f 'other texts’. For example, misunderstanding texts can happen in 
connection with “[...] non-understanding the significant orientation o f a text as a 
whole (or elements o f its global structure) towards other texts or the extratextual
I vnetekstovyi] world” (Levin 1981: 88).
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structure which is organised around or according to a certain 
dominant, the text is distinguished from the extratextual by a 
boundary... (Lotman 1969: 470f). The qualities o f  text can —  and 
often have been —  extrapolated to the level o f culture, and thus, in the 
context o f TMS, one would rather keep in mind the notion o f cultural 
space. Cultural spaces are interpretable also from an internal 
viewpoint that takes into account communicative cohesion entailing a 
certain autocommunicative whole. From such an internal viewpoint, a 
basic criterion for the definition o f a cultural space is the existence of 
self-explanatory self-models (or: ‘automodels’ —  avtomodelj). Such 
self-models have, in TMS where autocommunication has always been 
highly valued, been explained and associated with textual terminology 
as follows —  a self-model is:
A model o f a given culture o f itself which, as a rule, yields certain dominants 
in it on the basis o f  which there is built a unifying system that has to serve as a 
code for self-consciousness and self-identification o f  texts o f the given 
culture. (Lotman 1971: 170)
An integrated cultural space, in turn, may be referred to as a textual 
conglomeration in which there goes on hermeneutic cultural move­
ment where texts and metatexts exist in a dynamic cycle, where the 
cultural object-level and metalevel descriptions are interdependent. 
The so-called Petersburg text, for example, is “[...] one o f the basic 
‘texts-interpreters’ for the ‘neomythological’ works o f the Russian 
symbolists” (Mints, Bezrodnyi, Danilevskij 1984: 80). At the same 
time, into the ‘Petersburg text’ there are included not only lexical 
texts, but also architectural, sculptural items (Mints, Bezrodnyi, 
Danilevskij 1984: 82). This means that semiotic and physical aspects 
o f the city-space are joined in interaction.
On the other hand —  space in text is:
[...] a modelling language by the help o f which any meanings can be 
expressed as soon as they have the character o f  structural relations. Therefore 
spatial organisation is one o f  the universal means for the construction o f any 
cultural models. (Lotman 1986: 4)
This opinion is one o f those suggesting that the development o f meta­
language^) in TMS has most frequently been extremely closely 
connected with objects in their so-to-speak innocent status on the
research table, before an actual analysis begins. As mentioned, ‘texts’ 
have often been replaced with ‘textual spaces’, ‘cultures' with 
‘cultural spaces’ already on the so-to-speak object-level in TMS 
(objects are defined with the preface o f as even prior to analysis). 
Space, in this aspect, serves as a descriptor, and can be replaced by 
‘system’, ‘mechanism’ (e.g., ‘system o f culture’ as that o f norms; cf., 
e.g., Zoljan, Cemov 1978: 155, 162). This simplicity o f replacing or 
loading objects o f analysis with descriptive (or ideological, if  you 
will) features prior to actual analysis has been admitted also by 
Lotman whose note can complement the above citation:
[...] space often obtains a metaphorical character by which metaphoricity is 
introduced into the language o f investigative description. This is connected 
with that the notion o f space itself contains a contradiction: it is filled with 
both mathematical and behavioural contents. This contradiction, in itself, may 
even play a supportive —  creative —  role, if  it is recognised and purposefully 
used by the researcher. (Lotman 1986: 5)
Apparently, this understanding has made it easy for TMS to often talk 
about the above-mentioned textual spaces, whereas such textual 
spaces may extend to the field o f describing behaviour, even lives o f 
people, in textual terms. ‘Behavioural texts’ are, like any other cultural 
phenomena, built on natural language and belong, thus, to the realm o f 
secondary modelling systems (see Lotman 1977: 66). Such pheno­
mena are, in TMS’s works, described in entirely textual terms —  
dominant (or constants o f behaviour), genre, sujet, style, etc. come to 
forth (Lotman 1977). The text is, in TMS, understood in broad terms 
and hints at phenomena created through secondary modelling systems 
based on natural language. Maybe surprisingly, such a logic draws 
attention to the proximity o f TMS to any other discipline (e.g. cultural 
anthropology) studying cultural or sociocultural phenomena in merely 
other terminology. It stands in the theses o f cultural semiotics that:
The fundamental concept o f modern semiotics —  the text —  [...]  has integral 
meaning and integral function [...] . In this sense it may be regarded as the 
primary element (basic unit) o f culture. (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 6)
That ‘culture’ is mostly described in spatial terms (e.g. ‘cultural 
sphere’, opposition o f the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ o f culture, culture as a 
•delimited sphere’, etc., etc.), text comes to share the spatial essence 
of culture, especially in the term ‘cultural text’ (or ‘culture text’):
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In defining culture as a certain secondary language, we introduce the concept 
o f  a ‘culture text’, a text in this secondary language. (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 
11)
•Cultural texts’ can be compared to ‘cultural phenom ena’ (or ‘cultural 
units’, even both semiotic and physical ‘culture traits’, etc.) in 
anthropology , and reinforce the impression o f culture as a space of 
integrated structural (cultural texts) and functional (cultural languages) 
features. As it stands in TM S’s theses:
The concept ‘text' is used in a specifically semiotic sense and, on the one 
hand, is applied not only to messages in a natural language but also to any 
carrier o f  integral (‘textual”) meaning —  to a ceremony, a work o f the fine 
arts, or a piece o f  music. (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 6)
Keeping in mind the above-cited Lotman’s opinion (Lotman 1986: 5), 
it therefore probably would not be wrong to suggest that the notions of 
text and space are mutually influential, if —  in TMS —  not even 
interdependent. This interdependence comes extremely vividly forth 
nowadays when modem technology' itself forces to see and talk about 
the hypertextual space o f global communication. Now, communi­
cation, the nature o f space and the structure o f texts are intertwined, 
and we talk about intertextual spaces, intersemiotic and intersemiosic 
communication. On the one hand, it may seem as if  textual spaces 
have, by the development o f modem technology (Internet, hyperspace, 
cyberspace, virtual space, in fact also cosmic space), lost one of their 
originally inherent feature —  that o f being bordered and structured 
thereby. On the other hand, these developments can also be seen in the 
light that those boundaries have been and are being transformed from 
the disjunctive into conjunctive ones. We can witness this trans­
formation. or presupposition o f such a transformation, already in the 
concept o f the semiosphere (Lotman 1984, for a version in English see 
Lotman 1990). The semiosphere complicated the intertwined web 
containing ‘text’, ‘space’, ‘culture’, etc., with the idea o f linguistic 
interaction and internal translatability (Lotman 1984: 11-16). In a 
wav, one may thus compare the semiosphere to ‘linguistic spaces’ in a 
wider sense, but also to ‘translation spaces' in a broader sense as well.
Semiotic space and semiotic subject
The last nuance seems to have greater importance than only for the 
paradigm o f cultural semiotics. Namely, here shows another 
possibility to see the proximity o f  cultural semiotics and (cultural) 
anthropology: ‘culture bearers’ as actual representatives o f a socium 
can be understood in textual perspective. The conditional or analytic 
textuality o f actual culture bearers provides them with a certain 
principle —  or universal, if you will —  features that enable us to 
apply a unified toolkit at the analysis o f individual members o f  a 
socium. The actual physical nature o f culture bearers as carriers o f 
both physical an semiotic culture traits adds a most pragmatic 
dimension to the so-to-speak textualised individuals in a cultural 
space. At the same time, understanding cultures and/or societies in 
textual terms shares the same countenance: we may view these objects 
as cultural spaces in which holds a certain linguistic, semiotic, textual, 
translational congruity (cf. the semiosphere). Thus the individual and 
the collective-cultural level come to share (several) features, and —  
from the semiotic perspective —  we can apply a unified methodology 
to the micro- and macrolevel, treating our research objects as semiotic 
subjects. Semiotic subjects can be understood as semiotically bordered 
(semiotically distinct) and semiotically active physical organisms or 
conditionally distinct organisms. At the same time those distinct 
organisms must have a common share in order to be able to form 
sociocultural (or [inter-] textual) wholes connected through 
communication. That common share concerns knowledge o f both 
rules and lexicon o f semiosis; thus semiotic subjects can, again, be 
seen as internally cohesive informational spaces that exist in an 
interconnected (inter-) textual space. That common space presupposes 
also at least some differences in the stock o f knowledge o f its 
individual units —  otherwise it would not be possible to talk about 
communication as exchange.
The notion o f the semiotic subject is important for setting cultural 
semiotics in a wider perspective, and also in a larger semiotic context. 
Namely, it does not seem productive to approach semiosic activity as 
necessarily taking place between two ontologically separate subjects. 
When we talk about two semiotic spheres and their (partial) semiotic 
dissimilarities that create a situation o f such semiotic tension that 
leads to the emergence o f meaning, then there is no longer need to
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consider those semioactive subjects as separate also on the ontological 
plane. The emergence o f meaning is made possible in a tension field 
which surfaces (in-) between two semiotic subjects, and involves 
diverse cases o f the so-called unilateral communication, auto­
communication, intracultural communication, etc. Thus the concept of 
the semiotic subject implies two main functions o f semiosis. Semiosis 
is (a) a connector o f meaningful units and structures in a way that 
enables communication between entities containing and/or using 
(those) meaningful phenomena (e.g. man). Or in other words — 
semiosis is a creator o f consistency by making it possible for different 
meaningful levels and units to get organised into a coherent functional 
structure. On account o f such an integrating and so-to-speak subject- 
forming influence there also becomes possible semiosis as a part in (b) 
interaction between a semiotic subject and other subjects and the 
environment.
In semiotics, on the basis o f approaching the object, sometimes a 
distinction is made between two fundamental trends —  the semiotics 
o f the sign and the semiotics o f the code. Whereas it has been noted 
that “a semiotics o f the code is an operational device in the service of a 
semiotics o f sign production” (Eco 1976: 128), we probably should 
admit the fundamental interdependence o f the two. According to the 
relevant processes, we can call them semiotics that studies either 
signification or communication. At the same time, one can easily 
share the opinion that no communication (between semiotic subjects) 
can be executed without signs. This means that the semiotics of the 
code (or: communication) cannot be developed without involving the 
study o f signification. Likewise, no signification phenomenon can 
appear without at least two partakers (even though both can be 
generated by one and the same physical communicator), which makes 
it difficult for the semiotics o f the sign to do without the level of the 
code and communication.
The two major fields o f semiosic action —  keeping a semiotic 
subject coherent, and interaction with the ‘outside’ —  can be 
associated with two great concepts in semiotics that have to do with 
the relevant research traditions. These notions are J. von Uexküll’s 
‘umweit’ and J. M. Lotman’s ‘semiosphere’ that are keys for the 
biosemiotic and culturosemiotic perspectives. It should be kept in 
mind that we can really call them perspectives or accents, since both 
terms can be applied to the description o f both natural and cultural
phenomena; likewise are their historical backgrounds and essences 
similar. It is highly noteworthy that biosemiotics and cultural 
semiotics are fundamentally alike also methodologically: both favour 
the treatment o f their objects in metaphorical manners. Interestingly, 
the two concepts mentioned are comparable historically and develop- 
mentally. In 1940, ‘umwelt’ has been defined as the self-centred world 
of an organism:
Each Umwelt forms a closed unit in itself, which is governed, in all its parts, 
by the meaning it has for the subject. According to its meaning for the animal, 
the stage on which it plays its life-roles (Lebensbühne) embraces a wider or 
narrower space. This space is built up by the animal’s sense organs, upon 
whose powers o f resolution will depend the size and number o f  its localities 
{Orte). (Uexküll 1982: 30)
Around the same time, V. Vernadsky developed his conception o f the 
biosphere as one containing all living matter (his monograph The 
Biosphere was published in 1926), and coined ‘noosphere’ (the 
biosphere containing intellect) as the former’s continuation (later, 
‘noosphere’ was proliferated by T. de Chardin, cf. Chardin 1960). 
These two latter terms formed basis for the ‘semiosphere’ which is 
defined by J. Lotman as a ‘semiotic continuum’ that is “filled by 
semiotic compounds o f different types and diverse levels o f 
organisation” (Lotman 1984: 6); or: “the semiosphere is a semiotic 
space outside which the very existence o f semiosis is impossible” 
(Lotman 1984: 7).
Thus the terminological grounds o f umwelt and semiosphere are 
connected with the biological realm, their germs lay practically in the 
same scientific epoch, and they have become popular, reachable and 
widely utilised during the same period (the “discovery” o f Uexküll’s 
work in the 1980s and translation into English in 1982, the first 
publication o f the semiosphere in 1984 and translation into English in 
1990).
At this point, we can bind these two notions —  umwelt and 
semiosphere —  with the semiotic subject in a way as the former 
allows to describe relations between the semiotic subject and its 
environment. The latter makes it possible to deal with the analysis o f 
semiosis intrasubjectively: treating culture as a textual macro-object, 
via the notion o f semiosphere, we can describe the consistency or 
cohesive essence o f a semiotic subject on the textual level (cf., e.g.,
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Taborsky 1997), just as well as semiosic processes preceding the 
textual in the so-to-speak intrasubjective communication. It is vital to 
keep in mind the importance o f autocommunication and that a 
semiotic subject may create its own semiosphere without being in 
interaction with other umweiten. Likewise, (sensory) communication 
between umwelten does not necessarily entail semiospherical aspects.
From culture to semiosphere and back
However, we also ought to consider certain problems connected with 
TM S’s spatial conceptions, especially those related to the 
semiosphere. These issues come to light when we follow our designed 
pattern o f associating umwelt with communication between the 
semiotic subject and ‘external w orld’, and semiosphere with keeping 
the semiotic subject cohesive. Above, we mentioned that being 
bordered is one o f the most important features o f the semiosphere (cf. 
Lotman 1984: 7-11). This, however, raises several problematic and 
contradictory issues. Namely, inasmuch as “ [...] the notion o f the 
semiosphere is connected with a certain semiotic uniformity and 
individuality” (Lotman 1984: 7), and “[...] both notions presuppose 
the semiosphere to be discriminated from the outer-semiotic or alien- 
semiotic space by a border” (Lotman 1984: 8), there emerges a 
question: how does this border come to existence, or does it emerge at 
all, or is it somehow made up, fabricated? Lotman’s claims inevitably 
lead to issues o f  the origin o f that border in terms o f its emergence 
either on the object-level, or its generation on the metalevel. In other 
words, be the boundary stake at either at object- or metalevel, it can 
only be outlined by contrasting an ‘intrasem iotic’ world to an ‘outer- 
sem iotic’ world, and as far as the outer sphere be not semiotised, 
possibilities o f  differentiation are but disregarded. Thus the ‘absolute 
border’ simultaneously presumes and dismisses possibilities o f 
describing a semiosphere, and makes the depiction o f this border —  as 
the semiosphere in toto —  possible from a shifted (e.g. divine or 
extraterrestrial) viewpoint that would enable to engage comparison o f 
the internal and extra-semiospherical units. The original concept o f  the 
semiosphere is thus connected with understanding a semiotic reality o f 
a community in totalitarian terms. It seems important to note that a 
totalitarian understanding o f the semiosphere is, for Lotman, not an
occasional affair —  after two years o f publishing the conception o f the 
semiosphere, he maintains that the term refers to: “[...] the semiotic 
space o f  culture in which solely are possible semiotic processes” 
(Lotman 1986: 6). While, for Lotman, “[...] the ‘closure’ o f the 
semiosphere lies in its inability to get involved with alien-semiotic 
texts or non-texts” (Lotman 1984: 8), then, in the current context, by 
the individuality o f the semiotic subject, we understand the possibility 
to describe the semiotic reality as a cohesive, i.e. at least minimally 
individual whole. In actual case studies, from an internal viewpoint o f 
a semiotic realm, the description o f a meaningful world can be 
executed exactly against a background system which is often formed 
of ‘non-cultural’ or ‘поп-textual’. In order to specify the identity 
discourse o f a semiotic subject, i.e. its (semiotic) boundaries, we must 
outline those borders somehow, and this can only be done by 
contrasting the outside o f a semiotic reality with its interior. Here we 
are confronted with a paradoxical situation: in order to be able to talk 
about the semiotic subject and its individuality as a phenomenon 
based on contrast between the semiotised and non-semiotised world, 
and the dynamic border between them, we may conclude —  this 
border is indefinable. More exactly, this boundary —  thus likewise 
features resulting in the extent o f the semiotic reality —  cannot be 
circumscribed as persistent. This goes both for the semiotic metalevel, 
and all the more for the (hypothetically referred) semiotic reality on 
the object level: talking about the expanse o f the meaningful world, 
we must —  in order to describe its boundary —  have semiotised 
elements o f the (originally) ‘meaningless w orld’. Evidently, thereby 
the latter elements are switched into the frame o f the semiotic reality. 
With the intention o f referring to the ‘alien semiotic space’ as a 
phenomenon outside the semiosphere, we must already have had it 
semiotised. Consequently, we should not equalise ‘outside o f  semi­
otics’ with ‘alien sem iotics’, since the former cannot, in principle, be 
switched into (articulate) discourse. Therefore, when entities o f  a non- 
semiotised world are, through semiosis, incorporated into a textual 
output, they can be referred to as representing ‘non-culture’, ‘alien- 
sem iotic’, ‘non-textual’, rather than a sphere ‘outside semiotic(s)’.
While, in connection with the creation o f meaningfulness, there 
appear so many ambiguities at the definition o f the semiotic subject 
and reality already due to the notion o f the semiosphere, we probably 
should look for a more concrete phenomenon or a category through
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which to delimit the semiotic subject. Proceeding from the above- 
mentioned possibilities to distinguish between reality and the semiotic 
reality, we may face the verity that, by default, our topic ought to be 
concerned with the unreadable/incomprehensible/scarcely inter­
pretable on the one hand, and readable/understandable/interpretable on 
the other. This involves the factor o f viewpoint and deprives us from 
the too categorical nature o f J. Lotm an’s notion o f the semiosphere. In 
fact, the heuristic value o f the semiosphere can be cast to doubt, when 
we recall o f those points in the theses o f TMS that explain its views on 
the concept o f culture.3 While Lotm an’s treatment o f the semiosphere 
puts TM S’s conception o f culture often merely into another vocabu­
lary, it seems that the original understanding can be more flexible and 
suitable for actual analysis:
In investigations o f  a semiotic-typologieal nature the concept o f  culture is 
perceived as fundamental. In doing so we should distinguish between the 
conception o f  culture from its own point o f  view and from the point o f  view of  
a scientific metasystem [...]. According to the first position, culture will have 
the appearance o f  a certain delimited sphere which is opposed to the 
phenomena [...] outside it. Thus the concept o f culture is inseparably linked 
with the opposition o f  its ‘non-culture’. (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 1)
It is important that TM S’s original ‘culture’ is far less categorical than 
the ‘sem iosphere’ in ten years after the Theses:
The sphere o f  extracultural nonorganization may sometimes be constructed as 
a mirror reflection o f  the sphere o f  culture or else as a space which, from the 
position o f  an observer immersed in the given culture, appears as unorganised, 
but which from an outer position proves to be a sphere o f different 
organization. (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 3)
The application o f textual approach to cultural phenomena seems to 
imply that semiotic structures, or semiotic subjects, can but be set in 
such an environment which is demarcated from such ‘different 
organisations' in the manner as ‘culture’ is opposed to its outside. The 
combination o f  textualist and spatial vocabulary does not entail as 
categorical oppositions as contained in Lotm an’s treatment o f the
3 We can but hypothesise the value o f  some ideas introduced by Lotman under 
the notion o f  the semiosphere, if  the latter were replaced with 'the universe o f  the 
mind’ as a scientific concept, not merely a title o f  Lotman’s book in English (see 
Lotman 1990).
semiosphere. We can meet evidence to this even in Lotm an’s own 
practical analysis o f the so-called behavioural texts that are based on 
the dynamism between ‘norm al’ and ‘abnorm al’, ‘norm al’ and 
‘artistic’ spheres o f behavioural modalities. Behavioural texts concern 
interaction between the cultural space both in the physical and purely 
semiotic sense; for example:
The Russia before Peter knew binary contrasting o f the ritual and extraritual 
(non-ritual: vneritualjnoe) space in the world and in the space o f  human 
settlement. (Lotman 1977: 77)
It seems that considering TMS as a semiotic school centred around 
space has several important clues for understanding its development, 
just as well as significant consequences for scientific history. Space is 
one o f the most basic and substantial categories for reflection and 
analysis; space is an object o f study that can —  and has been used by 
TMS —  as a metalinguistic construction. This means that all through 
its history, TMS has been —  already since the very beginnings in the 
1960s —  one o f the few true transdisciplinary schools not only in 
humanities, but touching also the sphere o f the so-called hard science 
(for instance in its reflections on cerebral/cultural dynamism; Cherni­
govskaya, Balonov, Deglin 1983; Nikolaechko, Deglin 1984). TMS 
started off as a discipline studying Russian literature; it ended up by 
viewing diverse cultural phenomena as cultural texts. It is important 
what this development brought along in its course, for this is probably 
one o f the first cases o f transdisciplinarity in the modern era after the 
(politically and militarily forced) slow death o f the movement towards 
the Unified Science in the beginning o f the 20th century. TMS began 
by studying texts o f Russian literature, conditionally ending up by 
studying cultures as ‘texts’ or composed o f a set o f ‘texts’. This 
seemingly minor shift in scientific approach has enormous, almost 
extraordinary significance in terms o f a metalevel shift in general, and 
this may be one o f the few unique cases o f such metaphorical 
approaches that does have heuristic value. At the same time, the 
progress o f  TMS from analysing texts o f Russian literature to 
analysing cultural phenomena in textual terms represents, as 
mentioned, probably one o f the first contemporary transdisciplinary 
developments. TM S’s employment o f ‘cultural text’ was, in itself, a 
remarkably ingenious device (let us remind o f Russian Formalism). 
This brought TMS considerably closer to other trends studying culture
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even by enabling, at the analysis o f both physical and semiotic culture 
traits (let us remind o f Ruth Benedict), to apply uniform methods, and 
to grasp the holism o f physical and semiotic components o f culture 
(let us remind o f the Estonian folklorist Jakob Hurt and his old- 
hoar d t\  Culture as culture text is formed o f such cultural texts the 
developmental logic o f which should principally be hermeneutic; 
therefore the whole and its components are analysable by uniform 
methods. Such a state brings TMS closer, backwards, not only to the 
more dynamic side o f  Russian Formalism, but also with, for example, 
New Criticism (let us remind o f T. S. Eliot). Likewise, obvious 
connections can be seen with the more rational part o f those who 
dwelled on the Death o f the Author5.
The positioning o f cultural phenomena into sociocultural contexts 
allows talking about semiotic spaces and semiosis in diverse aspects 
o f both perception and cognition. Thus, transdisciplinarity, in a sense, 
lies in objects, and the conglomeration o f multiple perspectives and 
viewpoints draws attention to the futility o f trying to separate 
‘m ethods’ and ‘disciplines’ that has been an unfortunate topic in 
connection with semiotics in general. Viewing TMS as a school 
centred at the study and metalinguistic use o f  space, thus helps to see 
its connections with other traditions o f thought and research; 
unfortunately there are but a few examples o f suchlike studies yet (cf. 
e.g. Portis-W inner 1999). Transdisciplinarity is, in fact, not too 
implicitly implied by TMS itself already in its theses:
[...] together with an approach which permits us to construct a series of 
relatively autonomous sciences o f  the semiotic cycle, we shall also admit 
another approach, according to which all o f  them examine particular aspects 
o f the semiotics o f  culture, o f  the study o f the functional correlation of 
different sign systems. (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 1)
4 In Estonian: vanavara.
5 In principle, TMS turned the text into a spatial cultural phenomenon in both 
ontological and epistemic. plane. Therefore we can probably make a short 
evaluation, maintaining that TM S’s text's heuristic potential has, until now 
overcome the one o f  space, but this is a topic worthy a longer individual 
treatment.
Construction of semiotic subjects
Spatial thinking led us to the notion o f the semiotic subject, the latter 
in turn, to problems connected with the partial rigidity o f the 
conception o f the semiosphere. It may even be considered dangerous 
to view the semiosphere —  like J. Lotman did —  as separated from 
the ‘alien sem iotic’, because this would lead to the isolation o f 
semiotic subjects. All the more, viewing macro-level semiotic 
subjects, e.g. nations, as operating in isolated semiospheres, points at 
direct peril realised in the course o f history continuously. While in 
practical analysis it may turn out that semiotic subjects sometimes see 
their semiotic reality, or their particular semiosphere, as central and 
even singular (e.g. the exclusion o f barbarians, the Nazi propaganda 
for the Arian race, civilised world vs. the Axis o f Evil, etc.), this 
should not be regarded as a possibility on the metalevel. Self­
positioning in an exclusive manner has often been the case when 
aggressors have justified their military campaigns; it is exactly the 
‘civilised enclave’ that has been stated as in need to ‘cultivate’ the 
outside, to find new living space for itself, or the similar. However, 
opposing the cultivated oikumene to the rest o f the environment or the 
world is seldom the case at trials o f defining such semiotic subjects as 
nations, for example. In a way, nation-formation is as different from 
the founding o f a state or a related governmental structure as the latter 
are from the non-governmental. It is significant that contrary to prior 
cases in history, the foundation o f nation-states in Europe centred on 
self-definition through the description o f national sociocultural cores 
that were not necessarily opposed to others in the disjunctive 
modality. In a way, although nation-states appealed for a territory, 
their semiotic essence seems similar to contemporary non­
governmental organisations that are major agents in the process o f 
globalisation. Such organisations are not rigid, although their cores 
tend to be stabile; their boundaries are rather lines o f interaction, not 
those separating the ‘ow n’ from the ‘alien semiotic’. O f course, the 
core-centred and inclusive semiotic subjects that may often not even 
have territorial claims, can be o f diverse nature and goals (e.g., profit 
corporations vs. ideological organisations). Sometimes such organi­
sations, however, can follow the ideology o f making a distinction 
between the oikumenical and the ‘alien semiotic’ (e.g., terrorist 
organisations), but this is exactly the crucially grave situation we drew
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attention to in the above discussion. As mentioned, the (semio-) 
spherical or spatial conceptualisation o f semiotic subjects is directly 
connected with the topic o f identity (or: semiotic boundaries) and 
(self-) positioning in communication, be interaction concerned either 
with the interpersonal or intercultural level.
Today, intercultural communication first implies the question: 
what or who are its agents? Are we considering cultures, societies, 
races, states, nations, individuals or other possible subjects? Having 
picked one o f them, it is further necessary to define what exactly is 
kept in mind. For example, if  choosing ‘cultures’ to be the agents 
under inspection, we can probably rule out ‘intercultural communi­
cation proper’ because o f the mass communication facilities unifying 
knowledge and behavioural patterns in the world. Today’s world 
culture and the speed and extent o f  communication equalizes what 
used to be understood as distinct cultures, even culture areas, 
according to cultural anthropology (e.g., Kluckhohn 1961). Communi­
cation, literally as a technique o f sharing, has homogenized know­
ledge, behaviour, available and usable communication channels and 
patterns among peoples inhabiting geographically incongruent and 
distant areas. Therefore it is difficult to demarcate distinct culture 
areas in the sense they were outlined only some decades ago. Today 
we can probably talk just about world culture forming a background 
system for human population varying in what is actualised in 
individual communities. Peoples operating with different languages, 
state organizations, or who are anthropologically (in the biological 
aspect) dissimilar, do not diverge much in terms o f culture. O f course, 
we must remember that globalisation both homogenises sociocultural 
groups, and creates heterogeneity at the same time. If  contemporary 
technical facilities are unavailable, so is knowledge channelled in 
them, and there emerge oases o f informational lag or insufficiency.
How, then, to define a community? What forms its basis and 
influences the distinctive features distinguishing it from ‘others’? 
Inasmuch as people nowadays have to define/relate themselves on the 
social level by belonging to a certain political structure, most 
commonly a state as a spatial structure, we are to involve topics 
surrounding the notion o f ‘nation’ as major factors at the formation o f 
contemporary European structure on the level o f societies. It is 
interesting that while TMS frequently treats semiotic systems as 
operating within a social formation (in a ‘socium ’, most often), it is
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difficult to find any concrete treatment or definition o f the respective 
conglomeration itself. Instead o f finding distinctness in understanding 
the ‘society’, ‘collective’ or the similar, the closest more or less 
demarcated notion is the ‘nation’. Characteristically to TMS, this term 
lacks a clear-cut short definition (additionally has ‘nation’ sometimes 
been typologically compared to ‘quasi-nation’), but we can pay 
attention to the following:
Definition 3. Basis: the city is a quasi-nation.
Let a collective o f  people X be defined, through the previous inductive step, 
as a quasi-nation, and let a collective o f  people Y share the conditions 1—4, 
possibly also the 5th:
1) the territory o f  X borders or intersects with the territory o f  Y ;
2) X and Y use a common language;
3) X and Y are characterised by the unity o f  economic life;
4) X and Y have a common culture;
5) X is connected with Y by religious unity, mythological-epical unity o f  
tradition, or unity o f  historical fate —  then the union o f  X and Y is a quasi­
nation, its linguistic, cultural and other features are induced by the inductive 
step shaping it. [ ...]  Every time the fulfilment o f  at least four features o f  five 
is required.
[...]  Definition 5. [ ...]  A quasi-nation is a nation, if  [ ...]  it opposes itself to 
neighbouring collectives through characteristic features and is conscious o f  
itself as a coherent, closed commune. (Revzin 1977: 40)
This quotation shows, on the one hand, that ‘nation’ can be defined 
through subjective categories that, in fact, have been constructed and 
cannot be objectively verified. Even if, at first sight, language, terri­
tory or economic life may seem as definite distinctive features, they 
fade in terms o f concrete reference proper, when we think o f globali­
sation, the phenomenon o f Diaspora, immigration and the diverse 
processes and levels o f integration and assimilation. Territorial 
borders, orthographically correct language, the extent o f self-sufficient 
economy are negotiated types o f phenomena, not to talk about the 
relativity o f  cultural or religious belonging. The inherent essence of 
the named distinctive features as being constructed is evident and it is 
not worth to pay further attention to this trivialism here for longer. 
However, on the other hand, accepting their subjectivity, these 
categories start to function in the framework o f a paradigm centred at 
‘semiotic space’, ‘semiosphere’, ‘chronotope’, or ‘semiotic subject’ in 
our context. Revzin’s stress on the importance o f nation (as a semiotic 
subject) contrasted or opposed to ‘others’ connects TM S’s discourse
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on the topic with the Western one in terms o f approaching the 
phenomenon o f nationalism. Additionally, the semiotic and spatial 
distinctive features essential for the definition o f (nation as) a semiotic 
subject, allow us to see several parallels in describing sociocultural 
units in TMS and several Western schools o f thought.
Nationalism is something that has often been mixed up with 
ethnicity, race, racism, etc. We must not waste time on topics similar 
to racism or the like, since it has been long proved that there truly 
exist dissimilar races on Earth, differing in reality probably only by 
some morphic features. The problem rather lies in how is it possible 
for bio-anthropologically alike subjects to differentiate their identity 
as strongly as to use severe violence in order to define and maintain 
themselves. In Europe nationalism has been a front cover negative 
issue mostly after WW2. Similarly, definitions o f nationalism we can 
use belong to the same period. This is strange, because the idea of 
nation-specific entities dates back to the formation o f the current 
European states. In short: at times o f Enlightenment there was to be 
found an alternative to understanding social relations as based on 
(unequal) classes in favour o f an ‘equal’ foundation for human 
relations. If  in the case o f e.g. an ethnos we can define the unit at least 
in linguistic and anthropological terms, defining a nation is much 
more problemsome. There are and have been used very many criteria 
to define nation (language, culture, territory, time, history, social 
structure, bio-anthropological peculiarities) o f which the majority' are 
negotiated, arbitrary and most conditional constructions. While it is 
quite common to meet condemning attitude to nationalism in the 
‘adequately polite’ or ‘politically correct’ behaviour, e.g. in political 
statements, public discourse, etc., this cannot be the case in 
scholarship. Besides not being positive or negative, another issue is 
keeping in mind the difference between nationalism on the one hand, 
and chauvinism, patriotism and so forth on the other. Nationalism 
hints at the sentiment holding a community together and a rough rule 
o f the need for congruence o f an ethnic, linguistic, territorial and other 
dimensions mentioned above. Chauvinism, on the other hand, already 
refers to taking role in intercultural communication according to the 
principle o f (high) self-evaluation. Revzin’s understanding o f  the 
nation (except his fifth point o f definition) suits the definition o f  the 
semiotic subject in the line o f the so-to-speak positive nationalism, 
chauvinist nationalism can rather be described through the strict
conception o f the semiosphere. In actual research, the notion o f 
positive nationalism allows us to apply TM S’s conceptions o f culture 
and text to macrolevel semiotic subjects, and thereby also textual and 
spatial dimensions and features come together.
TMS: through space towards transdisciplinarity
The appearance o f TMS should not be regarded as out o f the blue. 
Hypothetically, developmental stages o f metacultures can be outlined 
as follows: discipline] -> multidisciplinary studies -> interdisciplinary 
studies -> transdisciplinary studies -> discipline2/new base discipline. 
This range can probably be altered in several ways (e.g. adding 
polydisciplinarity), but it seems that the development o f TMS can be 
characterised according to this logic. Apparently, TM S’s roots lay in 
the study o f Russian literature, and literary history was and is a field 
o f study considered as a discipline even nowadays. However, a 
semiotic attitude cannot but remain unsatisfied with the study o f mere 
texts: this follows even from the logic that took the Chomskyan 
‘linguistic competence’ to ‘com m unicative’, ‘cultural’, and ‘semiotic 
competence’. In order to understand texts, one has to pay attention to 
the cultural contexts that influence comprehension o f ways o f solving 
communicative situations. Orientation in cultural realms demands also 
abilities to navigate in the semiotic reality in terms o f comprehending 
and distinguishing between concrete and abstract referents. By way o f 
enlarging contexts (in addition to the literary, also cultural, social, 
economical, etc.), TMS managed to expand the study o f texts to all o f 
the named spheres o f cognitive competences.
The linguistic perspective and analysis o f strictly literary texts was 
replaced by the study o f cultural phenomena (including literary texts). 
The latter were (multi-) contextually positioned, and that enabled 
TMS to widely use spatial terms in concrete analysis o f literary texts. 
Space in text and textual spaces as objects and research trends indicate 
that first space was, in a way, quite strictly the space o f a secondary 
modelling system (e.g. that o f literature). Cunningly, in such a way 
space gradually became into the actual object o f study (sometimes 
called also as [sociocultural] chronotopes), while relatedly, spatial 
terms obtained higher and higher importance also for the meta­
language (from ‘textual space’ to e.g. ‘city space’, ‘semiosphere’ in
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the end). Besides texts as output o f secondary modelling systems, it 
was realised that there exist also physical and historical contexts of 
text-generation, and these implied the recognition o f diverse spatial 
levels:
At the same time, while the spatial language interests us not from the 
viewpoint o f  its genesis, but as the modelling code o f culture, we must study 
its complexity and understand that in reality the position is held not by a 
certain single language, but a hierarchy o f  spatial languages. (Lotman 1986: 6)
This is probably a background for the relatively high popularity of 
TMS and the applicability o f its metalinguistic constructions to quite 
diverse phenomena —  in fact, cultural semiotics along with its object 
o f  study, the semiotic space, can be considered as one o f the first 
instances o f transdisciplinarity as mentioned above. TMS, having its 
start-off in Russian literature studies as a discipline, passed through 
the above mentioned stages o f development, became into an 
individual discipline, and —  having reached the level o f trans­
disciplinarity —  can now be considered as a methodological basis on 
which to build the study o f sociocultural phenomena in general. The 
use o f TM S’s toolkit for the description o f culture along with its 
spatio-semiotic terminology could be a unified perspective to analyse 
sociocultural phenomena and semiotic subjects in contemporary 
situation o f globalisation. When we keep ourselves conscious to 
employ the conception o f the semiosphere only in the manner as 
neglecting its certain above-described totalitarian insinuations and 
remind o f its roots in TM S’s original understanding o f culture (which 
seems much more functional than the concept o f  semiosphere), and 
enhance such a view on semiotic subjects with implements coming 
from the model o f the umwelt, we may find ourselves at a trans- 
disciplinary threshold proper.6
6 Research for this article has been supported by Estonian Science Foundation 
grant 6729.
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О пространственности в семиотике культуры Тартуско- 
М осковской школы: семиотический субъект
В статье рассматривается развитие ТМШ от анализа текста до 
изучения пространственных семиотических единиц (из них наиболее 
известная —  семиосфера). В то же время предпринимается попытка 
показать, что в семиотике ТМШ такие понятия, как например, 
«культура» и «пространство», не нуждаются в прибавлении термина 
«семиосферы». В статье изучаются возможности связать базовые 
понятия Юкскюлля и Лотмана (как основы эстонской семиотики) с 
описанием культуры и пространства в ТМШ посредством «семиоти­
ческого субъекта». Такой подход позволяет увидеть трансдисципли- 
нарность уже в начальных разработках ТМШ, где симбиотически 
использовались «культура» и «пространство».
Ruumilisusest Tartu-M oskva kultuurisemiootikas: 
Semiootiline subjekt
Artiklis vaadeldakse Tartu-Moskva semiootikakoolkonna arengut teksti- 
analüüsist ruumiliste semiootiliste üksuste uurimiseni (viimastest tuntuim 
on semiosfäär). Samas püütakse näidata, et Tartu-Moskva semiootikas on 
olnud nt ‘kultuuri’ ja ‘ruumi’ näol tegemist selliste mõistetega, millele nt 
‘semiosfäär’ juurde ei panusta. Uuritakse võimalusi ühendada Uexkülli ja 
Lotmani baasmõisted (Eesti semiootika alustaladena) Tartu-Moskva 
koolkonna kultuuri- ja  ruumikäsiteluga ‘semiootilise subjekti’ kaudu. 
Seesugune lähenemine võimaldab näha alles viimasel kümnendil tähtsus- 
tunud transdistsiplinaarsust juba Tartu-Moskva algkontseptsioonides, mis 
avaldusid ‘kultuuri’ ja ‘ruumi’ sümbiootilises kasutamises.
On spatiality in Tartu-Moscow cultural semiotics 159
Sign Systems Studies 35.1/2, 2007
Space-Time: A mythological geometry
Jelena Grigorjeva
Department o f  Semiotics, University o f  Tartu 
Tiigi St. 78, 50410 Tartu, Estonia 
e-mail: jelena.grigorjeva@ut.ee
Abstract. In the article the fundamental graphic models that are used by the 
cultural consciousness to bring about the abstract spheres o f  thought are 
analyzed. The problem o f inter-semiotic, i.e. emblematic, interpretation o f  the 
categories o f space and time is also considered. The models o f  the cross and 
pyramid are analyzed from the point o f  view o f  their ideological 
(transcending) function and o f the mechanism o f  emblematizing the abstract 
notions o f time and space. This approach helps understanding the general laws 
o f cultural mentality and the process o f  emblematizing any meaning for the 
structuring and fixation purposes.
This research situates itself within the Kulturwissenschaft tradition o f 
philosophical-iconographic studies that go back to A. Warburg 
(Ginsburg 1989: 17-59). If  we use E. Panofsky’s distinction between 
iconology and iconography (Panofsky 1955: 29-30), it is precisely 
iconographic or formally analytical. Panofsky traces this “formal 
analytic method” back to H. Wölfflin, defining it as an iconographic 
analysis o f pictorial motifs and their combinations. The idea o f a 
pictorial motif, as will be elucidated further, fits within the diagram 
framework, whose development takes stage as m otif combinations and 
recombinations within a very broad take on visual culture. The 
groundwork laid by W. J. T. Mitchell (1986, 1994), N. M irzoeff (1999) 
as well as R. Krauss (1985) is the source o f this very visual culture.
The idea o f a ‘m o tif , as re-used by me, is rooted in B. Gasparov 
(1984, 1988-1989, 1993), who in turn applies it to literary text, while 
borrowing it alongside its formal aspects from music theory (Gaspa­
rov 1969). B. Gasparov currently holds a professorship at Columbia
University, but his early academic career began at Tartu. Early ideas 
towards m otif analysis were presented by Gasparov in a specialized 
course delivered in University o f Tartu in the late 1970s. M otif 
analysis is the key methodological tool which I will be using (with 
some adjustments made in terms o f the object o f study) in the current 
work. The concept o f  m otif extrapolated onto visual matter cannot but 
transform the method itself. In light o f  the Tartu-M oscow School, this 
method was taking shape under the influence o f ‘History o f Ideas’ 
school, primarily as outlined by Frances Yates (Yates 1966). Among 
the sources worth noting are the works on iconography by F. Buslaev 
(1886, 1919), which in many ways served as the groundwork towards 
a semiotic approach to analyzing spatial representation forms o f P. 
Florensky (1922, 1992, 1993a) that were eventually able to see the 
light o f day after a long period o f Soviet repression, particularly his 
essay, “Reverse Perspective” (1967).
Regarding my understanding o f myth and the pictorial motifs that 
may inhabit its zone o f influence, I owe it specifically to V. Toporov’s 
fundamental research (Toporov 1967, 1995, 1997, 2003). Toporov was 
one o f the founders o f the Tartu-M oscow semiotic school. I see as 
equally important the broader tradition concerning myth: philosophical 
(Losev 1991; Cassirer 1955; Barthes 1984), anthropological (Levi- 
Strauss 1963, 1970) and poetic (Eliade 1959, 1961, 1963; Graves 1948).
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1. Space-Time: problems of representation
Something needs to be said to precede the current study: both Space 
and Time are understood by the author as mythological concepts, that 
is, as models o f  consciousness, as opposed to categories. I define 
Space and Time philosophically, without trying to figure out their 
‘actual m eaning’. Without a doubt, this approach is emblematic: I am 
first and foremost concerned with the combined collective imagery, 
objects, word usage, along with the aforementioned programmatic, 
self-defining terms like “space” and “time” (regardless o f whether 
these combination are meant for a textbook on physics or a poetic 
text). In any case, we are dealing with a sort o f  representation which 
does not allow for its verity or quality to be tested under the method in 
question. In saying that the word has duration in time, or in 
discriminating between spatial and temporal art forms, we typically
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reason in terms o f plausib/e-enough-error which, effectively, is an 
operational field o f research for this paper. My purpose is to show the 
extent which plausible-enough-errors o f consciousness can be thought 
o f as a harmonious system, as well as to pinpoint ways in which they 
structure macro-mythological formations.
My approach has chiefly to do with theories o f creation myth and 
neo-mythology o f the late 19th century to the early 20th century. More­
over, all o f the 20th century is marked by the study, further discovery 
and cataloging o f myths and their working, throughout the areas o f 
human consciousness. Meanwhile, virtually all o f  the mythological 
studies are focused on myth as specific verbal way o f thinking. 
“[Myth’s] substance [...] [lies] in the story which it tells. Myth is a 
language, functioning on an especially high level, where meaning 
succeeds practically at “taking o f f ’ from the “linguistic ground on 
which it keeps on rolling” (Lövi-Strauss 1974: 210). I see this as 
paradoxical, to say the least, particularly in Barthes’ version: “Myth is a 
word, an utterance” (Barthes 1989). The very choice o f examples in 
Barthes goes to show the impossibility o f reducing myth to its verbal 
coating only. In part, such an interpretation is suggested by the word’s 
actual etymology (from Greek mythos —  story, narrative). However, it 
is impossible not to notice just how futile the attempts o f such 
reductionism are when it comes to a variety o f cultural trends which 
operate and are typologically described in terms o f myth, not the least, 
in conceiving and propagating the so-called “world model”.
A notable exception would be Losev’s theory o f symbol, particularly 
his thoughts on the mythologizing o f a person: “Myth is [...] an affir­
mation o f the person [...] functioning as disclosure and expressiveness. 
It is a person’s image, picture, [...] face. [...] Myth is portraiture, a 
pictorial radiance, an icon o f the person” (Losev 1991: 94, italics 
added)2. In actual fact, Losev is depicting a phenomenon which nowa­
days is referred to as ‘image’ o f the person, something o f a composite 
public identity. Yet, in order to acknowledge this element o f m yth’s
1 The immensity o f works concerning relationship between Space and Time can 
hardly be listed here in all its variety, even as a brief overview. It is one o f the 
perpetual problems o f human consciousness and, in all probability, one without 
solution. I am not holding any illusions o f  being able to provide a solution. My 
purpose is to suggest some form o f strategy in understanding this relationship 
using an emblem-based model for generation o f meaning.
2 Translations are mine unless otherwise specified — J. G.
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pictorial quality (kartinnost*) it is necessary to further analyze its 
patterns: something that has not been undertaken to date. It has been of 
utmost importance to my research to highlight the graphic rules of 
mythological representation, which are necessarily in close contact with 
the word and convention resulting in emblem-type formations.
In my analysis, I am consciously focusing on the exterior o f mytho­
logical sign. This is largely due to the fact that operational and analytical 
potential o f (artistic) expression applied to theory o f knowledge remains, 
so far, o f little repercussion. As a matter o f fact, the efficacy of this 
potential is recognized only in the realm of fine arts, preferably graphic 
art, although, the role o f the arts for theory o f knowledge is yet to gain 
acceptance. Science and easy ways do not always go hand in hand, and 
yet, however, in an attempt to define Time and Space, presented with an 
unhappy choice between “love o f the word” and what is plainly 
observable evidence I have chosen plain evidence o f the observable clear- 
cut certainties as my reference point, if it is to have any stability or 
permanence. After all, the means by which time and space are represented 
in culture, are plainly evident and obvious. Thus, between knowing what 
Time is and seeing what Time is, I will be referring to the latter. I would 
like to begin my analysis o f the clear-cut observable evidence by using a 
well-known graphic model for representing time.
2. An instance of graphic representation of Time
I came across an amusing pattern in my research on advertisement 
analysis. The time o f the day, as shown by mechanical clocks in 
advertising, is 10:10 in 90% o f cases (fig. 1-2). Deviations are 
possible (this is not the law o f gravity, although, as we will observe 
further, the pattern in question bears a certain relation to the law of 
gravity), at times this may be 11:10 or 11:05, yet occurs somewhat 
more seldom which is also quite logical. Besides, this rule is not 
observed when time shown is motivated by a plotline, for instance, 
when New Y ear’s Eve m otif is used. Yet, in all other instances, this is 
quite a regular feature. We have every reason to think that advertisers 
suggest this V-shaped position o f the clock hands (in relation to each 
other, as well as to the clock dial) because they perceive it as most 
visually appealing: something so regular and peculiar is enough to be 
worth an explanation.
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Figure I. Clock on this ad shows 10:10. The advertisement highlights the way 
how the movement o f the clock hand is comparable to the rotation o f the swastika.
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Figure 2. An advertisement for watches. The background contains the “rotating 
cross/windmill” motif. Human character in the center o f  the composition 
represents the same graphic element o f 10:10. With the windmill at the perspec­
tive vanishing point, the ocean cone becomes the sky cone in the landscape.
Here, the strategy o f presenting the case may have some flexibility: the 
logic o f analogies can be arbitrary enough, without being a claim to a 
final answer. The only criterion by which I was guided, was to account 
for as many motive/motif connotations (of this graphic figure and o f the 
model o f Time at large) as possible. Unlike the word (and this is of 
utmost importance), the graphic image will invariably retain some sort of 
motive/motif when serving as a link between form and expression. This 
motivation, however, will never consist o f one thing alone (in the absence 
of a fixed word reserved for it, unlike the classical emblem), is the reason 
why a priori interpretation in this case will not be relegated to one single 
meaning. This follows directly from the nature o f the link between the 
signifier and the signified when it comes to graphics. Unlike conventional 
language, graphic elements o f an iconic sign have no finite number of 
possible contextual meanings assigned to them. Therefore, all the 
attempts to “read” the graphic text unequivocally, as if it were verbal, are 
doomed to fail, methodologically speaking.
Thus, an explanation can be sufficiently simple: a V-shaped figure 
resembles the hand gesture combination which stands for victory. 
Why is the V-shape so optimal for both denoting victory and 
improving the image o f advertising clocks? Let us not forget that 
Churchill’s gesture was enthusiastically identified and gradually 
adopted the world over, even where the word ‘victory’ does not begin 
with the letter V.
It seems that we need to begin with motivation. Advertising is 
extremely convenient for that matter, since in it, as in a detective 
novel, motive is the pivotal engine (as in: look for somebody directly 
benefiting from the affair), yet, unlike the detective novel, the motive 
is known beforehand. There is no need to look for the signified: it is 
enough to know what exactly is being sold by the means o f the clock. 
Leaving aside luxury and prestige (or conversely: accessibility and 
practicality), neither o f which are exclusive to clocks or watches, 
clocks sell a representation o f current time which is precisely what is 
to be depicted. Therefore, according to this graphic version, time can 
be represented as V-shape.
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3. ‘Spatialized’ Time
It is evident that in the collective human consciousness (both that of 
the masses and the intellectual/elite) Time, likewise, is expressed only 
by the means o f a range o f spatial metaphors. N. Arutiunova writes on 
spatial metaphors o f Time:
Linguistic models o f  Time can be divided into those where Human Being is 
the key character and those oriented towards Time proper. In the former case, 
the Line o f Time represents the flow o f  life and the line o f  destiny; while the 
latter it deals with the movement o f  cosmic substances, namely: air and water. 
(Arutiunova 1998: 689)
The metaphor o f Time may be fashioned according to three basic most 
recurrent patterns: (1) in the shape o f some continuous extension (a rib­
bon, a thread, a river, a road), (2) some tiny particles (grains o f sand, 
raindrops, insects), and (3) allegorically, in the shape o f a human being 
(or, if  there are several humans, these mirrors the aforementioned “The 
Ages o f M an” motif) o f a certain age furnished with certain attributes (a 
beard, a scythe, an hourglass, a skull, a pair o f wings etc.) which can 
themselves independently generate the same meaning. Such icono­
graphic examples abound in the most exhaustive collection o f emblems 
from the 16th—17th centuries, which was effectively a period when this 
type o f iconography flourished in Europe (Henkel, Schöne 1967).
Moreover, continuity (just as fragmentation) is easily reversible 
here: water falls apart as drops, sand comes together as dunes, thread 
is ripped or cut in two and snowflakes stick together, forming the 
‘Ball o f  Eternity’. Both fragmentation and continuity may be thought 
o f as fundamental properties o f the archetypal notion o f Time.
These are metaphors that are easily recognizable, albeit at times 
familiar to the point o f  being worn out. Yet, there is a category of 
metaphors which we use on a daily basis while not considering them 
metaphors, but rather precision measurement instruments. Such 
instruments-metaphors are the clocks/watches o f  all types and 
descriptions. It is from this vantage point that L. F. Chertov analyzes 
the clocks in his essay “Clocks as spatial model o f time” (Chertov 
1998: 101-114), though without dwelling on the issues o f  basic 
graphic correlations.
As a matter o f fact, visible Time is always given to us in space: 
“Temporal relationships express themselves and unfold exclusively
Space-Time: A mythological geometry 169
through spatial ones (Cassirer 1955: 103-104; see also Smart 1955: 
239-241; Smart 1964; Borel 1960). I would like to further 
complement this point (which has attained sufficient triviality) with a 
number o f  mythological figures, whose perpetuity attests to their 
structuring potential as well as a certain emblematic intelligence o f 
these main philosophic categories.
The motion o f the Sun and the Moon, shadows moving between 2- 
and 3-dimensional spaces are a natural transformation o f Space by 
Time. Each vertically-oriented object turns out to be a clock hand, 
whilst each horizontal one, a clock dial. Or, to be more precise, the 
clock hand is a shadow projection onto the surface o f any object 
which forms an angle with that surface. Sundials re-use the same 
principle. Mechanical clocks materialize the movement o f shadow, 
thus presenting a metonymic model o f Space (Earth’s surface) 
arbitrarily segmented.
Both water-clocks and hourglasses measure time using more 
obvious spatial volumes. It is not for me to judge which o f following 
are primary or secondary with regard to the above: idiomatic metaphor 
(“passing o f time”), philosophical (“no one can enter the same river 
twice”) or being a water instrument for measuring time (klepsydra). 
What matters to me is that here too, the rule o f sharing the same 
“vessel” by some non-discrete substance, which may be easily divided 
into pieces or, to be more precise, one substance in two different 
philosophical-aggregate forms. Neither water, nor sand is (imme­
diately) quantifiable: we can count grains o f sand or drops o f water, 
which is a totally different concept.
Perhaps, the only way o f measuring or expressing time is the clock 
bell (or ship bell). Yet even here, the measurement-expression is made 
possible via our conception o f cyclical time; or, to put it better, the 
repetitiveness o f the cycle, that is: the rhythm which certainly is a 
category which has a spatial marking to it, given that a stand-alone 
symbol would be meaningless to the process: only the segment having 
this dual awareness o f the two points simultaneously, will be meaningful.
Repetition makes one look back, that is to say, halts Time while 
presenting an idea o f Space: in this case in terms o f an opportunity to 
visualize Time as a ‘gap’ (the very notion applicable to both Space and 
Time). Here, it seems, Henri Bergson’s observation is very timely:
If the sounds are separated, they must leave empty intervals between them. If
we count them, the intervals must remain though the sounds disappear: how
could these intervals remain, if  they were pure duration and not space? It is in
space, therefore, that the operation takes place. (Bergson 1910: 87)
When it comes to transformation o f Space by Time in the mind, this 
transformation is not observable outside that which we think o f as 
Time. The way we feel and perceive the Space depends on how 
prolonged this feeling is. A point having no dimension has no spatial 
traits either. Space as visualization or, more importantly, an imitation 
o f this visual image is structured as a combination o f light and shadow 
blots. It seems only two-dimension plane can be visualized outside 
Time (although it takes time to realize that it is indeed a two- 
dimension plane). In order for two-dimensionality to attain volume it 
needs to be cross-hatched. Thus, each portrayal o f  Space has a stamp 
o f Time on it as well. Light and shadow create a unique combination 
o f Space and Time existing inside each other. A division o f these two 
substances or light/shadow absolutized, eliminates the notions of 
Space and Time in human mind. That is: neither light nor shadow, on 
their own, posseses any o f these traits, yet they already signify 
timelessness and ‘spacelessness’, as well as the unknowable —  a 
consequence o f unfeasibility o f any translation.
This is precisely why both Early Medieval Western European 
religious painting, along with Byzantine icons, would imitate Light 
(using the golden background) rather than Space: this signifies 
‘spacelessness’ and timelessness that cannot be comprehended, yet 
can be an object o f  faith. When a source o f light is introduced into the 
image, it is thus immersed into a fixed space-time continuum. The 
next step towards regularization o f the relationship between the 
depicted chronotope and the chronotope o f the recipient, is the use of 
the rules o f direct perspective, which specify a direct link between the 
viewer’s and the painting’s mutual arrangement, within which the real 
and the imaginary/imitated space-time continuums intersect. Certain 
analyses o f  spatial-temporal relationships in art this interdependence is 
formulated in a somewhat more complex way via intersection o f the 
real, conceptual, and perceptual space-time (Zobov, Mostepanenko 
1974: 14).
Another method o f conceiving Space through Time (or vice versa, 
since this is a process o f mutual translation and no issue o f  what is 
primary/secondary arises) is the gesture or movement —  such process 
can also be called ‘rhythm ’. The length o f movement measured by the 
intervals transforms the categories into a feeling o f  their unity. The
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basic connection between these categories is the pulsating blood in the 
arteries and veins o f  the human body (vid. Elkin 1969: 78-79; and 
also Favorski 1988: 234: “How to measure Time? It appears to be 
different from person to person and depends primarily from one’s 
pulse”). This basic feature is further enhanced by the motor-tactile and 
acoustic information. Furthermore, all aspects o f  human economy can 
be related to mutually translatable Space and Time.
M oreover, it is certain that the human being can be also described 
as a device for gathering/dismantling one’s perception o f temporal 
(acoustic) and spatial (figurative) arrays. It is not by chance that 
Romanticism, in an attempt to reject the rigid emblematic framework, 
embarks upon exploiting the human somatic and physiological defects 
along with absolutizing music as the most Space-less art form, while 
also attempting to purity it to the core. Hence, we meet the Blind 
Musician character (Korolenko’s late romanticism), or the Deaf 
Musician which is even more teling for that matter: take for instance 
the life o f Beethoven (e.g., in Odoevsky’s Russian Nights).
The notion that Time can only be expressed in terms o f Space, is 
most likely to be a pan-cultural oxymoron, as both Space and Time 
exist in our mind as mutually exclusive or, to put it linguistically, in a 
state o f complementary distribution. One by no means can be the 
other, but also cannot exist outside the other, the two being 
“indivisible yet distinct” . This analogy (or model?) materializes in the 
shape o f a vessel with a very narrow neck through which the 
substance runs, while the substance’s quantitative properties are 
modified: the Space is fragmented to the point o f ceasing to be itself, 
it becomes Time. The above transformation is certainly not to be taken 
scientifically: it is but an interpretation o f one by the means o f the 
other, an interpretation with a clearly defined strategy: a reduction 
almost brought to its own endpoint.
4. Hourglass model
Graphically or geometrically, the idea o f hourglass may be presented 
as two pyramids or cones meeting each other at one point situated at 
their respective peaks. The pyramid presents a model o f reduction o f 
Space into one point. It is on this property that the mythology o f the 
pyramid builds all the variety o f its manifestations.
In accordance with the same strategy, we can draw graphs o f the 
changing correlation along the two axes —  vertical and horizontal 
which have only one point in common with each other. Is it an 
objective or subjective feature o f the point to be small enough so as to 
make its pertinence indistinguishable for the eye? One can be the other 
in one point exclusively. This point, as a rule, is also a ‘zero point’, 
which effectively places it outside the two sets. The latter moment is 
very substantial, since the process o f Time representation from this 
vantage point turns out to be the process o f  establishing a contact with 
some sort o f transcendental essence revealed apophatically via the 
same model: zero point is a negation o f the main factors o f the visible 
material cosmos. Therefore, the moment o f passage to “hereafter” can 
be presented as transit via a tiny hole in accordance with the formula: 
“It is easier for a camel to go through the eye o f a needle...” (The 
death experience which the analysts persist in placing alongside the 
birth one, produces a similar characteristic image/painting o f passage 
through converging pipework, funnels, passageways, labyrinths, 
orifices —  Grof, Halifax 1996.)
The point in question can be identified as mythological zero point 
o f  birth-death o f  the world. It represents first and foremost a spatial 
orientation support base (cf. Podosinov 1999: 4 5 9 ^ 7 2 ). This point 
can be presented as a rolled up cosmos within the Cosmic Egg (cf. 
Toporov 1967: 81-99). Yet, it may also present itself as pinnacle as 
well as the center o f the Universe. The above depiction can be 
compared to the scientific hypotheses concerning the origin of the 
Universe from singularity:
Return towards a mythological worldview o f  the unique “pre-existent” time 
can be seen in contemporaiy cosmogonic theories which presuppose a 
formation o f the Universe due to an ‘explosion’ o f  a hyper-dense substance 
concentrated in an ‘atom’. (Ivanov 1974: 41)
Once again, it may be noted that neither the logic nor the imagery of 
myth contradict the logic and terminological metaphors o f  the sciences 
o f the ‘natural' cycle —  this contradiction itself is rather a construct, a 
variety o f mythological thinking the opposites. To recall A. Losev: 
“Science is ever accompanied by mythology as well as is genuinely 
nourished by its initial intuitions” (Losev 1991: 29).
Moreover, one may clearly observe a constructive tautology in the 
way space-time correlation is presented in culture. The classical
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allegory o f time Chronos-Satum (the characters o f Saturn, Chronos and 
Cronus all had a tendency to be mixed already in antiquity —  cf. 
Klibansky, Saxl, Panofsky 1964: 133), while the imagery unfolding as a 
plot, displays the aforementioned properties o f the Space becoming 
Time With Old Chronos devouring his children (the moments), that is, 
processing him self via his own crushing neck —  the operational 
principle is the same as with the hourglass. The ancient emblem thus 
turns out to be a detailed enough account o f a time-measuring device. 
Or conversely: the device is organized according to the principle o f this 
emblem. The issue o f which o f these events is a first-order or a 
secondary one is quite convoluted, which is why, in all probability, we 
need to speak in terms o f some archetypal constructs o f consciousness.
There is an additional twist to this iconographic plotline, brilliantly 
illustrated by Panofsky (cf. Vater Chronos analyzed by Panofsky 
1980): Satum-Chronos devouring a child whilst another (or the same) 
child performs castration on Satum-Chronos. The process at play 
resembles the overall scheme o f the information process in its rather 
classical version (Wiener 1983). Severing genetic memory, the idea o f 
entropy is expressed with an ancient simplicity and sincerity. By the 
way, the hourglass is an ever-present attribute within the graphic 
compositions o f Vanitas-type depicting in a metonymically balanced 
fashion, both life (with its futility and vanity) and death (as inevitable 
consequence o f the former).
5. Atomization of space and genesis of speech
This very well-established way o f representing Time —  all-consuming 
Time —  allows me to make certain suppositions with regard to 
organization o f the orifice between the two cones, the zero point o f the 
chronotope. In the case o f Chronos, it is plausible that the orifice is a 
sort o f grinding device, a chewing mouth (Derzhavin’s crater o f 
Eternity), although this grinding can be facilitated simply by the small 
size o f the orifice. In a broader sense, this is a valve or a tap: a device 
that both lets the substances through and prevents this or that 
substance from penetration. A frontier understood in its logical 
philosophical sense as time a place where the two substances meet and 
separate. The mouth here is one o f the acceptable and widespread 
metaphors closely linked to mythology at the origins o f speech.
I will supply only one example o f a very tightly-built m otif array 
from Andrei Bely’s mytho-poetic theory o f speech genesis , inspired 
by Steiner’s theosophic system as well as (in my view) by the practice 
o f spoken German (cf. Grigorjeva 1998: 155-161) .
Genesis o f  verbal meaning, according to Glossolalias, is directly 
linked to kinesthetic plasticity o f  the organs o f  speech or graphic 
figures, hieroglyphs o f sorts emerging as a result o f propagating o f the 
acoustic wave throughout the ‘liquid’ changing space o f  the laryngeal 
and oral cavities.
In the и the depth o f  laryngeal well is well-defined; и is genuine just as die 
Uhr, in the и we feel the gullet, it seems like vanishing in [the remoteness of] 
the past. (Bely 1922; 73; here and in the other citations from Bely the italics 
are mine, bold script is A. B ely’s —  J. G.)
Another telling feature is that the larynx orifice is merged by Bely 
with the Time compound, die Uhr (German for ‘clock’) and the flavor 
o f antiquity, Ur-, as if  enacting the struggle o f antiquity (= Eternity) 
with Time:
From the struggle between a and e Time is conceived -  the tragedy o f the 
world; Arche begets Chronos', while Time is enveloped in struggle o f  the 
noble r in the timelessness o f  Uhr, a hero defeating Hurrah-Uranus which is 
Chronos; he is Herr, a battle ciy and a crunch o f  the ha-er-ha, a wheeze o f the 
struggling Hurrah being strangled. (Bely 1922; 45)
Naturally, Andrei Bely is far from being a positivistic scientist or even 
a philosopher (if  we take the fullness o f the meaning), yet this 
(neo)myth-creation to him is a professional activity. His intricate 
imagery, combined in various ways, is extremely detailed in terms of 
logical features, such as merging o f the ‘cry’ and the ‘crunch’ into
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3 Steiner’s Anthroposophy having hugely influenced a number o f  pedagogical/ 
formative aspects in European culture, to a large extent was oriented towards an 
esoteric, geometric tradition o f  mnemonics. The subject is yet to be touched upon 
by academic research. Surprisingly, even Lachmann, even though she does 
mention the updating o f  the Saturn myth by symbolists under Steiner’s influence. 
Even the remarkable book by Lena Silard, Hermetics and Hermeneutics (Silard 
2002) B ely’s Glossolalia is not mentioned. Bely never made a secret o f  his 
veneration o f  Steiner. Even a passing acquaintance with Steiner’s Cosmogonv 
(Steiner 1997: 183-255) is enough to see the parallels with Pomander's, as well 
as the social circle o f  Raymond Llull and the Camillo’s Theater.
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‘wheeze’. As a result, the choice o f word forms to reinforce his 
original forms is, by no means, a chance one: to depict a reduction of 
u-larynx it was more than adequate to pick the Russian word 
udushenie (strangling).4
Furthermore, Andrei Bely’s constructs perform this ‘organic locali­
zation’ o f meaning o f the word extended in time. Graphic semantic 
mechanism o f the phonetic compounds turns out to be directly 
comparable with mythological and ideological m otif compounds:
In the /гг-sound we [are given] an intersection o f  the lines o f  expiring fever 
with another powerful line: a rising r in the middle o f  a circle or cavity: cross 
in the circle, hr, is hrest which is crux, croix. Prior to world creation in the 
cosmic milieu (in the mouth) a cross is elevated. (Bely 1922: 45)
4 The issue o f  somatic tenets o f linguistic signs is an area which remains to be 
widely studied. It is typically seen as a prerogative o f  the poetic/artistic language. 
F. Zelinskij observes with regard to the convict’s speech (in Dostoyevsky’s The 
House o f the Dead): Dostoyevsky’s use o f the slang word tilisnu for “strike”, 
“slash” (“[and so I] slit her throat like she was a c a lf’). “Is there a semblance 
between the way tilisnut' is articulated in movement and the movement o f  the 
knife blade gliding along the human skin? Not really, albeit this articulate 
movement is best to none in depicting the position o f the facial muscles 
instinctively caused by a peculiar sense o f nerve pain experienced by us when we 
picture [in our minds] the knife gliding along the skin (as opposed to piercing the 
skin): the lips are suddenly brokenly stretched out, the throat is stifled, teeth are 
clenched, and there’s no option left but to utter the [Russian] vowel sound i and as 
well as the labial consonants t, I, s whose choice (and not the loud d, r, z) was 
somewhat dictated by onomatopoetic factors” (Zelinskij 1911, 2: 185-186). It is 
crucial that the above research highlights the idea o f  “pictorial” linguistic coinage 
being expressed in somatic terms: uttering the word compels one to mimically 
experience the aforementioned emotion. Similarly to Jacobson’s ‘poetic function 
o f language’ the cited phenomenon can be described in terms o f  ‘mimic/mimetic’ 
function o f language whereby the word is as if  replicated in a somatic-kinesthetic 
way. Also, it appears that this function comes with any natural language as 
opposed to just the literary one. Among the European languages that I am familiar 
with, it appears to me, only German has a highly developed kinesthetic plasticity 
o f expression, such as the alteration o f the quality o f vowels by umlaut is at times 
almost iconographic (for instance: lachen -  lächeln) or as is the case with the 
subjunctive when incompleteness, uncertainty o f  action is expressed by the means 
o f a clearly observed vowel contraction.
6. The Cross as an algorithm of grinding
I see this figure o f “cross in the mouth” as the most worthy of 
analysis, since it specifies the process o f mythological grinding of 
Space. In other words, this process is depicted in terms o f a regular 
algorithm. The Cross imposes the regular partitioning o f the Space in 
two, then again in two: Leonardo Da Vinci in his world famous sketch 
o f man-wheel is fully aware o f the potential o f  such algorithm. Death 
on the Cross implies the process o f the Flesh becoming Word, a 
process referring to the process o f conception by the Spirit where the 
Spirit=W ord become Flesh. The mechanism and combination are fully 
compatible with overall structure o f emblem combining word and 
image. (This nomination fits in well with the terms defining parts of 
an emblem in its classical version: “Their bodies, which some call 
figures, and their Mottoes, which are termed souls and words” -  
Estienne 1646, 2). Yet this emblem is peculiar: a translation taking 
place within it, is one between the “real” and the “transcendental”. 
Therefore, in observing the mechanism o f translation-transit/passage, 
we touch upon several fundamental principles o f the human culture.
These signification aspects o f the process o f passage from life to 
death were dealt with in the previous chapter. The strategies o f this 
emblem-making are archaic almost to the point o f  coinciding with the 
origin o f  consciousness proper, and are ever-relevant. Christianity re­
uses these strategies inheriting to the pagan sacrificial cults, yet 
introduces its own peculiarities. It seems to me, one o f the signs of 
such peculiarity is a more regularized process o f  transcendence. It is 
linked to the geometric idea o f the Cross as an algorithm o f this 
process. The Crucifix is an absolute model for the institute of 
martyrdom highly developed in Christianity. Martyrdom, in its many 
variations o f dissecting and annihilation o f the flesh, is an instrument 
o f access into the Kingdom o f Heaven, done as an imitation o f Christ. 
The Cross working in tandem with a historical God becomes an 
extremely powerful instrument uniting ideology, axiology and spatio- 
temporal notions in culture (cf. Danilova 1975: 62-80). Naturally, the 
Cross as a graphic symbol appears long before Christianity, yet it is 
Christianity that makes its use regular to the point o f  universality. This 
does not happen all o f  a sudden: mythic-ideological, as well as graphic 
framework, develop gradually, step by step, crystallizing around it 
Space and Time categories within the human mind. What we are
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dealing with here is the contemporary state o f a certain mythological 
complex in the mind, which absorbed an entire historical paradigm.
The early Christianity continues to use the swastika cross {crux 
grammata), that is, a cross with a defined symmetry o f rotation, with­
out a consistent tendency towards definite spatial oppositions. Yet this 
cross has a vector o f movement: left to right, in agreement with the 
solar movement in the north hemisphere (it is usually said that the 
swastika originated in the Sanskrit-based civilization). The aforesaid 
vector idea will covertly exert an influence upon the arrangement o f 
Space around the now motionless fixed cross, along with the 
development o f the regular field o f  the picture. Coptic Christian 
monuments adapt the Egyptian hieroglyph ankh (which stands for 
“life”), the so-called crux ansata, a T-cross with a loop on top. This 
cross, combining the male and female symbols, will much later 
transform into Rosicrucian iconography o f the Rose (= yoni) crucified 
(Hall 1997: 506, 528). I suspect that these connotations are equally 
present in the graphic idea o f the classical cross.5
It is not my objective within the confines o f this essay to analyze 
the differences between the above shapes in their mystical fulfillment. 
The mystical interpretation, as a rule, is bound towards esoteric 
knowledge whose aim is not so much to explain as to complicate, 
“mystify”. I am here interested rather in the “objective” properties o f a 
geometric figure and their relationship to ideology and myth. This is 
why I limit or fix my analysis to a specific “visible” form, and yet, 
despite the absence o f temporal historical boundaries to the problem, I 
still deem it possible to observe the issues in a clear prospective. 
Toporov describes mythological Space:
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s To be more accurate, there are four classic varieties: crux quadrata, or the 
Greek cross with four equal symmetric rays, crux immisa, or the Latin cross with 
an elongated bottom part o f  the vertical ray; crux commissa, T-shaped or St. 
Anthony’s Cross; and crux decussata, X-shaped St. Andrew’s Cross. I would 
additionally name the Pythagorean Y-cross (Hall 1997: 225), since the latter 
modification is co-existent with the other in the European iconographic tradition, 
as we will see further. All these varieties contain the idea o f ‘zero point’ o f  inter­
section which can be associated also with the yoni (= vulva), yet in a more 
compact implicit way than in the case o f crux ansata, allowing for a greater extent 
o f generalization without contradicting the notion o f regular partition o f Space. 
On the varieties o f  the Cross and its link to phallic cult and the problem o f choice 
understood as that o f  orientation in space, see Toporov 1982: 12-14.
For a mythological consciousness the Space is fundamentally different from 
the structureless geometric space devoid ot quality and accessible only to the 
measurements, as well as from the real space o f  the natural scientist which 
coincides with the physical environment [...]. In the mythological model o f  the 
world there were none o f  these types o f  Space and. oftentimes, not even a 
word for Space. (Toporov 1997: 158-159. emphasis is mine —  J. G.)
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7. The Cross as an instrument of axiologized Space
Space with the Cross implanted into it from the neutral physical, turns 
into culturally heterogeneous intelligible, axiologically charged Space. 
Space thus begins to have a fixed (as opposed to relative) right and 
left, top and bottom, with their respective shades o f meaning. As a 
consequence, this space becomes oriented.
The cross positioned vertically used to preserve the meaning o f  the spatial 
scheme, contrasting and uniting at once the pairs such as: top and bottom, 
heavens and hell, right (benign) and left (malign) sides. Perhaps, the Sign of 
the Cross used to represent a veiy simple and compact geometric formula of 
the basic spatial, temporal and moral oppositions which the medieval model of 
the world was built upon. (Danilova 1975: 66)
Danilova’s very precise description, from my point o f view, is still 
somewhat rigid, logically speaking. In my view, the Cross indeed 
represented the spatial-temporal correlations, yet it equally (and to a 
large degree) formed them in these rigid and clear-cut terms.
Particularly, given that the Cross itself is motionless (which is 
relevant at certain point in history: the Man hanging on it is a zero 
point o f  conversion o f the world into the anti-world); it implies the 
possibility o f choice and, therefore, that o f  movement. In other words, 
a possibility o f  drawing a graph o f the regular correlation between 
Space and Time. Time, which the eye needs in order to cover a certain 
distance. Naturally, this correlation is depicted conventionally, yet 
from now on it is done regularly.
In pictorial art, it is to do with the dominant eye movements: 
firstly, along the diagonals (on the meaning in painting, defined by 
diagonals see Tarabukin 1973: 472-481). Development o f  the basic 
composition rules in Western European painting, the so-called regular 
field (Daniel 1986; 1990), including direct perspective, is directly 
dependant on the Crucifix as the organizing principle. The Space o f
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the ancient painting, as described by Panofsky (1991: 40-42), knew 
no regular co-ordinates or compositional guiding lines, as it was 
aggregate one- The eye had no guiding lines, next to nothing would 
limit its movement, hence the viewer lacked any freedom o f choice. 
Meanwhile the mind lacked a system o f co-ordinates.6
6 Pythagorean cross, which also presupposes the idea o f choosing the correct or 
wrong path and also a conic reduction in the point o f bifurcation, is less stable in 
its fixating the spatial oppositions. This is due to fewer options in terms o f 
symmetry. Nevertheless, the need in this form is felt already in times o f  developed 
iconography o f the Crucifixion. The Cross was not used as Christian symbol until 
Emperor Constantine’s conversion in the 4th century. He also abolished the 
Crucifix as an instrument o f punishment and execution, whereby as if  legalizing 
its sacramental nature. Christian burial monuments the Cross is used somewhat 
earlier, circa 350 C.E. The depiction o f Christ on the Cross would appear after the 
5th century (until then image o f  the Lamb was used to represent the victimhood o f  
Christ, i.e. a re-worked pagan form). From the 6th centuiy C.E. depiction o f the 
Crucifixion begins to have a widespread use, as it presented the dual nature o f  
Christ. This was important in order to combat heresies, which saw in Christ the 
divine nature only, thereby denying his physical torments. These early images 
presented not so much the torments as the triumph over death: Christ was depicted 
with his eyes open. Only starting in the 9th century Byzantine iconography 
establishes the canon o f the Cross with the dead Christ on it; this same canon is 
adopted by Western European art in the 13th century placing an increasing 
emphasis on the suffering o f  the crucified.
During the same period when the image o f  the Crucifixion became 
widespread, the idea o f counting historical time from and after the Nativity o f  
Christ began gaining ground. This idea came to be as a side effect o f  the dispute 
regarding the calculation (computus) o f the Easter and was reflected in the Easter 
Tables compiled by Dionisius Exigius, an Italian monk (circa 500-after 525 C.E.) 
The first official sanction was given to this calendar in England in 664 C.E. by the 
Synod at Whitby. This was championed by Venerable Bede (672/673 -  May 25, 
735) in his treatises De temporibus (703) and De temporum ratione (725). Yet the 
universal recognition in Europe this system gained only by the 11th century 
(Finegan 1964). Using this or that event as the starting point for counting time is 
certainly an archaic feature, yet in Christianity it is made law once again to 
become a common standard. Christ is placed into a certain point which at once 
becomes the end o f  history and its beginning.
The antiquity knew neither zero nor negative numbers. The zero was used in 
the Ancient Egypt to denote a blank space between the digits and yet even in this 
capacity it was not adopted by Greek or Roman civilizations. The zero as an 
independent numerological idea was introduced for the first time by the Arabs (by 
Al-Khwarizmi circa 780-850). In Europe the Arab algebra and the zero gain 
acceptance only in 10 c. thanks to the French mathematician Gerbert d’Aurillac 
(945-1003), who studied the abacus in Spain and would later become the Pope
The appearance on the scene o f the fixed frame o f a painting is also 
tightly linked to the process o f  orientation by the Cross. In fact, it is 
that same Cross, the same co-ordinate gridline and the same tool of 
setting boundaries and establishing a contact with the world beyond. 
The frame, as a conscious artifact, is a relatively late phenomenon. It 
emerges during the process o f secularization o f the visual arts not 
before the 15th century in Europe, just as the images are taken out of 
the Church and into the secular milieu. In church, the function of 
image, as window into the transcendental, is more or less evident. The 
crucifix in the Catholic temple or the Royal Gates in the Orthodox one 
provide the recipient with an orientation amid the sacred Space. When 
the image is taken out o f the temple, in order to preserve the function 
o f the contact with the world beyond, it necessitates additional guiding 
lines separating it from the chronotope o f the recipient. These guiding 
lines are in effect supplied by the frame. Yet the cross-intersection of 
the frame functionally replicates the Cross o f the Crucifixion story, 
therefore a situation emerges whereby the Crucifix can be extracted 
from the representational chronotope and the painting thus gains an 
autonomous secular life. Although, this does not imply an abolition of 
the transcending function o f an image.
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8. Cross and Pyramid: ideology of the graphic forms
The appearance o f the direct perspective is the token o f new aware­
ness that the Cross (= frame setting the limits o f the image plane) is a 
representation o f the process o f passage given in the latitudinal 
section. The pioneer o f the direct perspective, Alberti, wrote: “The 
painting is a latitudinal section o f a visual pyramid” (in Panofsky 
1991: 63). Combining a cross-piece o f the frame with a cross-section 
o f the visual pyramid and the point o f  vergence in the eye o f a viewer 
facilitates a horizontal (depthwise) adjustment, to be more precise: an 
adjustment o f the three-dimensional space representation. The emer­
gence o f the frame and development o f the perspective practically 
coincide in time. These innovations are inseparably linked and they 
radically alter the situation o f the recipient’s transcendence. Directed
Sylvester 11 (999-1003) (about him: Chamberlin 1969: 115-121). As a matter o f  
fact, Gerbert was also an inventor o f  chronometer and had contacts with the 
Russian prince Vladimir who Christianized Russia.
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along the horizon line, this procedure which was unthinkable prior to 
perspective innovations in Andrea M antegna’s Lamentation Over The 
Dead Christ (circa 1475?, Brera), loses its hierarchical (and therefore 
value-based) reliance on the higher cosmos, ceasing to be necessarily 
sacred. All o f which was definitely a consequence o f having 
introduced the mechanism o f perspective: “Perspective plays the part 
o f a rigid inhuman machine which, as Leonardo figuratively puts it: 
“by its contractions helps turning around the muscle-bound body 
contour” (Danilova 1975: 43).
The process o f transcending becomes a matter o f  technology and 
optics. All the elements o f the mind mechanism acquire well-defined 
material shapes of a specialized device:
One of these devices is as follows: at the end of a table shaped as elongated 
rectangle, a rectangular frame with a glass is fixed, athwart the table’s surface. 
On the opposite narrow end of the table a wooden bar is fixed, parallel to the 
frame. Along this bar another transverse bar is moving [sidewards] on a long 
screw. The latter bar has a [...Jwooden pivot which can be fixed at different 
heights and having at its end a small wooden plate with a tiny hole. It is plain 
obvious: this device implies to some extent a model o f perspective projection 
from the hole [...] onto the surface of the glass sheet, so as [we] look at the 
item through the aforesaid hole [we are] able to draw its projection on the 
glass. (Florensky 1993: 231; emphasis by Florensky)
All these rods, screws, orifices, frames and plates are substantiated 
(emblematized) elements o f the mental construct o f passage, 
comparable to a Passion toolkit. The process is fixed onto material 
objects, and this is what makes it regular and manageable, although 
significantly more limited in variations than if  this fixation depended 
less on material structure. Yet, even though limited in variety, this 
technique supposedly acquires a style accessible to the masses whilst 
ceasing to be dependent on exceptional mystical gift/enlightenment o f 
the author/maker: “Function o f the devices is to allow for a replication 
of any item by the most unskilled draughtsman, purely mechanically, 
without the act o f optic synthesis” (Florensky 1993: 231, italics is 
mine —  J. G.).
Florensky clearly interprets the employment o f direct perspective 
technique reflecting a peculiar ideological shift o f consciousness:
The need to forge a doctrine on perspective for a whole group of intellectuals 
and very experienced painters over several centuries, including a number of 
top-class mathematicians, all of this done clearly after having already taken 
account of the basic principles o f perspective projection of the world, makes 
[us] think that the historical task of development o f the perspective was not 
about simple systematization of the pre-existent [features] of human 
psychophysiology, but rather a forceful re-education o f this psychophysiology 
in terms o f abstract demands by the new worldview. (Florensky 1998: 62; 
italics by Florensky)
Once the process is oriented this way, the transcendental realm is able to 
have an interpretation different from the religious interpretation. In fact, 
this very thought is expressed by A. Losev when he talks o f “egotism” of 
the direct perspective: “When we are presented with an egotistic 
orientation towards the reality o f the outside world, this is reflected on the 
image as a central perspective o f the lines coming together.; it is a space 
that is [both] closed and concentric” (Losev 1991: 95, italics by Losev). 
Until then, images displayed some kind o f significant ambiguity in 
relation to how this transition is facilitated. On the one hand, image was a 
window into the transcendental, i.e. it directed the viewer4s attention 
horizontally, transversely to the painting. On the other, the Crucifix, with 
a horizontal bar shifted upwards, suggested a clear vertical orientation, 
following rather a pyramidal model. Vertical direction was far more 
structured and regular: the rules o f proportions developed in antiquity 
were used and enforced, except for depictions o f depth, i.e. horizontal 
narrowing o f the perspective. All comforts were given to the upward 
view: “The Middle Age [...] gives vertical [line] a full priority” 
(Florensky 1993a: 185). This is also supported by architecture, parti­
cularly o f the developed Gothic variety.
The structure o f the Gothic temple, by the way, combines within itself 
the strategies o f the cross and pyramid. A veiy elongated pyramid, the 
broach, pointing right at the sky while the plan is cross-shaped. As a 
matter o f fact, these two geometric figures represent varieties of the 
reduction o f Space to the zero point: progressing (pyramid) and forceful 
(cross). In other words, this is same procedure done in different sections: 
latitudinal (pyramid) and longitudinal (cross). The Crucifixion image 
itself quite often is stratified, showing both principles at once: Christ’s 
arms, lifted upward in a V-style, suggest the geometry o f a cone with its 
peak pointing downward, whereas the Cross clearly sustains the right- 
angle partitioning scheme. Both as a storyline and an image, the 
Pythagorean problem o f choice between the right and wrong paths in the
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Crucifixion composition is oftentimes symbolized by the figures of 
"good” and “evil” thieves crucified alongside Christ and positioned to the 
right and left hand o f him respectively.
The arms raised V-style are immediately related to depictions o f 
victory in Western European iconography. Meyer Schapiro analyses 
this framework using the example o f M oses’ combating the Amale- 
kites (Schapiro 1973). A wider cone (almost approaching the Cross) is 
also used in the Orthodox iconography: the Mother o f God Oranta and 
also the Pantokrator. M oses’ arms raised in prayer directly affect the 
course o f the battle: while he kept his arms raised the fortune was on 
the side o f Israel; as soon as he, exhausted, dropped them down, the 
enemy would regain strength. Furthermore, the arrangement o f the 
arms may approach the V-style to a varying degree. They can be also 
interpreted as pyramid-shaped joining o f the palms o f hands (an 
upside-down V-style), a prayer gesture o f the Roman Catholics. This 
attests to synonymy (or even procedural synonymy) o f the three 
graphic versions o f the contact with God. Apart from that, the 
victorious gesture, in particular, the military victory in a reduced form, 
echoed in the ‘victory’ gesture by Churchill, already mentioned at the 
beginning o f the current essay. As we can see, it successfully blends 
into the more general rule o f graphic representation o f the contact with 
the transcendental. Churchill’s gesture can be interpreted in this 
context as in hoc signo vinces.
The cross, with a historical God affixed to it, halted the cycle o f 
births and deaths, or stretched it in a way that made a mind category 
exclusively. Canonization o f unity o f this event led, as a result, to its 
being understood as zero point on the time scale: Time now 
accumulates at both sides o f  the Crucifix in accordance with the 
hourglass paradigm. The place o f the Cross in the graphic composition 
along the axis o f symmetry became a visual affirmation o f this 
principle o f the zero-value centrality o f the here-and-now. Which is 
why Bible history, in particular, was understood throughout the 
Middle Ages, as well as the Renaissance, as immersed into the 
present, which was expressed by the depiction o f an entourage 
contemporaneous with the painter. Historical time divided by the cross 
in two suggests a “before” (past) and an “after” (future), as well as the 
zero-value “here-and-now”. The selfsame verbal formula while 
accompanying the act o f making the Sign o f the Cross, re-affirms this 
unfolding o f time to the sides o f the central axis o f the Cross=Present.
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The expression “Now, and ever, and unto the ages o f ages or the 
four-part version “Always, now, and ever, and unto the ages o f ages 
(Latin: In principio, et nunc, et semper, et in saecula saeculorum) 
contains a conglomeration o f tautologies, which can only be explained 
in terms o f graphic properties o f the Cross as signigying the unfolded 
Eternity spreading itself into the past and future. Additionally, the 
four-part formula contains the idea o f the top point o f the Cross (= 
forehead) also opening itself to Eternity at the time o f performing the 
Sign o f the Cross. The Latin formula clearly shows this higher infinity 
stands for a more universal and fundamental law o f being.
9. Composition of the Cross and 
deviations from the canon
Only as a backdrop to this fixed symmetrical composition arrange­
ment, could deviations from this canon become possible, with the 
deviations facilitating the semantic effects o f a universal event 
individually interpreted (since without restrictions there is no choice 
and thus no freedom). To illustrate the above, I will be attempting an 
interpretation o f several striking examples o f the well-established 
multifaceted canon demanding its own restoration. It was not my 
objective to trace the evolution o f styles or genres o f painting. I was 
concerned rather with the framework o f motif-imagery, superposed 
onto the geometric canvas. Therefore, I opted for the analysis o f the 
texts, m yself deviating from their historical succession: the logic of 
outlining the framework o f graphic motifs was more important to me.
9.1. Giotto
A sufficient enough deviation from the canon can be observed already 
in G iotto’s work. No wonder Florensky considered Giotto as a turning 
point for the development o f  the new, personalistic, egotistic 
consciousness (Florensky 1993: 209-210). Alpatov characterized the 
technical innovation o f Giotto as follows: “Living characters o f the 
Christian stoiy are equated by him to regular bodies, arranged in 
accordance with laws o f equilibrium and rhythm” (Alpatov 1976: 37). 
According to Alpatov, Giotto (as well as Renaissance art as a whole)
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impersonates the demonstrative/entertainment properties o f  art 
(Alpatov 1976: 149). Taken within the scope o f  issues raised in this 
paper, this is primarily about functional and conceptual change in 
eyesight/optics/gaze paradigm. Prior to Giotto (and even in the 
aftermath) the actants o f  image are not encountered by the gaze (in all 
probability, it is implied that they do not see each other but outside the 
depicted and observed Space, “in the eyes o f the soul”). Whereas 
Giotto, in The Kiss o f Judas (fig. 3), makes Christ and Judas look into 
each other’s eyes in a way that the eye contact is very tangible. Firstly, 
this immediately immerses the scene into the here-and-now. Secondly, 
it raises the issue o f the contact with the transcendental in a 
completely new way by re-interpreting it as “individual-nominative” . 
The gaze (of the mind establishing/detecting the contact) is not 
detached from the organ o f sight. It rather coincides with the specific 
individual eye o f the depicted character, as if  being named, identified 
in a specific way, used as a plotline motif.
Besides, both Christ and Judas are depicted half-face. Incomplete­
ness o f a face in relation to one who is the incarnation o f the 
wholeness o f being in the universe creates the scenario o f a bunch o f 
multifarious interpretations o f this contradiction that, certainly, could 
be felt as an expressive shock bordering on sacrilege. On the other 
hand, the half-face represents a vector o f the will power, marked by a 
lack o f equilibrium in the contour (Florensky 1993a: 148-149). The 
half-face requires a compositional opposition between the external 
object and subject. Giotto's image o f Christ's half-face is restored to 
the state o f being a compositionally complete full-face with the help o f 
Judas’ half-face —  a shocking thought, even to the early 20th century 
mindset (at least in Russia, where, for instance, L. Andreev’s Judas 
Iscariot which made use o f the same idea, caused an emotional re­
action o f the public).
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Figure 3. Giotto di Bondone, The Kiss o f Judas. Fresco, Capella degli Scrovegni, 
Padua. 1305-1313.
Perhaps, in purely graphic terms this technique was not such an 
outrageous thing in G iotto’s days. Both Romanesque and overall 
medieval images quite often portray the encounter between the two 
characters as a joining o f two half-faces within a single format. Yet 
Giotto does this in an accentuated and conscious way. Meyer Schapiro 
(Schapiro 1973: 4 5 ^ 6 )  is superb at analyzing this trend. As he points 
out, the artist sets apart the half-faces o f Christ and Judas, while 
placing the observing guard in the background, behind them. Thus, 
three faces are presented at once: Christ, Judas and a third observer 
mirroring the gaze o f the recipient viewer. This is a very powerful
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mechanism o f organizing the Space along the horizontal line o f the 
recipient’s frontal gaze: a point is set “behind” the scene. Moreover, it 
is a considerable shift with regard to the process o f becoming aware o f 
the graphic im age’s autonomous role as an interpreting mechanism. In 
other words, in G iotto’s work it is not the word, but a vision/image 
that is expressly shown to be the instrument o f contact-translation.
9.2. Judas’ Kiss and the hourglass configuration
The m otif o f Judas’ kiss and suicide is quite significant within the 
mythological framework discussed here. On the one hand, it is a 
reference to the widespread cultural mythologem o f the kiss resulting 
in death or a kiss which takes the last breath away. A mythologem 
mediated by the idea that the soul-word leaves the body or flesh-space 
via mouth, binding this plotline with the process o f speech-genesis 
applied to the Word o f God. On the other hand, it allows seeing this 
encounter as the two vessels’ mouths touching each other. This touch 
is lethal for both. Although, if  the death o f Christ is relative and, in 
fact, means eternal life, the death o f Judas is then absolute, expressed 
by the blocking the vessel’s hole by the rope on his throat. The lower 
section o f Giotto’s The Last Judgement (fig. 4) denoting Hell, situates 
the figures o f the hanged bodies: one o f the sinners is hanged by the 
tongue! The death o f Judas, who hanged him self on the tree (to each 
ethnic culture it’s “their” special tree), reverses the death o f Christ on 
the tree o f the Cross (certainly, we are dealing with the cosmic tree -  
something that was many times pinpointed by researchers; see 
Toporov 1982). The Cross, as a result, is an unfolded version o f death- 
birth, while the rope o f Judas is the closed no-exit version. 
Meanwhile, the body o f Christ, ever incorporated in the communion 
bread, is included into the unfolded cycle o f grinding in the mouth o f 
the communicant.
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Figure 4. Giotto di Bondone, The Last Judgement. Fresco, Capella degli 
Scrovegni, Padua, 1305-1313 (fragment).
This collection o f ideologems and motifs, including geometric 
constructs such as the hourglass, also defines the chronotope o f the 
Divine Comedy in a most generalized fashion, as noted by Florensky 
(Florensky 1922: 45-47). According to the legend reported by Vasari 
in his Life o f Giotto, Dante was a close friend o f the painter, having 
composed stories for his frescoes (Danilova 1970: 5-6). The 
legendary character o f this friendship is, perhaps, more significant 
than its reality: had there been no such friendship, it would have had 
to be invented for a number o f mythogenic reasons.
When Dante, the character o f the Divine Comedy, descends with 
his guide to the very bottom o f Hell, he finds the three-faced Devil 
(who fell o ff and betrayed God) eternally gnawing the three traitors, 
among these Judas. Three faces o f one head, a common allegory o f the 
three modes o f Time, known from antiquity and interpreted in the
emblematic tradition as Wisdom which comprises three elements: 
memoria, intelligentia and prudentia (see Panofsky 1982: 146-168; 
Yates 1997: 133, 213). Dante, certainly, reverses the meaning o f this 
allegory, ascribing it to the Devil who sacrilegiously parodies the 
Trinity. Yet the skeleton o f the scheme, while the sign meanings are 
switched to their opposites, still remains just as the link to the three­
fold nature o f Time. Besides, Dante provides the Devil with a set o f 
vampire-bat wings, which is one o f the standard iconographic 
attributes o f Saturn (Panofsky 1980; Klibansky, Saxl, Panofsky 1964). 
Furthermore, the traitor Lucifer devours his (equally treacherous) 
siblings who are his own creatures which, it appears, may give 
additional reason to link him to the personifications o f Time. The 
mouth o f a monster is one o f the most common iconographic motifs in 
the Middle Age —  it stands for the entrance o f Hell. This is a m otif 
which survived in the form o f an easily recognizable, albeit more 
amusing than monstrous, theatrical requisite o f  the Renaissance. I 
posit that the m otif o f the Saturn’s voracious mouth along with the 
Hell’s larynx have a shared base motivation in the geometry o f 
grinding at the crossing o f the “final line” .
Thus, Dante and Virgil descend further walking away from these 
larynges, stepping all along onto Lucifer’s body, down toward “where 
at the thigh // Upon the swelling o f the haunches turns” (XXXIV: 70- 
71)7. Then while reaching the point “On the other side the centre, where 
I grasp’d // The abhorred worm that boreth through the world” 
(XXXIV: 101-102), they turn upside down: “when I turn’d, thou didst 
o’erpass // That point, to which from every part is dragg’d” (XXXIV: 
104-105). The road turns out to be the way upward into the celestial 
spheres broadening gradually. Florensky interprets this chronotope as 
Non-Euclidian Space. It would be too daring on my part to contest a 
professional mathematician’s view. I suspect, however, that there is a 
much closer source for Dante’s imagery: it is the system o f allegoric 
emblematic and geometric-ideological invariants o f sacred images. 
Perhaps, the notions o f chronotope in mythology do indeed differ from 
Euclid’s geometry. Yet, it seems to me that the model described by 
Dante is indeed a reduction which works along the lines o f hourglass 
with a gullet (connected to esophagus or phallus) by which the Time is 
ground into time periods: “Mom // Here rises, when there evening sets: 
and he, // Whose shaggy pile we scaled, yet standeth fix’d, // As at the
7 Dante’s citations are from: Dante 1909-1914.
Space-Time: A mythological geometry 189
190 Jelena Grigorjeva
first” (XXXIV: 112-115). The model is also enantiomorphous and
reversible in the same way as the hourglass device.
Giotto’s “three-faced” model is as if  turned inside-out. all three 
gazes focus on the central point which also involucrates the potential 
viewer. This meeting o f the gazes in one point, a communicating and 
visual Cross, creates a situation o f Tim e’s “hanging up” in the 
communication insight. The connotations o f the dissected “Time” 
emerge upon the projection onto the aforementioned allegoric figure. 
Certainly Giotto too, just as Dante, subjects this figure to an essence- 
transformation. Nevertheless, the traditional meaning is still discernib­
le and may assist the interpretation. This prelude to the Crucifixion 
presented as an act o f communication, is a dispute between life and 
death. On the one hand, communication is understood as an apparent 
juxtaposition o f the subjects, localized and arranged in Space. On the 
other hand, it operates as a translation o f the word (kiss) into image 
(gaze). The fact that the recipient-viewer is involved in the develop­
ment o f this Cross elevates the probability o f transcendence for the 
former. W hilst the fact that this Cross in the plan would have 
presented itself only from G od’s viewing point, as the plan of the 
church, as it seems, contradicts the vehemently negative view on 
G iotto’s religiosity espoused by Florensky. After all, Florensky 
him self appears to sympathize with Luther’s quote: “We look at Time 
along whilst God sees it across” (Florensky 1993a: 275).
9.3. Cranach the Elder
Half-faces, long after Giotto, remain reserved for the donators, who do 
indeed represent the closeness to the ‘I’ o f the viewer. Yet their gaze 
running parallel to the surface o f the picture is indeed a mind 
construct. When it comes to this procedure o f  the imaginary vision, 
physical variables o f sight are ignored. Full-face and open eyes was 
privileges o f  the ‘transcended’ characters such as the Saints or 
Madonna. Speaking o f composition, the Crucifixion here invariably 
occupies the symmetry axis. As a backdrop o f  this stability, any 
deviations with regard to the scheme require a definite interpretation 
effort, that is, the process o f reception (in case o f sacred image, also 
transcendence) ceases to be automatically conventional.
Lucas Cranach, in his celebrated composition (fig. 5) moves the 
Cross to the left and gives it a rotation so that it is seen half-face: this 
makes for an unusually strong emotional impact. Christ is no longer the 
zero-axis o f the given algorithm: rather an individual whose uniqueness 
is no longer that o f an exemplary being, but o f an individual. Besides, 
this technique transforms the whole o f spatial arrangement: Space, as 
representation, acquires volume, ceasing to be the penetrable- 
impenetrable plane o f the window/borderline into the transcendental. 
The viewer’s gaze is made at home with the frontal position o f the 
Cross, the viewer now is able to imagine a vantage point within the 
constructed Space o f the painting: from the depth, on the left.
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Figure 5. Lucas Cranach the Elder, The Lamentation Beneath the Cross. Alte 
Pinakotek, Munich.
The T  o f the viewer becomes ambivalent while assuming various 
perception stances. The T  looks at the painting in a normal way, 
facing it upfront, yet the unusual composition forces the view er’s 
mind to reconstruct the position o f the ‘I ’ at the left facing the 
Crucifix. The actual viewer assumes the position o f the Virgin Mary, 
whose gaze is directed at Christ upfront (or nearly upfront: the Cross 
is still slightly turned towards the viewer, this being inevitable tribute 
to conventional forms o f perception in order to prevent the scheme 
from being completely obliterated). This is not a virtual gaze o f the 
donator along the surface o f the painting: rather it is a communicating 
gaze left unanswered It is as if the gaze o f John attempts to compen­
sate for this lack o f response, setting a plotline and graphic opposition- 
rhyme “live-dead”, enhancing the visual and intellectual perspective 
of the viewer identifying him self with Christ.
9.4. Rembrandt
The Cross in all this becomes mobile in the mind o f the author- 
recipient. It makes possible the freedom o f choice being defined by a 
fixed system o f co-ordinates. Rembrandt arranges the Crucifixion 
composition as Elevation o f the Cross (fig. 6), namely, the Cross 
hasn’t yet taken the place usually accorded to it: that at the central axis 
o f symmetry. Rather, it is situated along the strong “natural” diagonal, 
bottom left towards top right. And thus, the whole dynamic o f the 
event come to depend on the effort o f elevating the cross as against 
the “natural” direction o f reading the painting. One plotline effort of 
sustaining the Cross in an inclined position was far from sufficient for 
Rembrandt. He creates several visual counterbalances: a pyramidal 
shape at the back, a bent figure on the left and a cruciform shovel stem 
(at the bottom right) as if  suggesting the next phase o f incline for the 
Cross in a desired direction. Otherwise, the whole composition would 
hopelessly “collapse” to the right (fig. 7).
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Figure 6. Rembrandt van Rijn, The Elevation o f the Cross, 1633. Alte Pinakotek, 
Munich.
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Figure 7. Outline for Rembrandt’s Elevation o f the Cross (fig. 6).
The “abnormality” o f the Cross’ position makes the viewer to perform 
the task of reconstructing the conventional one, just as it was in the 
Cranach’s case. Otherwise, if such a task were to be completed 
graphically, it would follow that the Cross erected and made to stand 
vertically would cover the officer (the representative o f the ruling 
authority, “o f this world”). Yet neither a restored Cross would fail to 
stand along the central axis due to being shifted towards the left side, a 
more steady side o f the regular field. Whereas there exists an 
alternative type o f organizing symmetry, a rotational symmetry. It is 
also incomplete, if not vague. It is suggested initially by a bent figure 
in a Hashing black armor, followed by the same trajectory along the 
bright neck o f the horse. Using this bright spot as a background, 
Rembrandt paints his self-portrait, almost at the center o f the image —
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this is a sort o f clock dial o f the event registering the peculiar idea o f 
the painter’s role in the metaphysical as well as historical ceremony. It 
is the painter that takes up the zero point o f  the intersecting axes. The 
clock analogy (in the most “effect-frequency” sense o f Time) here is 
almost perfect: the long hand is the Crucifix, the short and less visible 
one is the officer’s sword with a cruciform handle. The “clock” shows 
10:10. The above said does not mean that Rembrandt intended to 
depict the actual clock, it is just that he used the same geometric 
framework relevant even to this day, as an advertisement for watches.
9.5 Brueghel the Elder
Having attained to possibility of movement, the Cross makes use o f it also 
through rotational symmetry. The dormant memory of the swastika and 
wheel re-awakened in an updated form against the backdrop of the 
established static scheme. Brueghel in his Road to Golgotha (fig. 8) 
expressly states this synonymy of cross and wheel both in terms o f 
composition and motif. As is typical with Brueghel, the painting is 
structured in terms o f the “Find Icarus” principle. An array o f tiny 
figures cover the landscape dominated by a rock with a windmill 
placed on top o f it. This is the dominant vertical line o f the whole 
composition, which is identified with Golgotha along the lines o f the 
biblical tradition. Here the impossibility o f an exact translation 
between the word and image is highlighted. It is for the artist to decide 
the way the mountain has to look. The rock is situated within a V- 
shaped glen at the frontier between sky and earth, light and shadow —  
a terminus o f sorts. Second vertical line (echoing the rhyme o f the first 
one) is the wheel on a pole. The wheel almost coincides with the right 
edge of the frame (a proximity to the frontier, though o f a different 
kind). The windmill, a moving wheel giving bread=life stands in 
opposition to the motionless wheel o f death both in terms o f semantics 
and functionality. The wheel on the pole is a near-sacrilegious 
iconographic parody o f the Crucifixion: in its vicinity instead o f the 
skull o f the first man Adam there lies a horse skull, while Mary and 
John are nearby. The viewer is to be more and more bewildered: where 
are the familiar traditional Golgotha, the genuine Cross and Christ?
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Figure 8. Peter Brueghel the Elder, Road to Golgotha, 1564. Kunsthistorisches 
Museum, Vienna. Outline for Golgotha.
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I cannot insist on a specific order o f discovering these objects: 
Brueghel’s space is very fragmented, almost stochastic. Apparently, 
he is more inclined to work with semantic motifs than geometric 
universals. And yet... The Cross with Christ who fell and is lying at 
the bottom o f it, can be found at the very center o f  the composition, 
amid the conglomerate o f the flickering tiny characters. Whereas the 
Golgotha, beneath the wheel, to the left, is a sort o f an empty elliptic 
tonsure-like (almost the ‘Bald M ount’ motif, although there is no sight 
of any mountain) space surrounded by the mob growing black. All in 
all, the Cross is gravitating towards the windmill, whilst the Golgotha 
towards the wheel. The m otif rhyme o f the image is becoming two, 
along with the juxtaposition. As a result, the Christ is bearing his 
Cross in order to combine it with an empty circle. What would result 
from this procedure, whether it is the wheel o f life or death, is left 
unanswered. However, there is an evident geometric and metaphysical 
problem being suggested by it all: to combine the dissecting tool o f 
the Cross with the full cycle o f the circumference.
In the Renaissance iconography to the North o f the Alps, execu­
tions done using the cross and the wheel are closely linked. (This 
motif is discussed in Mitchell Merback 1999, The Thief, the Cross and 
the Wheel. Pain and Spectacle o f Punishment in Medieval and Renais­
sance Europe). The death on the wheel is even analyzed as “an 
emblem of state-sponsored death”) inscribed within the same 
historical pattern alongside the guillotine and the gas chambers 
(Merback 1999: 158). Thus, the mechanistic nature o f all these 
methods is highlighted: they are the “machinery o f death” . This 
appears to be convincing enough in the light o f the retrospective 
judgment o f progress within the European consciousness having 
promoted the wheel as the most important stage o f technological 
civilization, “the Wheel o f Progress”, to use a linguistic cliche. And 
yet, Merback supposes that all the possible “solar” mythological 
interpretations o f this instrument o f murder lack any foundation, 
contesting the various statements, such as:
The very shape of wheel and the cross, the very act of crucifying pinpoint the
ideas of the cosmic order which are not felt, perhaps, only by the victim
presented on the altar for cosmic purposes. (Merback 1999: 6)
As an historical source for the origin o f the execution by wheel, 
Merback cites Gregory o f Tours who in the 6th century mentions the
execution performed among the Franks: the criminal lying on the 
ground had his bones crushed by a heavily-laden wagon. It seems to 
me. this indication o f genesis does not eliminate the “ideological” 
motivations either: only those figures and objects remain preserved 
throughout all times that satisfy a multiple range o f variables. 
Frankish execution style, although evidenced by written records, does 
not explain, for instance, why in later times the victim (that is, the 
body with its bones crushed by the wheel) was placed on the another 
(large) wheel located at a high spot, so that the “birds o f heaven could 
fly above and beneath the unfortunate” . (Written records are equally in 
need o f scrutiny, given that the medieval mind was prone to mixing 
history and myth and that a vast number o f written historical and 
geographic testimonies from that era contains the mention and even 
graphic depictions o f all sorts o f fantasy creatures.) Moreover, the 
iconography o f the execution by the wheel will closely approach 
another emblematic motif, the Wheel o f Forture: an obvious 
metaphoric transposition o f the idea o f the change o f the cycle phases 
onto the reality o f punishment.
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10. The Cross and and the Dial
A superposition o f the Cross onto the Wheel occurs in the clock 
during the period when they begin combining a dial (guided by the 
fixed geometry o f the Cross —  division into quadrants or quarters) 
with the rotating hands. First public clock appeared in the 16th 
century. Set in motion using the weights, they implicitly suggested 
that the motion o f Time was dependent on vertical orientation, the 
gravity force. The spring clock was invented in the 15th century. The 
spring clock’s appearance recreates the more archaic solar clock, 
although the latter was never able to enact the full-circle rotation of 
the shadow-hand. The dial o f  the mechanical clocks perfects the 
reality unto an abstract ideal. The concept is more or less identical 
throughout the various specimens: a cross inscribed into a circle, both 
motionless and rotating at once. This model contains a graphic and 
ideological analog to the physical properties o f the valve and the 
screw.
A good number o f mechanisms enabling to control access/sealing- 
off properties (i.e. border control) are used in culture. These functions
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can be assumed by a (fishing) net, a metal grill (a version o f which is 
none other than the cross), a window, a glass, a door, a threshold (as 
well as the various terminus-type devices, such as Jacob ’s Ladder), a 
keyhole (or a very tiny hole as in the camera obscura), the skin, the 
veil/cover (packaging) and so on ad infinitum.8 No doubt, all these 
motifs can be used in literature, arts and culture at large, as plot 
elements in their “nominative” function. Otherwise, as a graphic/struc­
tural basis o f the whole narrative or image, that is: operating as a 
dominant feature within the composition, including the purely 
technical tool to enable projection o f the visible Space onto the surface 
plane (cf.: “This precision in reproducing the Nature, according to 
Alberti, is ensured by the use o f velum (a grid) enabling to transfer 
everything that is visible through it onto the paper which has the same 
grid [pre-stamped] on it”, Alpatov 1976: 58). Typically, both 
principles co-exist within the same text.
El Greco structures the composition o f The Annunciation (fig. 9) 
arranging two interconnecting worlds in the shape o f hourglass with a 
dove in the middle, where the orifice between vessels is located. The 
dove twists the composition (as if  with a screw) relative to that center 
of symmetry. The dove (=Spirit, Word) exercises the function o f a 
plotline and composition mediator.4 El Greco’s composition tends to 
“swirl” into a funnel and dissect the space according to the touching 
vessels principle.
It is much later, towards the late 19th century, that the new 
awareness o f unity between the historical and cyclical laws in Time, 
between mythological and civilized consciousness, led to an explicit 
realization o f the entire compound described by us in art. An avant- 
garde painter could afford to say: “At the top o f your Golgotha [...] 
there is a wheel”. This avant-garde attempt o f reverse metamorphosis 
of the Cross into Wheel is analyzed by Mikhail Yampolsky with 
regard to intertextual situation surrounding Abel Gance’s movie The 
Wheel
For further discussion of the semiotics of frontier/border in art, see Grigorjeva 
1997:22-52.
On the analogy between the cross and the bird with open wings see Toporov 
1982.
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Figure 9. El Greco, The Annunciation, circa 1600. Baron Thyssen-Bomemisza 
Collection.
(1921): “A cross rotating with madness adopts the shape o f the wheel. 
Which is why at the top o f your Golgotha, dear Gance, there is “The 
Wheel”” . And furthermore:
Religious motives are good in explaining also: why did the medieval 
theologians were so frenzied in attacking the perpetual motion and confessed 
the finite nature of movement, declaring the perpetuum mobile to be 
incompatible with the science on God. (Jampolsky 1993: 219, 223)
This rotating cross has discredited itself following the mythical quasi- 
incestuous syncretism o f the Nazi swastika. Yet the swastika has 
proven to be only one o f the expressions o f a more large-scale trend. 
Symbolic force o f the screw becomes an object o f  graphic depiction, 
an object that is detectable upon a simple translation o f an image into 
word.
Dali, in his The Virgin o f Guadalupe (fig. 10), brings together the 
concepts o f the screw and the rose, contrasting them against (as well 
as equating them to) the framework o f the lily-cross. At the base o f  a 
clearly pyramidal framework, he introduces the lily, which symbolizes 
purity or heavenly love, in the shape o f a small 4-blade windmill. The 
lily rises from the hole o f a glass vessel located at the very frontier 
between heaven and earth. From this orifice the whole figure rises, 
like the jinn out o f the bottle. The roses, forming concentric circle 
around the pyramid, repeat this form o f a screw in a multiplied 
version. A marked indifference towards ‘realistic’ pictorial causality 
linking the symbolic elements compels one to “read” this composition 
in terms o f a mythological neology. The geometry o f the myth is thus 
accentuated and becomes the dominant feature o f an image.
The Crucifix and the clock are explicitly united in the numerous 
Crucifixes by Chagall (fig. 11, 12). He expressed that which was 
gradually taking a clear shape over the course o f Christian history: a 
common pattern in the workings o f the mechanism. Both visible 
(geometric) and metaphysical principles o f their organization are 
consistent through and through. And both represent collective 
metaphors o f a specific type o f mind frame. In his geometric 
preferences Chagall gravitates towards the hourglass form (it would 
suffice to recall his celebrated compositions: The Muse Inspiring the 
Poet, Wedding, I and the Village, The Fiddler) as well as towards the 
circles divided into sectors. His graphic work Motion (1921, fig. 13) is
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Figure 10. Salvador Dali, The Virgin o f Guadalupe, 1959. Private Collection, 
Madrid.
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Figure 12. Mark Chagall, Golgotha, 1912. Figure 13. Motion.
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an expressly stated reflection on the cross-w heel-sw astika with a 
human face residing in the point o f  symmetric rotation. In Homage to 
Apollinaire (1911-1912, fig. 14) Chagall places an androgynous 
character against the background o f an abstract dial-cross: it is Adam 
and Eve, indivisible yet distinct on the Cross and on the Wheel of 
Time with a symmetry point in the genital area, or, in Jungian terms: 
anima and anim us.10 Furthermore, Chagall has another composition 
noteworthy to our subject, The Crucified Ones (1944, fig. 15). Cruci­
fixes located along the road which gets contracted along the perspec­
tive. It is an organic combination o f a legendary historical narrative 
(Via Appia), the macabre here-and-now reality o f the Jewish settle­
ment following a raid, as well as the realization o f the Cross and the 
direct perspective as being functionally identical.
Figure 14. Mark Chagall, Homage to Apollinaire, 1911-1912.
10 On androgynous nature of Christ see Meeks 1974: 165-208; Bynum 1984.
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Figure 16. Maurice de Vlaminck, Road Under the Snow, 1925.
To provide a further analogy: the almost identical composition by 
Maurice de Vlaminck (1925, fig. 16) is worth a mention: here the 
Crucifix is absent, yet the snow is falling. These tiny particles, a result 
o f the fragmentation o f the matter, facilitate a mutual penetrability of 
heaven and earth in a horizontally oriented cone o f a reductionist 
perspective o f the visual pyramid. I already referred in this essay to 
the emblematic metaphor o f  the tiny particles. Jean Effel, both con­
sciously and ironically, identifies the mechanics o f the process of the 
Creation o f the Universe with the work o f God the M iller (fig. 17-19).
Apart from the specific painters distinctly displaying a clear 
tendency towards interpretation o f the aforementioned mythological 
compound (El Greco, Chagall, Dali), there exist a range o f formal 
semantic preferences, as if  requiring interpretation within the frame­
work o f the motifs highlighted here. Among these definitely can be 
mentioned, for instance, various depictions o f the female body and the 
tree within a diverse range o f connotations (fig. 20-22). It appears to 
me, that these or similar examples need no further commentary in the 
light o f what has been said above. The argument that the female body 
“in deed” gravitates towards the hourglass, cannot be deemed suitable 
here. The depiction o f the female body is far from adhering to the said 
form throughout the ages: Neolithic Venuses are clear evidence to 
this. In the M iddle Ages the contour o f the Madonna, for instance, is 
tending rather towards the pyramid shape with an upward reduction. 
(This pattern was used by Dali in The Virgin o f Guadalupe.) 
M eanwhile the medieval canon o f the Crucified presented a downward 
V-style reduction. Thus, The Star o f David as a symbol o f androgyny 
was split into two distinct characters: it is this very method that is used 
in symbolizing the gender difference on the restroom door signs. 
Furthermore, the pictorial canon in art does not always coincide with 
that o f  the ideal feminine body exploited, say, by fashion. In the 60s, 
for example, when the Twiggy ideal was dominant, that o f an almost 
shapeless two-dimensional line, artists continued to used the pattern of 
vessels narrowing towards the waist.
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Figure 17-19. Jean Efifel, from The Creation o f the World series.
208 Jelena Grigorjeva
Figure 22. Käthe Kollwitz, Hunger, 
1925.
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11. Why 10:10?
Finally, as a rhetorical device, let us return to one particular question, 
posed at the beginning o f the chapter. Why indeed do the clocks/ 
watches ever show 10:10? Considering the above said, let us attempt 
to work this out by the means o f contraries: which other time may the 
clocks show in advertising? 12:30 and 6:00 may not represent the 
passing time, just as the right-angle versions o f the clock hand 
positions, i.e. the quarters o f  an hour. “A half cut by h a lf ’, the 
selfsame Cross model, a zero-nought point outside Time: this is not 
Time, but a state, a metaphysical state o f passage, not real but thought, 
imaginary. The objective o f the advertising is rather modest: to it is 
enough that the clock is working. The same, but to even a greater 
extent, applies to 12:00, noon, midnight it is neither Time nor Space, 
but a frontier which is by definition neither one nor the other and yet 
is both one and the other. If the clock hands end up being at the 
bottom of the dial (e.g., 5:40), the model is again far too static 
(upside-down V-shape), this time due to the notion that the pyramid 
with its base on the ground sort o f uproots the clock hands within 
itself. This pattern is, rather, about the past (compare to the hourglass), 
it is closed (e.g. the steep roof o f a house/refuge), although to some 
extent can be oriented towards the contact with the Other, but 
passively, so to speak. The only option remaining is 2:50, when the 
hour hand is pointing to the right. In this case time will reverse itself 
in the backward direction! The long arrow has to coincide with the 
“natural” diagonal along which the image is interpreted, that is, 
clockwise (or along the visible solar movement trajectory). Let us 
recall the way Rembrandt counteracts this natural collapse o f the 
arrow left to right. If  the difference in the length and thickness o f the 
clock hands is not too well-defined, such an arrangement becomes 
synonymous with 10:10; whereas if  the difference is significant, it 
clearly results in the “counterclockwise” movement. At any rate, 
whenever it is necessary to depict the clock working backwards, it is 
2:50 pattern that is employed (fig. 23).
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Figure 23. The clock is indeed moving backwards (from: Burda Moden 
Magazine).
There is obviously an intuitive feel to the goodness of 10:10 pattern 
which is dynamic, optimistic. This simple matter-of-factness of this 
particular example is linked to more universal rules of cultural 
consciousness than it may appear at first glance, which I have 
attempted to demonstrate. The premise I use, is that culture, as a 
product o f  consciousness, is a meaningful whole, a semiosphere, to 
use Juri Lotm an’s term. Henceforward, it is, being a pragmatic 
framework, by all means open to inquiry and has an explanation, just 
as its constituent parts equally have an explanation in all their existing 
modalities. Within the stated compound o f issues it is primarily a 
modality o f  visible problems representing the more abstract conven­
tions, in other words, signification relationships o f emblematic kind."
An earlier version o f this article has been published as Chapter 4 in Grigoijeva 
2005: 130-174. Translated by A. Magergut.
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Пространство-время: мифологическая геометрия
Статья рассм атривает ф ундам ентальны е граф ические модели, кото­
рые использую тся культурны м  сознанием  для закрепления в коллек­
тивной памяти абстрактны х понятий. В статье затрагивается также 
проблема интер-сем иотического, то есть эм блем атического, пере­
вода категорий пространства и времени друг в друга. М одели креста 
и пирамиды анализирую тся с позиций их идеологической (трансцен- 
дирую щ еи) функции в качестве м еханизм а эм блем атизации абстрак­
тных понятий пространства и времени. Д анны й подход помогает 
пониманию  основных законов культурной м ентальности  и процессов 
эмблематизации значения лю бого ф еномена в целях его структури­
рования и м немонической фиксации.
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Ruum-aeg: M ütoloogiline geomeetria
Käesolevas artiklis käsitletakse graafilisi alusmudeleid, mille kaudu kultuuri­
teadvus kinnistab abstraktseid mõisteid kollektiivses mälus. Vaadeldakse ka 
intersemiootilise ehk emblemaatilise tõlke probleemi — aja ja ruumi 
kategooriate teineteisesse tõlkimist. Risti ja püramiidi mudeleid analüüsi­
takse nende ideoloogilistest positsioonidest lähtudes kui aja ja ruumi 
abstraktsete mõistete emblematisatsiooni mehhanisme. Antud lähenemine 
võimaldab kultuurse mentaalsuse ning iga fenomeni tähenduse emblema­
tisatsiooni protsesside põhilistest reeglitest arusaamist, ühtlasi seda feno­
meni struktureerides ja mnemooniliselt fikseerides.
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Abstract: Analysts studying the nexus between language and ethnic identity 
have characterized ethnolinguistic ideologies as the deep structure o f overt 
language practices. By contrast, this exploratory analysis argues for the 
advantages of shifting from a multi-level to a single-level explanatory model, 
consisting of interpretive frames and data (= aspects of sociocommunicative 
behavior) interpreted by way of those frames. The single-level model affords, 
arguably, a more unified treatment of people’s everyday inferences about 
ethnolinguistic identity, on the one hand, and research paradigms for studying 
language as an ethnosemiotic resource, on the other hand. Yet the “single­
tiered” model does not void socioideological considerations. Instead, it 
assumes that a continuum stretches between (1) entrenched language preju­
dices, (2) efforts to use language theory to question or dislodge such preju­
dices, and (3) the moment-by-moment hypotheses and inferences in terms of 
which humans make sense of their conspecifics’ linguistic behavior, along 
with other ethnosemiotic cues.
1. Introduction
In a recent discussion o f ethnolinguistic identity vis-ä-vis the develop­
ment and current status o f African American Vernacular English 
(AAVE), Walt Wolfram noted suggestively that although most o f the 
world’s languages are associated with ethnocultural groups, “language 
is neither a necessary nor [a] sufficient condition for ethnic group
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mem bership"1. In other words, one need not align oneself with a 
subordinated language variety to experience prejudice or, for that 
matter, outright discrimination. Rather, what enables the dominant 
culture’s exclusion or subordination o f minority groups is a complex 
system o f assumptions, norms, and practices, whose multifacetedness 
creates a sort o f built-in redundancy and reduces the weight carried by 
any one component o f the system. Encompassing various sources and 
types o f information —  from skin color and dress to religious 
practices and food choices —  this framework organizes experience 
into subsystems o f ethnosemiotic cues more or less accessible to 
conscious awareness, with language constituting just one of the 
subsystems at issue. Conversely, when isolated from the larger 
ecology o f ethnosemiotic conventions, linguistic behaviors do not 
suffice to qualify those who instantiate them as members o f particular 
groups. Hence the controversial status o f white rappers who, like 
Eminem, incorporate elements o f AAVE into their performance styles 
but do so at the risk o f  being viewed as re-appropriating or co-opting 
indigenous black culture —  and thereby threatening to diminish the 
critical and oppositional energies from which it takes its distinctive 
character.
But if  language is neither a requirement for nor a guarantee of 
ethnic identity, what then accounts for the pervasive and persistent 
tendency, on the part o f sociolinguistic researchers as well as non­
specialists, to associate language and ethnicity? Using Wolfram's and 
others' ideas as a springboard for my discussion, in this exploratory 
discussion I examine foundational issues facing theorists who study, 
from various disciplinary perspectives, the contingent and variable 
link between language and ethnic identity. Because o f the complexity 
o f the language-ethnicity nexus, analysts have sought to illuminate 
this nexus by synthesizing insights from a range o f fields. Here I shall 
follow suit, bringing ideas from sociolinguistic theory into dialogue 
with models developed in cognitive linguistics and text processing, 
discourse analysis, evolutionary psychology, hermeneutic theories of
Wolfram. Walt. Linguistic subordination and ethnolinguistic identity: The 
construction of African American Vernacular English. Paper presented at a con- 
terence on "Contextualizing Ethnicity: Conversations across Disciplines” 
sponsored by NC State University’s College of Humanities and Social Sciences 
and the Center for International Ethnicity Studies: Raleigh, USA, February 2003. 
Hereinafter referred to as Wolfram 2003.
interpretation, and cultural semiotics, among other disciplines. But 
though my account thus draws on concepts from multiple research 
traditions, my chief aim is to work toward an explanatory framework 
with maximal economy —  that is, one that combines the greatest 
scope with the fewest underlying assumptions. In other words, I seek 
to maximize opportunities for cross-disciplinary exchange concerning 
the language-ethnicity link by sketching a framework for inquiry that 
is attached to a very spare and thus highly transportable conceptual 
scaffolding. To put the same point yet another way, sometimes thin 
rather than thick descriptions are needed (<contra Geertz 1973), 
because the thicker the description o f a process or phenomenon, the 
more embedded that description is in the specific analytic paradigm 
that provides the descriptive nomenclature. To promote new synergies 
among the fields concerned with how language shapes and is shaped 
by ethnic identity, it may be necessary to build a stripped-down model 
on which diverse traditions o f inquiry can then re-converge, each 
thickening the basic account that provides a common foundation for 
cross-disciplinary work.
2. Language and ethnicity: 
From a multi-level to a single-level explanatory model
The link between language practices and ethnocultural groups is both 
synchronically and, as recent accounts o f the development o f AAVE 
suggest (see Poplack, Tagliamonte 2001; Rickford 1999; Wolfram, 
Thomas 2002), diachronically variable. However, if  there is one main 
lesson to be learned from the past 3 0 ^ 0  years of sociolinguistic 
research on language variation, it is that variability should not be 
confused with randomness. The linguistic code associated with 
English licenses alternative ways o f saying the same thing —  [ta:m] 
vs. [talm], hoagie vs. sub, I ain’t goin ’ nowhere vs. I am not going 
anywhere, and gimme a beer vs. would you please give me a beer? 
Sociolinguists have appealed to social, situational, and sociopsycho- 
logical factors —  including regional background, gender, age, class, 
ethnicity, and degree o f familiarity between interlocutors —  to ac­
count for why particular selections are made from among semantically 
equivalent speech productions. Thus, in questioning the extent to 
which language and ethnicity can in fact be considered co-variant,
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Wolfram (2003) revisits a basic sociolinguistic research hypothesis. 
His account suggests that the correlation in question cannot be 
explained without appeal to other, socioideological factors —  factors 
that were outside the scope o f the models originally developed by 
dialectologists and sociolinguists to study variety in language.
From this perspective, the tendency to associate language and 
ethnicity can be viewed as parasitic on social processes situated at 
another, more fundamental explanatory level; those further processes 
determine how language varieties become socially embedded in the 
first place. As Wolfram (2003) puts it, “linguistic boundaries are 
permeable, constructed notions defined more adequately on the basis 
o f sociopolitical and ideological considerations than on the basis of 
linguistic structures and sociolinguistic relationships”.3 Hence, to 
account for observed interconnections between the linguistic and the 
social —  interconnections that inform everyday communicative 
behavior as well as media portrayals and public debates like those
2 Drawing on the work of cultural theorists such Bourdieu (1991) and Foucault 
(1980), analysts in fields such as applied linguistics, sociolinguistics, and 
linguistic anthropology have brought these socioideological factors within the 
purview of research on a range of topics. Topics explored from this perspective 
include nonstandard varieties of languages; metalinguistic or metapragmatic 
awareness on the part of language users, who categorize speech events as well as 
speakers using specific kinds of verbs for reported discourse (he argued versus he 
speculated), labels for members of groups (e.g., redneck, college boy), and other 
metapragmatic signalling strategies; the nature and distribution of ethnolinguistic 
boundaries within and across speech communities; the interrelations among 
language use and educational practices; and the gender-marking and -creating 
functions of linguistic forms deployed in more or less distinct communities of 
practice. Overviews of relevant work in these and other areas can be found in 
Schieffelin, Woolard, Kroskrity (1998) and Kroskrity (2000); Woolard (1998) 
provides an especially useful summary of trends and approaches. This research 
provides a background for the present analysis, which seeks to identify core 
processes underlying and thus linking all these (apparently heterogenous) 
sociocommunicative phenomena. As I suggest below, those core processes 
involve the alignment or non-alignment of frames or typifications with specific 
sociocommunicative behaviors interpreted by way of those frames.
Cf. Roberts (1998: 109-110): “Despite disciplinary differences, one of the 
most remarkable trends in current thinking about language and culture is a broad 
consensus on the constructed nature of social reality. Ideas about social relations, 
social identities, national and ethnic groups and institutions are understood as 
being iormed out ol interaction and out o f the dominant and conflictual 
knowledge and assumptions that circulate within society”.
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surrounding the Ebonics controversy —  it is necessary to excavate 
another, deeper level o f  the social. The processes operating at that 
more fundamental level work to naturalize linguistic boundaries as 
markers o f ethnocultural divisions, which are in turn reified as found, 
not made.
By contrast, in the remainder o f this discussion, I wish to argue the 
merits o f a framework for studying language and ethnicity that shifts 
from a multi-level to a single-level explanatory model. Instead o f 
construing ethnolinguistic ideologies as the deep structure o f  language 
practices, I outline what I take to be a more minimalist model 
consisting o f interpretive frames and data (= aspects o f sociocommu- 
nicative practice) interpreted by way o f those frames.4 Occam’s razor 
is not my only reason for proposing the alternative account; beyond 
this, the single-level model affords, in my view, a more unified 
treatment of people’s everyday inferences about ethnolinguistic 
identity, on the one hand, and research paradigms for studying lan­
guage as an ethnosemiotic resource, on the other hand. It also en­
compasses all levels o f language organization, from phonetic to 
discourse-level features. By the same token, the “single-tiered” model 
does not void socioideological considerations from research on 
language and ethnicity. Instead, it assumes that a continuum stretches 
between (1) entrenched language prejudices resistant to modification 
in light of contravening data, (2) efforts to use language theory to 
question or dislodge such prejudices, and (3) the moment-by-moment 
hypotheses and inferences in terms o f which humans make sense o f
I use the term frame in parallel with what Artificial Intelligence researchers 
(Minsky 1975; Rumelhart 1981; Schank, Abelson 1977) sometimes refer to as 
schemata, i.e., “‘structures of expectation’ associated with situations, objects, 
people, and so on” (Tannen 1993a: 7). As characterized by researchers in fields 
including anthropology (Bateson 1954), sociology (Goffman 1974), and discourse 
and narrative analysis (Tannen 1993a, 1993b; Herman 2002: 85-113; Jahn 1997), 
frames allow previous experiences to be stored in the memory as structured 
repertoires of expectations about current and emergent experiences. In parallel 
with what Schutz (1962) characterized as typifications, or “normalized” 
representations based on more or less heterogenous instances of general processes 
(buying groceries, booting up a computer, engaging in classroom discourse, etc.), 
frames structuring sociocommunicative practice guide the production and 
interpretation of discourse until such time as linguistic, interactional, or other cues 
prompt the modification of a given frame or else its rejection in favor of some 
other emergent or competing frame.
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their conspecifics’ linguistic behavior, along with other ethnosemiotic 
cues.
In the single-tiered model, both language practices and research on 
those practices can be viewed as involving a more or less robust 
interplay between frame-driven or top-down and data-driven or 
bottom-up processing strategies; this interplay constitutes a version of 
what is known in other contexts as the hermeneutic circle, whereby 
understanding o f the whole affects interpretation o f the part and 
interpretation o f the part in turn (re)shapes understanding o f the whole 
(Bontekoe 1996). The frame-data nexus structures the relation 
between linguistic behaviors —  accents, lexical choices, morpho- 
syntactic features, discourse-level phenomena —  and inferences about 
those behaviors. To take a discourse-level example from face-to-face 
interaction, using a “joke” frame as opposed to an “insult” frame can 
lead to very different interpretations o f one and the same utterance. 
Conversely, if  enough utterances o f a particular type arise during our 
interaction, I may have to shift from the theory that my interlocutor is 
just kidding to the theory that he or she really has it out for me. 
Likewise, at the level o f  vocabulary, depending on what sorts of 
lexical items accumulate over the course o f an interaction (soda or 
pop? bucket or pail?), my initial theory about my interlocutor’s 
regional background may have to give way to a different theory. More 
generally, as linguistic information accrues over the course of an 
interaction or for that matter an extended theoretical inquiry, the 
interpretive frames used to make sense o f such data may need to be 
modified or else abandoned in favor o f other, competing frames.
The same goes for working theories about an interlocutor’s ethno­
linguistic identity. Those who (as Wolfram 2003 reports) revealed 
their bias against African American callers seeking to rent apartments 
no doubt used a variety o f linguistic cues to shift from a default, 
generic frame that did not commit them to any interpretation of a 
caller’s ethnocultural status to a more nefariously particularized frame, 
which was both the rationale for and the result o f  discriminatory 
business practices. My point is not to excuse such practices, o f course, 
but rather to situate them in the larger interpretive ecology from which 
they derive their internal structure as well as their pernicious effects. 
Arguably, engaging in the ongoing calibration o f frames and data is a 
phylogenetic legacy —  a species-general imperative arising from
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evolutionary pressures, not a racist idiosyncrasy.5 At issue are basic 
and general sociocognitive principles by virtue o f which typifications 
based on prior experience are subsequently used as frames for inter­
preting and organizing thought and conduct (Schutz 1962). It is just 
that language prejudices involve the persistent use o f invalid 
typifications, i.e., the perpetuation o f frames manifestly at odds with 
the data for which they purportedly account. Linguistic behaviors 
different from those associated with the standard trigger an inter­
pretive frame whereby the behaviors are construed as inferior to the 
standard. The root question posed by manifestations o f language 
prejudice can thus be reformulated in the following terms: why, in 
some domains o f language practice, do frames incongruent with 
accumulating data and blatantly controverted by linguistic theory 
nonetheless persist as ways o f seeing, as structures for understanding 
the world?
Addressing this question requires recognizing that there is a diffe­
rence in degree, not kind, between language prejudices and theory- 
building activities o f a more positive and progressive sort. The bigot’s 
self-fulfilling prophecy and the best intentions o f learning through 
experience are separated by a razor’s edge: namely, the nature o f the 
interface between frames and data. This isomorphism explains, in part, 
the difficulty o f using language theory to “cure” native biases about 
language practices, which constitute species o f theory-building in their 
own right. Linguistic science is fundamentally continuous with folk- 
linguistic knowledge, given that the goal o f researchers, too, is a 
goodness-of-fit between interpretive frames and linguistic data —  as 
is attested, for example, by the ongoing debate among the Anglicist, 
Creolist, and Neo-Anglicist positions vis-a-vis the origin and develop­
ment of African American Vernacular English, or AAVE (cf. 
Wolfram, Thomas 2002 for an overview; for a dissenting position, see 
Poplack, Tagliamonte 2001). Similarly, in his classic study o f ways in 
which speakers more or less consciously manipulate cues associated 
with linguistic difference, what Labov (1972) characterized as
In this sense, study of the diachronic profile of the interface between typifi­
cations and language practices falls within the domain of evolutionary psycho­
logy, which explores evidence for the development of human intelligence at a 
species level and builds hypotheses concerning how current-day cognitive abilities 
are an outgrowth of that evolutionary legacy. Relevant studies include Barkow, 
Cosmides, Tooby (2002); Gazzaniga (1994); and Tomasello (2001).
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indicators, markers, and stereotypes represent a point o f convergence 
between linguistic theory and folk linguistics. In ethnolinguistic 
contexts, these categories can be taken to refer to classes of 
ethnosemiotic cues embedded in frames that are brought to bear, in a 
more or less default manner, on the cues’ interpretation. At one end of 
the spectrum, indicators automatically trigger application o f a frame. 
At the other end, stereotypes have already been reframed, in a sense, 
because once a cue becomes subject to overt commentary, those who 
comment on the cue are no longer in the grip o f the frame by virtue of 
which it seemed transparently linked to an ethnocultural group. 
Stereotypes are thus frames made visible —  i.e., brought within the 
scope o f native ethnolinguistic theorizing.
3. Rejoining the circle
But the foregoing considerations only defer the question at hand: if 
language prejudices constitute (bad) theories in and o f themselves, 
why do those theories persist in the face o f better theories —  theories 
revealing the systematicity o f non-standard dialects, for instance, and 
thus the untenability o f claims concerning the “ inferiority” o f verna­
cular speech? In this connection, note that although they are 
distinguished by the degree o f automaticity involved in their 
manipulation and interpretation, all three categories o f cues identified 
by Labov (1972) —  indicators, markers, and stereotypes —  fall within 
the metapragmatic domain, as characterized by Silverstein (1993; cf. 
Lucy 1993). This domain encompasses the competencies undergirding 
what Roberts (1998: 111) succinctly characterizes as “speakers’ 
capacity to comment on language use and give o ff signals about social 
relationships”. Besides linking language use and language theory, 
such metalinguistic competencies suggest how language prejudice can 
be situated within the broader ecology o f human cognition, in which 
metacognition, or thinking about thinking (Moses, Baird 1999), can 
play a more or less prominent role —  depending on factors that 
include the complexity o f a given processing task and the availability 
o( the cognitive resources needed to perform it. From this perspective, 
language prejudice needs to be investigated as the close kin o f what 
cognitive scientists have termed judgment heuristics —  that is, general 
coping strategies’ by virtue o f which people arrive at determinations
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based not on exact calculations but on heuristic guides, or rules o f 
thumb. Heuristics o f this sort, influentially explored by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974; cf. also Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky 1982), enable 
people to determine rapidly the probability o f rain or the size o f a 
crowd on the street —  though they also lead to systematic errors that 
researchers have technically defined as the biases attendant upon 
distinct kinds o f judgm ent heuristics (see Fischhoff 1999). In essence, 
prejudice is a byproduct o f the same kinds o f  quick-and-dirty heuris­
tics, which may be put to non-pemicious as well as socially destruc­
tive uses —  whenever an information-rich environment causes a 
processing overload and prompts the use o f cognitive shortcuts. Given 
that humans’ basic cognitive endowment has achieved relative stabi­
lity at this point in our evolutionaiy history, it seems unlikely that 
people will ever stop using heuristics o f this sort. The challenge, then, 
is to militate against their indiscriminate application across all con­
texts —  in effect, to increase the range, diversity, and explanatory 
adequacy of the heuristics used to manage the informational richness 
of ethnosemiotic cues in particular.
We can come at this same issue from another direction —  namely, 
by emphasizing the basic asymmetry between frames and data, typi- 
fications and the specific practices or behaviors on which they are 
based (and which they are in turn used to interpret). On the one hand, 
it is impossible to make sense of an isolated datum in the absence o f a 
frame that allows it be chunked with other data and so made 
comprehensible as an element o f some larger experiential structure.6 
But on the other hand, it is possible for frames to become so 
entrenched, taken-for-granted, or “naturalized” that the hermeneutic 
circle is interrupted and some newly interpreted part is prevented from 
impinging on what is in reality an always only emergent under­
standing of the whole. In this sense, language prejudices can be 
recharacterized as grossly and reprehensibly data-resistant or, at the 
limit, data-impervious frames. At issue are top-down processing 
strategies that, more or less widely shared within a social collectivity,
Thus, in the sociophonetic experiment conducted by Thomas and Reaser 
(2004), which aimed to determine which phonetic cues listeners use to identify a 
speaker’s ethnicity, informants were (in effect) prompted to activate frames 
insofar as they were asked to make identifications in terms of pre-given 
ethnolinguistic categories. The design of the experiment itself, in other words, 
afforded frames for contextualizing the phonetic details under investigation.
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resist being brought into a complementary relation with bottom-up 
strategies, as well as with other frames defined by their perviousness 
to data. The more naturalized or entrenched a frame, the less amenable 
it is to being modified or replaced —  indeed, the less possible it is to 
discern features o f the world that would warrant modifying or 
replacing the frame in question.
Given the data-resistant profile o f language prejudices, how could 
such frames ever be denaturalized, that is to say, demonstrated to be 
contingent theoretical constructs rather than reflections o f the way 
things really are? The only viable strategy for countering prejudice is 
arguably to propagate, as widely as possible, alternative frames more 
sensitive to the confirmatory as well as disconfirmatory pressure of 
data. Ideology is a way o f describing what happens when the herme­
neutic circle is broken; a preconceived whole is forcibly imposed on 
parts in an effort to homogenize the different, to eradicate the other in 
the name o f the same. Paradoxically, then, only by refusing to step 
outside the circle o f interpretation can interlocutors as well as analysts 
begin to open the closed system o f language prejudice —  and thus 
start coming to terms with diversity.
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Этнолингвистика и социальное познание: 
языковой предрассудок как герменевтическая патология
Ученые, изучающие связь между языком и национальным иденти- 
тетом, описывали этнолингвистические идеологии как глубинные 
структуры первичных языковых практик. Настоящий анализ доказы­
вает, что гораздо целесообразнее перейти от многоуровневой анали­
тической модели к одноуровневой модели, которая содержала бы в 
себе интерпретационные фреймы и данные (т.е. аспекты социо- 
коммуникативного поведения), которые через эти фреймы интерпре­
тируются. Одноуровневая модель, безусловно, позволяет более адек­
ватно рассматривать, с одной стороны, ежедневные выводы людей 
об этнолингвистических идентитетах, а с другой — исследо­
вательские парадигмы языка как этносемиотического ресурса. Кроме 
того, одноуровневый подход не свободен от социоидеологических 
влияний. Наоборот, такой подход предполагает, что простирается 
некий континуум между (1) языковыми предрассудками, (2) попыт­
ками использования теории языка для опровержения этих предрас­
судков и (3) спонтанными гипотезами и выводами, на основе кото­
рых люди осмысляют языковое поведение своих сотоварищей 
(наряду с другими этносемиотическими указаниями).
Etnolingvistika ja sotsiaalne taju:
Keeleline eelarvamus kui hermeneutiline patoloogia
Keele ja rahvusliku identiteedi vahelist seost uurinud teadlased on etno- 
lingvistilisi ideoloogiaid kirjeldanud kui esmatasandi keelepraktikate 
süvastruktuuri. Käesolev analüüs aga väidab, et on märksa otstarbekam 
minna mitmetasandiliselt analüütiliselt mudelilt üle ühetasandilisele 
mudelile, mis koosneks tõlgenduslikust raamistikust ja andmetest (st 
sotsiokommunikatiivse käitumise aspektidest), mida antud raamide kaudu
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tõlgendatakse. Väidan, et ühetasandiline mudel võimaldab oluliselt ühtla­
semalt käsitleda inimeste igapäevaseid järeldusi etnolingvistiliste identi­
teetide kohta ühelt poolt ning keele kui etnosemiootilise varamu 
uurimisparadigmasid teiselt poolt. Siiski ei ole ühekihiline lähenemine 
puhas sotsioideoloogilistest kaalutlustest. Vastupidi, nimetatud lähene­
mine eeldab, et (1) juurdunud keelelised eelarvamused, (2) keeleteooria 
kasutamine nende eelarvamuste kummutamiseks ja (3) hetkelised hüpo­
teesid ning järeldused, mille pinnalt inimesed teevad järeldusi oma 
kaaslaste keelelise käitumise kohta (sh teised etnosemiootilised vihjed), 
moodustavad kõik ühe pideva kontiinumi.
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The relevance of C. S. Peirce for socio-semiotics
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15 route de Poussan, 34560 Montbazin, France 
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Abstract. Neither Peirce’s thought in general nor his semeiotic in particular 
would appear to be concerned with ‘society’ as it is generally conceived 
today. Moreover, Peirce rarely mentions ‘society’, preferring the term ‘com­
munity’, which his readers have often interpreted restrictively.
There are two essential points to be borne in mind. In the first place, the 
epithet ‘social’ refers here not to the object of thought, but to its production, 
its mode of action and its transmission and conservation. In the second place, 
the term ‘community’ is not restricted to the scientific community, as is 
sometimes supposed. On the contrary, it refers to the ideal form of a society, 
which he calls ‘the unlimited community’, i. e. a group of people striving 
towards a common goal.
Furthermore, Peirce’s semeiotic has been put in doubt as capable of 
providing a model for communication, the basis of social, dialogic, thought 
and action. The aim of the present article is to show that semeiotic, funded as 
it is on Peirce’s three categories, which define and delimit the ways in which 
man perceives and represents the phenomena, can provide a comprehensive 
model for the analysis of all types of communication in all social contexts.
Finally, in this domain, as in others, Peirce was a forerunner, with the 
result that his thought has often been misunderstood or forgotten. In addition, 
he was pre-eminently a philosopher, thus his work has been neglected in other 
disciplines. The elaboration of other triadic systems, such as, notably, that of 
Rossi-Landi, shows that the tendency of semiotics in general is to move away 
from the former static, dyadic model towards that involving a triadic process. 
This trend, with which Peircean theory is in harmony, has been sharply 
accentuated in recent years, but often lacks a philosophical justification for its 
assumptions, which Peirce provides.
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In an article entitled The Range o f Peirce’s Relevance, Max Fisch 
enumerated the many domains in which Peirce’s sign-theory has been 
of enduring influence, among them, not only semiotics, linguistics and 
anthropology but sociology (Fisch 1983). This last might appear 
surprising, as Peirce him self took a poor view o f sociology as such 
and o f sociologists in general. If  he admitted the existence o f “social 
sciences”, such as “the natural history o f religion, economics, political 
science” and the like (Ketner 1975-1987, 3: 229), he did not recognise 
sociology as such as a science because not founded on some general 
idea. His comments in review-articles in The Nation make this 
abundantly clear.
Furthermore, “society” is not a term often used by Peirce. 
Admittedly, for him, as for other pragmatists, all thought is “social”, 
and he develops this point very frequently. But Peirce, unlike other 
pragmatists, especially Dewey, was not interested in social conditions 
or conflicts, and when he uses the term “society” it is not with the 
connotations o f the term as used to-day, and certainly not those of its 
problematic nature. “The social nature o f thought is an essential part 
o f Peirce’s evolutionist philosophy and enters into his definition of 
truth”, wrote Philip P. Wiener; “unlike Dewey, however, Peirce 
scarcely deals with any specific social problem” (W iener 1949: 20).
At the time Peirce was writing, sociology was still in its infancy, 
and socio-semiotics as it is understood nowadays, not even thought of. 
And references to Peirce in contemporary writings on socio-semiotics 
are extremely rare. What could it mean then to say that Peirce’s 
semeiotic can have relevance for socio-semiotics? I think we can say 
that his thought, after the event, as it were, as in the case o f sociology, 
may be seen to have this relevance precisely because it constitutes a 
coherent system not confined to any particular time or place.
A counter-example may be relevant here: Dewey’s pedagogy was 
developed in Chicago and other industrial towns as a result of the 
conditions o f unrest prevailing there at the time. However respectable 
Dewey’s fundamental ideas may be deemed, the fact remains that 
when his system was later adopted in France, the result was 
catastrophic, the context being entirely different. One may object, with 
reason, that these ideas were imperfectly interpreted by French 
educationists, who did not perceive the philosophy underlying them,
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and were merely looking for “recipes” (Deledalle 1996, 2: 90) but that 
fact is also part o f  the context, which was not ready to receive them.
This is not the case with Peirce, whose semeiotic is founded on a 
philosophical basis capable o f transcending local or temporal material 
circumstances. If it remains true that Dewey and Peirce “both 
proposed the same methods o f approaching problems, any problems 
[...], Peirce’s pragmatism was more theoretical, Dewey’s instru­
mentalism more practical” (Deledalle 1996, 2: 90). If it is also true 
that a philosophy also depends, to a certain extent on time and place, 
the domains in which it moves and has its influence will be different 
according to the problems it has to solve. The more general the nature 
of this philosophy, and the fewer the particular questions raised, the 
wider this potential relevance will be. Peirce’s pragmatism was indeed 
that of ideas. But ideas are applied to concrete situations, “the proof o f 
the pudding is in the eating” and if  Peirce’s thought helps to solve 
problems, the pragmatic answer may be to use it.
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The social origin and nature of thought
What exactly does it mean to say that for Peirce all thought is social? 
One may first remark that in expounding his semeiotic, Peirce 
habitually takes examples from our everyday life. I am not here 
alluding merely to weathercocks, flags and such-like, which he gives 
as examples of different types o f sign, but to anecdotes and conversa­
tions in social contexts recognisable to the reader as corresponding to 
his own experience. The famous analysis o f “What sort o f day is it to­
day?” (CP 8.314) explores the question o f what a person is actually 
communicating, or trying to communicate, when he speaks, and the 
manner in which this is received by the interlocutor, in other words, 
everything which lies beyond a “signifier” and a “signified”. Likewise 
the passage on “the cook’s desire”, which analyses the idea of 
generality with reference to a common everyday event, (in this case 
the making o f an apple pie; CP 1.341). “This example, although a 
simple one, is highly significant, for it can be taken as paradigmatic o f 
Peirce’s concept o f intelligence: the governing o f behavior by 
appropriate general rules (or ‘habits’) in order to attain a desired end” 
(Limper 1996: 283-284), or the example o f two men standing on the 
seashore, o f whom one may descry a ship although the other cannot
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see it, this situation bringing about a modification o f the object o f 
discourse (CP 2.232).
But, although this aspect o f the question has been developed 
extensively in socio-linguistics (notably by M. A. K. Halliday, who 
claimed, curiously, in 1985 that “dynamic models o f semiotic systems 
are not yet very well developed” 1) this is a comparatively minor point 
in attempting to explain what Peirce really means by “social” . More 
fundamental is his exposition o f scientific method, where he explains 
him self quite clearly: the fact that the method o f modern science “has 
been made social” (CP 7.87) is a vital factor. He says:
On the one hand, what a scientific man recognizes as a fact of science must be 
something open to anybody to observe, provided he fulfils the necessary 
conditions, external and internal. As long as only one man has been able to see 
a marking upon the planet Venus, it is not an established fact. (CP 7.87)
In other words the validity o f facts or ideas must rest on public proof 
o f them, as Dewey was never tired o f remarking.
“On the other hand, the method o f modem science is social in 
respect to the solidarity o f its efforts”, and here Peirce compares the 
scientific world to a “colony o f insects, in that the individual strives to 
produce that which he him self cannot hope to enjoy. [...] When a 
problem comes before the scientific world, a hundred men imme­
diately set all their energies to work upon it” (CP 7.87). For “man is 
not whole as long as he is single, [...] he is essentially a possible 
member o f society. [...] It is not ‘m y’ experience, but ‘our’ experience 
that has to be thought of; and this ‘us’ has indefinite possibilities” (CP 
5.402, n2).
This notion o f “indefinite possibilities” is essential, and Peirce 
develops it elsewhere in the domain o f logic. “All human affairs rest 
upon probabilities, and the same thing is true everywhere” (CP 2.653). 
But man is mortal, Peirce goes on, and
death makes the number of our risks, of our inferences, finite, and so makes 
their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests 
on the assumption that this number is infinitely great. [...J logicality 
inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop 
at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community, 
again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom
1 Quoted by Scott Simpkins (1998: 511).
we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, 
however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who 
would not sacrifice his own soul to save the world, is, as it seems to me, 
illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social 
principle. (CP 2.654)
and elsewhere, “the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic” (W 
2.270-1). This solidarity o f  society (extended, be it noted in passing, 
“to all races”) is not thus, for Peirce, some vague well-intentioned 
humanitarian principle but a logical necessity.
A logical necessity, but also a psychological and intellectual one, 
for in reasoning, says Peirce
one is obliged to think to oneself In order to recognize what is needful for 
doing this it is necessary to recognize, first o f all, what “oneself’ is. One is not 
twice in precisely the same mental state. One is virtually [...] a somewhat 
different person, to whom one’s present thought has to be communicated. 
Consequently, one has to express one’s thought so that that virtually other 
person may understand it. (CP 7.103; CSP’s italics)
In other words, in order to think, we need others, and if  they are 
absent we have to imagine them. “No mind can take one step without 
the aid of other minds” (CP 2.220) and in fact “[...] the m an’s circle o f 
society (however widely or narrowly this phrase be understood), is a 
sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects o f higher rank than 
the person o f an individual organism” (CP 5.421). Thus society and 
the individual are indissolubly bound together. “The non-social 
individual is an abstraction arrived at by imagining what man would 
be if all his human qualities were taken away”, as Dewey said (Dewey 
1967-1972 [1888], 1: 232). The idea that all thought is a dialogic 
process is not new, but as Fisch remarks “There are no more pervasive 
themes in Peirce’s work, from early until late, that all thought is in 
signs and is dialogic in nature” (Fisch 1986: 442), and Peirce develops 
this idea in more precise contexts.
Consequently, all knowledge is social in origin. The impossibility 
for an individual o f arriving at any ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ is one o f Peirce’s 
most constant themes. In one o f his review articles he says that “to say 
that a broad philosophical conception is altogether new, is almost 
equivalent to a condemnation of it. That anybody has given it its 
definitive form can hardly ever be said” (Ketner 1975-1987, 3: 170).
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Why then, does Peirce so seldom refer to ‘society’? He prefers in 
general the term ‘com m unity’. In view o f this preference, it is 
somewhat amusing to find James M. Baldwin him self stating in his 
Dictionary that this word is used “loosely”, and that “no technical use 
o f this term is recommended” (Baldwin 1953, 1: 200-201). In a 
review article on a work by Baldwin, Peirce regrets with the author 
that there exists no theory o f the socius, which is “the weakness of 
current sociology” (Ketner 1975-1987, 2: 111).
It has also sometimes been remarked that the term, for Peirce, 
usually refers to the “community o f inquirers”, or the “scientific 
community”, which, understood in a restricted sense, leaves Peirce 
open to the charge o f elitism which is sometimes made, and which 
might appear to disqualify him as a universal thinker. If  it is true that 
in general he does use the term in this restricted sense, this is perhaps 
not so heinous as it may appear. For there is (pace Baldwin) a 
significant difference between the terms ‘society’ and ‘community’. 
The former term designates an association, a gathering o f people 
living in the same geographical locality, bound by a government, a 
common system o f laws, whereas ‘community’ implies some common 
link or interest binding a group together, which transcends physical 
proximity and legal or political conventions. A ‘society’ is not 
necessarily otherwise united: on the contrary, class-divisions and 
conflicting interests may prove to be a source o f social problems, 
which physical proximity may actually exacerbate.
In effect, different communities may exist within a society, 
whereas there can hardly be different societies within a community, 
which is more closely-knit, bound together as it is by shared norms 
and values. In a word, the cohesion o f a society is imposed from the 
outside, however ‘democratically’ (or not), whereas that of a 
community emanates naturally and dynamically from a group striving 
towards a common goal. So far, and superficially, the charge of 
elitism might seem to be somewhat justified.
But in actual fact, far from opposing the two notions, Peirce 
expands this notion o f ‘community' to the ideal o f  what a society 
should be, i.e. the ‘unlimited community’ (Goudge 1969: 261, 290, 
305). This community “may be wider than man”, indeed it may 
include “all living beings” (W 2.271) (which, with his inclusion of
Society and community
protoplasm (CP 1. 351) also perhaps foreshadows the possibility o f 
bio- and zoo-semiotics). And it is also unlimited in time. The concep­
tion o f reality “essentially involves the notion o f a COMMUNITY, 
without definite limits, and capable o f an indefinite increase o f 
knowledge” (W  2.239 C SP’s capitals). That, in actual fact, and in our 
daily lives, ‘society’ is usually conflictual, is not Peirce’s problem, but 
this is not in contradiction with the fact that all thought is social, for 
the epithet applies to the way in which thought is produced and 
elaborated, the mode o f its action and the means o f  its conservation.
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Communication
How does this link up with socio-semiotics?
If one accepts the idea that man cannot think by himself, and that 
thought is a collective process, this necessarily implies communi­
cation, and communication can take place only through signs. A sign 
cannot exist in vacuo; if  it is not perceived by somebody as a sign, it 
cannot be a sign. Any branch o f semiotics concerning man is therefore 
inevitably social. The term ‘socio-semiotics’ is almost a redundancy if 
we did not know, by ‘collateral experience’ what sense to give it.
There are many semiotic models, and the semeiotic o f Peirce has 
recently been put in doubt as a model for a general theory o f commu­
nication, a point to which we will return. However this may be, 
Peirce’s triadic model has a great advantage. In the first place, it is not 
merely a model, it is part o f a system. Models can usually be modified 
at will, sometimes to suit a particular case, whereas in a coherent 
system, if  an element is modified this implies either that this modifica­
tion will be an aberration, or alternatively that if  it is found to be 
genuinely justified, then the whole system will have to be modified 
and re-thought in virtue o f some other general principle.
The system on which his semeiotic is based is his phaneroscopy, 
which provides us with three categories for apprehending the pheno­
mena, Firstness (possibility, spontaneity, feeling), Secondness, (action 
and reaction, experience) and Thirdness (law, thought, mediation, 
habit). Peirce here did a useful work, appreciated by philosophers but 
not always by semioticians. In a recent article, Mats Bergman 
maintains that
the study of Peirce’s semeiotic has reached a point where certain central 
findings, such as the triadic character o f the sign and its reliance on Peirce’s 
categories o f Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, have been established 
firmly enough to speak o f an interpretive consensus. (Bergman 2000: 227)
This may be the case for philosophers studying semiotics, but it is 
doubtful if  for the semioticians who are not philosophers all the 
implications o f Peirce’s theory, especially in what concerns the 
hierarchy o f categories, esteemed by Gerard Deledalle (2000) as being 
o f crucial importance, are very obvious. Indeed, some semioticians 
think his system is needlessly complicated, whereas in fact it is 
simpler precisely because it reduces the number o f categories to the 
fundamental ones by which man perceives the world and represents it. 
His sign-system is thus also triadic. Peirce’s inestimable contribution 
to sign-theory is the presence o f the Interpretant, which pertains to 
mediation, and thus to Thirdness, within the sign-process. In a dualis- 
tic theory o f signification the Object corresponds to the Sign. In actual 
fact everybody knows this is not true. The immediately perceived 
sign, linguistic or other, (the Representamen) will invariably neces­
sitate a complement o f information before it can approach to an 
adequate ‘m eaning’. The latter, moreover, will not be fixed and stable, 
but will continue to evolve with each successive semiosis.
This is not news even to dualists. They have all encountered the 
problem and attempted to solve it in different ways. ‘Contexts’ and 
‘codes’ abound, but they are often simply convenient adjuncts to 
fundamentally dualistic systems where they have no official status. In 
other words, Thirdness is always with us, but unrecognised as such.
But Thirdness cannot be reduced to a dyadic system, there is no 
place for it. What pertains to thirdness will remain outside a semiotic 
process in a dualistic system, thus it can be modified at will. Gerard 
Deledalle (1978: 27—49; 2000: 100-113), for pedagogical reasons, 
attempted to formulate Peirce’s sign in Saussurean terms and proved it 
to be an impossible task. And it is not advisable, from the point of 
view o f the ethics o f terminology to use the terms ‘signifier’ and 
‘signified’ and to appropriate the term ‘interpretant’ as a useful 
adjunct in a basically dualistic process o f  communication and inter­
pretation as is sometimes done. If one is evoking the interpretant, one 
is at the same time referring to Peirce’s whole system, which, ideally, 
would have to be accepted in all its coherence. Peirce’s semiotic 
cannot be dissociated from the philosophy and the logic which are its
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foundations. This said, his position on ‘chance’ and ‘fallibilism’ must 
not be forgotten.
It can thus be argued that this phaneroscopy is relevant for socio­
semiotics precisely because it accounts clearly for the multiple and 
different ways in which man perceives and expresses the world in 
which he lives, moves and has his being.
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Can semiotics provide a model for communication?
1. C ontra
Semiotics in general however has been put in doubt as capable o f 
supplying a model for communication, and we shall here deal briefly 
with some of the objections formulated.
The ‘post-semiotic’ view o f John Stewart (1995) is that semiotics 
cannot be applied to other domains because o f “its symbol model 
basis, which assumes ‘language is fundamentally a system o f signs or 
symbols’” and that the “most prominent stumbling-block is a two- 
world orientation that posits ‘a fundamental distinction between [...] 
the world o f the sign and the signifier, symbol and symbolised, name 
and named, word and thought’” on the grounds that “ ‘world is the 
single coherent sphere that humans inhabit’” (Simpkins 1998: 509). 
While being valid with reference to a dyadic semiotics these remarks 
can obviously not be applied to Peirce’s triadic semeiotic, and in 
actual fact, no Peircean would object to this objection!
But other objections, paradoxically, are voiced by some o f those 
who advocate the extension o f the field o f semiotics towards other 
domains, notably the social. R. Hodge and G. Kress (1988) insist on 
the necessity in the latter domain o f a diachronic dimension, while 
also, just as paradoxically, condemning “semiosis [...] as ‘necessarily 
ideological’” (Simpkins 1998: 510). It is hardly necessary to point out, 
on one hand, that ‘semiosis’ in Peircean semeiotic is by definition a 
diachronic process, and on the other hand, that, although Peircean 
semiosis does not and cannot ignore ideology, the latter must be taken 
account o f only as constituting a field o f interpretants, which can in no 
way command or govern the semiosic process itself. The only way o f 
invalidating the statement I have just made would be for semeiotic to 
deconstruct itself by advancing the notion that it is itself based on an
ideology, however I think this sort o f  ‘Cretan paradox’ can hardly be 
maintained.
Although these authors claim to be taking into account “all sign 
systems” (Simpkins 1998: 510), that o f Peirce has obviously been 
neglected. This kind o f objection to semiotics in general as being 
unable to provide a model for communication is obviously irrelevant 
here.
More serious are the philosophical arguments set forth by Mats 
Bergman in the afore-mentioned article, with reference to works by 
Habermas (1995) and Parmentier (1985; 1994). Bergman does 
concede at the outset that
it is uncertain whether his scattered remarks on the topic entail a consistent 
theory of communicative phenomena, one may even question whether 
semeiotic can plausibly be developed in this direction at all. Peirce’s most 
formal account o f the sign relation, given in strictly unpsychologistic terms, 
without reference to human utterers and interpreters, indicate that pure 
semeiotic is after all only concerned with the abstract conditions of 
representation and truth, and that communication is a non-philosophical 
problem-area that is best left to the special sciences. (Bergman 2000: 226)
Playing the devil’s advocate, Bergman exposes the point o f view of 
those who maintain that the utility o f semeiotic is restricted to ‘truth- 
functional epistemology and mathematical logic, and thus renders 
Peirce’s theory o f signs practically useless for other types o f inquiry, 
such as studies o f  culture and social communication” (Bergman 2000: 
226).
Having duly nourished Cerberus, Bergman then proceeds to under­
mine these statements, with reference to the work o f Johansen (1985; 
1993), Colapietro (1996) and Liszka (1996) showing that it is the 
definitions o f  those who make them that “restrict” the scope of 
semeiotic. It is not our intention here to make a detailed analysis of 
Bergm an's lucid and thoroughly-documented article, but to stress 
several points made which have relevance for our present topic.
The main point is that the pragmatistic dimension, “the domain of 
habits and practices” (Bergman 2000: 237) o f  semeiotic cannot be 
ignored. Moreover, he says, if  one cannot maintain that Peirce’s 
model be a perfect model for communication, it must not be forgotten 
that the idea o f perfect communication is itself perhaps illusory, 
“communication is not a straightforward transmission o f  truth” 
(Bergman 2000: 238), which would be a dyadic process, he remarks
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(and, we would add, would entail interminable discussions about the 
nature o f  this ‘truth’, and the philosophical assumptions underlying it). 
He stresses the fact that although “Peirce undeniably characterizes his 
theory o f signs as a scientific undertaking [...] that does not mean that 
semeiotic would study nothing but science” (Bergman 2000: 247). He 
reminds readers o f a fundamental point we made at the beginning o f 
this article, that although Peirce’s most formal accounts o f  the sign 
relation concern the theoretical science o f rhetoric, Peirce, in spite o f 
his anti-psychologism indicates that “it is acceptable to take some 
psychological facts into consideration”, adding that “we could perhaps 
broaden its scope further by allowing a limited number o f sociological 
insights to enter the proceedings”, for “Peirce tends to view practically 
anything that can in any sense be investigated in semiotic term s” and 
“inquiry is a social mode o f conduct” (ibid., my italics).
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2. Pro
If it is true that the occurrences o f Peirce’s use o f the term ‘communi­
cation’ are rare, as Bergman and others point out, this does not mean 
that it is not, in fact, a subject continually treated, albeit indirectly, in 
his writings. In fact, contrary to the assertions quoted above, examples 
of communicative processes in concrete situations are to be found 
dispersed everywhere in his writings, as already noted, even in 
apparently abstract philosophical discourse, showing that Peirce never 
loses sight o f the fact that man is pre-eminently a sign, living in a 
“universe [...] perfused with signs” (CP 5.448 Fn PI). Semiosis does 
not take place in a philosophical stratosphere:
Propositions refer to the real universe, and usually to the nearer environment. 
Thus, if somebody rushes into the room and says, “There is a great fire!” we 
know he is talking about the neighbourhood and not about the world of the 
Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. (CP 2.357).
Or again, when defining ‘Predication’: when we say ‘it rains’, “it does 
not mean that it rains in fairyland” (CP 2.360).
In the present writer’s opinion, Bergman’s article most effectively 
disposes o f any objections o f a philosophical nature that could be 
made to using Peirce’s semeiotic as a model for a system o f commu­
nication or its extension to other fields o f social activity. That
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Bergman advances his arguments with some caution, and without 
mentioning Peirce’s many references to the context o f the everyday 
world is a fact, but this caution (I feel) is only a ‘sign’ conveying the 
usual reluctance o f certain philosophers to admit that their theories 
might have ‘effects’ or ‘practical bearings’ on the world in which we 
live. Not being a professional philosopher, I feel m yself entitled to go 
a little further.
In actual fact, researchers have not waited for a philosophical 
justification. Peirce’s thought has already been used systematically in 
recent years by Dinda Gorlee (1994; 2004) in the field o f translation, 
by Irene Portis-W inner in anthropology (2002), by David Scott and 
others in visual semiotics and also in architecture by Claudio Guerri, 
not to mention the analysis o f literary texts. ‘Communication’ is not 
restricted to some specialised field o f inquiry. All human activities can 
be the subjects o f communication, and most o f  them can be considered 
themselves as forms o f communication. So the multiplication o f fields 
o f interpretants requires that any statement, be it linguistic, artistic, 
sociological, psychological or other, about the human situation must 
be examined with the minutest care, in order to assess the import of 
the signs which constitute it. It would appear, at least to the present 
writer, that this can be effected only by a sign-system taking account 
o f the different ways in which the world is apprehended. Peirce, using 
Ockham ’s razor, supplied us with the essential categories necessary 
for doing this.
With the advance o f the twentieth century, sign-systems reposing 
on a dualistic basis had obviously fallen into disrepute, giving ‘se­
m iotics’ in general a bad name. As noted previously, thirdness is 
essential; some important, but relatively modern social concepts, such 
as that o f ‘alterity’ are based on it (Deledalle 1991; Net 1994; 
Deledalle-Rhodes 1994a; 1997) Other sign-systems have been 
elaborated, some o f these recognising the importance o f Peircean 
thought. And many semioticians refer to Peirce as one o f the 
‘founding fathers’ o f semiotics. Unfortunately, even though this is 
true, as Ketner and Kloesel (1975: 404) pointed out “some of them 
have hardly scratched the surface in understanding his work”. One of 
the reasons for this is, as previously noted, that Peirce “never 
published one single, special, and comprehensive work on semiotic 
and that comments and reflections which might be regarded as useful 
to modem semiotics are found throughout his published articles”
(Ketner, Kloesel 1975: 400). Another reason is that “some scholars 
present Peirce’s work in terms o f various compartments: his meta­
physics, cosmology, pragmaticism, ethics, semiotic, logic, mathe­
matics, and so on” (Ketner, Kloesel 1975: 397). This may sometimes 
appear useful for purposes o f exposition, the authors admit, but for 
semiotic they suggest that “this kind o f approach [...] is neither fruitful 
nor appropriate”; for “semiotic (or logic in the broad sense) which is 
his omnipresent epistemology, permeates his whole scholarly output” 
and “when Peirce turns to consider any o f the sciences other than 
semiotic, the consideration is undertaken using the epistemological or 
philosophical approach that semiotic provides” (Ketner, Kloesel 1975: 
397). The authors thus conclude that “present-day students o f semiotic 
should properly be conversant with all his philosophical work, not 
merely with what they consider to be a relatively restricted part which 
they identify as relevant to semiotics” (Ketner, Kloesel 1975: 398).
In publishing Charles S. Peirce: Ecrits sur le signe (Deledalle 
1978), which is not, as is sometimes thought a work written by Peirce, 
but a selection o f the most relevant o f  Peice’s articles arranged 
logically and accompanied by commentaries and explanations, and 
Theorie et pratique du signe (Deledalle 1979), Gerard Deledalle did a 
great deal to remedy this situation in France and francophone 
countries, and by founding IRSCE at the University o f Perpignan in 
1974 enabled scholars to study not only Peirce’s semeiotic, but the 
philosophy on which it is based. Furthermore, IRSCE became a centre 
for international conferences, assembling Peircean specialists o f 
different origins, mainly from Italy, Germany and the United States 
and South America, whose work is so well-known that it would be out 
of place to dwell on it here.
However, these international conferences, at which all aspects o f 
semiotics were exposed and discussed, were not devoted exclusively 
to Peirce, but recognised the relevance and importance o f other triadic 
systems, often based on Morris, as well as those stemming from the 
Prague school and, in some sense, parallel to Peircean semeiotic, but 
not in opposition to it. That o f Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, which is, 
according to Jeff Bernard “a genuine socio-semiotics ” (Bernard 1992:
1639) would appear indeed to be almost complementary to Peirce’s 
sign-theory. This theory was exposed notably by Jeff Bernard in his 
paper read at the 4th Congress o f IASS at Perpignan in 1989, and in
The relevance o f  C. S. Peirce for socio-semiotics 243
244 Janice Deledalle-Rhodes
1992, Gloria Withalm, invited lecturer at IRSCE devoted her seminar 
to the subject. Both found an appreciative audience.
The diagrammatic representation o f this system (Bernard 1992:
1640) is a pyramid, consisting o f a cluster o f triads, representing the 
semiosis o f sign-production. Bernard insists, and this is important for 
Peircean semioticians, that
this is not a model from the structuralist-functionalist kind [...] but in itself 
already a compositum mixtum o f  many empirical and theoretic origins [...] 
moreover, one should not forget that we have to deal here, factually, in a 
reductionist way with processes, i.e. with concrete persons in their historicity. 
(Bernard 1992: 1641)
The final diagram, which accounts for further exploration and applica­
tion o f this theory (Bernard 1992: 1646) shows a series o f inter­
connecting and related triads. These diagrams call to mind the triangle 
usually employed to represent Peirce’s triadic concept o f  semiosis, but 
they are obviously far more complex, and concern a domain not 
specifically treated by Peirce. That Rossi-Landi initiated his system 
with reference to a different field o f interpretants is not so important 
as it might first appear. Similar semiotic analyses are the result. The 
essential point for a comparativist semiotician is the triadicity, the 
dynamism and the continuity o f this system. Gerard Deledalle always 
insisted that the triangle, necessary in a first stage for pedagogical 
reasons, should not be taken to mean that a semiosis is limited. He, 
like Lady Welby, instead o f a “vicious circle” would have preferred 
the diagram o f an open-ended “virtuous spiral” (Welby 1983 [1903]: 
37-38), representing the continuity o f  the process o f signification, but 
for practical reasons this is far more complicated to reproduce.
Conclusion
At the present time, it is obvious that the static, dyadic model based on 
a dualistic world-view has been found unsatisfactory and is dying a 
natural death. After the event, even Saussure, held to be responsible 
for the diagram of a sign that perpetuated a dyadic model, sub­
sequently adopted in many other semiotic fields, has been re-read and 
interpreted in a totally different perspective, as exposed by Simon 
Bouquet (1997). My only point in writing this necessarily incomplete
essay is to underline the comprehensive, dynamic and coherent nature 
of Peirce’s system, elaborated unfortunately before  the development 
o f socio-semiotics, with the result that it has often been forgotten, 
misunderstood, or simply ignored. Peirce’s thought is too often 
regarded by non-philosophers as a complex and complicated system 
of abstractions having no relation to social facts and realities. Peirce 
himself would have been the first to deny this. For the pragmatist, 
ideas and theories are not mere playthings for philosophers, but tools 
to be used for solving real problems. This is nowhere more evident 
than in his article on “Theory” in which he analyses the distinction 
made between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, pointing out that on one hand 
no theory can embrace all the facts and on the other hand that all 
practice has a theory behind it, concluding as follows:
Perceptual judgments, [...] are, for the purpose o f  logical criticism, absolute 
facts without any admixture o f  theory. If a theory does not square with 
perceptual facts it must be changed. But the impressions o f sense from which 
it is supposed that the percepts have been constructed are matters o f  theory. If 
the percepts were proved not to square with the impressions o f  sense, it would 
not at all be the percepts that would have to be reformed; it would be, on the 
contrary, that theory, that the percepts are constructed out o f  the impressions 
o f sense, that would have to be modified. (Peirce 1953 [1901]: 693-694)
Far from being an abstract system removed from reality, Peirce’s 
thought, with its social origin, pragmatic dimension and its adaptabi­
lity to all types o f situations and experiences would seem to re­
commend it on the contrary as a potential tool o f great interest for 
sociosemioticians.
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Значение Ч. С. Пирса для социосемиотики
Ни общая философия Ч. С. Пирса, ни его специфически семиоти­
ческая часть на первый взгляд не касаются «общества» {society) в 
современном значении этого понятия. Более того, сам Пирс редко 
пользуется термином «общество», предпочитая термин «сообщество»
(community), трактуемое многими его читателями довольно узко.
Следует запомнить два положения. Во-первых, эпитет «социаль­
ный» указывает тут не на объект мышления, а на результат, меха­
низм, передачу и сохранение мыслительной работы. Во-вторых, «со­
общество» не ограничивается сообществом ученых, как часто ду­
мают. Наоборот, «сообщество» указывает на идеальное общество, 
которое Пирс называет «ограниченным сообществом», т.е. на группу 
людей, которые стремятся к общей цели.
Более того, часто сомневались и в том, может ли семиотика 
Пирса предложить нам модель коммуникации. Цель настоящей 
статьи — показать, что основываясь на трех категориях Пирса, кото­
рые определяют и разграничивают модусы перцепции и презентации 
разных явлений, семиотика может дать всеобъемлющую модель для 
анализа всех типов коммуникации во всех социальных контекстах.
Наконец, Пирс был первопроходцем в данной области (как и во 
многих других), что означает, что многие его идеи позабыты или 
неправильно поняты. К тому же он был прежде всего философом и 
поэтому другие дисциплины отвергали его работы. Возникновение 
иных триадических систем (напр Ф. Росси-Ланди) указывает на 
общую тенденцию семиотики отдалиться от статической диади- 
ческой модели и повернуться к моделям, содержащим триадический 
процесс. Это направление, которое соотносится с пирсовской 
теорией, проявляется особенно ярко именно в последние годы, но, к 
сожалению, зачастую без философского обоснования своих пред­
посылок, имеющихся у Пирса.
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Ei Charles Peirce’i üldine filosoofia ega ka selle spetsiifiliselt semioo­
tiline osa ei näi esmapilgul puudutavat “ühiskonda”, nii nagu seda mõistet 
tänapäeval üldiselt tõlgendatakse. Veelgi enam, Peirce mainib “ühis­
konda” (society) harva, eelistades mõistet “kogukond” (community), 
millele paljud tema lugejad on andnud üsna piiratud tähenduse.
Olulised on kaks tõsiasja. Esiteks ei viita epiteet “sotsiaalne” siin 
mitte mõtlemise objektile, vaid mõttetöö tulemile, toimimismehhanismile, 
edastamisele ja  säilitamisele. Teiseks ei piirdu mõiste “kogukond” käes­
olevas mitte teadlaste kogukonnaga, nagu vahel arvama kiputakse. 
Vastupidi, “kogukond” viitab ideaalsele ühikonnale, mida Peirce nimetab 
“piirituks kogukonnaks”, st grupile inimestele, kes püüdlevad ühiste ees­
märkide poole.
Veelgi enam, tihti on kaheldud selles, kas Peirce’i semiootika suudab 
pakkuda kommunikatsiooni —  sotsiaalse, dialoogilise mõtlemise ning 
toimimise aluse —  mudelit. Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on näidata, et 
põhinedes Peirce’i kolmele kategooriale, mis määratlevad ja piiritlevad 
erinevate nähtuste tajumise ja  esitamise mooduseid, suudab semiootika 
pakkuda välja kõikehõlmava mudeli igat tüüpi kommunikatsiooni 
analüüsimiseks kõigis sotsiaalsetes kontekstides.
Lõpeks oli Peirce antud valdkonnas (nagu paljudes teisteski) pioneer, 
mis tähendab, et tema ideed on tihti unustatud või valesti mõistetud. Peale 
selle oli ta ennekõike filosoof ja  seetõttu on teised distsipliinid tema tööd 
eiranud. Teiste triaadiliste süsteemide tekkimine (nt F. Rossi-Landi) 
osutab semiootika üldisele tendentsile eemalduda staatilisest diaadilisest 
mudelist ja  pöörduda triaadilist protsessi sisaldavate mudelite poole. See 
suundumus, mis on kooskõlas Peirce’i teooriaga, on just viimastel aastatel 
teravalt esile kerkinud, kuid kahjuks puudub tal tihti filosoofiline põhjen­
dus oma eeldustele, mis Peirce’il on olemas.
C. S. Peirce’i tähtsus sotsiosemiootika jaoks
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Abstract. The article asks, how one o f the basic notions o f  cultural-political 
identity —  we —  is constructed in mass media, viz. which kind o f  semiotic 
and linguistic facilities are used in constructing a political unity. The approach 
used in this article is based on Lotman's semiotic theory o f  culture and on the 
analysis o f pronouns in political texts, using Emil Benvenist’s theory o f  
deixis. Our case study concentrates on the years 1940-1941 which mark one 
o f the most crucial periods in Estonian nearest history. The source material o f  
the analysis consists o f speeches o f  new political elite in power, all o f which 
were published in major daily newspapers at the time. In outline, first year o f  
soviet power in Estonia can be divided in two periods. First period would be 
from June 21 to “July elections” in 1940. In political rhetoric, new political 
elite tried to create a monolithic subject, the unity between themselves and 
people {people’s will) by emphasizing activity and freedom o f  self- 
determination. Nevertheless, starting from “elections”, especially from the 
period after “accepting” Soviet Republic o f Estonia as a full member o f  Soviet 
Union, a transition o f we-concept from an active subject to mere passive 
recipient can be detected. From that time on, people ’s will was envisaged as 
entirely determined by marxist-leninist ideology and “the Party'”.
The occupation o f Estonia by the Soviet Union in June 1940 had a 
shocking effect on Estonian people. The former meanings that had 
constructed society and were crucial to human understanding were 
turned into being something with a minus sign and substituted with
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the Soviet ideological worldview.1 The following article analyses, 
therefore, how the ideology supporting the events o f the 1940s found 
expression in the speeches o f the new men o f power. Among other 
things the analysis might be deemed interesting due to the fact that 
ideological construction o f political reality is one o f the constituting 
factors o f human identity.
Defining ‘ideology’ has turned to a sort o f glass bead game among 
scientists. Thus the well known author o f several textbooks on politi­
cal science Andrew Heywood defines ideology as a system of beliefs, 
the truth or falsity o f which cannot be “proved in any scientific sense”, 
but which nonetheless helps to structure our understanding o f the 
world (Heywood 1990: 2). In the framework o f this article I consider 
necessary to delimit ideology as a programmatic and rhetorical 
application o f a grand philosophical system which agitates people to 
political action and can provide strategic guidelines for such activity 
(Hagopian 1978). Accordingly, ideology functions as a justification of 
political power, as a factor mobilizing the people and creates a mental 
order in the customary disorder o f political life, providing the “ground 
principles”2 so to speak, by which the ideology perceives the sur­
rounding world. Since politics had the subordinating role par excel­
lence according to the self-reflection o f the Soviet ideology, the politi­
cal identity had also to shape the socio-cultural identity o f human 
beings.
The concrete object o f  study is the category o f we. Semantically the 
keywords used in the framework o f this article are the ones established 
in the political rhetoric such as the will o f the people, the people etc., i. 
e. these referring to on whose behalf it is being spoken in politics.
The analyzed material is composed o f the largest daily newspapers 
Päevaleht (issues from 1938, 1939 and 1940) and Rahva Hääl (issues
The determining factors o f the public ideological discourse in the pre-War 
Republic o f  Estonia (1918-1940) were the valuing o f  fatherland and family, the 
participation in patriotic unions, the celebration o f national anniversaries. The 
sacral status was ascribed to the ancient time and Lembitu, Päts and Jakobson, 
Laidoner and the war o f  independence, patriotic poetry and folklore, which all 
together shaped the essence o f  the national whole.
I he Marxist-Leninist theoiy is the science o f  societal development, the 
science ol workers’ movement, the science o f  proletarian revolution, the science 
o f building the communist society” (The History o f the Union-wide Communist
(bolshevist) Party: A Crash-Course —  Lühikursus 1951 [1938]: 321).
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from 1940 to 1941).3 The essential part o f the sources is formed o f 
speeches o f  the politicians published in the press and o f the editorials 
o f the daily newspapers. Choosing media as the empirical object o f 
study can be justified mainly by the fact that the media (especially the 
editions that cover daily news) reflects the worldview, ideology and 
value-orientations o f  a community (Lauk, Maimik 1998: 80).
1. The two dimensions of the и^-category
As indicated above the political discourse is in this article approached 
mainly through the speeches o f politicians. For many scientists the 
verbal communication is the most important constituent o f  discourse 
(Dijk 1998). The importance o f political rhetoric is also expressed in 
the fact that it is through that that the official political position and 
intellectual framework is fixed —  a framework that is the basis not 
only for describing and cognizing the surrounding world but also for 
altering it (Hertzler 1965: 3—4).
The discourse analysis approach emphasizes that the discourses are 
inseparable from power —  their impersonal all-encompassing power 
to construct reality, but also the power exercised by subjects in 
(re)producing meanings.
The notion o f “discourse”, as developed in some contemporary approaches to 
political analysis, has its distant roots in what can be called the transcendental 
turn in modern philosophy —  i. e. a type o f analysis primarily addressed not 
to facts but to their conditions o f possibility. (Laclau 1993: 431)
At the same time this relationship between power and discourse 
should not be understood in the traditional framework for con­
ceptualizing power and politics in which power is seen in terms of 
legal means (and ontologically as an “object” or “thing”) to protect 
private property in the name o f public good (the liberal tradition from 
John Locke to John Rawls). The relationship between power and 
politics has also been described in terms o f economic competition for 
votes in order to gain power (Joseph Shumpeter) and politics has been
3 After the coup in 1940 the newspaper Päevaleht was closed down. The 
newspaper Rahva Hääl [literally People’s Voice] that was founded in June 1940 
instead o f newspaper Uus Eesti [literally New Estonia] formed one o f  the main 
official voices o f  the Communist Party o f Estonia.
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connected with interactions governed by public ethical norms (Jürgen 
Habermas). These approaches however leave unanswered the main 
question: how is a power relation established?
The focus o f studying political power moves away from the 
sovereign forms o f power like state or administrative apparatuses and 
the hitherto systematically concealed forms o f power enter the center 
o f attention in the social sciences. In this framework politics can be 
conceptualised as “a practice o f creation, reproduction and trans­
formation o f social relations” (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 153) that can 
always be seen as an expression o f the powers o f discourse. One of the 
possibilities for constructing a power relation is through the use of 
deictics.
It is true that the tradition o f describing deixis has a long history 
reaching back to the Stoics. But since Karl Bühler’s Sprachtheorie (1934) 
the deixis has a well-established place in scientific linguistic studies. The 
deixis analysis has also extended its theoretical basis: devices for analysis 
have been borrowed from analytic philosophy (e. g., Kripke 1990; Evans 
1985, etc.), semiotics (e. g., Greimas, Courtes 1993 [1978]) as well as 
from cognitive science (e.g., Lyons 1977; Fillmore 1982; Brown, Yule 
1983). While other elements o f language in political discourse have 
attracted attention well enough4 the role o f deixis in constructing power 
relations has largely been underestimated (cf. Weintraub 1989). The 
following could be regarded as a small contribution to filling that gap by 
using a concrete empirical material.
The deixis, as is well known, encodes in the utterances the person 
o f the speaker, his/her subjectivity and spatiotemporal context and it is 
formed o f corresponding orientational vocabulary and grammatical 
means. The deixis’s rules o f use enable the addressee to decode the 
utterance according to its context and to determine the extra-linguistic 
factors eliciting the content.
In the case o f we the /  and you form a unified subject that at a 
certain phase o f the speech feels, thinks, speaks and acts unitedly but 
can be changed again latter —  expanded, disintegrated, generalized or 
replaced. But, as Emile Benveniste explains the we is a very special 
kind o f union that is based on the non-equivalence o f the members: 
the we does not consist in a mechanical aggregation o f different I-s but 
in the we there is always a dominant /  (the subject o f the utterance) 
and this /  due to its transcendence subjects to itself a not-I which
E. g., metaphor (see Lakoff 1992; 1996); lexis (see Lasswell et al. 1949, etc).
means that only through stepping out o f itself it creates that we and 
thus determines the not-I (Benveniste 1966: 236-237). There are few 
words that are so ideologically and socially charged as the pronoun 
we. Through speaker’s emphases the social relations, statuses, power 
and ideology are expressed through it and the addressee manipulated 
(Dijk 1998: 201-203). By analyzing the use o f the personal pronouns 
in the political discourse (like the we in the speeches o f the politicians) 
it is possible to study the rhetoric mechanism by which the 
membership o f the in-group signified, the distancing it from its out­
group or is marked, and the denigration o f the out-group, the activism 
or passivity o f the social agents and many other functions o f the 
speech. It would be even more apt to say that the speaker constructs, 
creates the subject present in the utterance, the one on whose behalf 
he/she speaks.
Conceived this way the subject’s characteristics can be expanded 
to larger imaginary communitarian wholes. Thus for instance the 
social classes are subjects, whose unity is constituted by interests that 
are determined by their position in the relations o f production. Simi­
larly a nation is an integral subject that is united by an identity based 
on language, culture, religion, history or other factors. The concept o f 
we (us) that is accompanied by an opposition with them can be con­
sidered semiotically as the main characteristic o f culture. Therefore, 
this opposition determines and delimits the type o f the relation 
between culture’s self-description (organized space) and other culture 
(unorganized space). Hence for every culture corresponds a type o f its 
“chaos” that is not necessarily homogenous and always identical with 
itself but consist in an active human creation as the domain o f the 
cultural organization (Ivanov et al. 1998: 33)
According to Juri Lotman the national-cultural specificity is at the 
primary stage grasped by outlanders (Lotman 1999: 45). Thus it is 
understandable that for instance at the ideational bearers o f the first 
phase o f the Estonian national awakening were mainly intellectuals o f 
German origin.5 We have here rather a question: who are they
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5 The “national awakening” is a stipulative term coined in the Estonian 
historical literature in the first decades o f the 20th century. It refers to the period 
when against the background o f economic and social change in the second half o f  
the 19th century the acknowledgement o f  nationality began in the Estonian 
literary communication and the awakening o f the national self-consciousness and 
national movement started to emerge.
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(Estonians as a social group that has not yet uniformly determined 
identity) that are not us (Germans as a nation with full-fledged 
identity). At the next phase when a culture that had thus far been only 
an object o f  description, reaches at the level o f self-description, it 
takes “an exterior viewpoint towards itself and describes itself as 
unique” (Lotman 1999: 46). Estonians are counted in the so-called 
“nations without history” . Therefore the first ideologies o f Estonia- 
nism relied on ethnic traditions and folkloric myths. In constructing 
the national narrative and history the experiences o f other nations 
were followed and linked with ideas popular at the time (Annus 2000: 
89). A special role in the shaping o f the spiritual life (as for all o f the 
Eastern-European small nations) was played by the ideas o f Johan 
Gottfried Herder (Undusk 1995: 581). A positive and integral self- 
identification thus answers to the question: who are we? And through 
simultaneously opposing itself to the other —  the not-we (for example 
to other nations) —  the nation or class at the same time identifies itself 
negatively: we are not what are the others. At this phase an ideology is 
formed in which the self is conceived as sovereign.
The concept o f the subject correlates to that o f the object. The 
drive to self-organization depends on the mode o f the relations in 
society. The mode o f these relations determines weather the human 
being cognizes itself as the subject or object o f the creation o f culture. 
In this article the word we in addition to its meaning as a deictic 
pronoun refers exactly to such a category defined as a unified whole.
Two aspects o f  the we-category will be focused in the analysis:
(1) How it was constructed as a subject-object relation in the Soviet 
propaganda.
(a) During the span from the “coup o f June” to the July 
“elections” .6
(b) The period from July 1940 to the German occupation in July 
1941.
(2) How was the “we” positioned deictically in texts?
In July 14 15 1940, general elections o f  the State’s Council were held which 
was a spectacle conducted according to the directives from Moscow. The clique 
that had carricd on the “Coup o f  June” aggregated around the electoral block of 
Lstonia s Working People’s Union (EWPU), who, having the position o f  power, 
cancelled out any nomination o f  candidates from the opposition. As a result the 
LWPU got 92.8% o f votes from the “election”.
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2. Historical introduction
June 1940 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied by the Soviet 
troops. In the public-political discourse it was presented as the 
institution o f  the power o f the people. In august the 6th Estonian 
Republic was incorporated into the Soviet Union, which, in turn, was 
called “joining the USSR on voluntary basis” .
In actuality, the Soviet Union had already on the 23rd o f August 
1939 entered into pact with the German Reich, the secret protocols o f 
which established the Baltic States as part o f  the Soviet’s sphere o f 
influence. In September the same year the Soviet Union began to 
realize its aggressive foreign politics. On the 28th o f  September in 
Moscow under the pressure o f the Soviet Union the contract o f  mutual 
aid was signed with Estonia, by the terms o f which Estonia had to 
allow the building o f the military basis o f the Red Army to Saaremaa, 
Hiiumaa and Paldiski. In the early summer o f 1940, when the whole 
world's attention was focused on the successful action o f Wehrmacht 
in France, the Soviet government decided to realize conclusively the 
agreements o f the secret protocols o f the Hitler-Stalin pact. On the 
16th of June 1940 the Soviet Union delivered an ultimatum to Estonia, 
accusing Estonia o f military cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania, 
which supposedly threatened the national security o f the Soviet Union. 
A response to the ultimatum which stipulated the establishment o f  a 
new government and a free access to the additional military forces o f 
the Soviet Union was to be given on the same day. In case o f refusal 
the units of the Red Army were to move to Estonia by force. The 
government o f Estonia, considering the political situation o f that day 
Europe, decided to accept the terms o f the ultimatum and on 17th to 
18th of June the Soviet troops occupied the Republic o f Estonia. On 
the demands o f Moscow, a new and clearly Soviet-oriented govern­
ment was appointed, the head o f which became Johannes Vares- 
Barbarus. The Coup o f June was accomplished.
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2.1. The deictic constitution o f the we-category in the 
speeches o f the politicians
Johannes Vares-Barbarus begins his first speech in the 25th o f June 
issue o f the Rahva Hääl as follows:
A Miracle has happened —  we8 have won. Our day o f  victory has become the 
day o f  freedom. We all are patriots and love country and people. (Vares- 
Barbarus 1940a)
Here a question arises: whom does Vares-Barbarus mean by wel 
Should the addressee o f the communication be distinguished from that 
we on whose behalf it was spoken? And what do the words “we air  
mean in the last sentence? The speech by Vares-Barbarus allows to 
claim that at first by the “we а1Г it was meant a part o f a whole. 
Further in his speech Vares-Barbarus stresses the conclusiveness of 
the events o f  June the 22nd but adds that even
the most magnanimous o f  w ills and human capacities have limits, we already 
have done more but to gain even more it takes organized work and pains, 
therefore my hope is on the assistance o f  all the citizens. (Vares-Barbarus 
1940a)
Hence it is clear that the we o f  the addresser does not indicate 
speaking on behalf o f the whole people because the last part of the 
sentence (‘The assistance o f all the citizens”) allows conceiving people 
as something external. The we o f  the addressee and the we of the 
speaker (the speaker and the other communists on whose behalf it was 
spoken) exist separately in this speech. This separation is also 
detectable in the pre-election speech o f Hans Kruus on the July 10th 
issue o f the Rahva Hääl:9
All the votes to Estonia's Working People’s Union. No votes to the adver­
saries o f  our demands and platforms. [...]  Every human being possessing even
Johannes Vares-Barbarus was the prime minister o f the "people's government” 
(the Moscow-minded government) since June 1940. After the incorporation o f the 
Republic of Estonia to the Soviet Union in august 1940 Vares-Barbarus became the 
chairman o f the Presidium o f the Supreme Council o f  the Estonian SSR. 
q Here and hereafter all the italics are added by me — A. V.
Hans Kruus was the minister o f  education and the deputy o f  the prime 
minister of the "people's government”.
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the least o f attentiveness and knowledge has been able to witness the great 
changes that have taken place in our state and social life after the June 21st. 
(Kruus 1940a)10
The gap between the addresser and the addressee o f the speech is still 
to be overcome. The intra-textual opposition between the parties o f the 
communication disappears during the period following the “election”. 
Vares-Barbarus confirms in a speech on July the 15th after the 
triumphant “electoral” victory (92.8% o f votes to EWPU):
My esteemed fellow strugglers and comrades! Chinese walls o f different kinds 
have been tom down between us [meie]. Torn down is the wall between us 
and the Soviet peoples." Secondly that Chinese wall between the people and 
the ruler collapsed with the accompanying cheers o f the working people and 
without the Jericho horns. [ ...]  No force can hold us back from giving hand to 
each other for common struggle for freedom. There is no step backward. The 
die is cast! (Vares-Barbarus 1940b)
In the second sentence Barbarus specifies the position o f  the we- 
category through its belonging to a larger semantic whole —  the so- 
called “family o f the Soviet peoples”. From the point o f  view o f the 
interior unity the most important aspect is the disappearance o f  the 
gap between the ruler and the people in the third sentence. A unified 
subject is created in the utterance. The speaker identifies the public or 
people with itself or as Benveniste would put it: the /  subjects the non- 
I so that both now belong semantically to the same grammatical and 
semantic whole. At the same time the grandness o f  the break is 
emphasized by the figure o f the Chinese wall and the attitude towards 
the preceding period as something conclusively past and overcome is 
marked by the deictic that.
10 In Estonian there is certain ambivalence in the word “meie” in this quotation 
that has some rhetorical charge: it means both the normal meaning “омг” and 
grammatically it could also mean the more technical construction “o f  the we” 
where “we” is seen as a subject not merely a demonstrative pronoun. The 
grammatical reason for this is that the nominative and the possessive case for the 
word “meie” (we) are identical.
11 Here again the rhetorical charge derives from the grammatical peculiarities o f  
Estonian language: the phrase can semantically be read both as “between us and 
the Soviet peoples” as well as “between the we and the Soviet peoples”.
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2.2. The formation o f the subjectivity o f the we-category 
in the speeches by the politicians
The period from the coup o f June to the election in July can be seen as 
the first phase o f the formation o f the subjectivity o f the we-category. 
During that period a transition took place from the addresser-addres- 
see opposition (expressed in the separation between them) to their 
unity, i e the speakers (local communists) spoke on behalf o f both 
themselves and the spoken-to. In the first speech by Vares-Barbarus 
the subject is above all the we o f  the speaker, i e the local communists 
who had carried out the coup. In addition it implies ascribing activism 
and causality. Those who were addressed were passive receivers. They 
did not have their own face yet in the framework o f the new ideolo­
gical paradigm, in other words their identity (as a certain system of 
meanings) was “out o f jo in t”. But in the following speeches there is a 
traceable development towards eliminating the opposition between 
addresser and the addressee and the elaboration o f soviet identity 
unifying both counterparts. The speaker turns into an anonymous 
medium at the expression o f the will o f the people. In the speeches a 
category o f we (the people) was constructed that was simultaneously 
the speaker and the spoken-to and that expressed the will o f itself: “the 
real will o f the people has emerged in the elections” (Säre 1940a).12
3. The changes in the и^-category from 
the July “election” in 1940 to July 1941
On July 14-15, an “election” was held according to the directives 
from Moscow in order to “legitimate” the soviet coup in Estonia. 
After the July “election” the nascent State’s Council decided to 
change the name o f the Republic o f Estonia into Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic and to submit an application for ESSR’s accession 
to the Soviet Union. On the 6th o f  August 1940 in Moscow the 
Supreme Council o f  the Soviet Union decided to fulfill the request of 
the Estonian SSR. The annexation in accordance with the scenario of 
Moscow had been accomplished completely.
Karl Säre was the first Secretary o f  the Central Committee o f  the Estonian 
Communist Party in 1940-1941.
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In what follows I will analyze the ways in which the construction 
o f the we-category in the speeches o f the statesmen was altered in the 
new situation after the parliament elections. The afore presented 
speech by Vares-Barbarus on the July 15 (Vares-Barbarus 1940b) 
could be held as a communicational turning point in the parties’ 
formation o f the we-category. For the first time in any statesman’s 
speech we can witness the greetings addressed to the Red Army, the 
Communist Party o f the Soviet Union and their representatives —  
Stalin for most o f  the occasions.13 The canonical sequence o f 
greetings, so to speak, can for the first time be detected at the end o f 
the speech by Estonian Communist Party’s representative Karl Säre 
on the July 16 issue o f the Rahva H ääl:
Long live the friendship between Estonia and the powerful Soviet Union; 
Long live the heroic and undefeatable Red Army; Long live the tried out 
leader for the Estonian proletariat and for the entire working people: the 
Estonian Communist Party; Long live our teacher , friend and leader, the 
great Stalin! (Säre 1940a)
The purpose o f the obligatory greeting addresses is not to contact or 
enter a dialogue with the immediate audience o f the addresser, but the 
communication with the “third” party. According to Mikhail Bakhtin 
there is a third party in every dialogue who does not formally partici­
pate in the process, but in relation to whom the real communicants 
order their positions; for instance: God’s judgment, the eye o f history, 
consciousness etc. (Bakhtin 1979: 149-150). In the Soviet situation 
the third party is formed o f the Communist Party headed by Stalin. In 
the analyzed actual situations o f communication between the local 
statesmen and the public, Stalin as a third party concealed in the text 
becomes the real addressee o f the message. It is precisely the latter in 
relation to whom the addresser may not be in error when building up 
the discourse. The speeches passed a strict Moscow-minded censor­
ship through which even the least o f deviations from the speech canon 
approved by Moscow were eliminated. I f  we consider the tradition o f 
Estonian political rhetoric that had preceded the Soviet Occupation it 
can be said that the speeches suffered a pragmatic deficiency for the 
local audience. O f no small importance in this connection is the fact
13 In the first issue o f the Rahva Hääl (June 22, 1940) there was a coverage o f  
the people’s reaction that found its expression in a “powerful hurricane o f  
greetings to the Red Army, to comrades Stalin, Molotov, Vorošilov, Timošenko!”
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that there was no activeness on the proper-name level among the local 
party board.
Functionally the greetings had a role o f constituting the hierarchi­
cal, centralized structure characteristic to the soviet ideology. In view 
o f this feature the whole spiritual culture is describable as a pyramid14 
on whose top lye the politico-ideological values. As Lenin have said: 
“We have now become an organized party, and that means creating 
the power, turning the authority o f ideas into the authority o f power, 
the subjugation o f the lower instances o f the party to the higher ones” 
(Lenin 1946: 339). And this alters significantly the deictic use o f the 
we-category. The changes that had taken place in the speeches of the 
politicians did not involve exclusively the formal greetings directed to 
the “third party” . In a speech by Vares-Barbarus on the 1st o f August 
the unity o f the we-category is first emphasized:
We shattered the old retrograde regime. We declared the land the property of 
the people, we declared the industry nationalized to end the exploitation o f the 
human being by a human being. From now on the workers, the peasants and 
the working intelligentsia are the plenipotentiary masters o f the land. (Vares- 
Barbarus 1940c)
The increasingly battleful emphasizing o f the coup sets the former 
power (that has been overcome at the wow-point) as one that is old 
and retrograde behind the back o f the we-subject on the linear time 
axis, at the same time indicating the inhumanity o f old regime (the 
end o f the exploitation o f the human being). The structural form 
characteristic to the Soviet ideology is filled with the purely ideo­
logical content —  the power o f the proletariat, the nationalization, the 
end o f exploitation. And in the last sentence the result o f the activen­
ess o f the we is presented. But it is important to notice that in here this 
activeness determines the whole causal chain o f the events. The now- 
deictic signifying the substitution o f power is like a zero-point 
marking the beginning o f time, from which the position o f the subject
Ihis centralized hierarchy did not show itself not only in the authority o f the 
central party over the local ones but was also expressed in the entire socioclutural 
environment. Thus Kaginski identifies as the main characteristic o f  the soviet 
space the strict structurality and the dependence o f  that structure on the vertical, 
hierarchical and power-related dominants (Kaginski 2001: 157). A sharp hierarcy 
among nations showed itself in the speeches o f  the politicans after the famous 
toast in honor o f  the Russian people by Stalin after the Second World War.
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is defined. In fact it means the positioning o f the we to an entirely new 
notion o f time and history. Having their starting point in the German 
romanticism and Herderian conception o f culture in which the idea o f 
history had become the idea o f the nation and its historically unique 
self-fulfillment or an idea o f national culture is what distinguishes the 
Estonian notion o f  history from that o f the Marxist one. In the Marxist 
social theory the culture is reduced to the superstructure o f the 
economic formation and is dependent on the latter. The development 
of the economic formation and hence the development o f history 
depends on the dialectic o f the development o f the mode o f production 
constituting the social organization. Such determinism however refers 
to a world history or general history which cancels out the indepen­
dence o f someone's own history, so to speak. The modification is 
clearly present in the speech by the first secretary o f the Central 
Committee o f the Estonian Communist Party K. Säre who explicitly 
refers to the Stalinist constitution as a great sign-post in the world 
history:15 “the III five-year plan in which the world-historical mission 
will be accomplished: the transition from socialism to communism” 
(Säre 1940b). But in the subsequent speech by Vares-Barbarus the 
integral and active w -category moves into a new position:
We have an enormous work ahead o f us that has already been done by you.
[...] Under the sun o f the Stalinist constitution we bring the countiy to
prosperity16. 1 ...]Our sun rises from the east now, the west remains behind our
back as a cardinal point from which nothing rises. (Vares-Barbarus 1940c)
In the first sentence the we-category is opposed by a new case o f 
second person plural —  you. And at the same time changes the posi­
tion of the we-category in relation to the political reality pictured in 
the text. A hierarchy forms among the agents presented in the 
utterance —  a hierarchy in which the speaking we (a unitary „people“ 
created by the Estonian politicians) is underneath the speech and the 
enormousness o f our “undone work“ and the indication to the defi­
ciency o f the speaking subject (the Estonian nation) increases the
15 In a special study on this issue the author has never observed any attempt in 
the speeches by politicians o f  the Estonian Republic to connect the Estonians to 
the world history and messianic world-cognition.
16 The tying o f the Stalinist constitution with the symbol o f  the sun as a life 
enabling source found its expression also in the coat o f arms o f the Soviet Estonia 
(Rahva Hääl, October 10, 1940).
power position o f the you-category even more. The spatial and verb- 
deictics (behind, rise) define the we-category's socio-cultural 
belonging to the locus o f the East (the Soviet Russia). The we- 
category that had previously signified the unity between the addresser 
and the addressee and had become an active subject (Vares-Barbarus 
1940b) looses in this speech its sovereignty and also its subjectity. The 
possibility o f the we is based on and justified by an other —  in the 
given speech by the sun o f the Stalinist constitution. I shall add some 
other examples o f the transformation o f the we-category in the 
speeches from the active subject to object. Hans Kruus says in his 
speech on the 9th o f August 1940: “The Stalinist constitution gives an 
irrefutable basis and firm framework” (Kruus 1940b). By the Stalinist 
constitution it is meant here a principle enabling the “right” being and 
at the same time the constituting condition for reality. That is cor­
roborated by the successive utterance o f Kruus: “The Stalin’s constitu­
tion shall be a document that testifies that what is accomplished in the 
USSR can also be accomplished completely in other countries.” And 
finally: “We have no doubt that the new order will bring principled 
and actual growth o f and unprecedented human dignity” .17 Basically 
the same point is made by Säre in his speech on the anniversary of the 
Great Socialist October Revolution on the 5th o f November 1940:
Through self-denying struggle the Russian proletariat has gained the place of 
the people’s leader. [...] The proletariat is led by the brave and farseeing 
bolshevist party [...] as has been said by comrade Stalin [...] and all this is 
corroborated by clear facts. (Säre 1940b)
Although the conclusiveness o f the coup o f June is apparent in the 
earlier speeches by Vares-Barbarus and other party figures, the 
previously described period o f the formation o f the we-category is
concentrated on the abolishment and “destruction” o f the old regime.
18Thus the activity is meant rather as a negative activeness.
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17 I add here a quotation from a brochure characterizing the Soviet Estonia 
(Sovetskaja Estonija): “The heroic warriors o f  the Red Army were not just seen as 
the representatives o f  the big and friendly Soviet Union by the Estonian people 
but also as the bearers o f  a higher socialist culture, representatives o f the new 
order” (Jefimov 1940: 43).
Jaan Undusk has observed similar tendencies in the history writing discourse 
of the Soviet Estonia, characterizing the ways Estonians were pictured as a “only
1 he cognition enabling the new reality arrives at the speeches only 
after the “joining” the Soviet Union and is connected to the party’s 
subordinating role towards the possibilities o f cognition. The activity 
of the we is reduced now to the receiving and mediating o f  the 
objectifying activity o f  the new subject o f the speech —  the party or 
rather Stalin. The transition from the activeness to passivity, from the 
unconditioned to the conditioned takes place. Thus the we that had 
previously attained its unity in the utterance looses its independence, 
turning into an object for the party, and especially for Stalin to whom 
exclusively the position to be a subject was reserved in the public 
Soviet political discourse at that time. Stalin was the one who gave 
meaning to the we or “the soviet people” in the speeches. Behind this 
there was o f course a simple Realpolitik: from the “soviet people” 
were excluded those who disagreed with the politics o f  Stalin. The 
Stalinist slogan “Cadres will decide everything” and the ac­
companying “self-criticism o f the party” are actually one o f the 
ideological concealments o f this “game o f exclusion”. Thus it can be 
said that the “soviet people” created by Stalin was identical to the 
“we” that was created by his “I” . In consequence it can be said that the 
soviet ideology resembles to the cultural type (if we understand in this 
context ideology as synonymous to culture) that was characterized by 
Lotman as an aggregation o f texts that opposes to cultural type that 
creates the aggregation o f texts (Lotman, Uspenski 1994: 245). In this 
cultural type the content o f the culture is pre-given from the 
standpoint o f the self-understanding o f this culture; it consists o f 
prescriptive sum o f the “right” texts: in the Soviet ideology they were 
formed of the works o f the Marxist-Leninist classics and in the 
Stalinist era mostly the works o f Stalin himself.19 In such a cultural 
type the subject o f the speech as a creator o f the reality (content) in the 
utterance has only relative value. Everything new is actually predic­
table and known to the knowers —  the real subjects (Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, Stalin). Paraphrasing Benveniste it could be said that the /
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then” and “already at that time” syndromes that characterized Estonians as hope­
lessly behindhand and supressed compared to Russians (Undusk 2003: 53-54).
19 In fact the chrestomatic canonization o f Marx’s and Lenin’s works depended 
on Stalin’s concrete needs and it was not uniform and invariable (Vaiskopf 2002).
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subjected the non-1 completely or the /  created the we completely
according to its arbitrary will.20.
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ametisse astumise puhul.
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Vares-Barbarus, Johannes 1940c = Rahva Hääl 1.08.1940. Kõne töötavale 
rahvale.
Конструирование категории «мы»: советская политическая 
риторика в Эстонии с июня 1940 до июля 1941
Одним из поворотных пунктов в новой истории Эстонии были 1940— 
1941 гг. В статье автор ищет ответ на вопрос: каким образом было 
сконструировано в публичных СМИ понятие «мы» —  одна из основ­
ных категорий культурно-политического идентитета. В качестве 
источников используются речи политической элиты (Варес-Барбарус, 
Лауристин, Круус и мн. др.), опубликованных в основных газетах того 
времени. Начальное время советской власти в Эстонии можно 
разделить на два периода: первый условно датируется с 21 июня до 
«июльских выборов» в 1940 году, когда в политической риторике 
стремились к созданию единого монолитного субъекта и единство 
народа и власти описывали в категориях активности, творчества и 
свободы. Но начиная с «приема» Эстонской Советской Республики в 
Советский Союз 6 августа 1940 года в самоописании «мы» произошел 
существенный сдвиг. Местный «народ» был отодвинут на роль 
пассивного получателя, его подчинили марксистско-ленинской идео­
логии, диктату и воле Сталина и его партии. Для этого были использо­
ваны разные риторические средства —  дейктики, пассивные формы 
глагола и т.п.
“M eie” kategooria konstrueerimine: nõukogude poliitiline retoorika 
Eestis juunist 1940 kuni juulini 1941
Aastad 1940-1941 märgivad üht pöördelisemat perioodi Eesti lähiajaloos. 
Artiklis otsib autor vastust küsimusele: kuidas kultuurilis-poliitilise 
identiteedi üks põhikategooriaid “meie” konstrueeriti avalikus meedias. 
Uuritakse, milliseid semiootilisi vahendeid kasutati niisuguse poliitilise 
ühtsuse konstrueerimisel tekstides. Käesolevas artiklis lähenetakse püsti­
tatud ülesandele Lotmani kultuurisemiootikast lähtuvalt ja  asesõnade 
analüüsi kaudu. Analüüsi allikmaterjalidena kasutatakse poliitilise eliidi 
(Vares-Barbarus, Lauristin, Kruus jpt.) kõnesid, mis avaldati peamistes 
tolleaegsetes meediaväljaannetes. Nõukogude võimu algusaega Eestis
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võib jagada kaheks perioodiks. Esimest perioodi võiks tinglikult dateerida 
21. juunist kuni “juulivalimisteni” 1940. aastal, kus poliitilises retoorikas 
üritati luua ühtne monoliitne subjekt ning ühtsust võimu ja  rahva vahel 
kirjeldati kõnedes aktiivsuse, loovuse ja  vabaduse kategooriates. Kuid 
alates Eesti Nõukogude Vabariigi “vastuvõtmisest” Nõukogude Liitu 6. 
augustil 1940. aastal toimus “meie” enesekirjelduses oluline nihe. Koha­
lik “rahvas” oli kõnedes taandatud passiivse vastuvõtja rolli, kus ta allu­
tati marksistlik-leninlik ideoloogiale, Stalini ja  tema Partei diktaadile ja 
tahtele. Selleks kasutati erinevaid retoorilisi (deiktikud, tegusõnade pas­
siivsed vormid jne) ja semiootilisi vahendeid.
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Abstract. The aim o f the article is to elaborate ecosemiotics towards practical 
methodology of analysis. For that, the article first discusses the relation 
between meaning and context seen as a possibility for an ecological view  
immanent in semiotics. Then various perspectives in ecosemiotics are 
analyzed by describing biological and cultural ecosemiotics and critically 
reading the ecosemiotic works of W. Nöth and K. Kull. Emphasizes is laid on 
the need to integrate these approaches so that the resulting synthesis would 
both take into account the semioticity o f nature itself as well as allow 
analyzing the depiction o f nature in the written texts. To this end, a model o f  
nature-text is introduced. This relates two parties intertwined by meaning- 
relations —  the written text and the natural environment. In support o f  the 
concept o f nature-text, the article discusses the Tartu-Moscow semioticians’ 
concepts of text, which are regarded as broad enough to accommodate the 
semiotic activity and environment creation o f other animals besides humans. 
In the final section the concept o f nature-text is used to describe nature writing 
as an appreciation o f an alien semiotic sphere and to elucidate the nature 
writing’s marginality, explaining it with the need to interpret two different 
types of texts.
For understanding the paradigm o f ecosemiotics and its methodolo­
gical possibilities it would be useful to start with a wider perspective 
and to consider possible relations and similarities between semiotics 
and ecology. The development o f ecology as a discipline and the 
proliferation o f semiotics in the mid-twentieth century can both be 
seen as expressions o f the same wave o f systemic thinking in
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twentieth century' science. Also cybernetics, general systems theory, 
and a large part* o f structuralism belong to the academic movement 
that draws attention to the structure and behavior o f systems, and 
distinctions, influences, interrelations, and equilibriums in these. 
Ecology as a scientific discipline has remained faithful to the research 
objects and methodologies o f natural sciences but has later itself had 
various ramifications for humanities, for instance for environmental 
psychology, ecocriticism, green studies, cultural ecology and environ­
mental aesthetics, which have also shaped the intellectual atmosphere 
for semiotic studies.
Besides this general relatedness in development, some inner 
similarities between semiotics and ecology can also be found. 
Although semiotics has mostly focused on human sign activities and 
ecology has typically studied the life o f other biological organisms, 
both are largely disciplines o f relation, accustomed to consider their 
objects as relational or in relations with other objects and phenomena. 
They both consider such relatedness to be fundamentally important. In 
ecology the focus is on relations between organisms and their 
environment or on relations between different biological species. In 
semiotics the classical concept o f sign itself expresses a certain type of 
relation: a sign “is something which stands to somebody for some­
thing in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). There is also intuitive 
resemblance between Peirce's idea o f unlimited semiosis as series of 
successive interpretations (CP 2.228; 1.339), and recurrent processes 
in nature: change o f generations, food chains and substance cycling as 
understood in ecology. A beautiful connection from ecological 
relations in nature to semiosic processes in language is established by 
W. John Coletta using Peircean notions o f metaindex and metaicon 
(Coletta 1993). Similarly Peter Grzybek develops a semiotic view on 
human epistemogenesis where homologous spheres o f human self 
(microcosm) and nature (macrocosm) become mediated and reflected 
by the sphere where culture and nature mingle (mesocosm) (Gryzbek 
1994). Connections between semiotic and ecological processes can be 
elaborated quite far. as it is done for instance by Roland Posner, who 
introduces the concept o f  semiotic pollution, as noise or disturbance 
that interferes *4vith sign-processes as much as material pollution 
interferes with the fundamental processes o f  life” (Posner 2000: 290). 
Posner considers the factors o f  communicative processes (sender,
recipient, context, channel, etc.) to be “semiotic resources” (Posner 
2000: 294-296).
The question about ecosemiotics as a possible semiotic paradigm 
was raised by Winfried Nöth and his colleagues in the journal 
Zeitschrift für Semiotik a little more than a decade ago. Although this 
initiative was followed by some discussion, there is no reason to talk 
about ecosemiotics as a full discipline with wide research activities 
and an institutional establishment.1 Compared to the discipline o f 
biosemiotics, which also gained ground in the 1990s, but which has 
led to the establishment o f an international society, regular publication 
of a thematic journal, and to regular conferences, ecosemiotics 
remains quite clearly in the background. The present article is written 
with the understanding that the ecosemiotic paradigm has a lot o f 
unused potential. In the following pages I examine the different paths 
to ecosemiotics and try thereafter to formulate some methodological 
grounds and tools for studying texts that represent nature. Although 
the primary focus is on nature writing (understood as including essays 
and other non-fictional texts written about the natural environment 
(Maran, Tüür 2001; Tüür, Maran 2005), the proposed approach should 
also be usable for the analysis o f other cultural texts, where nature is 
an important topic.
Contextualism as a common ground 
for semiotics and ecology
An interesting semiotic concept regarding relations to ecology is 
context, which can be understood as “the circumstances that form the 
setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms o f which it can be 
fully understood and asserted” (Pearsall 1998: 396). In ecology, a 
quite similar role has been given to the concept o f environment as “the 
surroundings or conditions in which a person, animal, or plant lives 
and operates” (Pearsall 1998: 617), and which also have influence 
upon it (Lawrence 1989: 163). The concept o f context has many forms 
and uses in semiotics. For instance in the semiotics o f communication 
the contextual thinking may appear as an idea that the meaning o f the
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thematic issues o f journals Zeitschrift für Semiotik 15(1/2), 1993, Zeitschrift für 
Semiotik 18( 1), 1996, and Sign Systems Studies 29(1), 2001.
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message transmitted in communication is directed outside o f the 
communicative situation and toward the context. Marks o f such an 
approach can be found already from Karl Bühler’s organon model of 
language communication, which distinguishes expressive function 
directed to the sender, appealing function directed to the receiver, and 
representative function that is directed to circumstances, objects or to 
the surrounding world (Bühler 1934: 34-37). Also the classical com­
munication model o f Roman Jakobson asserts the relation between 
meaning and context by claiming that the referential function of 
communication is directed to the context (Jakobson 1981: 2 1).2
The question o f context and its influence on semiotic processes has 
in different forms been essential to many distinguished scholars who 
have been active in the border areas o f semiotics. One o f the best- 
known contextualists, British language philosopher I. A. Richards 
stresses the relevance o f context in the determination o f linguistic 
meaning. He writes:
The effect o f  a word varies with the other words among which it is placed. 
What would be highly ambiguous by itself becomes definite in a suitable 
context. So it is throughout; the effect o f any element depends upon the other 
elements present with it. (Richards 1938: 178-179)3
From another angle Eugene Nida has emphasized the importance of 
context in translation processes. According to his views, meanings of 
the words and texts can only be communicated in relation to specific 
culture, and in this process, context has the essential role. To describe 
the effect o f context on the text, Nida distinguishes different types of 
contexts such as syntagmatic and paradigmatic context, context
According to Jakobson, context must be either verbal or capable o f being 
verbalized i.e. accessible to the receiver. Although Jakobson's referential function 
should rather be understood through the indexicality, in the sense that 
communication itself distinguishes its context by referring to it  the openness of 
the communicative situation toward the surrounding world is still relevant 
regarding the possible ecological potential o f  semiotics.
A similar position is represented by a semiotician o f the younger generation -  
Yair Neuman, who. based on the works o f  Valentin Voloshinov, describes com­
munication as a recursive and hierarchical system that cannot be efficiently 
understood just by the descriptions o f  the syntactic forms o f  representation: “as far 
as natural language is concerned, the context o f  the whole utterance determines 
the meaning o f the components and vice versa in hermeneutic circularity” 
(Neuman 2003: 52).
involving cultural values, context o f a source text, etc. (Nida 2001: 
2 9 -4 1).4
Contextual thinking has also served as a basis for the works o f 
interdisciplinary scholar Gregory Bateson: “all communication neces­
sitates context, [...] without context, there is no meaning” (Bateson 
1980: 18). Contextual information may introduce redundancy to the 
communicational system, but there may well also exist several 
contexts, contexts inside contexts for the given message. Bateson’s 
understanding is also a relevant point for his Double Bind theory, 
which describes the condition where contexts o f  different levels are in 
contradiction for some recurrent communication thus bringing along a 
schizophrenic situation, where the participant does not have the pos­
sibility to give the correct response nor any way out o f  the situation 
(Bateson 2000: 206-207, 245). In relation to biological evolution 
Bateson has also written about the environment as context, which 
evolves as a response to animal activities (Bateson 2000: 155). 
Bateson has been rather critical toward the Darwinian understanding 
of a single individual or lineage as a unit o f survival and has argued 
that the evolutionary unit should be a flexible organism-in-its- 
environment (which is comparable with the connectedness o f the mind 
with the larger system of pathways and messages outside the body, 
Bateson 2000: 456^457).
The concepts o f context and contextualism seem to serve as 
possible ground for relating semiotics with ecology. When Thomas A. 
Sebeok starts to establish his zoosemiotic research platform in the 
1960s, he uses transmissional communication models (Shannon- 
Weaver, Bühler, Jakobson —  see Sebeok 1972b: 13; 1972b: 65) as 
one of his starting-points. Probably following these, Sebeok links the 
semantic dimension o f communication with context, understanding 
the latter as information related to functional status, ecological 
relations and external environmental conditions of animals (Sebeok
In relation to the natural environment Eugene Nida gives an example with 
many ecosemiotic associations —  the word run, whose possible meanings depend 
on our knowledge o f different animal species. For instance sentences “the boy is 
running” and “the horse was running” are different since the legs o f quadrupeds 
move differently from those o f the human. In the sentence “the salmon is 
running”, the situation is much different because the physical context o f moving is 
water and instead o f legs there are fins and flippers. But in the wider context the 
last expression signifies the vast numbers o f salmon swimming upstream to their 
spawning sites (Nida 2001: 31-32).
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1972b: 15; Sebeok 1972b: 80). According to Sebeok, contextual infor­
mation has critical importance in semiotic studies o f animal 
communication.5 The meaning o f the perceived message in animal 
communication can be completely different, depending on whether the 
communication takes place in the territory o f the sender or receiver, 
whether it takes place in open or closed and safe environment, 
whether participants are approaching each other, withdrawing or 
holding a constant distance (Sebeok 1990: 112). At the same time 
Sebeok emphasizes that there are few studies about the use of 
contextual information in animals.6 One reason for this is the 
inaccessibility o f the code and the meanings o f messages of other 
living beings for the researcher o f animal communication (Sebeok 
1972c: 132). In the zoosemiotic works o f Thomas A. Sebeok the 
linkage between meaning and contextual information becomes directly 
related with the environment in nature and the semiotic research of 
nature.
Different perspectives in ecosemiotics
Semiotics and ecology have come into contact with each other at 
several points and the origins for designing the paradigm of 
ecosemiotics differ accordingly. In the introduction to the thematic 
issue o f the journal Sign Systems Studies, Winfried Nöth and Kalevi 
Kull distinguish two principally different approaches to ecosemiotics. 
The cultural theoretic approach proceeds from semiology and 
structuralism, primarily from the legacy o f Ferdinand de Saussure and 
emerges in the writings o f Claude Levi-Strauss, Juri Lotman, Umberto 
Eco, and Algirdas Julien Greimas. It investigates to what extent nature 
is interpreted from a cultural perspective and to what extent various 
cultures interpret the same natural phenomena differently. The second
Even more emphasis is given to the concept o f  context by theoretical biologist 
W. John Smith. He contrasts it with the notion o f  signal, and includes in context 
almost everything in communication, which remains outside o f the message. 
Smith divides context into direct and historical context, where the first includes 
state o f  the receiver and the other messages perceived during the same 
communication. Historical context includes previous experiences o f  the receiver 
and its species-specific properties (Smith 1965).
A comparative overview o f  the use o f  context in human and animal communi­
cation has been given by Pietro Perconti (2002).
approach proceeds from the tradition o f general semiotics o f Charles 
S. Peirce and Charles Morris, is present in the works o f Thomas A. 
Sebeok, and treats semiosic processes in nature as phenomena in their 
own right (Kull, Nöth 2001: 9). The outcomes o f the latter approach 
are the paradigms o f zoosemiotics and biosemiotics and the process in 
semiotics that Winfried Nöth describes as the lowering o f the semiotic 
threshold (see Nöth 2000). These approaches can also be seen as 
possible answers to the epistemological question: can culture’s 
methods be used to study relations with something that lies outside the 
borders o f culture? Winfried Nöth has described these two alternative 
routes to ecosemiotics concisely as cultural ecosemiotics and 
biological ecosemiotics (Nöth 2001: 72-74).
In addition to these two approaches one more intellectual develop­
ment should be distinguished that has considerably influenced the 
shaping of ecosemiotic ideas. Namely, the activities o f researchers 
with a background in natural sciences, who include a semiotic per­
spective in ecological studies o f organism-environment relations. This 
approach is applied for instance by an influential German theoretical 
biologist Günter Tembrock, who has conceptualized relations between 
an organism and its environment at different levels. Tembrock 
elaborates his theory o f biocommunication (Tembrock 1971) towards 
semiotics and distinguishes semiotic types of relations between orga­
nism and environment as spatial semiosis, temporal semiosis, semiosis 
of metabolism, defensive semiosis, exploratory semiosis and semiosis 
of partners. Tembrock sees these distinctions also as basic types o f 
semiotic relations between humans and their environment (Tembrock 
1997). Another predecessor of ecosemiotic thinking is systems 
ecology where information processes are considered to be crucial 
constituents of ecosystems regulation (Patten, Odum 1981; for 
semiotic interpretation see Nielsen 2007). From contemporary authors 
who have brought semiotic methods into ecology, Almo Farina and 
his colleagues should be mentioned. Farina’s concept o f eco-field 
introduces Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt-theory into landscape eco­
logy. Eco-field should be understood as:
the physical (ecological) space and the associated abiotic and biotic characters 
that are perceived by a species when a functional trait is active. [...] The eco- 
field can be considered the interference space in which the mechanisms for 
collecting, concentrating, stocking, preserving and manipulating energy are 
active. (Farina, Belgrano 2004: 108)
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Many other authors have used a semiotic approach in ecological 
research as well (see Manning et al. 2004; Claval 2005; Vladimirova,
Mozgovoy 2003).
Also Winfried N öth’s own approach, when he outlines in 1996 the 
possible paradigm of ecosemiotics, seems to originate rather from the 
themes that ecology has dealt with under the name o f autecology for 
many decades. For Nöth, ecosemiotics is first o f  all semiotics of 
habitat, the aim of which “is the study o f the semiotic interrelations 
between organisms and their environment” (Nöth 1998: 333). The 
important research questions for Winfried Nöth concern the relation­
ship between organism and the environment:
Is it always o f  a semiotic nature, or is there at least always a semiotic aspect in 
this relationship, or do we have to distinguish between semiotic and non- 
semiotic environmental relationships? (Nöth 1998: 333)
In a later article, Winfried Nöth specifies the position o f ecosemiotics 
in relation to biosemiotics and zoosemiotics by writing that, in 
contrast to these, ecosemiotics should focus on the process of 
signification (as a sign process without the participation o f the sender, 
in contrast to communication), i.e., semiotic relations between an 
organism and its nonliving environment (Nöth 2001: 72). Thus Nöth’s 
ecosemiotic views lead towards the autecology that has been described 
as “the biological relations between a single species and its environ­
ment; the ecology o f a single organism” (Lawrence 1989: 45).7
Another author who has written in more depth about ecosemio­
tic s—  Kalevi Kull —  seems, according to N öth’s distinction, to 
belong rather to the tradition o f cultural ecosemiotics. Kull’s inspira­
tional article “Semiotic ecology: different natures in the semiosphere" 
published in 1998 can be regarded as expressing a cultural semiotic 
view because o f the following statements.
(1) Differently from the comprehension o f Winfried Nöth, eco­
semiotics does not deal with all living organisms in their relation to 
the nonliving environment, but solely with humans, their culture and 
relation with the natural environment (Kull 1998: 348).
Ecology has been classically divided into branches o f  autecology (corresponds 
to the level o f organisms) and synecology (corresponds to the level o f  commu­
nities o f species). Sometimes also the concept o f  demecology (corresponds to the 
level o f population or species) has been used.
(2) Kull defines ecosemiotics explicitly “as a part o f  the semiotics of 
culture, which investigates human relationships to nature which have a 
semiosic (sign-mediated) basis” (Kull 1998: 351).
(3) Man cannot perceive nature without it having first been mediated 
or filtered by language. Nature in itself (0 nature) and nature that is 
categorized by language (1 nature) form clearly distinguished types 
(Kull 1998:355, 356).
(4) Culture that comes into contact with nature cannot avoid changing 
nature by describing it and acting upon it (Kull 1998: 347, 359). This 
change is in principle uni-directional; the development o f human 
umwelt leads unavoidably to the diminishing and degradation o f 0 and 
1 type natures at the expense o f humanized nature (Kull 1998: 347, 
356).8
Kalevi Kull’s distinction o f four types o f nature, which has been 
derived from Jakob von Uexküll’s model o f the functional cycle, has a 
potential to become a grounding principle for ecosemiotic theory. In 
practical research such typology can be used as a methodological tool 
for analyzing different forms o f mediating nature in culture, or 
different degrees o f nature’s culturization, which for instance in land­
scapes lead to the development o f natural, semi-natural and cultural 
plant communities (see Kull 1998: 359). At least in one study, Kull’s 
typology has been used in practice as the research method for 
analyzing Estonian folk medicine and the different ways in which
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4 Similarly to Kalevi Kull also A lf Homborg emphasizes the ability o f  the 
human sign system to influence and change ecological processes. In his overview  
of the environmental relations o f Amazonian native people he distinguishes three 
subsequent types o f sign systems regarding the transformation o f nature as 
sensory, linguistic and economic (Homborg 2001).
Kalevi Kull explains the distinction o f four types o f nature as follows: “Zero 
nature, at least when living, is changing via ontological semiosis, or via 
physiosemiosis if applying J. Deely’s term. The first nature is nature as filtered via 
human semiosis, through the interpretations in our social and personal knowledge. 
This is categorised nature. The second nature is changing as a result o f ‘material 
processes’ again, this is a ‘material translation’ in the form o f true semiotic 
translation, since it interconnects the zero and the first (or third), controlling the 
zero nature on the basis o f the imaginary nature. The third nature is entirely 
theoretical or artistic, non-natural nature-like nature, built on the basis o f the first 
(or third itself) with the help o f the second” (Kull 1998: 355). In later 
conversations Kalevi Kull has stressed that the distinction between four natures 
should rather be understood processually as different strategies by which nature is 
generated.
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herbs are used in it (Sõukand 2005). At the same time it seems that 
Kull’s approach is more corresponding to passive nature (although he 
uses also several examples involving animals) and is applicable 
foremost for analyzing relations between humans and inanimate 
nature, plants or landscapes. This becomes more apparent when we 
compare K ull's typology with some typology o f bilateral relationships 
such as the one developed by Thomas A. Sebeok to describe possible 
relations between humans and animals. Thomas A. Sebeok distingu­
ishes situations where human is destructor o f the animal, human is the 
victim of the animal, human is the parasite o f animal or vice-versa, 
animal accepts human as its species-mate and so on (Sebeok 1986: 
107). Compared to Sebeok’s typology, Kull’s approach seems to focus 
more on the human counterpart and to describe one direction of 
transmission o f messages in communication.
According to Kull the goal o f ecosemiotics is the
research on the semiotic aspects o f the place and role o f  nature for humans, 
i.e. what is and what has been the meaning o f nature for us, humans, how and 
in what extent we communicate with nature” (Kull 1998: 350) [my 
emphasis —  Т. M.]
The other participant o f this relation, nature, does not have any active 
role in this process. For instance, describing nature and dealing with it 
makes nature, according to Kull, become more human-like, but 
involvement with nature cannot make culture become more nature­
like. Likewise, nature that has once been described and changed has 
few possibilities to revert back to its original state (as such possibi­
lities, Kull mentions the ability to forget, and cultures that do not rely 
on long-term memory techniques (Kull 1998: 364-365), but even this 
possibility arises from the peculiarity o f culture rather than from the 
active involvement o f nature). In short it seems that applying 
Uexküll’s concept o f functional cycle to culture-nature relations may 
lead to the attributing o f the status o f “subject” to human culture and 
the status o f "object" to nature, where for the latter there does not 
remain any voice or right for expression outside mediations by the 
human sign system.
Both biological and cultural ecosemiotics have their theoretical 
strengths and weaknesses and research topics in which their use is 
appropriate. For the formation o f a viable ecosemiotic tradition we 
would need, however, the synthesis o f the two. Both approaches in
themselves are limited in their ability to describe culture-nature 
relations. Biological ecosemiotics leans toward the tradition o f natural 
sciences or, in the better case, towards biosemiotics and becomes 
mostly interested in theoretical descriptions o f sign relations between 
living organisms and their environment. Cultural ecosemiotics is on 
the contrary grounded in cultural semiotics, and is therefore bounded 
by language centrism or by culture centrism and is not capable o f 
shifting the researcher’s point o f  view beyond the limits o f human 
language and cultural system.
The need to overcome this dichotomy between the cultural and 
biological approach in ecosemiotics has been vigorously expressed by 
Riste Keskpaik:
In the tradition o f cultural ecosemiotics ‘nature enters the semiotic scene only 
as a referent (or content substance) o f  language [ . . . ] ’ (Nöth 2001, 73). 
Biological ecosemiotics relies on the assumption that semiosis occurs in 
nature irrespective o f the knowledge o f it. In my opinion the ecosemiotic view  
only emerges at the crossing o f the two perspectives; irreducible to either o f  
them it transcends the linear, dichotomous logic. (Keskpaik 2004: 53)
Only then can ecosemiotics aspire to fulfill its most significant task: 
“to help to diminish communication problems between human and 
nature, because from that viewpoint it becomes possible to speak 
about nature, as it seems to us in culture, and to speak with nature, 
because its ability of speech has been restored” (Keskpaik 2003: 50).10 
The role of ecosemiotics understood in such a way would be to 
connect, mediate and translate different sign systems and structural 
levels of semiotic systems in culture-nature relations, to recognize and 
explicate possibilities for categorization, textuality and meanings in 
animate nature, and to bring forth natural, anim al and nonverbal 
aspects of human culture and its texts. For the practical research 
methodology such an approach would bring along the need to take 
into consideration changing viewpoints between culture and non­
culture and different levels o f semiotic description, to combine 
research methods o f texts with those o f natural science; but also to 
introduce a phenomenological perspective that allows the researcher 
to combine his/her participation as an intelligent being in the world o f
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10 “Aidata vähendada kommunikatsiooniprobleeme inimese ja looduse vahel, 
sest sellelt vaatekohalt osutub võimalikuks kõnelda nii loodusest, kuidas ta meile 
kultuuris paistab, kui ka loodusega, kuna talle antakse tagasi tema kõnevõime”.
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text and culture with his/her participation as a living being in the 
world o f nature and its immediate perceptions and meanings.
Nature-text as a methodological concept for ecosemiotics
On the level o f practical analysis the necessity to integrate two 
branches o f ecosemiotics should result in the formation of research 
methodology that allows both the representations o f  nature in culture 
and nature in its own semiosic activity to be covered. The perfect 
model object for such a twofold framework o f analysis is nature 
writing. A nature essay includes the author’s imaginations, social, 
ideological and cultural meaning relations and tensions, but it also 
embraces organisms, natural communities and landscapes with their 
special properties and abilities to grow, communicate, learn and 
multiply. The understanding o f nature writing does not depend solely 
on interpretation o f the written text, but also on structures of outer 
nature, which have their own memory, dynamics and history, and if 
those outer structures change, then the field o f possible interpretations 
for the written text will also change. The object o f ecosemiotic 
research should therefore also be considered to be twofold: in addition 
to the written text that speaks about nature and points to nature, it 
should also include the depicted part o f the natural environment itself, 
which must be, for the relation to be functional, to at least some extent 
textual or at least textualizable.11 I will call the unit that is formed 
through meaning relations from those two counterparts nature-text 
(Figure 1).
The relations between the written text and natural environment 
operate similarly to the relation between two interconnected texts or a 
text and its context, where the interaction significantly shapes the 
possible interpretations o f the text. The relation here is complementary 
in the sense that the text does not need to convey all meanings, as they 
are present in the environment and familiar to the reader. Pointing to 
them is often enough. Correspondences between the written text and 
textual nature can also be structural (e.g. a sequence o f a text
C ompared to the written text, the structure o f the natural environment and its 
perception is multimodal. 1 herefore natural environment and written text do not 
relate as two equal counterparts, but the relation corresponds rather to a one-to- 
many relationship.
following a nature trail), but there is hardly one-to-one correspon­
dence between the two entities. Rather, the written text is contrasted 
with a space o f possible structures and meanings that could exist in the 
depicted natural environment. In nature there is simultaneously taking 
place a multitude o f parallel events or stories that do not form a linear 
sequence, but occur in various media and sign systems.
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Figure 1. Nature writing conceptualized as nature-text: components and inter­
relations.12
In order to appear and become related with nature writing, the 
meanings of nature need mediation by human semiotic processes. 
Therefore the author o f the written text and the reader should also be 
included in the model o f analysis, which in that case becomes 
quadripartite: (1) textual natural environment; (2) written text; (3) 
author of the text; (4) reader. Every participant is characterized by its 
own semiosic activity, and relations between participants are not fixed 
but form a specific pattern in each and every case. The reading 
experience o f a nature essay may become the cause for the reader to 
visit the depicted natural environment, but it may also well be the 
other way round —  the reader is first familiar with the natural 
environment and then becomes interested in nature writing. The 
reading experience o f a nature essay can differ according to the 
reader’s familiarity with the depicted region: whether the reader lives
Following Mikhail B. Yampolsky’s terminology (see below) nature-text can 
be understood as a set o f  physically justified meaning connections between text 
written in a conventional language and the natural environment.
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in the region or does not have any personal experience with the place. 
Also, if nature writing is usually associated with the inspiration 
acquired from the natural environment and with the attempt to share 
appreciation toward nature, then this is not so in all cases. In the 
tradition o f Estonian nature writing an incident is known where the 
environment became endangered because o f a written text. A story 
was written about a mineral island in Muraka raised bog, praising its 
quietude and beauty, and the story became so popular and provoked 
such intense interest in the readers that their increased visits 
eventually damaged the place (see Kask 1995: 50-53).
Meaning relations between a written text and natural environment 
may also have different intensity. Written text may be open and 
include descriptions o f the author’s experiences o f different places as 
well as various cultural and literary references. But a nature essay can 
also be a closed text that relates to some specific place in such a way 
that it is not possible to understand it fully without knowing the 
depicted place. Because o f the specific relationship with the local 
environment, nature-text is characterized by locality, understood as 
“the characteristic o f semiotic structures by which they merge into 
their surroundings in such a way that they cannot be separated from 
their environment without significantly altering their structure or 
information contained in this structure” (M aran 2002: 70). This 
property o f nature essays may become noticeable for instance during 
the process o f translation, where references in the text to the local 
natural environment may show remarkable resistance to the trans­
lator’s efforts.
Arguments for including natural environment 
in the analysis
Such a theoretical approach to nature writing may raise questions as to 
what is the essence o f this other part that remains outside of the 
written text, and on what grounds can this natural structure be taken as 
a part of an object for semiotic research. These questions are 
connected with our capabilities to become related to and to interpret 
nature, both as humans in our everyday practices and as researchers on 
a meta-level. Some answers to these questions can be found from the 
tradition ol Iartu semiotics. In general, in the Tartu-M oscow  semiotic
school not much attention was paid to the natural environment. 
Semiotics in Tartu developed as a part o f the European semiological 
tradition and thus considered literature and culture to be its primary 
research object. Also the distinction between culture and things 
outside it, which became one o f the central constructs o f the Tartu- 
Moscow semiotic school, probably impeded a constructive approach 
to the physical environment. In some interpretations o f Tartu-M oscow 
semiotics this distinction has also been expressed as the opposition o f 
culture and nature (Sonesson 2000). At the same time, another central 
concept of the Tartu-M oscow semiotic school, the notion o f  text, was 
understood so generally that in certain conditions it could also include 
some parts o f the natural environment. Juri Lotman and his colleagues 
understood the notion o f text ambivalently and broadly, defining it not 
by written form or linear structure, but rather on the basis o f operating 
and functioning in culture. Text is something that has specific 
meaning from the point of view of the carrier o f culture and has 
integral function from the point o f view of the investigator o f culture 
(and it is thus simultaneously the concept o f the object level and meta­
level; see Ivanov et al. 1998: 65). Such view allows national costu­
mes, pieces o f music and paintings to be considered as texts, given 
that these are used, understood and valued in culture. Also parts o f the 
natural environment can act as texts if there is a custom in the given 
culture to interact with nature’s structures in a way that they become 
distinctly meaningful in culture.13
In Estonian culture the existence o f many semi-natural plant 
communities such as wooded meadows and coastal meadows (that 
persist only with the mild but continuous influence o f human culture, 
see Kull 2001), strong tradition o f nature writing and nature films, and 
rich folklore about natural phenomena give evidence about the 
culture’s practice to be meaningfully related to the natural environ­
ment (for overview, see Maran, Tüür 2005). Such valuation o f nature
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Anti Randviir distinguishes in his article “Loodus ja tekst: tähendus//jUbse 
tekitamine” between speaking about nature as text metaphorically and texts that 
exist in nature. Into the latter category, Randviir puts phenomena that can be read: 
“read in the sense that because o f our (cultural) experience we can set some limits 
of interpretation to them and can very probably evaluate their semiotic nature (and 
origin) [lugeda selles mõttes, et me oskame tänu oma (kultuurilisele) kogemusele 
neile seada mingisugused tõlgenduspiirid ning oletada küllaltki suure tõe­
näosusega nende märgilist päritolu (ja märgilist loomust)]” (Randviir 2000: 141).
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could also be the best proof that, at least in Estonian culture, it is 
reasonable to consider the natural environment as a textual entity.
A representative o f younger generation o f the Tartu-Moscow 
semiotic school, Mikhail B. Yampolsky has written about natural or 
physiognomic text that is expressed as relations between the part of 
culture that is fixed into conventional language and the real world. 
Such text is created according to Yampolsky in the language of 
physically justified connections. He notes that interpretation o f natural 
or physiognomic text is problematic, because o f the absence of an 
effective code for reading (Yampolsky 1989: 62-63). At the same 
time it seems that for the semioticians o f the Tartu-M oscow school, a 
phenomenon in culture does not need to be decoded or even decodable 
in order to acquire the status o f text:
utterances circulating in a collective but not understood by it are attributed 
textual meaning, as occurs with fragments o f phrases and texts brought from 
another culture, inscriptions left by a population that has already disappeared 
from a region, ruins o f buildings o f  unknown purpose, or statements 
introduced from another closed social group, for instance, the discourse of 
doctors as perceived by patient. (Lotman, Pjatigorskij 1977: 129)
Natural environment is similar to foreign cultural texts, which are 
imported or carried over from another culture, or to historical texts, 
which have been long forgotten and then retrieved. In the case of 
foreign cultural texts a specific addresser may be unknown, their code 
is often unfamiliar and as such they tend to bring along cultural 
polyglotism (see Ivanov et al. 1998: 44); the same seems to apply to 
nature as text. Meaningful relations with the natural environment often 
take place in the form o f a communicational situation where the 
specific addresser is unknown or is absent altogether, or where addres­
ser and addressee are principally different by belonging to different 
species.14
Here it is relevant to introduce the argumentation by British educa­
tion theorist and semiotician Andrew Stables according to which, in
Similarly to the endeavor o f the present article to use the concept o f text for 
studying culture-nature relations, Kalevi Kull has also recognized the need to 
widen the notion of text proceeding from the Tartu-Moscow semiotic school. In 
biosemiotic paradigm he has proposed the term biotext, understood as an 
organism’s ability to interpret sign processes taking place inside itself (Kull 2002:
modern literary theory the position o f author is anyhow blurred and 
that makes it possible to open the concept o f text up also to natural 
phenomena. Writings by Roland Barthes, Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
others have engendered the view that instead o f personal authorship 
the meanings o f texts are socially or culturally constructed. Stables 
notes, that in landscapes the network o f shared meanings extends 
beyond human sphere and that it is difficult to make a distinction 
between the creative activities o f humans, other life forms and natural 
forces (Stables 1997). From such a viewpoint, natural environment 
can be understood to be a result o f  common creative activity, 
“written” by individuals o f many different species, each proceeding 
from their own sign system, umwelt, and life activities. Some o f those 
authors, such as beavers and ants shape landscape to a remarkable 
degree and make changes that influence the habitats o f many other 
species, humans included. Also tracks o f wild animals in the 
landscape, which connect drinking places, feeding areas, and resting 
places, are part of environmental scripture. Although the descriptions 
of such changes in the environment and the names o f animals that 
have caused these are attributed by human culture, one must admit 
that ant nests and beaver dams in themselves are the creation and self- 
expression o f animal authors.
In many cases the living activities o f different organisms merge in 
the environment in a way that makes it very difficult to distinguish the 
contributions o f different species in it. As such, nature becomes a 
medium or interface, which different living beings read and where 
they write into. The example o f such collective creation o f environ­
ment is forest. Life cycles o f different organisms in forests combine in 
complicated ways; some species form habitats for others, the decay o f 
some organisms becomes food and source material for others, and so 
on. Forest is full o f information and communicative relationships, 
which, related to the topic o f this article, brings up the question o f 
how people read forests, what aspects o f it they are able to interpret 
and how.
To understand the specific interpretation and communication 
practices that humans use for communicating to and relating with 
nature, the concept o f zoosemiotic modeling by Thomas A. Sebeok 
may turn out to be useful. Sebeok presented this model as a criticism 
of the distinction o f semiotic modeling systems made in the T artu- 
Moscow semiotic school. As is well known, the Tartu-M oscow
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school has considered natural language to be the primary modeling 
system. Complex cultural phenomena (literature, art, music, film, 
myth, religion) are regarded as secondary modeling systems, because 
these are derived from and built upon natural language (e.g., Lotman 
2000: 47-48). Thomas A. Sebeok has argued against such categori­
zation, claiming that natural language is both ontogenetically and 
phylogenetically preceded by yet another modeling system —  the- 
world-as-perceived, where signs are distinguished by the organism’s 
species-specific sensory apparatus and nervous system and aligned 
with its behavioral resources and motor events (Sebeok 1988: 73-74). 
According to Sebeok, humans possess two mutually sustaining 
modeling systems —  the anthroposemiotic verbal, which is unique to 
the human species, and the zoosemiotic nonverbal, which unites us 
with the world o f nonhuman animals. The existence o f a primary 
zoosemiotic modeling system is hard to notice for humans, because 
we are bom into it (which makes it self-evident) and also because it is 
later to a large extent overwritten by the system o f conventional 
meanings. The existence and properties o f the-world-as-perceived 
become, however, more apparent if the perceptual possibilities and 
communication systems o f different species are studied. Direct and 
spatial perceptions, tactile and olfactory sensations as well as many 
occurrences o f nonverbal communication between humans belong to 
the sphere o f nonverbal modeling. Language resources are often 
insufficient for describing these kinds o f phenomena, but it is certainly 
possible (and this is often done) to express these kinds o f sensations 
by textual means.
Concerning nature writing such view regards writers and readers as 
two-sided creatures: as cultural beings, we are capable o f cognition, 
language and literary expression but on the other hand as biological 
organisms, we are capable o f immediate perception o f natural 
phenomena through our senses and o f participation in the nature’s web 
o f relations and meanings. As embodied sensual creatures we humans 
communicate with other living beings and natural environments by 
means o f sounds, sights, scents and touches, bodily movements and all 
corresponding perceptions. As intellectual beings we are able to 
discern and describe these sensations, to convey and valuate these in 
writing. The distinction between two modeling systems has also an 
inner dimension in the form o f understanding our own bodily proces­
ses and verbalizing these. Mental states with biological background,
such as anxiety, fear, affection and fury are also important motives for 
literary imagination. The questions about one’s own inner feelings, 
desires and phobias, that can be summarized as a quest to understand 
one’s inner nature has been a backbone for many classical novels.
Nature writing that relates to immediate environmental experiences 
is probably the most suitable material for studying traces o f such 
zoosemiotic modeling. The attention o f the researcher can turn here to 
the perceptual properties o f humans as biological species, to the ways 
how one can relate perceptually and bodily with the environment and 
to the possibilities to express these experiences. Zoosemiotic 
nonverbal modeling enables communicative relations between humans 
and animals, as it relies on biological foundations that are common to 
humans and many animals (Sebeok 1990). Similarities, which make 
the occurrence of meaningful relations between humans and animals 
possible, lie in morphology (bilateral symmetry, positions o f limbs, 
body and face), perception (concordance in sense organs, communi­
cation channels and diapasons), basic needs and dispositions (need for 
food, water, shelter, avoidance o f accidents, pain and death), being 
subjected to the same physical forces (gravity), inhabiting the same 
environment and relating with it, etc.
Nature writing as regarded through 
the concept of nature-text: some ethical implications
If we agree with the arguments given above that it is reasonable to 
consider natural environment as being textual and related to written 
texts, then this may lead to some questions about the effects that this 
new type of relation may have on nature writing and its research. 
These implications apply to some degree also to other texts o f culture 
that develop close contact with natural environment such as nature 
documentaries, folk knowledge about the nature, environmental art 
and others. First, it seems that understanding nature writing in the 
framework o f natural environment, written text, author and reader 
opens up new possibilities to define nature writing. This is so because 
of the changed position o f nature writing —  a written text that is 
related through meaning relations to a part o f natural environment, 
carries out two processes: it communicates nature and at the same time 
it values nature through that communication.
Towards an integrated methodology o f ecosemiotics 287
288 Timo Maran
Durine each writing act choices are made among alternative 
experiences, reflections, imaginations, and ideas and the results of 
those choices are fixed in the linear sequences o f  words. This is 
especially so because o f a multitude o f events, stories, perceptions and 
sign systems present in nature compared to the relatively constrained 
scope of a nature essay. As these choices made determine what will 
and what will not be communicated in human culture, writing activity 
inevitably becomes decision making concerning the values in culture. 
At a higher cultural level also, nature writing as a phenomenon can be 
seen as a possible value decision o f culture. By changing individual 
experiences o f the author to become a part o f wider experience of 
culture, nature writing becomes a strategy for regarding and valuing 
nature. Writing about nature is simultaneously a recognition that 
nature as such is worth writing and talking about. If nature is under­
stood as being composed o f various um weiten and semiotic spheres, 
which are foreign and partly inaccessible to humans, then every nature 
essay turns out to be an attempt to raise these natural foreign semiotic 
spheres above the interpretation threshold o f human culture. 
Therefore, according to the concept o f nature-text, nature writing 
could be understood as an aesthetical expression o f the appreciation of 
the foreign semiotic spheres o f nature.
Another conclusion that can be derived from regarding nature 
writing as nature-text relates to the position o f nature writing in 
culture. This thought can be expressed as the combination o f genera­
lity and specificity (also as a combination o f intelligibility and 
unintelligibility) o f nature essays. Existence o f intense meaning con­
nections between the written text and the natural environment 
determines significantly the possibilities for interpreting nature essays. 
On one hand the strong relationship with the processes and pheno­
mena of the natural environment makes the structure o f the nature 
essay more predictable than it is in belletristic writings. Movement in 
nature, encounters with different animals, names and descriptions of 
various organisms, their life and behavior, climate conditions, 
seasonal changes and personal recollections o f experiences in nature 
are the most common elements for compiling nature essays.
On the other hand the adequate interpretation o f the nature essay is 
only possible if the reader has a nature experience that is at least to 
some extent similar to that o f the author. If the nature experience of 
the reader is very different from that o f the author or is absent
altogether, then many meaning connections that point in the written 
text to the natural environment remain inaccessible to the reader. The 
marginal position o f nature writing in contemporary culture (as is the 
case in Estonian culture) seems to derive from that peculiarity of 
nature writing. For the modem day urbanized reader access to the 
natural environment is inhibited both physically and semiotically 
through negligence and lack o f knowledge about nature’s forms o f 
being, various signs, and communication processes within it. In such a 
situation the nature writing that presupposes competence o f inter­
preting and relating two types o f text —  written text and textual 
natural environment —  remains feasible to few readers. Works o f 
nature writing become closed texts and common consciousness o f 
culture ignores them as unimportant or nonexistent. At the same time 
the writers and readers o f nature writing form a small but quite well 
established and homogeneous group (for instance in the Estonian 
tradition there are a few authors, who, besides nature essays, also 
write belles-lettres). In addition to attachment to nature, also the 
mutually supporting effect o f the two types o f text may contribute to 
the formation o f such a group —  nature writing leads readers to 
experience nature directly without any literary mediation, and personal 
nature experiences o f individuals direct them back to nature writing to 
find out about similar experiences o f other people.
Conclusions
An important background and support for developing ecosemiotic 
views is the understanding that the ecological approach itself is not 
alien to semiotics, but is in fact present in the foundations of 
semiotics. Besides explicitly ecosemiotic writings, the communication 
models by Roman Jakobson and Thomas A. Sebeok, the contextual 
thinking of Gregory Bateson and works o f authors o f language 
philosophy and translation studies can also turn out to be useful for 
enriching semiotics with the ecological perspective.
Ecosemiotic itself has several roots and interpretations. The most 
important o f these are biological and cultural ecosemiotics that follow 
the dividing line between American pragmatist semiotics and Euro­
pean semiology. As ecosemiotics endeavors to study both semiosic 
activity in nature and its cultural representations, this divide becomes
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particularly distressing. Riste Keskpaik has described the main goal o f 
ecosemiotics as solving communication problems between humans 
and nature. This essential task can only be fulfilled if  ecosemiotics 
studies nature’s representations in culture, semiosic activities as they 
take place in nature itself, and what may be most important, pays 
attention to the ways how these two are interrelated. The present 
article discusses the possibilities for using the legacy o f  T artu- 
M oscow semiotic school for developing ecosemiotics. The concept o f 
nature-text is introduced as a methodological possibility to overcome 
the gap between cultural and biological ecosemiotics. Describing the 
ways in which nature is represented in culture in the same framework 
with semiosic activities o f nature itself may help us to pinpoint the 
problems in our communicative relations with it, and maybe even 
explicate possibilities for the restoration o f concordance.15
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К проблеме синтеза методологии экосемиотики: 
понятие текста природы
Цель статьи — разработка экосемиотики в плане практического ме­
тода анализа. Для этого сначала рассматривается связь значения и 
контекста как имманентно содержащаяся в семиотике возможность 
экосемиотического подхода,. Затем анализируются разные перспек­
тивы в экосемиотике с помощью описания биологической и культур­
ной экосемиотики и критического перечитывания трудов Винфрида 
Нёта и Калеви Кулля. Автор подчеркивает необходимость комбини­
рования этих экосемиотических подходов таким образом, чтобы 
возникающий синтез как учитывал семиотичностъ самой природы, 
так и умел анализировать изображение природы в написанных текс­
тах Для этого создается модель текста природы, которая объединяет 
написанный текст и природное окружение, связанные между собой 
механизмом означивания. Для поддержки концепции текста приро-
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школы, которые достаточно широки, чтобы охватить семиотическую 
активность и созидание среды не только человека, но и других 
живых существ. В конце статьи концепция текста природы исполь­
зуется для определения понятия «литературы, описывающей приро­
ду» в качестве признания человеком чуждой ему семиотической 
сферы и для объяснения маргинальное™ литературы о природе, 
обосновывая это необходимостью интерпретации двух разных типов 
текстов.
Ö kosem iootika m etodoloogia sünteesi poole: loodusteksti mõiste
Artikli eesmärgiks on ökosemiootika edendamine praktilise analüüsi- 
meetodi suunas. Selleks tutvustatakse esmalt tähenduse ja  konteksti seost 
kui semiootikas immanentselt sisalduvat võimalust ökoloogiliseks vaa­
teks. Seejärel analüüsitakse erinevaid perspektiive ökosemiootikas, kiijel- 
dades bioloogilist ja  kultuurilist ökosemiootikat ning lugedes kriitiliselt 
W. Nöthi ja  K. Kulli käsitlusi. Autor rõhutab vajadust kombineerida neid 
ökosemiootilisi lähenemisi viisil, et tekkiv süntees arvestaks ühtaegu nii 
looduse enda semiootilisust kui suudaks ka analüüsida looduse kujutamist 
kirjutatud tekstides. Selle eesmärgi täitmiseks tutvustatakse loodusteksti 
mudelit, mis ühendab kahte tähendusseoste läbi seotud osapoolt — 
kiijutatud teksti ja looduskeskkonda. Loodusteksti kontseptsiooni toe­
tuseks tutvustatakse Tartu-Moskva koolkonna semiootikute tekstikäsit- 
lusi, mis on piisavalt avarad hõlmamaks peale inimeste ka teiste elus­
olendite semiootilist aktiivsust ja  keskkonnaloomet. Artikli lõpus kasuta­
takse loodusteksti kontseptsiooni, et määratleda looduskirjandust kui 
inimese jaoks võõrsemiootilise sfääri tunnustust ning selgitada loodus- 
kirjanduse marginaalsust, põhjendades seda kahe eri tekstitüübi inter­
pretatsioon i vaj adusega.
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Gathering in Biosemiotics 6, Salzburg 2006
Günther Wit zany, Maricela Yip1
The sixth Gathering in Biosemiotics w as organized in Salzburg, Austria, by 
Günther Witzany and W olfgang Hofkirchner.3 Fifty-eight scientists from 
various scientific fields like philosophy, system s theory, sem iotics, linguis­
tics, semantics, mathematics, statistics, psychology, physics, m edicine, b io­
chemistry, em bryology, molecular biology, m icrobiology, cell b iology, gene­
tics, epigenetics, evolutionary biology, zoology , m ycology and botany parti­
cipated.
Introduction
Biosem iotics is a transdisciplinary science w hich investigates sign processes 
(sem ioses) within and among living organisms with theoretical and empirical 
studies. The signs used underlay three levels o f  sem iotic rules. Syntactic rules 
govern combinatorial possibilities, be they physical, chem ical, spatial, 
temporal, or rhythmical. Pragmatic rules govern interactions and interactional 
contexts like growth, developm ent, defence or mating. Semantic rules depend 
on their contextual use, i.e. sem antics is v isib le in the specific function o f  
signs which represent their meaning.
Individuals in populations share a com m on repertoire o f  signs and rules. 
This is valid also at the level o f  cell b iology. Dependent on the context o f  use 
the same signs and sequences o f  signs may have different informational 
content. Therefore it can be understood that from the same genetic dataset it is
1 Address: Günther Witzany, telos —  Philosophische Praxis, Vogelsangstraße 
18c, A -5111-Bürmoos, Salzburg, Austria; e-mail: witzany@sbg.at.
2 Address: Maricela Yip, ICT&S Center, University o f Salzburg, Sigmund- 
Haffner-Gasse 18, 5020, Salzburg, Austria; e-mail: maricela.yip@sbg.ac.at.
3 W Hofkirchner is from the Center for Advanced Studies and Research in 
Information and Communication Technologies & Society (ICT&S), University o f  
Salzburg, Austria.
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possible to produce different cell types according to different methylation  
patterns o f  the chrom osom e for different needs.
B iosem iotics investigates not only sign processes within and am ong cells  
but also im m unological, neuronal or hormonal sign sequences. For many 
biosem ioticians life starts with sign processes and v ice versa (H offm eyer 
1996; Kull 1999; Barbieri 2001; Markos 2002; Em m eche, H offm eyer 2005; 
W itzany 1993; 2000; 2006). Until recently biosem iotic terms w ere view ed as 
mere metaphorics by molecular b iology, genetics, ecology and evolutionary 
biology because o f  the conviction that they could be replaced com pletely by 
chem ical and physical descriptions. The hardly bridgeable gap between 
chem ical-physical and b iosem iotic descriptions allow  biosem iotics a clear 
distinction betw een life and non-life or as Howard Pattee (2005: 321) said: 
“Life is distinguished from the nonliving world by its dependence on signs”. 
B iosem iotics therefore broadens our understanding o f  all biological proces­
ses. Life processes depend not solely on physical/chem ical changes but 
additionally on com m unication and information processing which are deter­
mined by sem iotic rules w hich are coherent with but different to natural laws. 
Their success or failure decides the growth, developm ent, disease or death o f  
all living beings.
Pre-programme: Biosemiotics in transdisciplinary contexts
To g ive a broader audience the possibility o f  getting in contact with biosem io­
tics the organizers Günther Witzany and W olfgang Hofkirchner initiated a 
pre-programme, one day before the official start o f  the Gatherings with 
experts, in several cases non-sem ioticians, w ho presented their theoretical and 
empirical work with strong relation to biosem iotics.
After the introduction given by W olfgang Hofkirchner, Jesper Hoffmeyer 
(Copenhagen, Denmark) opened with an analysis o f  the work o f  Gregory 
Bateson, one o f  the forerunners o f  b iosem iotics. Frantisek Baluska (Bonn, 
Germany) reported about “neurobiological” com m unication in plants: with 
synapse-like cell-cell-com m unication plants can use a kind o f  signal-trans- 
m ission system  which enables them to develop a great variety o f  behaviours 
also in their sessile  lifestyle. Peter Barlow (Bristol, England) explained a 
model (L-system s) o f  constructing algorithms which could represent 
succession states recognized as proceeding from the tw o ‘pillars’ o f  living  
organization -  metabolism and m orphology. His model proposed to look at 
the sem iotic contexts o f  these “living” algorithms. Randy Jirtle (Durham. 
U SA ), one o f  the pioneers in epigenetic research, reported on his break­
through research success when they detected genom ic sequences which are 
inherited either paternally or maternally. So they could prove that special 
parental feeding behaviours can influence and change genom ic expression
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patterns o f  descendents. Kalevi K ull’s (Tartu, Estonia) contribution showed a 
com m on feature o f  sem iotics and biosemiotics: the ability to study qualitative 
diversity. B iosem iotics could be a new approach for better understanding o f  
sem iotic selves in non-human living beings and their comm unicative 
identities covering all biological species, social groups and even perceptual 
categories. Günther W itzany’s (Salzburg, Austria) talk focused on recent 
research on virology. So-called “junk-D N A ” which has been thought to be 
useless remnants o f  former evolutionary stages and which represent 97% o f  
the human genom e are now being recognized as higher order regulatory 
domains which regulate transcription, replication, repair and recombination in 
all detailed steps and substeps. They descended most likely from viruses with 
persistent non-lytic lifestyle which use genom es o f  cellular life forms as a 
comfortable life habitat and organize host genom e syntax according to their 
needs and those o f  their host organisms.
In the afternoon Nikolaus Bresgen (Salzburg, Austria) demonstrated the 
complex phenomenon o f apoptosis, that success or failure o f  all cell signalling 
processes depends on the context in which these signals are used. Erich 
Hamberger (Salzburg, Austria) focused on som e transdisciplinary remarks o f  
biosemiotics in the relationship o f  word, sign and signal dependent on their 
(bio-) cultural background in which this relation is comm on use. Therefore also 
on the cellular level similar functions can be analysed like transduction, trans­
mission and signalling. Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski (Berlin, Germany) developed a 
non-mechanistic but semiotically inspired informational theoretic perspective 
on biotic information processing especially for som e ethical aspects. Donald  
Favareau (Singapore) looked at animal sensing, acting and knowing and 
suggested the Peircian levels o f  signs (icon, index, sym bol) to be appropriate 
tools for investigating animal perceptual worlds and to reconstruct a human 
knowledge generating hierarchy o f  sign relations. Albert Duschl (Salzburg, 
Austria) referred to the evolution and mechanisms o f  m ixed analogue/digital 
information processing in living cells according to an information theoretical 
perspective which looks at living organisms as information processing “living 
computers”. John Collier (Durban, South Africa) suggested a system s biological 
approach for a better foundation o f  biosem iotics. According to the model o f  
Robert Rosen’s systems theory, Collier suggested to understand certain living 
processes in a mechanistic perspective rather than needing sem iotic analyses. 
Ingolf Schmid-Tannwald (Munich, Germany) tried to integrate sem iotic aspects 
in a systems theoretical realm.
Programme
The mam programme o f  the Gathering was separated into s e v e n je e t io n . We 
w ill report selected exam ples. The start,ng sect,on was Semanncs
Biosemiotics with contributions on the emergence and generation o f  meaning  
functions in living entities. M arcello Barbieri (Ferrara, Italy) started with his 
m odel o f  the em ergence o f  the genetic code as being independent o f  
contextual needs whereas the later steps o f  sequence order and the em ergence 
o f  a great variety o f  other biotic codes have been context-dependent. In the 
section Methods o f  Biosemiotics four talks suggested how  biosem iotic  
m ethodology could be developed. Kalevi Kull (Tartu, Estonia) presented a 
clarifying overview  on m ethodological presuppositions and differentiations o f  
biosem iotics in contrast to non-biosem iotic perspectives. Peter Harries-Jones 
(Toronto, Canada) suggested the installation o f  an editorial group for bio­
sem iotics at W ikipedia. In the section Semiotics in Biosemiotics Donald Fava- 
reau (Singapore) suggested in his contribution to choose a unique vocabulary 
for b iosem iotic studies in using the Peircian icon, index and symbol.
The second day o f  the official programme started with six talks in the 
section Applied Biosemiotics with Argyris A m ellos (Athens, Greece) with a 
biosem iotic analysis o f  the functions o f  the serotonin-com plex. A lm o Farina 
(Urbino, Italy) presented his eco-field  hypothesis and its relevance for 
humans to understand resources and functions o f  cultural landscapes. 
Toshiyuki Nakajima (Matsuyama, Japan) spoke about exchange o f  genetic 
elem ents and their relevance for evolutionary processes. Günther Witzany 
(Salzburg, Austria) developed an applied b iosem iotics o f  fungi for the first 
time and gave an overview  about all levels o f  rule-governed sign-mediated 
interactions within and among fungal organisms. In the afternoon a broader 
section focused on Biosemiotics and Information Theory. In several contribu­
tions different concepts were presented o f  the term “information” and its 
relation to b iosem iotics. Pierre Madl (Salzburg, Austria) and Maricela Yip 
(Salzburg, Austria) demonstrated recent results o f  research on bio-photonics 
and its relevance for a non-linear view  o f  living processes.
The last day started with the session on Evolution, Development and Sign 
Functions. Marcella Faria (Säo Paulo, Brazil) reported about sign-processes 
in metabolism, cell-cycles, cell-developm ent, neuronal comm unication and 
the im m une-system . Randy Jirtle (Durham, U SA ) demonstrated the pre­
dictability o f  disease susceptibility depending on epigenetic induced changing 
expression patterns o f  the genetic code which have been changed by different 
nutritional behaviour. Mario Gimona (Santa Maria Imbaro, Italy) presented 
his concept o f  protein linguistics as a grammar for protein assem blies which  
could be a synergetic concept in the field o f  applied biosem iotics. The 
afternoon session focused on Biosemiotics and Mind Models with various 
concepts o f  consciousness, mind and language. Robert Logan (Toronto, 
Canada) introduced a new definition o f  “information” which clarified the 
interdependence o f  the em ergence o f  languages and cultures in non-human 
living nature as w ell as in human life.
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Summary
This congress show ed clearly that the great variety o f  disciplines which have 
been represented by the participants could focus easily on diverse aspects o f  
biotic sign processes. This seem ed to be a unifying perspective in contrast to 
other disciplines which are less able to develop a comm on repertoire o f  
m ethodological, theoretical and empirical realms of investigations. The ex ­
change o f  concepts, ideas, opinions and perspectives was less dogmatic and 
more transdisciplinary which was expressed also by leading biologists. This 
could lead to a new perspective on living nature and therefore to changing the 
relationship o f  humans and non-human life in general and in detail. The full 
programme and all o f  the abstracts can be downloaded at the congress 
website.4
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The 7th Gathering in 
Biosemiotics —  a review
Yair Neuman1
In a post-modern era in which the fragmentation o f  know ledge is evident in 
every academic field, the attempt to gain a m eta-perspective seem s like an old 
anachronistic venture. However, an emerging new field o f  inquiry seem s to 
challenge this fashionable dogma. B iosem iotics is a field o f  inquiry that seeks 
to understand a variety o f  biological phenomena as sign-m ediated processes. 
For example, to understand biological phenomena, such as immune recogni­
tion or genetic coding, as biological processes constituted by signs and their 
communication.
Biosem iotics is a field with a Janus face. On one hand, it is an antiquarian 
field which is nurtured by the sem iotic tradition o f  scholars such as Peirce, 
Uexkiill, and Bakhtin. On the other hand, it is a field that seeks to address the 
challenges o f  modem biology. In this sense, biosem iotics is deeply rooted in 
the past but tries to avoid anachronism and irrelevance by addressing current 
challenges. This is not a sim ple task since it forces the scholars operating 
within the biosem iotics community to delicately resonate betw een old 
semiotic terminology and current scientific know ledge, and to point to the 
benefits o f  conceptualizing biological phenomena from a sem iotic perspec­
tive. This task is under the continuous threat o f  falling into obscure jargon and 
o f  “name calling”. Indeed, if  biosem iotics wants to establish its status as a 
serious field o f  inquiry it w ill have to prove the advantages o f  approaching 
biological phenomena from a sem iotic perspective, and to convince main­
stream biology that this advantage exceeds the boundaries o f  language-gam es 
played by a closed group o f  scholars.
These challenges attracted a group o f  researchers who participated in the 
7th B iosem iotics Gathering.2 The gathering took place at the University o f
1 Address: Yair Neuman, Office for Interdisciplinary Research, Ben-Gurion 
University o f the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel, 84105; e-mail: yneuman@bgu.ac.il.
2 The earlier Gatherings in Biosemiotics took place in Copenhagen (2001, 
2003) Tartu (2002), Prague (2004), Urbino (2005), and Salzburg (2006). See also 
Em m eche 2001; Kull 2002a, 2002b; Witzany, Yip 2007a, 2007b.
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Groningen under the kind hospitality o f Prof. Barend van Heusden from the 
department o f  Comparative Literature, from June 6 to June 9, 2007. The 
participants celebrated the publication o f  the first book in the new book series 
dedicated to b iosem iotics (published by Springer) and were informed that 
Springer w ill launch the new Journal o f  Biosemiotics under the lead o f  the 
editor, Prof. M arcello Barbieri from the U niversity o f  Ferrara. H ow ever, the 
m ost important thing in the Gathering was the stimulating presentations and 
the passionate intellectual discussions that accom panied them. A s an 
interdisciplinary researcher who has participated in many different conferen­
ces, I found the B iosem iotics Gatherings to be one o f  the most intellectually 
stimulating environm ents I have ever encountered. These are not conventional 
social/political conferences o f  academics that com e to show  them selves, 
shake hands with journal editors, to promote their doctoral students or to 
create alignments with colleagues for getting research grants. The B io­
sem iotics Gathering was a rare occasion in w hich scholars w ho love to think 
together gather to passionately discuss their ideas. This unique atmosphere is 
evident in the interdisciplinary nature o f  the participants. Although the main 
concern o f  biosem iotics is with biological system s, the participants extend 
this basic sense to include in their studies phenomena from other fields to 
include psychology and literature. Covering in a short academic review all o f  
the presentations is an im possible task and therefore I decided to present some 
highlights that reflect only my personal taste. W hile the Biosem iotics 
Gatherings involve a core o f  people who regularly participate in the 
gatherings, I decided to open my presentations’ survey with the newcomers.
Victoria N. Alexander, an American scholar and novelist, is a co-founder 
and director o f  the Dactyl Foundation for the Arts & Humanities, in New  
York City. In her dissertation Alexander has investigated chance and 
teleology in narrative by writers like Saul B ellow , Henry James, Milan 
Kundera, Vladimir N abokov, and C. S. Peirce. In her presentation she 
discussed the way teleology is associated with em ergence and these are 
associated with poetics. The second newcom er to the gathering was Charles 
Goodwin, a leading linguist from University o f  California, Los A ngeles, who 
gave an inspiring talk about the way in which language, human action and 
cognition constitute situations o f  activity from g irls’ play to the work o f  
archeologists. Cognition, as Goodwin suggests, exists in the multiplicities o f  
sign modalities: language, gestures and intonation. The attempt to locate 
cognition in a wider sem iotic context was the subject o f  another talk by 
Stephen J. C ow ley, a psychologist from the UK. C ow ley presented the thesis 
that infants use sem iosis to organize their experience and elaborated on this 
topic from his recent publications.
Am ong the “core” biosem ioticans, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Claus Emmeche, 
and Frederik Stjemfelt, all from the University o f  Copenhagen, gave talks that 
concerned the meaning o f  biosem iotics from a wider perspective. H offm eyer  
reemphasized the meaning and importance o f  biosem iotics; Em m eche, a
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philosopher o f  science, reflected on biosem iotics and biological sciences from 
a Kuhnian perspective; and Stjemfelt pointed to the roots o f  biosem iotics in 
German thought. Other presentations aimed to point at the alternative 
biosem iotics may provide to mainstream biology. M arcello Barbieri passio­
nately argued for the relevance o f  biosem iotics by discussing the evo-devo  
case and Kalevi Kull, a naturalist and the head o f  the Sem iotics Department at 
the University o f  Tartu (Estonia), made the radical statement that bio­
sem iotics can serve as an alternative to (neo)Darwinism.
Som e talks discussed more specific applications o f  biosem itics. Yagmur 
Denizhan, a professor o f  Electrical Engineering and a polymath from the 
University o f  Bogazi<pi (Turkey), presented the case o f  magnetotactic bacteria 
as a case study for a biosem iotic description. Marcella Faria, a biochem ist 
from the University o f  Sao Paulo (Brazil) examined the non-coding status o f  
some D NA  sequences through a biosem iotics perspective and illustrated how  
this perspective may better explain the role o f  these structural features in the 
context o f  a w hole “meaning making” organism. A lm o Farina, a landscape 
ecologist from the University o f  Urbino (Italy), discussed the “sound-scape” 
o f birds, as a landscape o f  meaning which is crucial for understanding birds’ 
activity.
What can we leam from this partial list o f  presentations? The first lesson  
which is rather trivial is that biosem iotics is still a young interdisciplinary 
field o f  inquiry which is seeking its way in the academic world. The second  
lesson is that biosem iotics is one o f  the few  serious alternatives to mechanical 
biology. As such, it is a venture worth pursuing.
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